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THE PAGE 
ii. 
SUMMARY OF THESIS 
The thesis argues that in their development, organization 
and news services, the major western-based global news 
agencies have responded and continue to respond primarily 
to the requirements of western markets. In particular, 
their domestic markets are shown to be especially 
important to them, and much of their early development 
is explained by their struggle to secure monopolistic or 
oligopolistic control of these markets. The struggle 
to, achieve security in the domestic markets greatly 
tempered early international competition between the 
agencies in a way that still has consequences for their 
relative market positions in certain world regions, and 
which has. hindered their penetration of one another's 
domestic markets. Nevertheless, growing international 
competition, general difficulties in traditional domestic 
newspaper markets and the evolution of new client require- 
ments have combined to stimulate considerable market 
diversification in recent decades, both inside and outside 
media client groups. Within their traditional overseas 
markets, the global agencies, in their organization of 
news-gathering and news-distribution, have made consider- 
able use of the national news agencies. . 
The global 
agencies have stimulated the development of many such 
agencies, entering into relationships of unequal exchange 
with them, while only marginally threatened by the attempts 
of some national agencies to upset the dominant market 
iii 
position of their global partners. The thesis provides 
evidence of contemporary agency organization, news-gathering 
practices and news-service content in order to support 
the argument that there continues to exist a structural 
imbalance in agency operations which favours western 
market interests, and to further explore the underlying 





This study was mainly written up between the winters of 
1974-5 and 1975-6 on the basis of research undertaken 
for the most part between the summers of 1971 and 1975. 
The study was funded by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust 
in response to the application of Jeremy Tunstall and 
Dr. Ken Thompson of the Open University. I was appointed 
Research Officer for the duration of the project. Most 
of the work for the following report and all the respons- 
ibility is mine, but I am indebted to many colleagues 
for assistance, and in particular to Hazel Grayson for 
her perseverence and good humour during nine months of 
arduous content analysis; Dr. Michael Palmer of St. 
Anthony's College, Oxford, who was with the project in 
a part-time capacity for nine months, in which time he 
did a great deal of the interviewing in Paris, as well 
as contributing to the evidence on the historical devel- 
opment of AFP; Jeremy Tonstall, who conducted several 
interviews on behalf of the project, but in the course of 
his own research, in two Latin American countries, one 
African and one Asian country; Jaime Potenze for several 
interviews from one Latin American country; Denis Holt 
for supportive content analysis work, covering the New 
York Times News Service, Press Association, and Reuters 
Economic Services; Cynthia Richards who typed up the 
final manuscript with astonishing accuracy and speed. 
And I am of course indebted to the three to four hundred 
journalists, embassy and non-journalist sources, of more 
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than twenty countries across four continents, whose 
patience, accessibility and friendliness made this study 
possible. 
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Only a very few newspapers around the world, probably 
less than two dozen, could make a reasonable claim to 
independence in the matter of international news- 
gathering. Most of them are situated in a small 
handful of countries: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, one or two European countries. The 
others are wholly or at least heavily dependent on 
news agencies for, their fare of news about other 
countries. Even the newspapers which could theor- 
etically manage without the agencies, and yet still 
present a fairly comprehensive record of major world 
events, do in fact subscribe to the agencies, and at 
high cost to themselves. The more extensive their 
own international news-gathering operations, in fact, 
the greater the range of agency services to which, as 
a general rule, they subscribe. 
The newspaper as a social institution has been closely 
associated throughout its history with either the 
possibility or the actuality of political opposition 
and diversity of viewpoint. The tight control over 
the press which exists in many countries, and the 
more subtle controls which exist in many others, 
simply testify to this association, if only in a 
negative way., 
There are many factors which operate to limit 
editorial diversity of the press, even in countries 
2. 
where such diversity is highly valued. One of the most 
important factors, and one which is only beginning to 
receive the kind of attention it deserves, is the 
influence of advertising and, therefore, of market- 
orientation, upon editorial choice. Other factors 
concern government press policies, the patterns of 
newspaper ownership and control, and the kind of 
relations maintained between newspaper journalists and 
news-sources. 
The study of news agencies is inspired primarily from 
a concern for editorial diversity. If different news- 
papers, which supposedly function to represent different 
interests and opinions, tend to rely on the same news 
'wholesalers' for much of their information, even if 
they only use these organisations as 'tipsters', doesn't 
this suggest that real editorial diversity is rather 
less than implied by the existence of different 
publications? If so, it follows that the need for 
information about these external sources is all the more 
important. 
The extent of newspaper dependence on agencies has been 
documented in a number of studies, although incompletely. 
Possibly the most comprehensive study was conducted by 
the. International Press Institute (IPI) in the early 
fifties1. This showed that almost three quarters of 
all foreign news in 105 U. S. newspapers that were 
examined was supplied by the three major U. S. news 
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agencies: Associated Press (AP), United Press (UP), 
and International News Service (INS). There is no 
indication that this dependence has declined in 
subsequent years. Instead, there has been a decline 
in the number of major agencies available. In 1958, 
UP assimilated INS to form United Press International 
(UPI). There has also been an increasing tendency for 
American newspapers to subscribe to only one major news 
service2, and not simply for their fare of national and 
international news, since as one informed observer has 
estimated, more than half the newspapers published in 
state capitals take their statehouse news from agencies 
rather than maintain their own journalists on such 
coverage3. 
The 1953 UPI study drew estimates from editors of a 
number of European newspapers of the percentage of 
agency copy to total foreign news published, and these 
ranged from an average of 110% in some countries to 70% 
in others. The sample did not include editors of 
provincial or regional newspapers in Europe which, in 
almost all cases, take their supply of foreign news 
either from a national news agency which makes a 
selection of the news items it receives from the world 
agencies, or direct from a world agency. Once again, 
there is no reason to think that the situation in 
Europe has changed towards a position of greater inde- 
pendence in this respect since 1953" In Scandinavia, 
for instance, studies by Starck and Thoren in the late 
1960ts indicated heavy dependence on the four major 
4. 
western-based global agencies by the comparatively 
serious and internationally-aware national newspapers 
of Sweden and Finland4. The analysis by Galtung and 
Ruge (1968) of the coverage of three international 
crises by four Norwegian papers showed that 87% of the 
examined news items came from the same four agencies5. 
The United States and Western Europe are certainly 
amongst the world's most well-endowed areas for media 
facilities. Using data collected from the UNESCO 
study, 'World Communications', Schramm (1964) calculated 
that North America and Europe had more daily newspapers 
than all other parts of the world combined (5180 compared 
with 2840) 
6. 
The disparity has not changed remarkably 
since. In 1971 there were 4438 in the United States 
and the non-communist countries of Western Europe, and 
2705 in the three continents of South America, Africa 
and Asia (excluding China and Taiwan )7. Similar 
disparities have been recorded for broadcast media 
facilities. 
The extent of dependence on news agencies for the supply 
of foreign news, which is great even in the United States 
and Western Europe, is even greater in most other parts 
of the world. Here, only the national press of Japan 
approaches self-sufficiency in international news- 
gathering facilities among the non-communist countries. 
Other countries within this block take most of their 
news of world affairs directly or indirectly from four 
5- 
or five organisations based in the United States (AP and 
UPI), Britain (Reuters), France (Agence France Presse - 
AFP), West Germany (Deutsch Presse Agentur - DPA). In 
the communist countries the media rely heavily on such 
news services as TASS, based in Moscow, and the New China 
News Agency (NCNA) in Peking. Newspapers look to the 
news agencies not just for general news on international 
affairs, but in many cases for news of their own geo- 
political regions and occasionally for news of their own 
countries. All but one of the major world agencies are 
also national news agencies. That is, they gather news 
concerning the country in which they are based (i. e. have 
their headquarters) and distribute this news within that 
country. Some of these major agencies also act as 
domestic national news agencies for other countries in 
addition to their own. 
'Dependence' is a matter of degree of course. In the 
present context the word is used to denote fairly 
complete reliance on the news agencies as sources of 
foreign news. The typical newspaper exercises its 
editorial judgement only in so far as it decides which 
news items from the agency services it wants to print. 
It may reduce the total volume of a story it uses, and 
patch together a news story from which it has removed 
one or more paragraphs. It rarely rewrites a story in 
the creative sense, (except. -including corroboration from 
alternative sources). If it does, it is generally for 
one of two reasons. Either it disagrees with the 
6. 
implication of an agency story and wishes to locate it 
within its own value framework (e. g. an Arab newspaper 
might ignore agency references to Israeli sources which 
seemed to reduce the burden of Israeli responsibility for 
the Middle East crisis, or vice versa), or it is anxious 
to present the news story in a manner which implies that 
it is the newspaper itself, not the agency, which re- 
ported it. It is relatively rare for a newspaper to 
engage in independent checking of agency sources, or to 
supplement agency sources with material gathered by its 
own staff. Papers like the London Times, the Guardian, 
the Washington Post, Asahi Shimbun - these are the 
exceptions. The dependence of the rest is, if anything, 
increased by modern technology which allows for virtually 
automatic feed-in of agency material directly onto news- 
paper pages. Under these circumstances, creative 
independence in foreign news treatment is an economic 
liability. 
The agencies do not service newspapers merely with general 
news, and they do not merely service newspapers. Each 
of the western agencies has a specialist economic news 
service. Most important of them are Reuters Economic 
Services (RES), and Associated Press - Dow Jones which 
is run in conjunction with North America's leading 
domestic economic news agency. Both these services are 
distributed internationally, not only to media clients 
but also to non-media clients like banks, brokers, and 
commercial houses. Well over half of Reuters' revenue 
now comes from such sources. There are no similar 
7" 
organisations in the field of like scope or importance. 
The American agencies, AP and UPI, have newsphoto 
services unequalled by the European agencies or any 
other institution. UPI and Reuters, through their 
involvements with UPITN and Visnews respectively, are 
leaders in the international newsfilm field for tele- 
vision. All the major agencies sell to radio and 
television stations as well as to newspapers, and the 
American agencies have separate 'broadcast' wires 
tailored to the special needs of that market. 
The importance of the agencies to broadcast stations is 
no less than their importance to newspapers. Three 
kinds of service are provided: regular and specially 
tailored teleprinter services; audio Ivoicecasts'; 
and television newsfilm. , Many of the smaller radio 
stations in the United States use agency teleprinter 
services directly. These are the trip and read' 
radio news programmes. The anchorman rips off the news 
as it comes in on the printer and reads it out over the 
airwaves. Larger stations have their own news editorial 
staff, but the agencies remain by far the most important 
single source of international and non-local news stories. 
The same is true of television: 
"As do the other networks, NBC bases 
the bulk of its news service on the 
world-wide facilities of the AP, UP 
and Reuters. "8 
A case study of two American affiliate television 
stations found that information from some sources, 
especially from the news agencies and from press releases, 
8. 
was accepted at face value. 
"Wire services are staffed by pro- 
fessional journalists who are assumed 
to check on their stories, before 
'sending' them over the wires. Since 
most of the reported stories are too 
far removed to be verified by local 
newsmen, stories sent by wire services 
are assumed to be 'institutionally 
verified'. "9 
The agencies were identified as the most important 
basic news sources for BBC Television News by Bernard 
Adams in a recent television documentary on the subject10. 
Researching the Agencies 
Given the significance of the agencies as news sources 
for the 'retail' media, it is surprising that until 
recently these organisations have excited relatively 
little attention amongst the media scholars. The 
agencies do not enjoy the high visibility of the media 
they serve, and very often the more prestigious client 
is less likely to be generous in its acknowledgement of 
agency contributions. Agency news content is comparat- 
ively difficult to obtain. Newspaper content can 
easily be preserved, radio and television material can 
be recorded. But it is not always easy to determine 
what is agency material and what isn't in a newspaper. 
If the agencies are credited with some stories there may 
be other stories, uncredited, which are also agency 
material. What can be said about agency material 
collected from a newspaper which is truly about the 
agency and not about the selection criteria of the 
9" 
newspaper? What can be said about the public impact 
of the agencies, the effect of their reporting, if agency 
coverage reaches the public only via the newspapers served 
by the agencies? The media scholar must arrange to 
obtain agency content direct, unmediated by any newspaper 
or smaller agency. He can do this by subscribing to 
agency services, which. is not only expensive but can only 
provide him with a limited range of the total services 
put out by each agency(because not all services are 
everywhere available). Or he can go to a newspaper or 
an agency bureau and ask to pick up a complete wire or 
wires for his own use. This is often inconvenient for 
the newspaper office or the agency and they may refuse 
his request. But if they do agree, neither a newspaper 
nor an agency bureau will be able to provide more than 
one or two services. And the scholar will need several 
days' worth of material for each single wire he examines. 
His conclusions will necessarily be limited, because 
different parts of a single country, different cöuntries 
or regions, often receive different versions of the same 
basic service, or different sets of services, from a 
single agency. He has to assume that he has been 
provided with the actual services as they were initially 
distributed, not ones which have been 'doctored' in any 
way for his benefit, or which for one reason or another 
are incomplete. 
Any conclusion drawn from the basis of one or two agency 
wires must be qualified by an awareness that the material 
10 
distributed to clients is not necessarily the material 
that was transmitted by correspondents initially (material 
that is generally difficult to obtain); that the material 
received by some clients is not always the same as that 
received by others; and that clients sometimes have 
supplementary services or alternative sources of their 
own. Apart from the number of qualifications that must 
be made for each finding, a further deterrent to research 
is the sheer volume of agency output, and the tedious 
work of content analysis required to master it. 
A study of content is rather more conveniently accomplished 
than a study of the agencies as organisations, spread out 
as they are across the world. The sheer size and com- 
plexity of their operations have also acted as a deterrent 
to academic study. This geographic extensiveness on the 
other hand is sometimes accompanied by a surprising degree 
of centralization of control which can make unvetted 
enquiries awkward. 
These difficulties might have been less compelling if some 
of the glamour which surrounds, say, investigative 
reporting on the Washington Post or the Sunday Times, had 
attached itself to agency journalism. The agencies have 
always preferred a rather low profile. The public 
statements of their spokesmen are generally couched in 
a predictable philosophy of impartiality and service, 
both worthy and dull. For sexiness they refer to the 
latest technological innovations and the number of seconds 
11. 
off transmission time which these have eliminated. Such 
was the language of Baron de Reuter, part of the formula 
of success in the news agency business. For the most 
part, the agencies want to be anonymous and uncontroversial. 
Agency reporters do not get bye-lines as a rule, unless 
for very specialist reporting, of which there is relatively 
little, or under exceptional reporting circumstances. 
All this makes the agencies rather unusual amongst media. 
There are no 'stars'. There is no advertising to be 
attracted. The clientele is not a particular section 
of the market; it is a relatively sophisticated group 
of fellow media men who between them serve the whole 
market. The most striking characteristic of their 
clientele, as far as the agencies are concerned, is its 
diverse make-up. Any serious hint of obvious bias, 
or sloppy reporting, or any behaviour that contravenes 
orthodox journalistic procedure, is likely tobe bad for 
business or at least for reputation. Why should it 
want controversy? The clients (who are sometimes 
'members') do not want it for the 
agencies 
either. If 
an agency began to overshadow its client in prestige or 
appeal, that would detract from the client's own 
position and staff morale might suffer. An agency can 
be part of the furniture maybe, but not the overall decor. 
It is possible that media scholars accepted the agencies' 
definition of themselves at face value, and having done 
12. 
so decided not to take any further trouble. If so, 
things are changing. Media studies have broadened in 
recent years to include a far richer variety of facets 
than was once customary. Audience, content, organ- 
isational structure, employee characteristics and 
professional practice, sources, social and economic 
environment - all have been considered relevant and 
brought into one explanatory framework or another. At 
the same time there has been increasing political concern 
about the ability of the mass media to reflect society's 
many different interest groups satisfactorily, and about 
developments in media economics which appear to limit 
rather than to facilitate this ability. Political 
scientists are beginning to ask about the origins of 
much of the information which goes to build up their own 
image of society. How far is it possible for them to 
accept as 'facts' what newspapers, and the agencies which 
serve them, report as 'facts', and what about the 'facts' 
that do not get reported? The Creon Project at Drew 
University in New Jersey, for example, attempted to 
develop an empirical theory of foreign policy based on 
data taken from a chronology called Deadline Data on 
World Affairs which abstracts widely from the world's 
press. In an attempt to test the validity of this 
source, researchers in Japan, Lebanon, Kenya, Norway 
Chile and India coded a sample of the time period under 
investigation, using the 'best' local source, often a 
national newspaper carrying the most foreign news. It 
quickly became apparent that the vast majority of items 
13. 
coded in all the sources derived from reportage of the 
major wire services - AP, UPI, Reuters and AFP. The 
researchers had then to turn their attention to these 
ll 
organisations. 
It is not only political scientists who should thank 
the agencies for their data, but governments themselves. 
Phillips Davison (1974) interviewed several European 
diplomats about their sources of news. He concluded: 
"The role of the wire services 
deserves special mention. At 
every major foreign office and 
at many embassies, one finds wire 
service tickers clacking out news. 
The printouts are examined fre- 
quently (at one foreign office 
every 15 minutes) by officials 
designated for this task, and 
are distributed to other officials 
with particular geographical and 
functional responsibilities. 
These reports may cause cables to 
be despatched, they may affect a 
decision that is being made, or 
they may lead to the preparation 
of an explanatory statement. ""12 
News agencies are sometimes 
course of decision-making. 
Cuba missile crisis anews 
first source of information 
other side. Each time the 
Moscow radio broadcast. 
13 
dramatic factors in the 
Three times during the 
agency dispatch was the 
about developments on the 
dispatch was a report of a 
Even at times of special 
emergency, therefore, news agencies may be faster than 
internal diplomatic channels: perhaps especial at 
such times, for as Gerald Long, Managing Director of 
Reuters, has said, it is not difficult to be faster 
14. 
than diplomatic channels14. Phillips Davison gives 
examples of diplomatic use of news agencies: 
"A member of the foreign office of a 
major European power described how the 
wire service had entered into one decision. 
'Recently the Prime Minister asked for a 
briefing (on a developing crisis) at 11.00 
in the morning. I stayed with the ticker 
until 10.55 and then rushed over to the 
P. M. 's office with my arm full. of paper. 
Literally all we had on it was from the 
agencies. ' The same P. M. frequently 
asked for 8.00 a. m. briefings on reports 
received from the wire service during 
the night. Most. of the information 
reaching governments about developments 
throughout the world comes from the wire 
services, newspapers, news magazines, 
radio and television. Furthermore, mass 
media reports come in first; supplementary 
information via diplomatic or intelligence 
channels arrives hours, days or even weeks 
later. "15 
Definition and Identification 
Not all news agencies are the same, and the differences 
between them are sometimes crucial for an understanding 
of their actual functions. A tremendous range of 
organisations fall under the description 'news agency', 
including small town agencies which gather local inform- 
ation and sell it to either local media or national media, 
have a staff of perhaps six journalists or less and 
transmit their news by telephone to clients. Such 
organisations may have commercial public-relations 
activities as well. At the other end of'the scale 
there is the giant 'global' news agency, which most 
concerns us here. 
There are often reckoned to be six 'global' news agencies. 
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These are AP and UPI of the United States, Reuters of 
Britain. AFP of France, TASS of the U. S. S. R., and NCNA 
of China. These are 'global' organisations in the sense 
that they gather information from most parts of the world, 
and distribute it to many parts of the world. The 
agencies of the communist countries are part of the 
political machinery of their respective governments, with 
which they have direct organisational relations. This 
affects the way in which they operate and the functions 
they perform. In particular, the western agencies are 
market-based: failure of market viability is a far more 
serious threat to them than to their communist equivalents. 
This book mostly addresses itself to the history and 
contemporary operations of the western-based agencies, 
partly because of difficulties of access to the socialist 
agencies, and partly because of differences of operation 
between socialist and western agencies which make the 
western agencies suitable subjects for separate inquiry. 
There are significant differences between the western 
agencies as well. AFP, for instance, looks to French 
state organisations for much of its revenue, whereas 
Reuters depends mainly on non-media clients for economic 
services and the two major North American agencies are 
primarily media-based in revenue terms. Whereas UPI 
is a private commercial enterprise owned by a newspaper 
grou1j, AP is a co-operative almost entirely owned by 
North American media organisations. AFP and Reuters 
are also media co-operatives to some extent, but the 
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media involved are not the most significant sources of 
revenue or finance. 
The major western-based agencies share a number of 
important characteristics. First of all, as. we have 
seen, they gather information from most areas of the 
world and they sell it to most areas of the world. 
The communist agencies on the other hand do sometimes 
distribute their services free of charge, which the 
western agencies do rarely if at all, although they 
may accuse one another of gross rate-cutting in certain 
places. In this respect the communist agencies may 
have more in common with government information services 
of western countries, like the United States Information 
Agency or the British Information Services, than with 
the western news agencies. 
The western agencies tend to concentrate on what they 
commonly refer to as 'spot news'. ' This is information 
about on-going developments which interest the agencies 
if they feel there is a market for it, and provided it 
is 'fresh'. The western agencies are not, as a rule, 
interested in information of. yesterday's developments 
or the day beföre's, except in the sense that it provides 
material for a bare backgrounding to today's development. 
They place great emphasis on speed. Nearly all major 
innovations of the agencies have been inspired or 
justified by their contribution to the speed with which 
information can be gathered, processed and distributed. 
I 
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Provided that information is fresh, and that there is a 
percieved potential demand for it, there is a strong 
chance that it will be carried by one or more of the 
agencies. Much can happen between the reporting of an 
event and the distribution of that report, and the 
reporter often faces a host of problems with sources 
and transmission authorities, but there is no formal 
acknowledgement by the western agencies of any right of 
intervention by political or other authorities. Such 
intervention may occur sometimes, either beyond the 
agencies' control or with their implicit acquiescence, 
but this is a very different situation from that typical 
of the communist agencies which exist to promote formal 
or explicit political objectives, and whose interest in 
speed and the 'spot news' character of the information 
they carry is often greatly qualified by political 
considerations. 
There is some dispute as to whether there are really 
only four major western-based agencies or whether the 
number should be increased to include at least two others, 
namely, DPA of West Germany and Kyodo of Japan. Both 
these agencies have a large annual capital turnover and 
extensive international news-gathering strength. Kyodo 
executives interviewed in 1973 did not regard themselves 
as in the. same league as the global agencies, however. 
Their news-gathering forces are concentrated very much 
in North America. and Western Europe. South America 
does not figure very prominently, Africa and the Middle 
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East hardly at all. Kyodo's overseas sales do not 
compare with those of the four major agencies in any 
part of the globe. DpA's spread of news-gathering 
resources around the globe is rather more consistent 
than Kyodo's, its international sales of greater 
significance. Interviews with DPA bureau chiefs 
indicate that just as Kyodo foreign correspondents 
regard the Japanese market as almost their sole concern, 
so do DPA correspondents concentrate very much on the 
German market, and German-speaking Europe. There are 
about 75 overseas DPA offices, and over 100 important 
overseas clients, but these figures are considerably 
below those for the major agencies. The strength of 
DPA overseas bureaux in manpower terms rarely compares 
with. that of the four major agencies. DPA bureaux do 
not operate round the clock, and little attention'is 
given to certain categories of news which the major 
agencies do cover in some depth; in particular, sport. 
DPA subscribes to the international service of UPI, 
which indicates continuing dependence on the major 
agencies, and Kyodo subscribes to all four major news 
agencies. None of the major western ' agencies subscribes 
to the international service of another western agency, 
Although they may take one another's domestic service. 
Below the 'global' agencies, then, there are agencies 
whose operations in some ways are less extensive, like 
DPA or Kyodo, which can conveniently be described as 
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'international'. There are international agencies in the 
communist block as well, like Yugoslavia's Tanjug, or East 
Germany's Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst. These 
agencies have some foreign-correspondents of their own, 
usually concentrated in a handful of major capitals or 
fewer, and who may sell internationally to one particular 
region (as Spain's EFE does to South America), or to a 
few significant clients overseas, often national news 
agencies with whom an exchange arrangement may be main- 
tained rather than a cash relationship. At a further 
step down the ladder are the national news agencies, 
which might have one or two correspondents overseas in 
major cities to cover news of special interest to the 
country of their agency, but which function to gather 
and disseminate their own domestic news, and to 
distribute international news from larger agencies to 
local media or government departments. In a few 
countries, the primary function of a national news 
agency is to distribute news from international agencies 
locally. This tends to happen where there are few local 
media, or even none at all, and where internal communicat- 
ions are insufficiently developed to allow for regular 
news-gathering from provinces to the capital. At the 
bottom of the heirarchy there is a whole spectrum of 
smaller organisations. Some of these may specialise in 
certain kinds of news, such as economics or sports 
agencies, or in certain geographic regions of a country, 
or in certain kinds of client. 
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These different levels of the heirarchy can also be 
conceptualised as different points on a continuum which 
is itself made up of several dimensions which. may or 
may not always correlate. This does not alter the fact 
that in practice the daily news media of most countries 
in the world depend very heavily for their supply of 
overseas news on a mere handful of organisations which 
we can with reasonable accuracy describe as 'global' 
news agencies. 
The Foundations 
Today's global agencies originated in Europe around the 
middle of the nineteenth century. L'Agence Havas, 
predecessor to AFP, was established in 1835. Reuter 
established his London office in 1851. The original 
1 AP was formed in or around 1848 (the date is disputed) 
in New York but not until the turn of the century and 
after did the American agencies engage significantly 
in international gathering and distribution of information. 
Third most important of the European agencies was Wolff 
in Prussia, founded in 1849. 
One of the distinctive characteristics of these 
organisations was their early exploitation of the 
electric telegraph. This was invented in England in 
1837 in response to the communication requirements, 
and facilities, of the fast-expanding railway networks. 
Reuters, from 1851, depended entirely on this new 
innovation for its raison d'etre, which was not the 
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transmission of general news so much as economic 
information for bankers, brokers, and commercial houses 
of all kinds. The electric telegraph was extremely 
appropriate for this purpose. It. was the speediest 
form of transmission of information yet known, and no- 
where was there such a demand for speed in transmission 
than amongst those with a wide geographic spread of 
financial or commercial interests. This was the market 
on which Reuter depended for the first decade of his 
agency's existence. The newspapers had to be talked 
into making use of this kind of service for general 
political news. 
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In France the telegraph was from the first almost 
entirely a State affair; whereas in England it was 
developed by private enterprise until internal 
communications were nationalized in 1870, and in the 
United States it remained in the control of private 
enterprise. In England and the United States the 
telegraph companies produced their own news services 
for newspapers, coffeehouses, and commerce. They wanted 
to make use of their spare wire capacity, especially 
at night when normal demand was at its lowest. In 
this way the benefits of electric telegraph were first 
brought'to the provincial and regional press as well as 
to the metropolitan. Provincial papers were obliged 
to make use of such services for competitive reasons, 
and also because in this way they could be independent 
of the metropolitan press for their supply of national 
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and international news. Yet they resented the companies 
which ran the services as a side-line and with a dedication 
far weaker than the papers would have liked. Knowing 
their importance to the provincial press, the companies 
asked for what seemed exorbitant subscription fees. On 
the other hand, there were not so many companies that the 
papers were able to play one off against another. The 
newspapers wanted exclusive information and here again 
the companies failed them. The latest telegraph news 
could be posted up in coffee-houses long before the 
papers appeared in the streets. 
This list of grievances on. both sides of the Atlantic 
inspired the formation of news agencies controlled by 
newspaper co-operatives. AP was first and became the 
largest of these. The Press Association in Britain was 
formally constituted in 1869, and was one of the interest- 
groups which campaigned for the nationalization of the 
telegraph. Co-operatives of this. kind were invariably 
co-operatives of daily newspapers, the newspapers that 
were under the keenest pressure to secure supplies of 
up-to-the-minute news, because their performance in 
this respect could be monitored so frequently. They 
formed an obvious market for the agencies for whom this 
kind of information function was the most convenient. 
The electric telegraph was an extremely expensive form 
of communication at first. Pithy economic reports and 
short announcements of the latest political developments 
could be transmitted suitably in this way, but not 
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long-winded explanatory essays. Telegraphic 
communication was not only very useful for decision- 
makers who needed to be well-informed, but it also 
created its own demand amongst newspaper readers and 
this was another factor which increased the importance 
of agency services in the eyes of editors.. 
Through their exploitation of the electric telegraph, 
the news agencies played a significant role in the 
developing relationship between provincial or regional 
and metropolitan newspapers. In the United States, 
the telegraph stimulated the expansion of small-town 
dailies who were soon. to become the members or clients 
of the major American agencies, functioning as sources 
of revenue for them and as sources of news. America 
would not have done without a regional press, but the- 
agencies ensured a minimum standard of news-coverage 
for it. The Press Association in Britain supplied 
regular national news to its member newspapers and also 
distributed international news which it took from Reuters 
on an exclusive basis (except for distribution to papers 
in the London area). Had it not been for this arrangement, 
the continued exploitation of railway distribution for 
the national or London papers might have killed off the 
provincial dailies in Britain altogether. ' 
Not all the consequences were necessarily positive. In 
France, Havas did not develop as a co-operative. By 
making international and Parisian news available to 
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provincial French newspapers by telegraph, the agency 
not only weakened the possible role of the Parisian 
press but it also intensified competition in the 
provincial press, and this worked in favour of the 
stronger, wealthier papers better able to afford the 
new service which was inclined towards maximization of 
revenue, unfettered. by the co-operative ethos that 
pertained in Britain. And in all the countries where 
these early agencies originated there were complaints 
that the news agencies imposed a uniformity of content 
that reduced true editorial diversity. 
The electric telegraph, like the railway, was invented 
and first developed in the world's leading economic and 
political powers. It was in some of these countries 
that the newspaper press first began to flourish. In 
Britain, the 'taxes on knowledge' designed to restrict 
expansion, were lifted in the 1850's, with the result 
that many new provincial papers emerged, and the ground 
was set for the creation of a 'popular' or mass 
circulation press. Political press suppression 
continued unevenly in France after the 1850's but in 
addition to the weighty elitist papers. there emerged 
a 'petit' press which was apolitical and depended for 
much of its success on serialised fiction. The first 
newspaper to reach a one million circulation by 1900 
was Le Petit Journal. Press freedom had a much earlier 
history in the United States than in Europe, and was 
positively supported by the federal government in 
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reaction against the continent's initial experience of 
European oppression. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century the'United States had become the world centre 
of the cheap daily press, which reached deep down into 
the urban working classes long before the daily press of 
Europe had reached most of the middle class. The 
formation of strong newspaper markets for the news 
agencies had taken place therefore well before the turn 
of the century. Whereas the newspaper market was 
adequate for the American agencies, however, it was 
not strong enough to concern Reuters unduly in the 
agency's very early years or to deter it from cultivating 
other markets later on, nor strong enough to sustain the 
appetite of the Havas family. 
The most important political fact about these agencies 
from a global point of view was their location. The 
West European powers led by Britain were entering their 
second major imperial phase; their overseas economic 
interests grew even faster and more permanently than 
their territorial acquisitions. The electric telegraph 
followed territorial and economic interest; the agencies 
followed the telegraph. The, extent of-agency expansion 
closely reflected the extent of imperial and economic 
expansion. Reuters was for a long while the most 
'global' of the agencies, followed by Havas which tended 
to concentrate on Southern Europe, and then the Prussian 
agency Wolff whose main sphere of activity was central 
and northern Europe. This division of interest, in 
26. 
part determined by the political and economic 
configuration of the time, was crystallized in the 
cartel arrangements between the agencies which controlled 
their activities for at least half a century. 
The first successful transatlantic cable was laid in 
1866. Before the end of that decade, a direct line 
between Malta and Alexandria made possible direct 
communication between Malta and Bombay. By 1872 
South East Asia was well interconnected with Europe. 
Many of these original lines were duplicated in sub- 
sequent years to allow for heavier traffic and cheaper 
tariffs. Important extensions to the network to 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Borneo and China (Shanghai), 
were accomplished during the late seventies, eighties, 
and early nineties, almost entirely on British capital 
and initiative. Where foreign landlines had been 
necessary initially to interconnect strategic routes,. 
new routes were formed to allow for British control. 
This was a region. in which Reuters was by far the most 
prominent agency for the next forty to fifty years. 
At the same time as cable was extended to South East 
Asia there was similar activity in the Meditteranean, South 
America and West Indies. In 1871 for instance, cable 
connections were made linking up St. Thomas, St. Kitts, 
Antigua, Guadaloupe, Dominica, Martinique, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent, Barbados, Granada, Trinidad, and Georgetown-. 
Many of Brazil's most important internal lines were laid 
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in the early 1870's as well as connections between the 
eastern seaboard countries of South America. The cable 
development of intra-African communications started a 
little later, the most active period being the late 
eighties and early nineties. Some of the important 
networks laid in that time were between Capetown, Durban 
and West Africa; Dakar with Accra, Lagos, Sierra Leone 
and the Cameroons; Aden, Zanzibar, Mozambique, Dar-hs- 
Salaam and the Seychelles. The territories of several 
European nations were involved, and companies of several 
nations co-operated with one another when it served their 
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interests, just as did the news agencies of Europe. 
Cable communications were very expensive in their 
earliest years. The market for news was not so lucrative 
that the agencies felt free to establish local news- 
gathering networks wherever they wished. Instead, 
they relied very much on each other for their information. 
The system of news exchange which grew out of this was 
accompanied by mutual protection of each other's major 
markets. The agencies agreed in other words not to 
poach on each other's territory for clients. They 
could not recoup news-gathering costs through local 
sales in areas which were not 'theirs', so they tended 
to concentrate their news-gathering resources inside their 
own client-areas. For Reuters these were Britain and 
all parts of the British Empire, Holland and its 
dependencies, Australia, the East Indies and the Far 
East. Havas had France, Italy Spain, Portugal, the 
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Levant, Indochina and Latin America. Some territories 
were operated jointly by Reuters and Havas, such as the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt. and others were considered 
'neutral'. These included the United States. 
There were modifications as time went on, but the basic 
character of the cartel remained constant until the 1930's, 
when the leadership of the European agencies was effect- 
ively challenged from America. AP had begun to establish 
its own independent reporting system in Europe well before 
the first World War, but it did not sell overseas. AP 
was a junior member of the cartel, which owed its initial 
survival to the exclusive contract it had signed with 
Reuters for the supply of news from the cartel in 
exchange (plus a cash payment) for its own news of the 
United States. The deal was an important factor that 
enabled AP of Illinois to secure victory in its fight 
with the older but corrupt AP of New York. It was 
permitted to expand to a few territories considered 
'natural' AP property, like Puerto Rico and the Philippines, 
but in most respects AP's dependency on the cartel 
continued well into the twentieth century. It was from 
UP that the European agencies first felt the American 
threat. UP had no link with the cartel and, in order 
to secure news sources abroad, often established relations 
with other agencies outside the cartel system. 
Before the Second World War the importance of the American 
agencies made itself felt most of all in South America, 
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where first UP and then an increasingly rebellious AP 
ousted Havas from a position of dominance, and later in 
the Far East where the American agencies confronted 
Reuters. In Europe the old agencies held on to their 
traditional markets. These had been strengthened for 
Reuters and Havas in one sense as a result of Germany's 
defeat in the First World War. This eliminated Wolff 
as a major agency, although it did contine on the 
national level. 
The breakdown of the cartel was not solely the result 
of competition from America, although it was largely 
related to factors that also precipitated America into 
the great-power arena. The American agencies owed their 
success not simply to the quality of their services but 
also to resentment amongst smaller agencies and news- 
paper clients against the European cartel. This resent- 
ment was experienced both by clients in colonial 
territories and, even more so, by the agencies of 
larger countries with strong political aspirations of 
their own, like Stefani in Italy and Domei in Japan which 
tried to offer alternative services of their own, with 
limited success. Whether out of cultural self-assertion 
or out of sheer poverty, many of the agencies that had 
once been compliant junior members of the cartel failed 
to meet the annual subscription charges, and bad debts 
increased as the Depression took its course. 
The Depression undermined even the alternative revenue 
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sources of the leading European agencies-advertising in 
the case of Havas, economic news in the case of Reuters. 
Economic insecurity fostered ties between the agencies 
and their respective governments, which aroused much 
protest from newspaper clients and greatly weakened the 
agencies' credibility at home and abroad. 
Just as the agencies had been quick to exploit the 
advantages of the electric telegraph, they soon learnt 
to adapt the new technology of radio transmission to 
their own ends. This made communication much cheaper 
than it had been, but it also tore another hole in the 
structure of the cartel. The cartel was based on 
geographic division, and radio did not respect geography. 
Radio made it easier for competition to enter the field, 
and it was especially convenient for competition which 
was essentially propagandistic in purpose since it could 
be picked up so readily. Radio communications could 
be more easily pirated on that account. 
AP formally withdrew. from the cartel in the early thirties. 
The needs of the domestic United States market were strong 
however, and most of the organization's energy was 
confined to expanding and improving internal communications 
and news-gathering networks. It was not until 
immediately after the second World ; jar that the American 
agencies really established themselves as global agencies. 
The war had destroyed Havas, and AFP needed a few years 
to properly establish itself. Reuters had lost many 
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clients - in the wreckage of the war and with the loss 
of markets to TASS in the new communist territories. A 
few years later it lost China, and when the Press Trust 
of India established itself as monopoly distributor of 
news in India, Reuters also in effect lost that market. 
The American agencies deliberately cultivated Europe. 
In some cases agency representatives were ahead of the 
liberation troops, signing up new clients in war-ravaged 
cities. The European agencies were relatively weak on 
the ground; the Americans were strong. America's 
foreign policy of active involvement in Western Europe 
and in other parts of the world to contain what was 
feared to be the potential expansion of the communist 
countries, its role in supporting Western Europe 
economically via the Marshall Plan, and not least its 
promotion of'a crude version of the 'free flow of 
information' doctrine, 
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helped create a huge demand 
for American news, which the American agencies could 
best supply. 
The European agencies were to recover, but at a price. 
Whereas the American agencies remained basically media- 
based agencies in the sense that media were their most 
important sources of revenue, Reuters turned increasingly 
for support to non-media subscribers of its economic 
services and AFP tended to rely more and more on State 
clients, 'so that both agencies could continue to support 
the infrastructure necessary for their global role. 
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Impartiality and Structural Balance 
The early years in the development of any industry 
typically constitute its entrepreneurial age. The 
unknown character of the market and the tentative state 
of industrial organisation combine to produce what is 
often a great flexibility of direction. Later on when 
the product has been successfully established, even 
considered a necessity by some, and when revenue is 
relatively secure, greater caution is often exercised 
in the face of apparent market changes and the emergence 
of new possibilities. 
Something of this kind may have happened to the global 
agencies, although they have not exhibited excessive 
business conservatism in the third quarter of the 
twentieth century. Two ideas have remained constant 
throughout their history. The first of these is their 
commitment to the importance of speed, and we have seen 
how they exploited the distinctive character of the 
electric telegraph as a form of communication. The 
second is their adherence to the idea of non-partisanship. 
When Reuter first began 
information to business 
distributing his inform; 
time. Early access to 
the speculator, but for 
privilege to just a few 
supplying economic and financial 
clients, he made-a point of 
ýtion to all of them at the same 
information may mean money for 
Reuter to have granted this 
would have occasioned mistrust, 
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if not outrage, amongst the majority. 
The original compelling reason for impartiality in the 
case of Reuter, therefore, was the similarity of interest 
shared by his clients. When it came to newspapers, it 
was the. diversity of interest and outlook which required 
impartiality. The press in Britain at that time was 
greatly partisan in character. In France it became so 
whenever the government permitted, and sometimes when it 
did not. For an agency to demonstrate any kind of 
evident political leaning, one that could be recognised 
and labelled as such, would have meant an immediate reduction 
in revenue as clients dropped the service and perhaps 
put their money into an alternative. Later on these 
two countries followed the United States towards the 
development of an apolitical press that concentrated 
on the 'middle market' in order to achieve the right mix 
of circulation size and advertising revenue 
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again, relative uniformity of interest, this time in 
being relatively non-partisan, required impartiality 
(understood as the absence of overt partisan support 
rather than as strict philosophical neutrality). 
There was an agency in Germany after the first-World 
War, namely, Hugenberg's Telegraph-Union, which in 
addition to a general news service also put out 
differently nuanced services for papers of the political 
right, and for 'neutrals'. Havas, in its earlier years, 
transmitted as a special service different political 
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editorials from Paris depending on the political colour 
of the client. This has not been a widespread solution 
to the problem of political diversity, and for good reasons. 
Such an arrangement calls for rather more manpower and 
work than the provision of a single service, particularly 
where speed is considered an essential operating necessity. 
But the sheer cynicism of the exercise might in itself 
give rise to lack of trust on the part of the clients. 
In the communist countries, the agencies. are of course 
clearly aligned with political objectives, and the western 
principle of 'impartiality' is rightly held suspect. But 
on the other hand, the political values which the agencies 
are required to uphold are treated with much the same 
feeling and importance as the idea of 'impartiality' in 
the West. Both are cultural 'truths', too structurally 
important for their respective societies for doubt to be 
welcomed. 
For the western agencies, the commitment to impartiality 
has to be understood within the context of a capitalist 
and social-democratic political economy. It would have 
been fairly hard to fault them on the principles which 
they applied to the reporting of events, which are the 
principles to which most journalists in the western 
hemisphere will at least pay lip-service. But the 
question of which events were selected and which were 
not - the values in other words that determined what was 
and was not 'news' - this clearly raised problems of 
partisanship. So long as these values coincided with 
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the cultural boundaries accepted by the bulk of their 
paying subscribers, however, the agencies' claim to 
'objectivity' had a definite social meaning. 
The philosophical and political limitations of the concept 
become clear when the nature of the agencies' clientele 
is considered. The newspaper was then greatly restricted 
in cultural and class outlook, especially so in Europe, and 
this cannot have failed to influence the first services 
of the agencies, which were not after all subject to any 
more complex sets of demand than from the press. The 
agencies also exhibited a metropolitan bias. It was 
natural that Reuters should concentrate on the wealthy 
. press 
of London, that the early AP should be greatly 
controlled by its original New York owners, and that Havas 
should favour the fatter papers of the leading French 
Cities. 
There were other papers: small weeklies, or periodicals 
of infrequent appearance, in both town and country, 
representing trade unions, radical parties, and various 
interests of the working and middle classes. If an 
organisation is to be defined in part by what it chooses 
not to become then it is important to remember those 
sectors of the 'market' that the agencies passed by, 
however inevitably. 
The 'impartiality' of the agencies must be understood in 
practice therefore in terms of the range of political 
differences that was considered to be significant by 
36. 
their clientele. And the major differences were mostly 
to do with party affiliation or tendency. 'Impartiality' 
referred to a process whereby news was reported from a 
perspective other than that of a specific political 
ideology or propagandistic interest. But it did not 
ignore these things. On the contrary, the agencies' 
'impartial' perspective focused very much on. the very 
same phenomena that excited the political men, but 
without taking sides, or being seen to do so. 
This is the kind of news-reporting which has come more 
and more to characterise the newspapers of the western 
world and its sphere of cultural influence, "and which 
coincided, it has been argued, with the rise of the 
'middle-market' or mass circulation newspaper, the 
newspaper designed to attract advertisers as much as 
readers** The early news agencies preceded the rise 
and maturation of the 'middle-market' newspaper, but 
they shared much in common with it. Both distrusted 
marked political preferences, for commercial reasons. 
A connection has been demonstrated between telegraph 
news and press non-partisanship, mediated by the 
institution of the news agency. D. L. Shaw (1967) 
studied the national election coverage of a random 
sample of 147 English-language daily papers in the 
United States between 1852 and 191621. Using judges 
to help distinguish between biased and non-biased 
stories, he found that the amount of bias in his sample 
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declined during the period he selected. At the same 
time, the number of campaign stories which originated 
prom telegraph news rose. The increase in the use of 
wire news over time was related to at least five factors: 
the expansion of telegraph facilities; the decreasing 
relative cost of telegraph news to newspapers; declining 
costs of newsprint; expansion of press association 
services and a growing reader demand for telegraph news. 
Between 1869 and 1887 the volume of press association 
news sent over nonleased Western Union wires increased 
from an estimated 2- million messages to 241 million. 
Press association news attracted greater respect then 
the services previously put out by the telegraph 
companies themselves - the press associations maintained 
a far closer relationship to their newspaper customers, 
who were virtually their sole customers, whereas the 
company services were merely a side-line to utilize 
spare wire capacity. 
The recipients of telegraph news were not of course 
obliged to use it unchanged. Melville Stone, first 
editor of the 'modern' AP which grew out of AP of 
Illinois, recalled talking one day with a young man 
employed on the Chicago Times: 
it 'What do you do? ' I asked 
'Edit the telegraph', he replied'. 
'And how? ' I returned. 
'By inserting the words which the 
correspondent eliminated to save 
telegraph charges', he explained. " 
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AP disapproved of this practice, and in time it succeeded 
in imposing a fair level of uniformity in this respect 
throughout the American press, (later helped by the 
development of teletypesetter delivery). In England, 
Storey records that 'Reuter often had to fight for the 
accurate reproduction of the telegrams against the 
editors inclination to preserve at least the appearance 
of their individual originality by chopping and changing 
mercilessly what he gave them. From the beginning he 
had insisted on having his name quoted at the head of 
his messages'. 
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But the agencies had other standardizing influences. 
According to Emery (1964), the style of agency reporting 
affected all reporting - in promoting the custom of 
leading a story with its summary and composing it in the 
manner of an inverted pyramid, for instance, and by 
simply determining news priorities. 
24 
There is some scope for arguing that the agencies, in 
attempting to provide as non-partisan a service as they 
could, contributed to the relative depoliticisation of 
the press in the western world and its sphere of influece. 
But of course, 'non-partisan as possible' can still be 
fairly partisan by other standards. This book is an 
attempt to explore one facet of the issue: namely, the 
phenomenon of structural imbalance and its consequences 
for the ethic of impartiality. The issue itself 
originates in political concern: the globe is dependent 
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on a few organisations for the continuous flow of certain 
kinds of information that are considered important to the 
administration, education and entertainment of peoples. 
Do these organizations serve all peoples equally, or are, 
their activities determined by the interests of a few? 
If certain interests have more influence than others, to 
what extent is this an inevitability of history or 
politics? 
Arrangement of the Manuscript 
This is not a study of swash-buckling foreign correspond- 
ents, although systematic analysis of agency news-gathering 
is included. It looks at news agency activity very much 
as a business, which survives ou of a concern for money, 
even if maximum profitability is not always its goal. 
Central to the theme is the essentially western character- 
of the world agencies, and the extraordinary dependence 
of practically all media organizations on these agencies. 
For non-western countries this dependence on the agencies 
for news of other countries is not simply dependence for 
news of events in the west, which is provided in generous 
measure, but also dependence for news of their own 
geographical regions, although the supply of-non-western 
news is not as liberal. 
The study seeks to demonstrate and to explain, amongst 
other things, the greater responsiveness of the four 
western-based global agencies to western requirements 
as determined by their clients among news-organisations 
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in the west. The first three chapters therefore are 
concerned with showing just how important the agencies' 
domestic markets are. The domestic markets provided 
(and in at least three of the four. cases examined still 
provide) the main impetus to expansion and maintenance 
of overseas news-gathering machinery. This is apparent 
in the abundance of agency services for their domestic 
markets which are not available elsewhere; in the 
general distribution of their resources; and in the 
character of agency news content. Domestic markets are 
important because they are in general the wealthiest 
available. For that reason they invite competition, 
internally and externally. The struggle of each of the 
agencies to establish as strong a market position at home 
as possible, and the strategies they employed to succeed 
in doing this, are the subjects of Chapters 2 and 3. 
Just as domestic markets tend to be favoured in the 
distribution of agency resources, so in the foreign 
field wealthiest markets tend to receive the most 
attention. In the case of the United States, however, 
the oligopolistic position of the two major domestic 
agencies does not leave room for extensive external 
competition from Reuters and AFP, which are nonetheless 
obliged to expend considerable energy in covering the 
United States for news purposes. Reuters' recent 
penetration into new U. S. markets 
is one of the topics 
of Chapter ! i, which is generally concerned with 
the 
history of European coverage and the gradual emergence 
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of American agency activity on European markets, as well 
as the history of American coverage and the relatively 
low profile in the United States of the European agencies. 
Chapter 5 carries the review of foreign markets to less 
wealthy areas of the world and is concerned to show how 
there is less agency competition in certain world regions 
than is iimnediately apparent, and how this is to be 
explained in part by the coincidence of interest between 
the agencies and the governments of their base countries, 
both in the past, and to a lesser extent, in the present. 
Chapter 6 moves away from a concern with the geographical 
distribution of agency activities to a concern with 
differences in kind between major client groupings and 
how these have affected agency development. Although 
the agencies are publically identified mainly with the 
newspaper market, alternative sources of revenue have 
been cultivated from an early point in their history. 
These sources can be divided into. those which involve 
the sale of material similar in presentation and 
organization to the sale of general news for newspapers 
but involving non-media clients; and those still mainly 
located within the media field but involving radically 
different forms of organization, such as agency services 
for radio, cinema, television, and the provision of 
photo news for newspapers. Economic news services for 
non-media clients, especially as these have been developed 
by Reuters, form the main concern of Chapter 6, along with 
the involvement of the French agency, Havas, with 
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advertising clientele between the world wars, which has 
had important consequences for the constitution of its 
successor, AFP. Chapter 7 continues the theme of 
market diversification, and examines in detail the growth 
of agency involvement in the business of television 
newsfilm distribution. 
Chapter 8 analyzes the importance of national news 
agencies in the overall process of news collection and 
distribution by the global agencies. The development 
of national agencies is seen as an out-growth of the 
pattern of relations between the global or international 
agencies of the late nineteenth century, and of the 
general process of imperialism. Many of the first 
national news agencies were modelled on the original 
agencies of Britain, France and Germany, and were caught 
up in the oligopolistic division of the world market 
established by these agencies. In recent years the 
global agencies have recalled some aspects of this 
earlier period by acting as consultants in the formation 
of new national agencies. The contemporary relationship 
between world and national agencies shows that the 
national agencies need the world agencies for their 
supply of world news, and sometimes for technical and 
editorial assistance. The world agencies need the 
national agencies as important local news services, as 
clients, and as news distributors. In practice the 
character of the relationship is often oomplicated by 
political factors. 
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The final five chapters of the book look in some detail 
at the character of news-gathering and agency organization 
today. Chapter 9 examines the organizational structure 
of the agencies, in relation especially to the degree of 
centralization of control, communications and client 
relations. Chapter 10 is a report of survey evidence 
gathered in the course of study into organization of 
individual news agency bureaux from the view-point of 
bureaux chiefs. This is supplemented with interview 
data for an analysis of agency relations with news 
sources, the subject of Chapter 11. Chapter 12 reports 
the findings of content analysis in which different agency 
wires were compared to give some further indication of 
the way in which the product is related to the production 
process in news-gathering. A more qualitative analysis 
of agency news, finally, appears in Chapter 13 which 
looks at some of the public statements that agency 
executives have made about the values that lie behind 
their occupational practice, and some estimations that 
have been made of agency performance in South America 
and South Vietnam. The Conclusion suggests an 
explanatory model for an understanding of agency 
development in terns of a set of organizational 'strategic 
choices', between conflicting strategies for survival. 
Throughout the study, but especially in the earlier 
chapters, pain has been taken to establish the historical 
context, and one of the objectives of the research is to 
demonstrate how certain patterns of contemporary practice 
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derived from earlier patterns established as much as a 
century ago or more. The data-base for the historical 
material is very different from the data-base for 
contemporary material: , it consists mainly of the few 
histories that exist of the separate agencies25 (of greatly 
varying quality), of articles and notes from professional 
and trade journals such as 'Editor and Publisher' or early 
copies of 'Journalism Quarterly', of histories of the 
press in varying countries, and from other less likely 
sources wherever useful information has been found. The 
objective has been to establish a major comparative source 
of reference on the major western-based global agencies 
for future students. At the same time this is the first 
study to examine and compare contemporary aspects of 
agency organization, news-gathering and marketing of all 
four of the major western-based news agencies across a 
number of different countries; it is also the first to 
provide a detailed account of agency diversification into 
major media-related or non-media client fields, such as 
economic news services for industrial or financial clients, 
or television news-film distribution. Much of the material 
relating to the period from World War Two up to the 
present (1975-6) therefore has no prior published source, 
and is based on interview, survey, or content-analysis 
data collected for this research. The dual aim of 
providing a comparative historical framework and an 
analysis of contemporary practice has meant that the 
manuscript runs to a considerable length by most 
standards. 
! "5" 
Most of the people contacted in the course of the research 
were promised effective anonymity, which has created a 
sourcing problem. This arose out of the competitive 
relationship between the organizations studied, and from 
the author's own research interest in market-related data 
which was of some importance to that competitive relation- 
ship. Much of the discussion on contemporary agency 
organization in Chapters 1,6,7,9,11, and 13 is derived 
from interview data or as in Chapter 10, and the analysis 
of the contemporary American market in Chapter 3, on- 
survey data. The discussions on agency coverage of 
contemporary Europe, the United States, and the Third 
World in Chapters 4 and 5 are also mainly derived from 
interview data. Sometimes sources are referred to by 
category rather than as individuals: 'senior HQ executive' 
for example, indicating a source at head office; 'local 
news executive' indicating a bureau chief or a senior 
journalist of an overseas bureau. A longer description 
of methodology is to be found in Appendices 1-3. 
It is well to clarify one or two terminological problems 
at this point. A fourfold distinction is maintained 
throughout the text between 'global' agencies and 
agencies which are 'international', 'national' and 
local, corresponding to the points of the continuum 
discussed earlier. Furthermore the term 'domestic' 
is applied to characteristics and operations of any 
agency within the country in which the agency maintains 
its Head Office; the terms 'foreign' and 'overseas' 
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therefore refer to the subject's non-domestic activities. 
Finally the term 'local' is often employed in relation 
to correspondents, clients and sources to indicate that 
they belong to the country under discussion, in the sense 
of working or living there. 
The news agencies sometimes do their best to obscure 
some of the most important facts about themselves: 
they are in one of the most competitive branches of the 
news business, hidden though they may appear tobe from 
the general public. I have attempted to assemble all 
the relevant facts; however, the information needed to 
tie up loose ends or to compare the agencies directly 
on some specific point has not always been made available. 
It remains to be said, finally, that the world in which 
the agencies operate is one of constant flux: this 
applies as much to technology as to the politics of 
countries in which. they operate. Where it has seemed 
appropriate I have inserted the year in which I obtained 
the facts under discussion, and in general my analysis 
is intended to apply only up to the mid-seventies. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Business Begins at Home 
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The single most important fact about the global agencies 
in their role of international news wholesalers for the 
world is their fundamentally national character. This 
becomes apparent immediately upon examination of the 
ownership and control of these agencies, and of the ways 
in which they distribute their resources. Extending 
our enquiry beyond that to the comparative availability 
and quality of agency services between the domestic and 
foreign markets, we find that in at least three out of 
the four cases the clients of the domestic markets are 
in the most favourable position by far. 
Ownership 
The leading American agency, AP, is just that: American. 
AP is a newspaper co-operative owned by its member 
newspapers. Of the two kinds of members, full and 
associated, only full members can purchase bonds, and as 
bondholders they are entitled to additional directorship 
votes. All full members are located in North America 
(full membership was opened to Canadian papers in 1971). 
Associate membership is extended to broadcast organizations 
and to some foreign subscribers, but these are not 
permitted full membership. Not until 1976 did the AP 
membership vote in favour of increasing the number of 
directors from 13 to 21, so that three AP broadcast 
members could sit on the board. 
1 Associate membership 
means little in terms of organizational influence and 
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control, and even the significance of full membership 
is limited: 
'A careful reading of AP's Annual 
Reports indicates that the member- 
ship is not consulted on most 
issues....... Directors operate 
ordinarily without benefit of 
initiative and referendum. '2 
It is the power to vote in the election of directors 
that is the main inspiration for publishers to maintain 
full membership of the agency. As a result, the board 
tends to reflect, as Schwarzlose (1965) has shown, the 
predisposition of the larger and more lucrative members 
of the organization, those most likely to have many 
bondholder votes. This does not by any means give 
total control to the board, since it has been argued 
that organizational power in recent years has drifted 
away from the board via the general manager which it 
appoints to the administration. 
3 
Like AP, Reuters is also owned mainly by its national 
press, that of the U. K. But although it is often 
considered to be a co-operative in the same spirit as 
AP, the similarity stops short. Just why this is the 
case will become clearer later on, but briefly, the U. K. 
press has never been financially strong enough to 
support Reuters in the way the United States press 
supports AP, not to mention UPI. Few of the structural 
characteristics of a co-operative which AP exhibits are 
to be found in the operations of Reuters. 
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Reuters is a limited liability company incorporated 
under the Companies Act (U. K. ); its capital is owned 
by the press of Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 
The Press Association, representing provincial newspapers 
of the U. K., owns 111.7/; the Newspaper Publishers 
Association, representing London-based national newspapers, 
owns an equivalent share: 41.7%; and the remainder is 
divided between the Australian Associated Press, re- 
presenting Australian daily newspapers, whcih has 13.9%, 
and the New Zealand Press Association, representing the 
dailies of New Zealand, has 2.7% (1973 figures). 
4 
Ownership is therefore concentrated in the U. K., and 
Australian and New Zealand representatives do not normally 
attend the regular board meetings in London, although 
there are occasional board meetings in the Pacific area 
which they do attend for discussion of area-related 
issues. In practice, control of the organization rests 
largely with the Managing Director appointed by the board, 
and his staff. 
The French agency, AFP, is not actually 'owned' by any- 
body. It was given provisional status as a public body 
in 1944, and in 1957 was formally reconstituted in law, 
granted the rights of a private individual but outside 
all conventional judicial categories. 
Those working for AFP often like to consider themselves 
part of a co-operative structure not dissimilar to AP 
or Reuters. They point with some justification to the 
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body which actually administers the agency, the Conseil 
d'Administration. This body elects a President-Director 
General for a renewable period of three years and retains 
the power to suspend him. 
It is made up of fifteen members as follows: 
-8 newspaper directors, designated by the most 
representative professional organisations; 
-2 representatives from O. R. T. F.; 
-3 representatives from public service 
clients of the agency, 'designated respectively 
by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and the Minister of Finance; 
- .2 representatives elected 
from the agency's 
personnel, one of whom is a journalist 
while the other is taken from the remaining 
categories of personnel. 
It would seem therefore, that newspaper publishers 
together have more power on this body than any other 
group. But the 1957 statute created two other bodies 
less frequently talked about by AFP officials when 
describing their agency's operations. The first and 
most important of all three controlling bodies is the 
Conseil Superieur. This body exists to ensure that 
the responsibilities with which the agency is charged 
by law are carried out. These responsibilities are 
that the agency: 
(i) should be completely impartial, free of all 
ideological and other interest or considerations 
that would compromise its impartiality. 
(ii) must use its resources solely for the purpose of 
furnishing its French and foreign clients with a 
news service which is regular, uninterrupted, 
accurate, impartial and trustworthy; 
and 
*but cf. Note l, p. 957 
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(iii) establish a chain of bureaux around the world 
which will give it the character and status 
of a world news agency. 
Costs of the news service have to be covered by payments 
from subscribers, most important of whom are in practice 
State organizations. 
The Conseil Superieur, in its -watchdog function, has the 
power to direct its observations to, or impose its 
requirements on the President-Directeur General'of the 
Conseil d'Administration. It can require the suspension 
of a decision made by the President or the Conseil 
d'Administration, or force a second deliberation. In 
a case of extreme circumstances, it can decide to fire 
the President himself. 
This supervisory body has eight members: 
-1 member of the Conseil d'Etat as elected by 
the General Assembly of the Conseil d'Etat, 
who is the President of the Conseil Superieur; 
-1 magistrate for the Cour de Cassation (Supreme 
Court of Appeal) as elected by the General 
Assembly of the Cour de Cassation; 
-2 newspaper directors designated by the most 
representative professional organizations; 
-1 journalist, again designated by the most 
representative professional organizations; 
1 representative of French radio, O. ß. T. F.; 
2 further members co-opted by these six. 
Finally there is the Commission Financiere, appointed 
by the founding statute. This third body comprises 
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three members as follows: 
-2 members of the Cour des Comptes, designated 
by its first President; 
-1 expert elected by the Minister of Finance. 
This Corunission is charged with the surveillance of 
AFP's financial affairs, and has the right of complete 
access if it considers that the agency's administration 
has not taken the necessary measures to ensure financial 
equilibrium. it has the power to require the appoint- 
ment of a provisional administrator of AFP by the 
President of the Tribunal de Commerce. 
America's second major agency, UPI, is sometimes thought 
to be totally dissimilar to the other agencies.. It is 
not a co-operative; it is not a public body of any 
kind; it issues no official annual report. In practice 
though there are similarities: it is part of a news- 
paper group and it has as close a relationship with its 
clients as any other agency, with the possible exception 
of AP. 
UPI is a private subsidiary of E. W. Scripps Co., which 
owns a controlling interest in the agency in addition 
to its interests in Scripps-Howard Newspapers (which in 
1974 had 13 dailies and which was one of the 21 U. S. 
chains to own more than 100 papers, ranking fourth in 
terms of the total circulation it controlled); United 
Feature Syndicate (a subsidiary of UPI), Newspaper 
Enterprise Association (a supplemental agency), 
Scripps-Howard Supply Co. Inc. (which deals mainly in 
W 
`"'" t' i' i'"ý{'? ess reports' hotiever were inaugurated in 1973 
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newsprint), and Allied Newspapers Inc. (the advertising 
department of Scripps-Howard -Newspapers). 
E. W. Scripps Co. also has a 66°% holding of Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., licencee of four UHF TV stations, two 
AM radio stations and one FM radio station. In 1967,. 
E. W. Scripps Co. told the Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly Senate Judiciary Committee, that it could not 
transfer UPI profits into its newspapers, but could lend 
money to its subsidiaries. 
5 
Revenue 
It is not ties of ownership alone which give the agencies 
their national character. Of greater importance to 
them is the relative wealth of their domestic markets. 
The global agencies are big spenders: e. g. $70 millions 
by AP in 1972, $57 millions by UPI in the same year, and 
132 million francs by AFP. Reuters' turnover that year 
was almost L14 million. 
6 
They are concerned to cover 
costs. Home markets for all the agencies account for 
a substantial proportion of total revenues although 
official figures are not available in all cases. In 
the case of the American agencies, the proportion of 
total revenue accounted for by the domestic United 
States market is certainly not less than 605a and is 
probably around 80u, ö. 
7 
The second most important 
market for the American agencies in revenue terms is 
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almost certainly Western Europe. Some of the other 
major world regions are of almost negligible importance 
in this respect. An IPI study in 1956 gave some 
indication as to the extent of difference which exists 
between the largest and smallest markets: UP told IPI 
that only 3% or 4/ of all its total revenue came from 
Asian clients; an AP Tokyo bureau chief estimated that 
only 3% of the total income of his agency was derived 
$ 
from the Asian service. 
AFP also looks to the home market for the bulk of its 
revenue. In 1971, for instance, overseas revenue 
accounted for only 17% of its overall revenue, whereas 
domestic revenue accounted for 79.3% of the total. 
9 
About 73% of that domestic revenue came from organizations 
of the French State in their capacity as AFP clients, 
while most of the remainder was accounted for by news- 
papers. As a rule one might say that revenue from 
overseas is only about one third of the revenue AFP 
obtains from Paris, but about twice as much as the 
revenue earned from French provinces and overseas 
colonial territories (see Table 1). 
If the State sector is excluded from the revenue figures, 
however, foreign revenue appears to exceed the total 
revenue earned from Paris and the provinces; and revenue 
from the provinces exceeds Paris revenue. In other 
words, it is especially AFP's dependence on the State for 
revenue rather than the-media, which makes the home 
market so important for the agency. 
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TABLE ONE 
AFP BUDGET RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES (in 000's francs) 
Year Receipts Expenses 
Paris Prov- Foreign Paris Prov- Foreign 
inces & inces & 
Terri- Terri- 
tories tories 
1969 67,140 10,978 19,242 60,305 6, ii6 30,762 
1970 74,242 11,948 22,347 65,924 6,7.19 35,895 
1972 91,194 14,379 27,008 81,525 7,542 43,595 
Year Receipts excluding State Sector 
Paris Provinces Foreign 
Territories 
1972 9,579 13,586. 24,077 
(SOURCE: AFP Official Annual Estimates) 
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There is some indication that the importance of the 
overseas market for AFP is growing. The domestic- 
foreign revenue balance certainly improved by comparison 
with the figures for Havas before the Second World War. 
In 1939, Havas (AFP's predecessor) earned 8.5 of its 
total sales receipts from overseas. Even in"1949, AFP's 
overseas sales were more important than this. But 
Havas was both a news and an advertising agency. The 
advertising agency was separated from the news function 
during the war, and AFP dealt only in news. In absolute 
terms the total domestic revenue figures were therefore 
smaller after the war. On the other hand, income from 
the French press dropped from 33% in 1939 to 15% in 
1949-50. This decline, a result both of war devastation 
and the temporary limitations on AFP's activities, perhaps 
increased the relative importance of the foreign market. 
In more recent times the trend has continued. 
10 Between 
1957 and 1968 for example, receipts from overseas clients 
increased by 1811%. while receipts from domestic clients 
over the same period increased only 166%. Overseas, 
the agency's financial turnover in the period 1957-65 
increased by 143.2315 compared with a domestic turnover 
increase of 103%. The percentage increase of overseas 
receipts (as a proportion of total annual receipts) 
jumped from 17% in 1956 to 23% in 1966 (there was a slight 
fall in the early sixties). These improvements must 
partly be the result of a decline in the number of French 
daily newspapers, which has been fairly consistent since 
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the post-war period. In the decade 1953-63 alone, 18 
provincial newspapers disappeared. From the point of 
view of AFP's domestic media revenue base this must 
certainly be disappointing; but if it brings about a 
greater balance between domestic and foreign markets, 
overseas clients may expect to be able to exert more 
influence. All this cannot for the moment change the 
overwhelming presence of the French State as the agency's 
major client. 
Reuters, unlike the other three agencies, has no domestic 
arm as such. The Press Association, which is part-owner 
of the agency, distributes international news from Reuters 
and AP to the provincial U. K. press. Reuters distributes 
its news services direct to the national newspapers in 
London and to the Press Association's London Head Office. 
It distributes financial and economic news services to 
clients throughout the country, whether media or non-media. 
Because of the arrangement with the P. A. therefore, the 
importance of the domestic market is not so evident in the 
case of Reuters as it is in the others. Yet the proport- 
ion of U. K. revenue to the total is still considerable for 
just one country. In 1974, overseas trading revenue 
represented 84% of Reuter's overall revenue, and the 
remainder was mostly accounted for by the U. K. There 
is a strong tendency for the importance of overseas 
trading revenue to increase over time. The percentage 
of revenue accounted for by overseas trading has risen 
consistently from 73% to 84% in the period 1966-72. 
The percentage for earlier years is not available, but 
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it is known that between 1961 and 1966, a high percentage 
of the increase in total revenue was accounted for by 
increases in overseas -trading revenue. This percentage 
fluctuated between 61i% and 91% of total respective 
increases of 11.8iß and 7.2°%. 
11 Reuter's most important 
overseas market is Continental Europe, which in 1972 
accounted for 38% of total trading revenue, followed by 
North America (17%), Asia (11%o), Africa (7%), the middle 
East (3%) and South America (3; ). 
12 
Clients 
The domestic markets are unusually wealthy markets for 
the agencies because these are countries which are media- 
saturated. Each domestic market accounts for a large 
percentage of the total number of clients served by its 
agency although there is evidence of an expansion in 
overseas clients. In 1977 UPI reported a world total 
of 6,972 direct subscribers to its news services. In 
the United States the agency claimed to reach 1,131 
newspapers and 3,650 radio and television stations. 
13 
Almost a third (31/6) of all UPI clients therefore are 
foreign clients. This represents a significant increase 
in the relative number of overseas clients of 9 percentage 
points in the space of 13 years and 3 points in 1974-7 
alone, (in 1964 there were 1,336 foreign clients out of 
a world total of 5,846). Almost 70% of the foreign 
clients in 1964 were reported to be newspaper and broad- 
cast organizations in the European-African region 
controlled from London. It can safely be assumed that 
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nearly all of these were in fact European given the 
paucity of the African market (cf. Ch. 5). Most of the 
remaining 30% were in South America. There is little 
evidence to suggest that these proportions have altered 
significantly since then. Overseas expansion concentrates 
on the more affluent world regions. 
In 1952 however, the proportion of UP's foreign clients 
was actually higher than in 1977 at 33% (total 3,527). 
This was before the UP-INS merger, and UPI's subsequent 
renewed assault on the domestic market in an attempt to 
establish itself on an equal footing with AP. 
The absolute number of UPI's foreign clients has increased 
consistently from 386 in 1937 to 1,336 in 1964, to 1,855 
in 1973 and 2,191 in 1976, or by six times in a forty 
year period. The total number of clients (domestic and 
foreign) increased consistently in the period 1957-73, 
from 5,063 to 6,622. 
The proportion of AP's clients who are overseas is rather 
higher than UPI's case, although directly comparable 
figures are not available. In 1966, AP claimed to 
reach 1,236 U. S. newspapers, 2,600 radio stations and 
324 TV stations. The total number of clients recorded 
was 8,500, indicating therefore that foreign clients 
accounted for about half the total (4,515 in 103 countries 
and territories). This total was some 2,000 clients 
greater than UPI's for 1966, and a similar disparity 
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occurred in 1957-8 when AP recorded a total of 7,275 and 
UPI a total of 5,063. It cannot be certain that these 
client numbers are assessed in exactly the same manner by 
each agency (e. g. it is not known whether the figures 
include those indirect clients who receive the foreign 
services via the national news agencies). The number 
of AP's newspaper members in the United States has 
risen fairly consistently in the period 1957-73 from 
1,265 to 1,741. Schwarzlose has shown that expenditure 
on AP's foreign activities increased a little more rapidly 
than on its domestic activities 1949-63.14 In general it 
would seem that the underlying tendency is for the U. S. 
agencies to intensify their competitive rivalry on 
international markets, leading to a slight decrease in 
the overall significance of the domestic market. But 
this tendency must be strictly limited by the entrenched 
position and other world agencies in many. international 
markets, and the relatively poor revenue possibilities 
in so many third world areas. 
The greater representation of domestic clients is not 
as evident in the case of AFP as it is for the American 
agencies, but it is still appreciable. . 
In 1972 there 
were approximately 550 overseas clients for AFP services. 
At home there were some 110 subscribers to main AFP 
services in the provinces, and 28 newspaper subscribers 
in Paris. Excluding French State clients, therefore, 
the home market accounted for 23.41/a of the total. 
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In terms of direct overseas client numbers, the world 
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market for AFP breaks down in an unusual way, with (in 
1972) 169 in South America, 95 in the Middle East, 93 
in Asia, between 55 and 87 in Europe, 52 in North America, 
and 54 in Africa. These figures include private clients 
as well as national news agencies which also distribute 
the service to many other papers and broadcast stations 
not included. Fifteen of the European clients are 
national news agencies. National agencies are generally 
much more important as revenue sources than any single 
media organization. Twenty-eight of the African clients 
are news agencies. In South America on the other hand, 
there is no distribution through national agencies because 
there are few such agencies to distribute through. This 
helps to explain the high number of clients in South 
America, over half of which are broadcast organizations. 
In the Middle East, over half of the clients are private. 
In terms of revenue importance, Western Europe is by far 
the most important market after France. AFP retains 
only a low profile in North America (see Chapter 4). 
It cannot be said that the proportion of U. K. clients 
to the total of Reuters' clients is as great as in the 
case of the other agencies, but just as Reuters' revenue 
base tends to be Continental Europe, which in conjunction 
with the U. K. accounts for over half of the total trading 
revenue, this same area probably accounts for a similar 
majority of its clients. For instance, Reuters in 1969 
distributed directly or indirectly to 3,154 newspapers 
around the world: 52% of these, or 1,640, were located 
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in Europe. 16 Reuters does not have a domestic market 
base so much as a regional market base therefore. 
Distribution of Resources 
Concentration of ownership, revenue and clients within 
national boundaries appears to influence the distribution 
of agency resources in favour of these privileged home 
markets. This is certainly trueof the American 
agencies, and of the French agency to a less obvious 
extent. 
The number of bureaux which the agencies maintain around 
the world may be taken as a rough indication of the 
extent of their commitment to news-gathering in each 
major region. A bureau is an office manned by at least 
one full-time staffer. By. this measurement of agency 
resources, the American agencies appear to be more 
concerned to maintain adequate domestic news-coverage. 
than foreign news-coverage, unless it is accepted that 
the standard of adequacy should be determined by the 
home market, which in fact is what seems to happen. 
Schwarzlose (1965) reported that AP's domestic bureaux 
in 1962 accounted for 66% of their total bureaux. 
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In the space of the subsequent decade, the proportion 
of domestic bureaux appears to have fallen very slightly 
to 65% of the total. Elliot and Goulding (1971) report 
Go foreign bureaux for AP to 111 domestic bureaux, although 
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Weiner (1972) records only 110 domestic bureaux. 
18 A 
slight increase in the proportion of foreign bureaux 
would lend some confirmation to Schwarzlose's judgement 
in the early sixties that foreign markets would become 
more important growth areas. 
19 He showed that, whereas 
expenditure on foreign news was relatively slight in 
comparison with expenditure on domestic news, the relative 
increase in expenditure for both categories over time 
favoured foreign news. In 1963,54.4%. of total AP 
expenditure went on domestic news-gathering costs, and 
only 16.5% went on foreign news-gathering. But over 
the period 1943-63, foreign news expenditure had increased 
by 74.40% whereas domestic news expenditure had increased 
by rather less: 69.2%. There is some evidence in the 
case of all the agencies that foreign news-gathering has 
received a mild impetus in recent years by comparison 
with domestic news. This may be the result of a tendency 
in the affluent mid-sixties to establish bureaux in some 
of the remaining capitals of the world which before had 
no full-time staff; also, to the influence of the 
Vietnam war on Asian coverage. But the economic recess- 
ion of the early seventies, accompanied in the case of 
America by an inward-looking news-drift as a result of 
Watergate and allied domestic problems, almost certainly 
placed at least temporary brakes on such expansion. 
UPI in 1962 gave rather less emphasis to domestic news- 
coverage than AP in terms of bureaux. Domestic bureaux 
accounted for 58°ä of UPI's total for that year, still a 
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hefty proportion. Weiner (1972) lists 100 domestic 
UPI bureaux, and the agency's publicity material for 
the same year gives a total of 238 bureaux altogether, 
indicating that foreign bureaux outnumber domestic 
if the publicity material is correct. UPI's definition 
of a. bureau is very liberal by comparison with AP's. 
But this kind of problem of comparison besets the scholar 
very frequently in the study of news agencies. A more. 
comparable figure for UPI's overseas bureaux was given 
as 100 in an internal AFP report in. 19o5.20 Even this 
figure probably included many 'bureaux' which were simply 
locations of occasional or part-time correspondents. 
A count of foreign bureaux listed in the Editor and 
Publisher Yearbook for 1974 excluding those where the 
'news correspondent' is found 'care of' a newspaper 
(indicating stringer status) or where there is only a 
reference to some larger bureau in another country, 
gives a total of 64 foreign bureaux for UPI (no count 
for AP). The same source lists only 94 domestic 
bureaux for UPI, so that on these figures the proportion 
of domestic to total bureaux is 59.5%, a slight increase 
on 1962.21 It would seem therefore, that UPI devotes 
more of its resources (on this measurement) to foreign 
news-gathering. than AP, possibly in an effort to 
compensate for AP's much stronger position on the 
domestic market (cf. Ch. 3). 
Measurement of the relative importance of the domestic 
market by the number of bureaux in domestic and foreign 
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markets is necessarily a crude measurement. A bureau 
may vary in size from one man to one hundred men. 
Variations in the number of bureaux may be considered 
less important in some respects than investments in 
communications and new technology, although, as we will 
see, the United States is usually first beneficiary of 
new innovations introduced by the American agencies in 
any case. The extra revenue taken in from the provinces 
is less than half of the expenditure deficit on overseas 
markets. One may suppose that some 16 million of the 
77 million francs anticipated in 1972 from State 
subscriptions, mostly paid in Paris, went towards 
supporting the agency's overseas burden. 
The relative sizes of domestic and foreign bureaux 
constitute a further indication of the overriding 
importance of the domestic market especially in the case 
of the U. S. agencies. The bureau size of a middle- 
ranking domestic AP bureau compares quite favourably with 
the bureau size of an average overseas bureau. Take 
for instance the AP bureau in Philadelphia, one of AP's 
ten 'hub' bureaux in the United States, responsible for 
the dissemination of regional news within the area 
covered by the 'hub' and one of three AP bureaux in 
Pennsylvania alone. This bureau in 1972 employed 22 
full-time journalist staffers, including photographers 
and excluding technicians. UPI's Philadelphia bureau 
was the agency's second most important bureau in the 
state, since the main bureau was in the state capital 
69. 
of Pittsburgh. Yet even the Philadelphia bureau housed 
a full-time staff of eight reporters, two maintenance 
m, en, one photographer and two operators. In Austria, 
on the other hand, AP in 1974 had a journalist staff 
of three, one of whom was a photographer, and UPI had 
a staff of six journalists, of whom 5 were engaged 
mainly on translation work for a German language news 
service. For Holland, AP had a journalist staff of 
three, UPI had two. In Italy there were 13 journalist 
staff for AP and 10 for UPI. 
The population of Philadelphia in 1973 was estimated to 
be under 2 million (U. S. census figures quoted in 
Editor and Publisher Yearbook 1974). For the American 
agencies this city was considered rather more important, 
measured in manpower resources, than Austria (population 
in 1969 of over 7 million), and Holland (population in 
1970 nearly 13 million), and about as important as 
Italy (population in 1969 over 53 million), (national 
population figures given in Pears Encyclopedia 1971). 
Non-European bureaux are not generally as well-staffed 
by American agencies, or by any of the agencies, as 
European bureaux. 
Distribution of resources in favour of the home market 
would be meaningless in this context if it were not 
accompanied by a superiority of service. Once again, 
the evidence in the case of the American agencies is 
overwhelming; and impressive in the case of AFP. The 
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American agencies in the first place simply offer a 
much greater variety of services for their domestic 
clients or members than are generally available 
overseas. The important services offered by AP 
to its members and clients in the United States are the 
'A' and 'B' national wires and the state or regional 
wires. There is a special broadcast wire for radio 
and television stations, and a wirephoto service for the 
press. In addition to these services there are others 
of lesser importance, like the economic news wire which 
mostly carries stock market figures. It is immediately 
evident in comparing the domestic and overseas situation 
that there is far greater differentiation of the"American 
market in terms of services than there is overseas., The 
broadcast wire for broadcast organizations is one example. 
It is not simply a question of the content received, but 
the convenience with which it is received. Small clients 
can arrange to take a single wire which carries all the 
main ingredients of the other wires. This service is 
compiled at state or 'hub' level. Most newspaper 
clients for AP (and most of these remarks apply equally 
to UPI) can receive their services in teletypesetter form, 
which means that they can transmit agency material into 
print without the need for further manual typesetting 
on their part. A few already subscribe in 1975 to 
datastream services which allow the client to dial the 
stories he requires in advance. 
The national 'A' wire carries priority national and 
international news. The 'B' wire carries news of 
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lower priority, as well as articles, features and types 
of relatively 'timeless' material. Much of the 'B' 
wire material is destined for certain localities or 
even for specific clients. The 'state' or regional 
wires, needless'to say, carry a high proportion of 
local news in addition to the general fare of national 
and international news. The broadcast wire carries 
relatively little news, reflecting the lower news 
consumption of its clients. It is edited in a form 
convenient for immediate use by newsreaders, and goes 
out in short, regular cycles. There are more than 
twice as many broadcast clients as there are newspaper 
clients for the agencies. Most of them are small, so 
that they may not be as important as sources of revenue 
as the press, but important all the same. 
Foreign clients of the American agencies generally 
have nothing like the choice available to U. S. clients. 
They usually have one wire only, although in some 
countries it is possible for them to have a 'B' wire as 
well. Sometimes they are totally dependent on selections 
of the service made by a national agency, but in any 
a 
case they have no control over the volume of the service 
offered nor over the content.. Wirephoto is generally 
available, although cable transmission is possible only 
in Europe and Mexico. In most other parts of the 
world, radio rather than'satellite is still used; and 
in some parts, clients who cannot afford the charges 
entailed rely on air mail. Where costs of transmission 
are exceptionally high, in other words, the client has 
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to face the prospect either of paying these himself, in 
effect, or doing without the service. The agency will 
take the initiative only where a reasonably good market 
is already established. 
U. S. clients or members of the American agencies enjoy 
certain refinements in the news coverage they receive 
which affect overseas clients only indirectly, if at all. 
AP, for instance, unlike UPI, maintains a 'Special 
Assignments' team in Washington, whose members work on 
longer-term projects that require the kind of 'digging' 
and 'investigative reporting' that is not common on 
ordinary news beats for the wire services. The 'Special 
Assignments' team tends to concentrate on Washington or 
federal stories which are of primarily domestic signif- 
icance, and therefore not geared specifically for the 
overseas market, and often not even transmitted overseas 
in any form. Much the same could be said of AP's 
'enterprise' output from New York, which has its own 
editor to inspire original coverage. Here again, 
domestic news stories appear to get the most attention. 
During the author's visit between the middle of. February 
and the middle of April 1972, for example, only one 
out of 21 'enterprise' stories had a direct bearing on 
foreign affairs and this was a five-part. series titled 
'The Road to Peking, U. S. Chinese Relations', by Dill 
Ryan. The domestic stories included a report from 
consumer writer Dave Wallace that standards for lead 
free gasoline were so high that emission control devices 
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would not work; an article by science writer Brian 
Sullivan that gave depth treatment to the vitamin E fad; 
an account of the controversial ITT-Hartford hire merger 
by business writer David Burke. Naturally, topics of 
this kind are likely to be of interest to other countries, 
especially those which are linked with the United States 
by reason of culture, politics, economics and technology. 
But they are inspiredby the needs, or the perceived 
possible interests, of the domestic U. S. 'market. 
The bulk of AP's members in the United States has to be 
greatly impressed with this kind of enterprise or 
investigative reporting before it will consider using it. 
Many papers do not even notice the stories going out over 
the wires. Traditional resistance to 'heavy coverage' 
by the smaller papers and dislike of using material that 
the competition might also use, are two problems quite 
apart from the expense, and which help explain why it 
was not until 1965 that the Special Assignment team was 
created (by AP General Manager Wes Gallagher). In 
1969 the team won the Worth Bingham Prize 'for a steady 
stream of reports spotlighting corruption, waste, 
bureaucratic bungling and other government practices 
ill-serving the public interest'. The shift towards 
more emphasis on depth coverage under Gallagher did 
assume some change in market feeling. In his 1967 
address Gallagher claimed that "research had revealed 
that 'members want more enterprise reporting and less 
police-blotter type of coverage' and that as a result 
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'AP has concentrated increasingly on trends, or reporting 
of social change and its effect on society and the 
individual's way of life"'. 
24 
But the limits to the public appetite for this kind of 
reporting are severe, as AP recognises. Seymour Hersh, 
who exposed the My Lai massacre story, walked out on 
the Special Assignments team after the AP slashed one of 
his pieces on biological warfare from 10,000 to 1,700 
words. A decade earlier even 1000 words would'have 
been extremely unlikely. In 1969 Paul Miller, President 
of AP, told AP Managers' Editors Association (APME) that 
lengthy 'specials' from AP were not getting the play in 
the newspapers the wire service had hoped they would 
receive. 
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Nevertheless, the Special Assignments team 
has survived well into the seventies and looks like a 
fixture. 
AP's 'enterprise' reporting is based largely on a 
bank of specialists maintained in New York. This 
bank was greatly expanded during the sixties, and 
includes writers on racial developments, consumer 
interests, science, aerospace, education, religion, 
urban affairs, auto racing and golf. There is a task 
force of writers for enterprise projects in addition to 
the news-gatherers, and a task force of photographers 
stationed across the country and on immediate call of 
the Photo desk, who can be brought in for either spot 
news or enterprise developments. 
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There are few such specialists outside the United States. 
Nobody really likes to use the term 'specialist' at all 
overseas, where every correspondent can be called on at 
anytime for any kind of coverage. But there are one or 
two journalists in the larger bureaux who spend most of 
their time working within a specific area. In London's 
AP bureau there is a diplomatic correspondent and a sports 
specialist. Diplomacy and sport are the fields which 
most frequently attract specialist attention overseas. 
Economic reporting for AP is largely taken care of by 
AP-Dow Jones; but in the case of UPI this is another 
field which in the larger bureaux often occupies one 
man full-time. The majority of bureaux, however, do not 
have specialists. Nor can they usually enjoy the option 
of calling in a specialist from a regional centre in the 
way that regional bureaux in the United States can request 
the services of a specialist from the New York Head Office. 
A. encv-Client Relationships 
Clients with specific information requirements, or who 
wish the American agencies to follow up stories for them 
on an exclusive basis, would do better on the whole to be 
situated in the United States. Some requests are more 
easily dealt with than others. If a request is for 
information that has already gone out over the wires, the 
client has merely to be referred to the right number and 
time of story. If it asks for information which will 
be covered in any case during the course of the day, there 
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is no extra work involved. Problems arise when the 
request is slightly unusual, raising new angles or issues 
an agency would not normally bother with. In such cases, 
a request has more chance when the material which is asked 
for is also suitable, or can easily he made suitable, for 
many other clients in the same region or even around the 
world. But if the material does not have such 'sales 
prospects', the client is very likely to be charged for 
the sorvice. It is in the nature of the general 
structural imbalance characteristic of the agencies that 
requests coming from those parts of the world where the 
agencies commit fewest resources, and where clients are 
less wealthy, will create the most extra work and cost. 
Media in the developing world, having fewer alternative 
sources of foreign news than media in the west, are more 
likely to have greater reason for putting in special 
requests. Their very geographical position is likely 
to make their interests somewhat unusual or individual, 
and they are not likely to be able to pay for the extra 
effort involved. UPI's Washington bureau houses a 
regional desk established in 1961 to handle special 
client requests from the domestic market. A regional 
editor supervises the activities of six Washington 
reporters, each of whom is responsible for looking after 
the interests of a major geographical division. The 
reporter in charge of the North West division knows that 
anything which is discussed in Washington about the lumber 
industry is likely to interest the clients of his area. 
The regional reporters are there to anticipate client 
requests and to respond to them when they come. They 
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expect some fifty requests or so a day altogether, relayed 
either through state capital bureaux or from the clients 
themselves direct. Similar though smaller regional desks 
exist in New'York, Philadelphia, Chicago and Cleveland-. 
There is also an International desk which is meant to 
serve the interests of overseas clients in a similar way, 
and this is staffed by nine journalists. It is slightly 
larger in full-time manpower than the regional desk which 
caters for domestic clients, but then the regional desk 
has, right beside it, some 36 full-time staff of the 
general news desk whose assistance can be called on if 
necessary, not to mention the three journalists for the 
broadcast wire, three for a local Washington wire and 
five for the audio service - all mainly domestic services. 
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Journalists on the inter-national desk are for the most 
part covering r<öutine Washington 'beats', but looking for 
international angles, rather than responding directly to 
specific client requests, although they do some of this 
too. Their main function in any case is to provide 
adequate Washington information to the rest of the world. 
Washington is the only capital in the world which the 
American agencies consider merits this kind of attention. 
There is no similar machinery to the International desk 
in any non-American capital. Special requests from 
overseas clients to American agency bureaux outside the 
United States would have to compete with the pressures 
on Ehe journalists who staff them to produce a basic 
service, as well as compete against the requirements of 
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more important clients. Since requests are often more 
likely to go to high crisis or especially 'newsy' points, 
the competition is. intense. In Saigon in early 1973 
there was such a back-log of requests from U. S. clients, 
that it could take up to several months to clear them. 
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Under such conditions, non-American clients would probably 
have stood even less of a chance. 
Client consumption of news stories is monitored by the 
American agencies around the world, and. rather more 
closely than by the European agencies. Local bureaux 
send in to their regional Head Office or to New York 
weekly accounts of how the important papers of their area 
used the material they received from each agency. Scores 
are compiled to show which of the U. S. agencies 'won' on 
each important story; the agency which 'loses' may note 
why it lost: a certain angle missed, a delay in trans- 
mission, failure to back a story with a photograph. In 
this way, each organization builds up a fairly good picture 
of its relative strength in each client area and in each 
news-area. The reports, AP Log and UPI Reporter, are 
sent to every bureau for general reading. The assessments 
of their competitive position cannot be completely accurate. 
Not all newspapers are necessarily monitored every week; 
it sometimes is impossible to tell where an unsourced 
news item originated; and a bureau chief may not always 
want to send in too accurate a picture! Nevertheless, 
the weekly record is one of the agencies' most important 
forms of feedback. Records of client consumption are 
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as keenly kept outside the United States as in the 
interior. 
In other respects, the quality of client-agency relation- 
ship is far superior inside the United States. This is 
especially apparent in the case of AP which provides the 
organizational and referent framework for the APME. 
This association of editors frone member papers of AP 
each year establishes a number of committees which sit 
to discuss and organize research into aspects of AP 
functioning and of their own newspaper problems. More 
than 500 editors sat on APME committees in 1971. The 
Association offers various awards for outstanding coverage 
each year, such as the Public Service Award and the Freedom 
of Information Award. In November 1974, Brooks Jackson, 
a member of AP's Special Assignments team in the Washington 
bureau, and photographer Chick Harrity, also of the 
Washington bureau, were given APME's 'top performance' 
awards. Each received 0500 and a plaque. Jackson was 
singled out for his coverage of the milk producers' 
. political 
campaign contributions and Harrity was honoured 
for his picture of former President Nixon as he bade 
farewell to his staff. 
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The scope of APME committees from year to year is tremendous. 
In 1974, the Writing and Editing Committee compiled a list 
of 50 common errors in newspaper writ: iitg. Most were 
matters of word usage; others concerned spelling or 
grammatical rules. 
29 
The Committee on Professional 
Standards in 1972 conducted a survey of editors on their 
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attitudes to gifts and publicity junkets, and found 
that 55% did not rule out free gifts, and only 20°0 
did. APME committees in 1969 were able to tell 
American newspapers that fully half of a survey of. 
260 newspaper readers across the country reported a 
lack of confidence in their newspaper in one respect 
or another, and that another survey of 53 persons 
demonstrated that American newspapers had a credibility 
gap of substantial proportions. 
Especially important are the committees which assess AP's 
performance. In August 1969, for instance, the Media 
Competition Committee reported that AP was gaining in 
competition with the TV networks in coverage of space 
shots. 
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The Business News Committee in 1971 delivered 
a comprehensive survey of editors' attitudes towards 
business news services. One member of the Committee 
contacted a 
. 
cross-section of editors from large and 
small dailies, asking them to have. their financial 
editors communicate with local persons in the business 
field and get their reactions on the news coverage of 
the AP in that category. He reported that AP business 
news did not get a high rating from businessmen because 
they used the Wall Street Journal as their bible. 
"Businessman generally agreed that the AP 
is shallow in its coverage in that field 
and inferior to the Wall Street Journal 
and the Dow Jones ticker, but most rated 
it above the United Press International 
service. "31 
Although APME's research is far from meeting academic 
standards, there can be little doubt that the AP 
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relationship with Its members through APME helps create 
a unity of identity amongst members, a reliable and 
powerful means of feedback, an. impetus to excellence in 
professional practice and a forum for new ideas that is 
not matched by any of the other agencies, least of all 
the European agencies. It is not a criticism of AP 
members to say that they look after their own interests 
first, but it is important for an understanding of world 
news flow to appreciate the vital domestic character of 
the two American agencies and the concentration of 
organizational vitality on home ground. 
UPI, possibly in deliberate emulation of. APME, established 
a similar organization. UPI had traditionally held a 
conference of editors and publishers every year (EDICON) 
but this did not have the continuous backing features of 
APME. The EDICON meeting held in Mexico City in 1973 
voted overwhelmingly in favour of the establishment of 
a national newspaper advisory board. The main function 
of the board would be to 'assist and advise UPI executives 
on ways the agency may carry out its goals and purposes 
for the benefit of the profession'. 
32 
Rod Beaton, UPI 
President, hinted at one motive behind the agency's 
encouragement of the scheme: - 
"In particular we feel communication advances 
and technical innovations, affecting us all, 
make it essential for the closest possibl 
liaison with those who use UPI services. " 
3 
The board's activities would focus on assisting UPI in 
charting common management goals, principles and policies 
82. 
designed to strengthen UPI services. They would include 
consideration of issues relating to clews-gathering and 
dissemination, both foreign and domestic. The board was 
also to be charged with evaluating and developing services 
geared to a high standard of performance. It was instructed 
to work with UPI in research and development of new methods 
and systems in editorial and production areas. 
The 
. 
fi teer. -t:: cmber Newspaper Advisory Board held its first 
meeting in Chicago in the Spring of '74. Board members 
had been elected to represent the five major U. S. regions: 
Central, East-Northeast, Southwest9 West and South- 
Southeast. An early intention to include non-U. S. media 
representatives did not materialize. The holding of the 
annual EDICON conference in London in 1975 indicated some 
intention to focus the attention of European media in the 
agency's direction, but this was not followed up by a 
broadening of Advisory Board membership to include non-U. S. 
media. The board set up working committees and partic- 
ipated in a general discussion of news service activities. 
Three working committees were announced: the Services 
Committee which would study and make recommendations on 
the various UPI services, including news and news-picture; 
the Management Committee which would consult with UPI 
senior executives on operational matters; and the 
Technology Committee. In a meeting in the autumn of 1974 
the chairman of the Services Committee reported on a 
survey of more than 30 papers' news priorities. He found 
that they 'emphasised in-depth coverage on the significant 
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stories of the day'. Another member claimed the Board 
would function to help establish priorities for the 
future: 
'In this electronic age, we have the capacity 
to deliver almost any kind of service any- 
where in the world. We must take advantage 
of each technological advance. We must make 
UPI a wire service for the 1970's, tailored 
to adapt to the last quarter of the 21st 
century. It is important that we become 
not merely a patched up, makeshift version of 
the 70-year-old service. We need only to 
establish priorities. This is the function 
of the advisory board, to advise and consent - 
and dissent where necessary. We will not 
run the UPI or presume to speak for its 
subscribers, but simply act as a bridge for 
the two. ' 34 
A new development of the UPI Advisory Board in late 1971i, 
along lines similar to the organization of AP1ý1E at the 
state level, was the introduction of a committee of 
New England editors whose stated function was to assist 
UPI in meeting the news requirements of newspapers in 
the six-state New England area. The first committee 
meeting considered-the status of the UPI news writing- 
photography contest and the wire service's annual New 
England newspaper subscribers' convention. In parallel 
with AP's decision in 1976 to allow Broadcast members 
representation on AP's Board of Directors, UPI estab- 
lished a Broadcast Advisory Board that same year, with 
a similar brief to its neorspaper counterpart. 
No organization similar to APRIL or UPI's NAB exists in 
conjunction with Reuters' activities or those of AFP. 
These organizations do not follow client consu: Iiption of 
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their material quite as scrupulously as the American 
agencies; they are not quite so concerned to assess 
their competitive position in this respect. Naturally 
there is a great deal of interaction of an informal 
day-to-day kind between the European agencies and their 
clients, but this interaction is rarely systemised for 
hard inspection. In the case of Reuters and to a 
lesser extent in the case of AFP, the reason for this is 
partly that they do not have the large homogenous market 
of the American agencies. If they were to gather together 
sufficient numbers of editors and publishers every year on 
a scale similar to the American agency annual conferences, 
they would have to cope with problems of language and of 
great differences in interest between media of different 
countries. That is to say, they would have to organise 
truly international conferences, whereas the American 
agency conferences are almost entirely domestic affairs. 
If the European agencies were to try to do for their 
clients what the American agencies, especially AP, do 
for theirs in this respect, they would be breaking new 
ground indeed. So far they have not tried. There are 
organizations tichich try to do for the international 
market what the American agencies do for their domestic 
market. There. is the International Press Institute, 
for instance, which amongst other things produces an 
annual report on censorship and freedom of the press 
around the world (AP also produces a is: imilar but less 
well documented annual survey). The greatest problem 
of all in the European case may be that the market is not 
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as stable as the U. S. domestic market, and the agencies in 
Europe may feel there is not the same kind of reward to 
be gained. On the other hand, one of the aims of the 
American agency organizations is to enhance the profit- 
ability of their members and clients, and to seek ways 
of improving the relationship between newspapers and 
their readers on the principle that what is good for 
their newspapers is good for the agencies. 
Reuters is necessarily an exception in this section, 
which is concerned with agency facilities for domestic 
clients, because it is not : involved in the home market 
to quite the same extent as the other agencies are in 
theirs, nor can it be said that the scope or quality of 
its services for U. K. clients is noticeably different from 
the services offered to, say its European clients, although 
there are significant differences when the European market 
is compared with, say, markets in the southern hemisphere. 
AFP shares something in common with the American agencies, 
in the importance it attaches to the domestic French 
: Harket, although not to the same extreme in all respects. 
France is its most important source of revenue, as we have 
seen, accounting for almost 80% of the total, largely 
because of funds injected through State clients; and France 
attracts the heaviest expenditure, around 6756 of the total. 
A sizeable proportion of all clients are situated withiri 
the country - approxiinately. 23, o if State clients of Paris 
are excluded - and 15% of all major bureaux. 
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Just as some of the middle-ranking North American 
bureaux of the U. S. agencies are better endowed with 
resources than some of the middle-ranking European 
bureaux of the same agencies, some of. AFP's French 
provincial bureaux are more heavily manned than certain 
bureaux which cover whole European countries. AFP 
divides France into 13 metropolitan regions. Of these, 
Marseilles is probably the most important. There were 
more clients here in 1972 than in any other region, 
including 13 newspapers, 2 ORTF stations and 3 regional 
prefectures. 
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The bureau was manned by a regional 
director, six journalists and six technicians. Lyon, 
with eleven newspaper clients and also staffed by six 
journalists as well as support staff, was second most 
important. Each of the regions has a regional director 
and between two and six full-time journalists. There 
are two for Clermont-Ferrand, three each for Lille, Nice 
and Le Havre, four each for Metz, Renne and Toulouse. 
These figures compare quite favourably with some middle- 
ranking European bureaux. The Madrid bureau, which is 
additionally important as a source of news for AFP's South 
American clients, has a staff of four editorial men in 
addition to a director and auxiliary staff. In Vienna, 
the journalist staff consists of one director and three 
editors. Athens has an editorial staff of three. 
There is a high concentration of manpower within France 
itself. In 1972, AFP distributed to 26 European countries, 
110 African, 20 Asian and 21 American countries and 
i; 
territories. Including bureau chiefs, it maintained 88 
editorial staff in Europe and 83 support staff (outside 
France); 84 editorial and 77 support staff in Asia; 57 
editorial and 50 support staff in Africa; 46 editorial 
and 86 support staff in South America; 23 editorial and 
22 support staff in North America; 41 editorial and 38 
support staff in the Middle East. In France itself the 
agency maintained 60 editorial and 88 support staff in 
the provinces and a team of eight journalists on the 
provincial desk in Paris. Excluding the non-provincial 
staff in Paris, therefore, 179% of AFP's editorial strength 
around the world was concentrated in France, and 19% of 
its technical support staff. The percentage of total 
editorial staff accounted for by the French provinces 
is not very different therefore from the percentage of 
the total number of major bureaux. 
All four of the western global agencies tend to appoint 
nationals of their own countries to senior executive 
posts overseas. This is a further indication of their 
concern that the needs of the home market should receive 
top priority. One senior news executive of an American 
agency in Europe, asked about the declining number of 
locally-recruited bureau chiefs in his area, linked it 
directly with the increasing concern of his superiors 
for meeting tie news requirements of domestic U. S. 
newspapers. 
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Given the heavily national character 
of the agencies in other respects it also makes for 
convenience in organizational control to appoint fellow 
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nationals overseas, and this provides a wider range of 
career possibilities for domestic staff. Information 
on the nationalities of bureau chiefs was collected from 
a total of 145 bureaux around the world excluding domestic 
bureaux. Of these, 97 or G7% were nationals of their 
agency's base country and a further 13 or. 9% were nationals 
of another agency's base country (for instance, a French 
national working for an American or British agency) or 
white Commonwealth (usually Australian) nationals, and 
35 or 211% were locally recruited from the country covered 
by the bureaux, (cf. Ch. 10). There were no remarkable 
differences between the agencies. Many of the bureaux 
in the charge of locally-recruited bureaux chiefs were 
very small, ones which transmitted their stories to 
regional head offices for clearance before being placed 
on the main distribution circuits. 
Services for Overseas: Dependence and 
Independence in Distribution. 
The scope of client choice in the case of subscribers 
to the U. S. agencies is much greater inside the United 
States than outside. The same is also true for AFP's 
French clients: there is greater scope for them to 
choose than for non-French clients. Regional AFP 
provincial bureaux, for example, gather regional news to 
insert alongside the national and international news 
service from Paris for clients in their area. AFP clients 
outside of France generally receive just the one service 
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directed to their region from Paris, with very little 
if anything added by the local bureau. In many cases 
they receive the service through a national news agency 
which makes heavy cuts in volume and has its own standards 
of selection. 
Distribution via national news agencies occurs for a 
variety of reasons. Some governments require their 
media to takeinternational services in this way; some 
media prefer this distribution system because it is less 
costly on them individually; the agencies may choose to 
distribute this way where they do not wish to meet the 
costs of translation and distribution themselves, or simply 
because the national agency can pay more than the potential 
market of individual clients. Sometimes it happens that 
the arrangement with a national agency is not exclusive, 
and clients have the choice of taking the service in a 
truncated form through a national agency or subscribing 
to the global agency direct, or taking the full service 
of the global agency but through the communications 
facilities of the national agency. 
The question of whether a client chooses or is obliged 
to take a global agency service through a national agency 
or not, or whether a global agency distributes directly 
or indirectly, has some very practical relevance to the 
quality of global agency services available. In some 
respects there has been an increasing preference for 
independent distribution by the global agencies for their 
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overseas clients over the last few decades, and in other 
respects a fall-back. The following data was collated 
from interview evidence. Statistical 'i_-nformation in the 
case of (mainly) third world non-aligned countries is 
presented in Table 2 on page 96 
Naturally, where government restrictions impose 
distribution through a national agency, the global 
agencies cannot do very much about it. This happens 
most of all in African countries, some Asian countries 
(most noticably India), and in communist countries. In 
South America there is not much choice because there are 
hardly any 'national agencies' with a monopoly on their 
home market in the way that there are in Europe, or wkth 
extensive leased communication facilities in the interior 
of their countries. AFB' distributes through national 
agencies wherever a suitable agency exists, as a general 
rule, although not always on an exclusive basis. Of 
course, if the alternative to taking the agency service 
through a national agency is taking the full service in 
French as is sometimes the case, then that is not really 
an alternative in those places where French is not commonly 
spoken. 
Reuters has exhibited a tendency towards independence 
from national agencies in recent years, but there are 
severe economic restrictions on the extent to which it 
can go. The most noticeable examples are nothing to do 
with distribution but with news-gathering - in the United 
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States and in France it no longer takes the domestic 
news services of AP and AFP as it once did. The most 
forceful example of a move to independence in distribution 
is in Uest Germany where Reuters 'rio longer distributes 
through the West German agency DPA, out instead delivers 
the service directly. This step was taken unwillingly 
by the agency, however, after UPI's successful bid for 
the contract in 1972. 
In Europe, Reuters translates into French and German for 
direct distribution. AFP, which distributes through 
national agencies in most European countries, translates 
into German and English. Its Spanish and Portugese 
translations are for the South American market only. 
The English translation is most of all suitable for 
Britain, and is also transmitted to Scandinavia where 
English is more acceptable than French. AFP also uses 
English for transmissions to North America, Asia (except 
Indochina), and Anglophone Africa. In Germany the 
agency has traditionally distributed independently, and 
now woes 
through the newly established German agency DDP. 
This is not an exclusive contract, and individual news- 
papers can also be furnished with the German language 
service. The German service also goes to, the Democratic 
Republic of. Germany, Austria and Swwitzerlhnd. 
UPI which once stressed the need for independence in 
distrib'it-. i_on, has undergone a recent policy change, one 
result of which is a preference for distribution through 
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national agencies where this can be suitably arranged. 
In West Germany it goes via DPA. The only European 
countries in which UPI now (1976) maintains independent 
distribution, (which also means translation of the service 
from English into the local language) is in France and 
in Austria. The translated services for Scandinavia 
were phased out from 1975 to be replaced by contracts 
with Scandinavian agencies. 
AP, on the other hand, has tried to maintain independent 
distribution as long as possible. AP services in trans- 
lation are still distributed in France, Italy, Holland, 
Germany, Austria, Norway and Sweden. Belgium receives 
services in Dutch and French; Switzerland gets services 
in French, German and Italian. In Spain, AP is distributed 
through. 'the Spanish agency EFE, which translates the service. 
The Spanish situation is explained partly by AP's relative 
lack of success in attracting clients there, and partly 
by Spanish preference for distribution of global services 
through EFE which is government controlled. In Portugal, 
AP had no clients for her news services in the early '70's. 
Signs of retrenchment on the policy of independent 
distribution were further evident when the Danish service 
was discontinued in 1974. 
In South America the two American agencies and AFP 
generally distribute independently. The emergence of 
strong national agencies in Argentina and Brazil in the 
1970's, however, and AP's 1976 agreement with the Brazilian 
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agency, Agenda JB (AJB) whereby AJD will distribute AP 
news and photo services, indicates a change in direction. 
Up until now all three agencies have translated both into 
Spanish and Portugese. In Canada, AP transmits in French 
and Italian as well as English. UPI provides French and 
English services. Reuters and AFF distribute mainly 
through the Canadian national agency, Canadian Press (CP), 
in French and English. 
All four agencies transmit in both French and English for 
Africa. Reuters, AFP and UPI tend to go through national 
agencies. Neither of the American agencies have substantial 
markets in Africa, and in fact UPI withdrew its service to 
: Test Africa in the early seventies because of bad debts 
accumulated by its clients in that region. AP still 
maintains its preference for independent distribution. In 
Kenya, for example, where it has only one main media client, 
the Kenyan national radio, it is the only one of the four 
agencies that does not go through the Kenyan News Agency 
(KNA). In the Middle East, Reuters now provides a full 
Arabic service translated (up to 1975) in Beirut; AFP 
provides a locally translated service in Egypt, but the 
translation is by the Egyptian agency AIENA. Distribution 
in the Lebanon is independent for all the agencies but 
impossible in Egypt. In Israel AP is the only agency 
not to distribute through the Israeli news agency. 
Services -to Asia are generally in English, the nearest 
thing to a regional lingua franca. But French is also 
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used for Indochina. Distribution on the Indian sub- 
continent is through national agencies for the most part, 
although for AP and UPI at least this is because of 
political pressure and not choice. In Japan, distribution 
in Tokyo is direct for the national media in the case of 
Reuters, AP and UPI, but through the Japanese agencies 
for the provincial market. The global agencies do not 
translate into Japanese. Nor do they translate into 
Chinese except for local bulletins distributed in some 
Asian countries. In other Asian countries the situation 
is variable. As a general rule, AFP is the most inclined 
to distribute through a local agency; Reuters is normally 
willing to consider doing so on commercial grounds if it 
pays, which it usually does, and UPI increasingly takes 
the same attitude. Only AP puts up a real resistance 
although. there is not much it can do against government 
dictate. The different attitudes towards distribution 
by the agencies as described above were very apparent 
in the course of interviews in 1973 with senior news 
executives in Malaysia when it was thought the government 
would require the global agencies to distribute through 
the national agency ßernarna. 
When a global agency for one reason or another distributes 
through a local agency, for the client this means a 
greatly truncated service. The advantage on the other 
hand may be that the national agency subscribes to more 
than one global agency and selects from them both, or all 
four as is sometimes the case. The standards of story. 
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selection by the agency may or may not work in favour of 
the client's interests. A pilot study of the foreign 
wire of the U. K. 's Press Association for instance 
indicated that the British national agency may simply 
reinforce certain content imbalances of the Reuters 
and AP services to wbich it subscribes in its selection 
from their files, so that news of America and news 
related to British interests are given even more 
prominence than on the original wires, (see Ch. 12). 
The danger of indirect distribution for the quality of 
global news agency services on the other hand is that 
editors tend to structure the overseas wires with more 
of an eye to. keeping the content simple and straight- 
forward, so that it can be easily translated, than with 
providing as comprehensive a service as possible. The 
same danger is just as evident however when the agency 
itself undertakes the translation. A senior executive 
in New York's UPI office explained that incoming 
international news for the domestic market was easier 
to handle than outgoing news for the international market, 
precisely because greater care had to he given to 
presentation and language in the latter case. 
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This 
applied as much to news agency clients who translated 
the service for themselves as for UPI overseas bureaux 
which did the translation. The pressure is one of speed. 
Translation is laborious; it slows tip the transmission 
process, and may hurt the agency's Competitive position. 
In one way or another if a service has to be translated 
it has to be translated . for all the agencies; the question 
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is: who does it? If the agency does the translation it 
can control the rate of translation by employing the 
right people; but if the client does the translation 
the competence of the translators may vary tremendously. 
Translation also costs money, and the more there is to do 
the more expensive it is. The most important immediate 
consequence is a drastic reduction in wordage. On Friday 
March 5th, 1974, for example, AP carried almost 54,000 
words on the European 'A' wire, and almost 62,000 words 
on the African wire. The Paris wire on the other, hand, 
which is translated into French by the Paris bureau of AP, 
carried only 21,600 words after translation, less than 
half the volume of the European and African wires. Many 
respondents testified to this effect of translation on 
volume. 
Table 2. 
Sales to Non-Aligned Countries by Three News Agencies 





tzoxr . Dir- ect 
uov dir= 
Oct 
` Cxoý-t . 
Region 18 5 4 5 8 7 10 
Africa 41 2 3 1 - 5 27 
Asia 14 2 4 1 3 3 6 
Americas 9 8 - 7 - 5 2 
Europe 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 
Total 85 19 12 15 12 22 46 
Note: The table illustrates in the case of non-aligned 
countries, the tendency for AP to resist indirect distri- 
bution where possible and the greater degree of direct 
distribution in the Americas. Note also the greater volume 
of distribution activity by Reuters in Africa and the 
Arabic region. 
Source: Pinch, Edward T. (1977)3 
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Regionalization o 'News Services 
Within the home markets of the agencies, with the c: cept: i. on 
of Reuters, fairly considerable attention is given to 
domestic regional news requirements. Only about a 
quarter of. AP's trunk wire is given over to international 
news; the rest is national or state. The 13' wire, 
which carries less international news than the 'A' wire 
is very heavily state-oriented. 
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Within recent years 
(early 1970's) there has been a tendency for the American 
agencies to focus on problems concerning the provision of 
state and inter-state news, and this trend has been greatly 
facilitated by new computerized operations. AFP also 
makes special provision for the inclusion or regional 
provincial news to its French clients. 
Overseas, the percentage of 'local nervst on these three 
global agency services, or news referring to the country 
in which the service is distributed, is considerably 
smaller than the percentage of national and state news 
on their domestic wires. Generally it is almost non- 
existent. In some countries the global agencies have 
agreements with local news agencies that they will not 
compete with them in the provision of local news. In 
any case, they say there is no point in competing with 
the local press, which has superior news-gathering 
facilities and sources. If the global agencies were 
seriously to compete with local media as a general rule, 
they could be cutting, their own throats since the local 
media, under pressure of competition, could cease 
*but cf. note 2, p. 957 
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subscrib: i. n; to these services and _loolc 
for others more 
compatible. There are a few countries in which the 
global agencies do actually compete with local media. 
The first of these is North America where Reuters has 
made a slight dent in the newspaper market with inter- 
national and -Prominent national news. But Reuters' 
success with American newspapers has been limited; in 
any case, it concentrates mostly on Washington news. 
No American paper would depend solely on Reuters. The 
other principal country is possibly the second wealthiest 
media market in the world: West Germany. Here AP and 
Reuters gather dnd distribute German news as well as 
selling international news.. Reuters does not try to 
cover more than the most important kinds of federal news. 
AP has a greater investment in covering news at a regional 
level but it is nowhere near as great as DPA's and few if 
any West German media would dare rely solely on AP. 
In no other country outside South America is there any 
serious attempt to cover local news for local distribution 
that is anything more. than the most prominent kind of 
national news, on which the global agencies might compete 
with local media in speed rather than depth. In South 
America there are a few countries in which the American 
agencies are important sources of local national news - 
in which they operate, that is, as national news agencies. 
This is due to the general absence of strong national 
agencies in South America, and to the weak, if prolific, 
character of South American media. In Chile the United 
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States agencies continued to perform this role even 
during the presidency of Salvador Allende. Allende did 
temporarily close down part of the UPI Santiago bureau iti 
September 1973 because, he alleged, UPI had been 
distributing 'false and partial news. taken from newspapers 
outside Chile' which gave a false picture of his government. 
The story he objected to was a report on secret meetings 
he was said to have had with left wing leaders in Ecuador 
and Columbia. The law, which was later rescinded, applied 
only to UPI's international service from abroad, not to 
the agency's internal services. AP operated an internal 
service in Argentina until the 1973 Peron government 
banned such services. 
Instead of seeking to provide national news of the country 
in which it distributes to media clients of that country, 
a global agency has the option of providing iriternat: ional 
news which is of special relevance to that country. The 
extent to which this actually occurs may be influenced 
by the consideration of the revenue importance of the 
country in question. The provision of news of special 
area relevance, as a proportion of total news supplied, 
is rarely very high. In the first place, wires that 
are compiled in New York, London or Paris, are destined 
for huge geographical areas. AP's 'European' wire is 
designed for almost all of Europe and some, of the 
Mediterranean area. In practice, AP 'regionalizes' its 
international -wire to a very small extent oiily 
* 
and 
senior news executives in London have said that this is 
*cf. important corrective note, note 3, p. 957 
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a specific policy decision. in the London bureau of AP, 
editors are supposed to insert regular regional material 
gathered from Europe and Africa into the flow of news 
from North America. But In the mid-1970's this has 
rarely been happening. In Nay 1972, AP reduced the 
editorial strength of its London bureau by between one 
quarter to a third when five U. S. journalists, three 
British journalists and one British photo-editor were 
removed, and not replaced. Staff shortages were 
blamed by a senior news executive in 1971, for a decline 
in the handling and transmission of regionally-gathered 
news to Europe and Africa. 
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This meant that New York 
was making the decisions about-what news was suitable 
for Europe and Africa with the aim of creating a single 
world service; rather than London making the decisions 
with the object of composing a service adequate at the 
regional level. Regional additions to the world file 
from New York can also be made in Tokyo for Asian and 
South East Asian clients. Local news executives in 
1973 deliberately underemphasized this function and 
gave the impression that relatively little was added 
in practice. One claimed that important news of 
specifically regional interest or of interest to just 
one country could be telexed to the appropriate bureau(x) 
for local insertion. But he also said this happened.. 
lfl 
infrequently. 
Another consequence of the staff reduction in London in 
1972 was that AP PIs wires to the United States from Europe 
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were reorganised so that some European news at certain 
times of the day went straight to New York for editing, 
without handling in London. This again removed the 
determination of criteria of relevance from the trained 
editors closest to the source, to New York. AP at this 
time was possibly worried at the introduction by UPI of 
a computerized multi-addressing system in London in 1971, 
accompanied by new. editorial procedures which eliminated 
regional editing in favour of direct coding of dispatches 
at source for specific destinations. UPI's system 
increased speed of transmission, amongst other things, 
and this may have persuaded AP to try to reduce London's 
editorial role in the news-flow, although AP did not have 
the technological facilities of UPI at that time (it 
eventually introduced them in 1975) nor had its editorial 
staff undergone the same training for direct transmission. 
Whether UPI's new system has actually increased news 
regionalization is a moot point, but content-analysis' 
for this study does indicate that for Europe at least, 
UPI's priorities are more regional than APIs, 
i2(soe 
Ch. 12). 
Of all the agencies, Reuters and AFP are the most region- 
alized. The extent of regionalization on Reuters African 
wires has not been found to exceed 3O0, 
t 
although Reuters, 
using a more liberal definition of 'regional interest' 
perhaps, claims higher percentages. All four global-. 
agencies appear to give particularly close attention, 
however, to North America and Western Europe, regardless 
of the destination of their wires, and this is explained 
more fully in Chapter 12. It is debatable whether this 
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emphasis reflects western market interests, or reflects 
the actual requirements of media in the developing world, 
or both. Even taking the figure of. 3011S regiorialization 
of news, it has to be considered that much of this 
'regional' material is in fact routine diplomatic material 
(meetings of dignitaries at airports, for example), or 
material which concerns the most dominant country of the 
region, (South Africa, Japan). So the extent to which 
news entering a country is of specific 'regional' interest 
to that country is even Hore limited than figures for 
regionalization would imply. But of course, definition 
of 'regional interest' is itself a hazardous enterprise. 
Technical Co; ninunicatiojis Facilities 
One further factor of inequality between domestic and 
some foreign markets concerns the technical quality of 
service reception by clients. The expansion of the 
American agencies in their early years is in part the 
history of communications in the United States, and in 
particular of cable couununicatioil. 
, 
for the European agencies. 
The same is true 
Between the world wars, the supremacy of cable was 
challenged by radio. The European agencies were 
particularly keen to exploit radio because their 
comprehensive services over vast distances to Asia and 
South America made it a very attractive medium. The 
American agencies also became involved with radio, but 
they retained a preference for cable wherever they could 
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afford it. After the Second World liar the American 
agencies put down cable networks across p and 
the European agencies followed. The introduction of 
telephoniccable in the early sixties heralded a new era 
for cable. 
Outside Europe and the United States, however, the agencies 
continued to rely mainly on radio communications. 
Transmissions went out from London and Paris to Southern 
Europe (Greece and Turkey), the Middle East and Africa. 
The European agencies sent -their services to the rar East, 
South-East Asia, Australasia and the Indian sub-continent 
by this method. The American agencies sent their trans- 
missions to these parts of the world across the Pacific. 
Radio transmission has a number of drawbacks: it is 
influenced by sun-activity and other atmospheric disturb- 
ances; Services can be disconnected for several hours. 
Messa ; es in relatively good times are orten arbled 
hey' 
. 
1. recognition. One study of international news 
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flow, into Afghanistan through the national news agency 
Dakhtar, sole source of foreign news for media in that 
country, found the copy received was frequently garbled 
and unusable because taken by radio teletype. Although 
most of the copy used by Dakhtar was fror-ii Reuters, AP 
and DPA, in that order, the cleanest and most complete 
copy cane from the New China News Agency, which was quite 
close by and had the strongest signal. 
lo4z 
Two important developments have occurred since the war. 
In some parts of the world there is a switch to cable 
from radio. And there is a tendency to use satellite 
instead of ordinary radio. Major developments along these 
lines occurred during the late sixties and early seventies 
in the Far East and South East Asia. The net result is 
an improved quality of co! mnunication between this region 
and the northern hemisphere, and a dual set of communi- 
cations within the region itself, depending on the state 
of development of the communications industry in each 
country. 
UPI set up Hong Kong as a regional centre in 1972, just 
as the year before it set up Brussels as a European 
centre. Both centres were equipped with computerized 
'message switching centres' to facilitate intrareional 
conmtunicat: ions. In South East Asia, leased lines were 
established between Hong Kong and Saigon, Phnom Pehn, 
Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Sydney. Radio 
communications were maintained as before for Korea, 
Indonesia, Burma, India and Pakistan. Hong Kong was 
linked with the United States by four cable and satellite 
circuits via Honolulu. 
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Reuters developed a similar system from the time it 
established Singapore as a major regional centre in 
1967. Singapore takes a trunk wire from London, and on 
the basis of this compiles a regionalized service, 
using copy sent in from other bureaux of the region. 
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This is sent out 1) y cable to those clients who can 
receive it in this fashion. However, like UPI, many 
countries of the region taking Reuters still take a 
radio service. This is the 'Pacific Wire', which 
combines world and regional news, is put together in 
Singapore, filed to London via Sydney, and is then sent 
back by radio to India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, 
Taiwan, East Malaysia and 'Korea. 
AP and AFP have not gone over to cable to the same extent. 
AP is linked by cable between Tokyo and San Frans: isco. 
An automatic relay system puts in-coining news into Tokyo 
on a radio distribution system for South East Asia. The 
Saigon bureau is exceptional in this network. The service 
is picked up by radio in Saigon, and there is a radio 
connection between Saigon and Hong Icon-, from which Saigon 
is in 'cable communication with New York. 
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AFP's main 
service is received by satellite in Hong Kong, which puts 
together a regional service and this is sent out by radio- 
teletype to clients in South East Asia. AFP has exploited 
satellite communication further than the other agencies, 
partly by devising new communications routes that help 
cut the higher costs. 
A substantial section of international agency clientele 
are still dependent on ordinary radio commünicat: Lon with 
all its imperfections. Satellite is superior to ordinary 
radio because the use of microwave communication between 
the earth and the satellite ranoves the dependence on the 
106. 
ionosphere Which is the source of many of the traditional 
problems in radio communication. Countries Which at 
the time of writing are still subject to those problems 
in reception of agency services include many large 
territories in the Far East and South East Asia, many 
parts of Africa and the Rliddle East, and to a lesser 
extent, Latin America. 
Eventually most countries of the world will be served by 
cable or by satellite for reception of agency services. 
It is difficult now to say whether cable will be super- 
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seded altogether by satellite. Many respondents in this 
project, including communication specialists, believe that 
the two will exist side-by-side for the forseeable future, 
but that satellite will dominate in the end. Insofar 
as the forces which have inspired the development of 
satellites are North American and European for the most 
part, the agencies are once again bound up, by virtue of 
their dependence on communication networks, with the 
consequences of big power politics. The less developed 
countries will be the last to benefit from these 
technological advances in the reception of news agency 
output. They do not have the necessary reception 
equipment, and their agency clients do not have the money 
to pay the subscription charges which the agencies would 
certainly impose if the agencies themselves were to 
initiate this kind of service improvement. 
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Summary 
In the case of at least three of the global agencies, 
therefore, clients who are located in the home territory 
of the agency or agencies to which they subscribe, enjoy 
a greater range and higher quality of service than clients 
located outside the home territory. 
In the case of Reuters, the advantage in favour of the 
home market client is less obvious, but the location of 
Reuters Head Office in London, the character of its 
ownership and the British nationality of most of its 
senior news-gatherers and executives, might be expected 
to work in favour of Anglo-Saxon news requirements. 
The next chapters will look at the importance of the 
home market as revenue-base in the course of the agencies' 
historical development. The process of securing this 
market facilitated the international expansion of the 
agencies, but because the home markets in question were 
wealthy markets they attracted competition and were 
secured only after struggle. 
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CMPTE; T. iO: Domestic ýIozionnly - .. ritain and France. 
The home territory of each of the global agencies is 
either the most important ('1P, UPI AFP) or one of the 
most important (Reuters) sources of its revenue. In 
the course of their early development , the agencies faced 
two major problems with respect to the domestic market, 
which were, firstly, how to secure the best possible market 
position and, secondly, having attained that position, how 
best to contain actual or potential competition, whether 
external or internal to their -national territories. 
In Britain, as this chapter argues, 
1 
the key to Reut. o rs 
dominant market position in the sale of international news 
was its relationship with the Press Association. A 
sym. pathet. i c.; but not necessarily an intimate relationship 
with the Establishment was of some im ortance, but not as 
useful a security as the shift to an ownership structure 
in which first the provincial press and later the national 
press were the major powers. In France, Havas achieved 
a dominant market position through its early involvement 
in tue sale of client's advertising space to non-media 
clients, and its close relationship with. the Government 
which secured State subsidies for its overseas activities 
at tines of financial stress. Its successor, AFP, does 
not have the same connections t. itli the, world of advertisers 
and financiers as IIavas, but does depend heavily on public 
or State clients for its overall revenue, arid this also 
helps maintain its do: »inaiit market position. 
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Both Reuters and AFP experience some measure of cormpct: Ltion 
on the home markets from both internal and external sources, 
but this appears to be more severe in the case of the French 
market. 
(i) Reuters 
Reuter had signed up most of. the London dailies as clients 
for his service of foreign news before 1860. Very soon 
he also supplied some of the leading provincial papers. 
But provincial papers which did receive a supply of foreign 
news by telegraph mostly took it from Electric and 
International Telegraph Company. Electric and International 
subscribed to Reuters and distributed its dispatches; the 
selection and distribution was controlled entirely by the 
company. The provincial newspapers still did not receive 
their foreign news as speedily as the London t5ress, because 
the primitive character of early telegraphic equipment 
caused delays. But they were generally unhappy with the 
telegraph companies in any case, and this was the main 
impetus behind the formation of the Press Association in 
1865. The PA took over the collection of, all British 
news, both from London and the provinces, and campaigned 
for the nationalization of the telegraph. This came 
about in 1870. 
Reuters-PA 
The Routers-PA relationship is the key to the monopolistic 
position achiovcd by Reuters for the first eighty years or 
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so of its existence with respect to world news distribution 
on the UK market. In the United States and in France, 
domestic news agencies set up machinery for international 
news-gathering and distribution after they had established 
themselves at home. In the case of Reuters, the first 
important home market was the finance and not the newspaper 
market. Reuters, unlike the other global agencies, did 
not start as a domestic news agency for newspapers. But 
the domestic market was important to it nonetheless. 
Recognising the significance and the strength of the PA, 
Reuters was happy to enter into a co-operative arrangement 
with it whereby the PA received its service for exclusive 
distribution to many provincial clients and the PA in 
return supplied Reuters wit} its domestic news service. 
The exchange was not an equal one, and the PA made a 
substantial payment to Reuters, but at a greatly reduced 
rate by comparison with what it would have cost individual 
members separately. In the late 1880's, PA members were 
getting Reuters news for ; 3,000 per annum, whereas London 
papers had to pay '15,000. Reuters had initially wanted 
to charge the rate the telegraph companies had imposed, but 
the IPA resisted such a return to what they considered 
e_corbitaiit rates. The international agency retained the 
right to supply iiez,, 
-s 
direct to subscribers within i fifteen- 
mile radius of Charing, Cross. 
Through this arrangement, Reuters had established for itself 
a secure domestic market, without having to involve itself 
directly in substantial nation-wide news-gathering. 
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At the same time it maintained a direct relationship with 
the most lucrative end of the market: the national news- 
papers of Fleet Street. Since the P. A. undertook to rely 
solely on Reuters for its foreign news, the competition 
was taken care of to some extent by* removing the possibility 
of a broad, national revenue-base for a competing news 
organization. 
Domestic Competition 
But it could not eliminate competition entirely. A 
second major domestic agency, Central News, was established 
in 1863, to offer 'general, parliamentary and sporting 
intelligence and other matters connected therewith', in 
addition to Stock Exchange prices. 
2 
From 1871 it also 
gathered foreign news. Although it had nothing to compare 
with Reuters' facilities overseas, and did not enjoy the 
same reputation for accuracy, it did compete seriously. in. 
the liveliness of its coverage. This may explain why 
the PA felt obliged to complain to Reuters in 1887 that 
some of its provincial newspaper members were beginning 
'to think that Reuters was a channel for official messages 
rather than a news agency'. 
3 
The PA was concerned 
because Central News competed with it for domestic news. 
At home and especially abroad, Central News could afford 
to be more selective in the areas and kinds of news it 
wanted to cover, because it did not 'have the responsibility 
of producing anything that claimed to be a reasimably 
exhaustive service. In other words it could concentrate 
expenditure on the maximum revenue-producing news areas. 
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Reuters' relationship with the was remarkable in the 
sense that it contributed to the strength of the provincial 
press relative to Fleet Street, yet in the long run did 
not alienate Fleet Street fror, the services of either 
Reuters or of the PA. The London newspapers did sometimes 
resent their dependence on Reuters news. No paper could 
afford to provide for itself in as extensive a fashion; 
and in times of war and similar catastrophe, important 
news sources had already discovered the advantage of 
speaking to the press as a whole through a single news 
agency reporter. Wealthier papers were more resentful 
of Reuters, because Reuters gave to the smaller, less 
wealthy papers something which before they could not have 
had. Being wealthy was no longer as significant an 
advantage as it had once been. The Times especially 
recogn: Lsed this. Not only did Reuters give its 
competitors the kind of supply of foreign news which 
before only the Times and one or two other papers could 
provide, but the other papers were making life even more 
difficult by their successful applications of the 
techniques of popularization imported from the United 
States. The Times thought it could beat both Reuters 
and its competitors through supporting likely alternatives 
to Reuters news agency. The most successful of these was 
Dalziel's agency, established in 1890. This agency was 
an exponent of the American tnew journalism': 
'Its main hacking came from America, 
its methods were American, and it was 
from America that most if its news came. ' 
By 189"", Dalziel had persuaded a number of provincial 
newspapers to switch over from 
Reuters by offering to 
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accept half the normal subscription to its service in the 
form, noi: of cash, but of advertising space - the method 
which Fiavas had employed with such success in France. 
Dalziel's flame was intense but brief. Most of the 
agency's news came from America: this helped to make 
it popular, but not necessary in the EnZlaiid of that time 
since the rise of the popular press was still mainly 
confined to the news weekly and, not so much the news 
daily. (The Daily Mail, first of the mass circulation 
popular dailies, began in 1896, well after Dalziel's 
decline. ) Reuters offered a global, and in particular 
an imperial news service which Dalziel hardly began to 
match. Dalziel had a poor reputation for accuracy, and 
scored only on sensationalism. The Reuters-PA alliance 
was too strong in any case: the importance of a reliable 
and comprehensive foreign news supply to provincial papers 
was far too great for them to risk losing it for what was 
in effect an agency of a fairly specialised character. 
Patronage of Dalziel by the PA would have contravened the 
conditions of contract whereby Reuters service was supplied. 
The competition from Central News and Dalziel did not 
therefore change the basic client support for Reuters-PA 
but did succeed in inspiring a superior performance from 
these established agencies. PA and Reuters clients now 
demanded a livelier coverage, the kind which today is 
loosely described as 'human interest'. In reply 
especially to Dalziel's increasing success, Reuters launched 
a 'Special Service' and the PA contributed half the cost. 
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The Special Service was offered to papers in addition to 
the regular service, and covered what was considered to 
be more interpretative and more sensational matter. 
Incidents were now to be covered which before Reuters 
might have ignored, including wrecks of liners and steam- 
ships, tcalamitoust railway accidents, fires and explosions 
'involving serious loss of life?, destructive earthquakes, 
cyclones or inundation, startling crimes and outrages, 
popular disturbances, illness or death of famous personages, 
and assassination attempts on monarchs or statesmen. 
A third competitor, Extel, established in 1872, also 
maintained foreign correspondents in important news- 
centres and whose numbers increased in times of major 
crisis. . 
The Extel service circulated mostly to the 
metropolitan press, and usually as a supplementary to 
Reuters. It gras of more concern to the PA and to 
Central News, especially in the fields of financial and 
sports reporting. 
Relations with the Establishment 
Second in. importance to the Reuters-PA relationship in 
establishing Reuters on the home market was the agency's 
relationship with the Establishment. The process of 
becoming established was not simply a matter of finding 
clients, but also of winning the respect and the favour 
of important news sources. This was especially a challenge 
for the original Paul Julius Reuter who was, after all, 
German. Yet by 1871, not much more than a decade after 
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the agency first began to supply newspapers, its founder 
had been elevated to the status of Baron, and was later 
to receive fröm the Queen a Royal Warrant which gave Baron 
_tcii. ter and his heirs the privileges of the Foreign Nobility 
in England. 
Reuter supplied his services to the Queen and her ministers 
free of charge. In return he'no doubt won many informal 
concessions in the receipt of early intelligence, but 
there was little in the way of a formal relationship, and 
Router would have wanted to maintain his independence. 
In 1857 lie won the temporary privilege of receiving copies 
of Foreign Office telegrams in return for early intelligence 
of the Government's official news. In other territories, 
Reuters' correspondents often enjoyed close ties with the 
ruling political and business elites. But the British 
Government had no wish to change the agency's status. 
Closer involvement might have been embarrassing - in Reuter's 
struggle for the Iranian railway concession for instance, 
the Government maintained a very cool and non-supportive 
attitude. 
A number of factors conspired to jeopardise this balance 
between government and agency. The first was the state 
of the agency's finances, which were less healthy after 
the 1900's than before, and this inspired a search for 
alternative means of support. By then the very longevity 
of the agency, its established position with the London 
press business community, and Government departments meant 
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that its ailing, economic position became a matter of concern 
to the Government in foreign relations, as it certainly did 
in the First World War. With respect to the relationship 
between Government and agency, the policy of Roderick. Jones, 
who took over executive control after the death of. Herbert 
Reuter in 1915, was less cautious than Julius IZeuter's had 
been. 
Tile initially secret purchase of. Reuters by Roderick- Jones 
was a partial solution to the agency's financial difficulties, 
especially after the failure, of its ventures into banking 
and financial advertising. The move occurred with possible 
Government encouragement as a way of avoiding a takeover 
by American interests or even by Marconi, who was thought 
to he interested. Financial difficulty also helps to 
explain teutersI role in the First World War. Reuters 
agreed to disseminate official Allied communiques and news 
to neutral countries, the British Empire and All. -Led troops. 
This service-was barely distinguished from the regular 
service by*a change of prefix from 'Reuter' to 'Agency' or 
'A(-en--e Router'. The Government financed the new service 
by paying the transmission costs of the telegrams., which 
amounted to N120,120,000 per annum, and contrib-tited to the 
material expansion of communication facilities. Roderick 
Jones accepted a post in the Department of Information, 
supervising its cable and wireless services, while main- 
taming his function as znnaging Director of Reuters. 
Later, one of the directors of the Reuter's board, John 
Buchan, left it in 1918 to become Director of Intelligence 
121. 
in the new ministry formed out of the Department under 
Lord Beaverbrook. Roderick Jones, who by this time had 
been given a knighthood, was asked to become full. -time 
Director of Propaganda. He accepted the post without 
remuneration, but did not consent to. handing - in his 
formal resignation as Reuters' -Managing 'Director. 
Questions were raised in the Commons alluding to this 
dual responsibility, and in the same year Roderick Jones 
resigned from the Ministry due to ill health. 
The War had demonstrated both 'the importance of Reuters 
to the Government at a time of crisis, and the willingness 
of its Board to share responsibility for Government object- 
ives at such a time. The relationships and outlook 
nurtured in those days seemed to continue into the post- 
war years. Government ministers, and even the. Sovereign, 
were to express concern in -these inter-war years about the 
role of Reuters in disseminating British news in compctit: i. on 
against propaganda agencies of other countries. Roderick 
Jones seems to have encouraged this fusion of interest 
between Gover: ntnent and agency. Discussion between Reuters' 
executives and the British General Post Office in this 
period, concerning the wireless broadcast of news throughout 
the world, often alluded to the agency's responsibility 
for the '. national interest', a responsibility which Reuters 
was willin to affirm if only in order to obtain material 
concessions in rates and the goodwill that would follow a 
coincidence of va_lues. 
5 The Post Office also stood to 
gain fron increases in the volume of international traffic. 
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In the 1920's, Reuters and the Post Office experimented 
with wireless telegraphy as a means of transmitting- the 
commercial service, and by 1929 Reuters was sending its 
first continuous service of general news by radio to 
Europe. That year Reuters approached the Post Office 
for help in cor: lbatting European competition in the field 
of financial news, by a favourable rescheduling of rates. 
In considering this request, the Post Office wrote that 
it would be 'in the national interest' for Reuters' 
request to be granted. In 1931, the European News 
Editor, Mr. Murray, argued with the Post Office that it 
should accede to Reuters' requests for further tariff 
concessions in order to help Reuters combat the growing 
competition of the American agencies. The Post Office 
informed the Accountant General that the 'establishment 
of a world-wide news service for this country is undoubt- 
edly very desirable frort many points of view'. 
6 
Planned rate increases were indefinitely postponed; and 
if they were not lowered this was possibly because to have 
done so might have benefitted some of the less powerful 
buL' less desirable domestic competitors such as Central 
News, which was linked with the Central News of America 
and had American backing (Central News was also involved 
in a radio news service run in conjunction with a Dutch 
wireless station the operation of which the Post Office 
had considered to be in opposition to Britain's best 
interests), or Extel which supplied UP with British news. 
In 1935, Mr. Murray, in conversation with Post Office 
officials, 'stressed the value of the Reuters service to 
Imperial interests and suggested that the services should 
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be regarded as supplementaryto the Foreign Office Press 
and charged for accordingly'.? 
This particular request was not successful: the Post 
Office did however help in rzther more subtle ways, as 
on another occasion when it reported: - 
'It. has been brought to the notice of the 
Department in other papers that much 
anti-British propaganda in Arabic is being 
sent by wireless from Italy for reception 
in Palestine and elsewhere and it would no 
doubt be in British interests that the 
Reuter Commercial Wireless Service rather 
than an Italian service should be received 
in Palestine. 'B 
Roderick Jones for one was gratified for such assistance, 
when in an address in 1932, which was recorded in the Post 
Office Minutes, he claimed that 
'Without the British Post Office we should 
never have been able to establish the system 
which we have now established, and if we had 
not, this country, instead of being the scat 
of a main distributing; force in the world for 
all classes of information... would have been 
subordinate to the foreiner. '9 
TewQwncrgh-jStructure 
In practice this low-profile agency-government relationship 
was insufficient to assuage the agency's growing insecurity 
during the inter-war period (cf. historical account in 
'Introduction'). A different kind of solution was 
sought to consolidate the agency's market position at home 
and to improve or at least bring about, its profitability. 
Jones' tendency to look to the Government for support in 
solving the agency's problems was to prove his personal 
downfall but may have precipitated the final actual 
solution. Continued financial deterioration during the 
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'-thirties probably encouraged Jones to enter into secret 
negotiations with the Government on the eve of the Second 
World War that would have liven the Government some control 
over senior appointments. Press concern arising from this 
development was an important contributory factor in the 
eventual decision of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association 
(\TPA) to become joint owners of Reuters along with the PA 
and Commonwealth press associations. 
Roderick Jones had travelled half the way towards this 
solution in the inter-war period by bringing in the PA 
as part-owner. His purpose in doing this. : ras to establish 
a firm capital base for the agency, which the strategy of 
maintaining good relations with the Government never did 
succeed in doing itself. At the same time he also offered 
50% control to the national papers, represented by the NPA. 
The NPA did not respond positively on that occasion (1926), 
partly because 'Jones was unsympathetic to suggestions from' 
some NPA members that the news operations of the agency 
should be separated from its coimnercial news services. 
The Second World ; dar, preceded by the scandal of Jones' 
approach to the Government, created the right climate for 
the NPA's participation, and the present ownership structure 
was established in 1946 (although the Press Trust of India 
later withdrew). 
This arrangement merely tightened the alliance which had 
ai gays existed between Reuters and the PA. But whereas 
Reuters before the war had continued under the cCfective 
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control of Roderick Jones, despite the participation of the 
PA-appointed directors, the post-World War Two solution 
promised more democratic control. Bringing the national- 
papers into part-ownership tightened up that end of the 
market in Reuters' favour. Competition which had existed 
before the War certainly had a less favourable outlook after 
the War. Central News had disappeared during the thirties. 
It was supported for some years by Eititel which had feared 
it could other wise be tal,. en over by foreign interests 
(the principal stockholder of Central Netts. had been American) 
detrimental to the interests of other domestic agencies. 
Baut after World War Lo it was divided between Extol and 
the PA. L. ctc. l itself has virtually disappeared from 
general news-gathering. it informed, the Royal Commission 
on the Press in 1948 that altliou, -:,. i most of its revenue came 
from non-media interests, its primary purpose was the general 
no,. -. -s service. In 1965 however, it divested itself of most 
of its news-gathering activities with the claim that these 
could not be made to pay, even though it was then making 
a handsome profit from its racing service to bookies 
following tine legitimation of off-course betting in 1961. 
Today (1975) Extol's news interest is mainly confined to 
sport, (racing in particular) and a specialized financial 
news service. 
Co: nnetiti n from other Global Almenci. es 
The other major source of competition has been the rival 
global news agencies. Well before the Second World War, 




h its English agent, Dritish United Press. 
DUP was actually financed fron Canada, where UP, as in 
Britain, eventually tool, it over. DUP's first English 
client was securod in 1927, and before the Second World 
War claimed a total clientele of seventy. . 'lost of its 
staff teere ýnslis}i, and some of them later rose to senior 
positions in Reuters. Its attraction was faintly similar 
to the earlier Dalziel's agency: it was North American, 
popular in tone, heavy on human interest content, rather 
brash. UP's significance in the post-World dar Two years 
is probably less now than it was. The nature of. UPI's 
service approaches that of the other major agencies more 
closely, while Reuters has left behind its 'official' 
image of the thirties and the pattern of its ownership 
has secured it greater doa. estic support. The PA, by 
arranging with the other American agency, AP, to dis tribute 
an edited version of. AP's service to PA clients (PA talces 
the AP service in return for supplying AP with its own) , 
has succeeded- in containing the competition posed by both 
American agencies. The proportion of AP to Reuters news 
that apl; ears on the PA wires is only i bout 101; '0, ]nit this 
is sufficient to provide clients with a reasonable semblance 
of variety. The arrangement also moans that AP does not 
distribute directly to provincial newspapers, and that there 
is not a great prcivi: -iciat market for UPI - which docs 
however sell to the London offices of some of the provincial 
newspaper groups. The other attraction of this arrangement 
is that through the PA-AP arrangement the provincial press 
is given relatively cheap access to foreign news pictures, 
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Which Reuters does not provide, without upsetting the 
provincial newspapers' major allegiance to PA-Reuters. 
The situation in 1974, as monitored by tho author in a 
questionnaire survey, 
10 
was that every single national 
daily media organization in Britain including the . 
two 
major broadcast organizations, BBC and ITN, subscribed 
to Reuters general news services - fourteen altogether, 
of whom at least five also took Reuters' economic nets 
services. Thirteen also too! -, UPI, of whom nine took 
UPI's picture service; eleven took AP, of whom eight tools 
AP's picture service, and five toot. AP-Dow Jones, the 
jointly owned economic news service. Only two organiz- 
ations subscribed to the fourth global agency, AFP. 
For domestic nests all subscribed to the PA, one of whom 
also took Extel. Neither American agency covers the U. K. 
market for U. K. clients. For the provincial press, the 
PA's selection of. Reuters and AP is by far the most 
important source of foreign news: the combined wordage 
of these two organizations is reduced to less than a 
quarter on the PA wires, and much less than this of AP's 
total alone. Competition from other global news agencies 
does not appear to have hurt Reuters financially, iliasfar 
as British media appear to take other agencies to complement 
rather than substitute Reuters, although it might be argued 
that Reuters' exploitation of the advantage of market 
dominance is restricted by the presence of competit_',. on. 
The control exercised by Reuters over the supply of U. K. 
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nnewas to o-%, Crseas clients is less than that of AFP or of 
the American agencies over their domestic ncws supply 
because, of course, it is not as heavily engaged in 
domestic news-gathering. Reuters and the PA share the 
same building in Fleet Street. This, and their formal 
relationship gives Routers privileged access to PA wires 
and files, and there is some mob: Llity o;. personnel between 
the two organizations. The present, (1975) Editor-in- 
Chief of the PA, for instance, held a senior editorial 
appointment in Reuters previously. Reuters does not 
depend entirely on the PA. It has its own U. K. desk 
in Ln:. don which compiles a U. K. report for distribution 
to Reuters clients overseas. This report is similar to 
the report put out by agencies from other capital cities: 
it concentrates very much orn. metropolitan sources and 
'national' news. Of the nineteen journalists employed 
on the U. K. desk, three spend most of their time on 
coverage of parliamentary events of particular interest 
to foreign clients and their function therefore bears 
some resemblance to UPI's International Desk in Washinthton. 
There are also specialists in finance, diplomatic affairs, 
Commonwealth and African affairs. Until 1972, the bureau 
produced what was known as the Correspondents and Executive 
Wire, a synopsis of foreign and domestic news for foreign 
correspondents and businessmen in London. This service 
was later taken over by the PA which argued that Reuters 
had no contractual authority to distribute U. K. no s with- 
in the U. K. The U. K. desk of Reuters takes the PA wires 
but its news, intended for overseas distribution, is naturally 
dif`'erent : i. n1 ei: iyiiasis from the PA's. It tends to concentrate 
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on U. K. stories of specifically foreign interest. Much 
of this material is fed directly into the international 
distribution syste: ii with little or no extra editorial 
interference at the computer face, signifying the relative 
autonomy and importance of the U. K. desk. 
Specialists from the U. K. desk probably enjoy privileged 
access to news sources in comparison with the other global 
agencies. For example Reuters is included, naturalýy 
enough, as a British news organization by the Foreign Office, 
and Reuters correspondents join the group of British agency 
representatives at Foreign Office briefings each afternoon, 
whereas the French agency AFP has a briefing three times 
a week, and AP about as often. UPI did riot send represent- 
atives at the time of interview, possibly because it had no L 
as"t. ied for the facility. 
5 It is generally agreed that 
national agencies generally enjoy better relations with 
official sources of their own country, although Britain 
seems to be considered more 'open' in this respect than 
6 
France, but less so than the United States. 
The alliance between the PA and Reuters has lasted for 
over one hundred years. It helps explain how Reuters 
established itself on its home territory; it is. a major 
feature of the British daily press, a forum in which the 
common interests of national and provincial papers are 
expressed; it is a relatively cheap source of supply of 
much domestic hews to Reuters, and of foreign news to 
provincial papers. Each organization has assisted in the 
survival of the other. But it is not all-important: the 
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main owners of Reuters, N'PA and the PA, do not provide the 
kind of support provided AP by AP's menibers, for exainpi o. 
It may he co-opc at v: y owned, but it does not function 
as a co-operative in the ,; ay that AP does. Clients for 
financial services are more important in the U. I. than 
media clients for general news services as sources of 
revenue. 
It could be argued that without the PA's marshalling of 
the domestic market, the impact of competition from other 
domestic agencies and from the rival global agencies both 
before and after the Second World War might have been 
much more harmful to both Reuters and the PA. This is 
probably true. One possibly undesirable consequence of 
this situation today is. the virtual monopoly on national 
news enjoyed by the PA which is the only organization that 
feeds a 24-hour news operation by teleprinter through to 
clients up and down the country. It concentrates very 
much on national news most of which originates in London, 
where nearly all its correspondents are. based. Provincial 
news is increasingly left to local provincial newspapers 
usually operating as monopolies in their own circulation 
area, and by an odd assortment of some seventy local news 
agencies of very mixed quality and character, few of which 
employ more than half a dozen full-time correspondents. 
. further consequence of the PA's monopoly position on the 
domestic market is its strategic position in the event of 
a dispute between the journalists' union (NUJ) and any 
given media employer. In a clash between the NUJ and the 
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pt Lithers of the Birmingham Post and the Evening Mail, in 
the Autumn of 1975 for instance, the NUJ sought to bring 
pressure to bear on the PA to suspend its regular services 
to those newspapers. 1v'hile the PA refused to suspend its 
regular services (and claimed that suspension would be 
technically impossible in any case), it did say that no 
special reporting assignments would be accepted from the 
papers involved for the duration of the dispute, although 
such assignments are a normal feature of PA worh for those 
of its members who wish to pay for them. Growing militancy 
of some PA journalists indicated that this kind of problem 
would be exacerbated in the future. It is conceivable 
that in a situation of greater domestic competition 
between agencies, agency journalists might be less tempted 
to act in concert over union issues. Greater competition 
might also improve the quality of news service. Provided 
by PA. 
(ii) Ilavas/AFP 
For IIavas the techniques of market consolidation were not 
dissimilar from those of Rcutcrs; however Hzvas was able 
to secure a particularly lucrative slice of advertising) 
revenue, as Well as a closer financial alliance with the 
., 
overnuºcnt than Reuters ever achieved or desired. 
I-Iavas bureau began iii 1832, and became L'Ageiice IIavas in 
183 j. The 18,, o's were a time of polit. Lc 1 repression 
for the press, but two cheap journals appeare which 
required the kind of information Iiavas was in business to 
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provide. These : giere: La Siecle and La Presse, which 
emphasised world-,, i dc coverage and speed of information 
delivery. Charles :: avers, 52 in 1832, had been a financier 
and had lost his fortune after the tattle of 'i-Waterloo. 
At Cirst his eceýicy furictio, iod like many others before 
it and like another agency founded in 1832: Correspondance 
Gar,, ier, " %. hich extracted articles from 
foreign papers and 
sold them to the press. 
By 18110, having swallowed up a number of rival agencies, 
Havas was strong enough to merit Mention iii an article 
by Balzac who claimed that the apparent multiplicity of 
papers in Paris and the provinces could really be reduced 
to just one man: Navas. He first began selling to the 
Government in 18110, for whom he provided a special bulletin. 
Die success of this contract and his activity in the 
gathering and distribution of financial news were the major 
contributors to the agency's rapid growth. Some of his 
earliest colleagues included none other than Julius Reuter 
and Bernhard Wolff (founder of the German agency of that 
name) . IIavas was the major 
domestic agency by the time 
the ei e'ctric telegraph was introduced to France 
(before, 
he had used optical telegraph and pigeons), and the first 
to rent telegraph facilities from the State (which con- 
trolled the telegraph and could censor messages if it 
chose), on an appreciable scale. 
When the EiiLlish and Ger: na n agencies came into existence 
IIavas was quick to malte arrangements with them for the 
e:: cllango of financial news. Since each agency 
had a 
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virtual monopoly in the international distribution of its 
domestic financial news, this was a very pw orful asset, 
and one which : ras consolidated by the eventual formation 
of the European agency cartel in the fields of both 
financial and general nei": ws. 
By 1857, in addition to supplying most of the Parisian 
newspapers, IHIavas also had about two hundred provincial 
newspaper clients. No co-operative like the PA appeared 
in France. French newspapers did not go through 'the 
English and American experience of dependence on commercial 
telegraph companies, which had prompted the formation of 
domestic agencies in those countries. In France the 
telegraph was a virtual state monopoly, and I-Iavas was 
the first agency to use it. The press had no immediate 
reason to be dissatisfied with IIavas' service, since it 
was tailored to newspaper needs. 
In 1857, Havas promoted an idea which was to consolidate 
his strong position on the domestic French market. He 
made his first venture into advertising, by the sale of 
official government advertisements and announcements to 
his newspaper clients. This was an attractive source 
of revenue for them which helped cover the cost of 
telegraphic expenses. The idea was extended over time. 
Clients now sold Havas some of their advertisin,,; space 
in return for his news services. In the be; inning, the 
available space was especially explosited for sale to banks 
and credit _i. nstitutions for their reports and announcements. 
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Very soon the provincial and the Parisian press looked to 
Havas to secure much or their advertising revenue, and also 
as a cheap source of Parisian and foreign news which could 
be supplied over the telegraph at a ra to far belog, : ghat it 
would have cost them separately to maintain their own 
Paris offices (thou;; h soi: ie continued to do so), and rent 
their own communication facilities (Havers rented telegraph 
space in such volume that it could act almost like a 
private company). 
The development oC Havas' advertising operations is described 
at -reater length in Chapter 6. It suffices to say that 
by the mid-thirties Havas controlled four major Parisian 
papers and many but not all provincial chiles through its 
manipulation or non-local and financial advertising. 
Domestic 
_Cop 
eti. ti. o! 1 
France is a larger country than England, less dominated 
in press terms by the metropolis (partly but not entirely 
because IIavas helped malte the provincial press strong in 
ra; r news material), and perhaps more culturally diverse. 
There was always some cor: ipetit. i. on from domestic press sources, 
but never enough to be considered a serious threat. Cli. ent 
requirements for a more elaborate service than the basic 
spot news notification function were taiccn into account 
by a special service from Paris for those who wanted 
distinctive political commentaries. This idea was rather 
similar to the Reuters Special Service. Lilco Reuters, 
IIavas also had to contend i iii Dalziel's American agency. 
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This may have been a more worrying intrusion on the French 
than on the English market, since the early nineties were 
a poor period financially for the French press: many 
papers died and I-Iavas' revenue from news. and advertising, 
declined. On the other hand there was not a great deal 
of sympathy for the agency anon; Paris newspapers, some 
of whom accused it of insiduous An; lo-Saxon political 
motives. Most virulent in its attacks on the agency 
was La Cocarde, associated with the nationalism of 
Doulangism, and which had especially close ties with Havas. 
Dalziel's success in France was as short-lived as it gras 
in Britain. 
? Much of the competition appears to have been concentrated 
in the provision of stock exchange prices. In Britain, 
E: tel secured an early exclusive contract for this inform- 
ation in the 1870's and Reuters, which had initially taken 
it direct from source, thence took it from Extol. In 
Paris m sirgle organization won an exclusive right to 
distributio :, which : ueant that the market here was open. 
Henri Honssaye, then in charge of the Havas telegraphic 
service, wrote to a colleague in 1871 concerning a 
competitor: - 
"L'agence Continientale is nothing. You know 
. 
that anyone can find out and telegraph the 
stock exchange quotation list, and set himself 
up as an 'agency' i%ith no-one to say him nay; 
this is the case with l'Agence Cont: inentale...... 
which just like us has the means to telegraph 
the exchange quotation list v'13 
This was also largely true of a later entrant into the 
field, l'Agence Fournier, established in 1919 to compete 
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with Iiavas, and which took a foreign news service from UP 
in partial exchange for its service of French news. This 
was, eventually taken over by IIavas. It specialized in 
Cinance, dealt mostly with I-larisian clients and did not 
d: istrih,. ite by teleprinter. Fluch the sane applied to 
1' Agence Econominue et rinlnclcre. There : ras sonic 
competition in the provinces which does not seem to have 
fared long, or which never became more than local. One 
such competitor was 1'Agence Ewig, -which tried to operate 
in a fashion similar to I-iavas. In 1881, this agency took 
a half-ownership of a newspaper in Lo Havre: La Depechc 
IIavraise, at a cost of 10,000 francs. The agency, which 
undertook to guarantee a similar sum whenever required by 
the paper, enjoyed the exclusive lease of local and Pon- 
local advertising copy. Advertising revenue was divided 
between the agency and the paper. Unfortunately the 
paper survived only a year before being suppressed by the 
Mayor of Le Havre. A year later 1'Ageiice Ewig tried to 
sell its services to the largest Lyonnais Paper, Le Lyon 
P, epublicain. Since Iiavas had enough money to lease its 
own telegraph wire from Paris to Lyon and Marseille, the 
smaller agency made little headway and shortly afterwards 
dropped out of the race. Not having the early advantage 
of a tidily-marshalled provincial market as was the case 
of the co-operative PA in Britain,. Ilavas undoubtedly had 
to fight hard in these years, and one consequence of this 
may have bncli a financial shrewdness which later earned it 
discredit when the domestic market had been finally 
conquered. 
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Havas's tight market control after World War I made life 
difficult for the American agencies in the inter-tsar era. 
American attempts to penetrate were not successful and of 
short duration: 
TIT es a ences etran cres essayerent tin: ideumeait 
et on vain de vendre lours services 1 des 
journeaux (entre autres United Press et 
International News Service) sans autre resultat 
quo des experiences de courte duree. 11111 
Relations with the Government 
Havas, like Reuters, began as a straightforward commercial 
operation. It experienced no pressing economic difficulties 
to encourage dependence on the government. Whereas 
Julius Reuter chose to give away his service to ministers 
at first, Havers sold his. Iiavas's unofficial relations 
with the French government grew out of financial greed 
rather than poverty. The prize was a monopoly on 
government information sources, and on government 
advertising revenue. 
In the 'twenties and 'thirties, the agency accepted 
governrnent help in the distribution of news overseas. 
The French government, like the British, was increasingly 
engaged in a propaganda war prompted by the introduction 
of radio transmission, and saw Havas as a key weapon in 
the battle, which was for trade' markets as much as any- 
thing. Havas was accountable to many different pressures: 
foreign agencies with which it had exchange relations, the 
French government, Havas officials, and the banque de 
Paris et Pays-Bas which had financed part of the agency's 
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c : pansion a ft, )r the First World War. 
"In its efforts to offend no one, I-Iavns 
sometimes used credit lines which con-' 
ceoled the source of the information... 
There were times dien more 'complete 
information was sent to Coreign services 
than to French net: spapers. "1j 
This source concluded that Havas 
"during most of its history, . as extremely 
close to the French government. It was 
'healthy' for Havas to respect government 
wishes. News going out of France was 
released by IIavas through ovcrr.:: o nt 
channels, which permitted the French 
government to 'color' foreign news when 
advisable. ' Galtier Doissiere asserted 
that IIavas was officially responsible 
for disseminating government propaganda. 
Havas was used as intermediary in relations 
of the French government with French public 
opinion and with foreign governments. If 
a political or diplomatic manoeuvre was 
revealed prematurely, a denial by IIavas often 
carried the same weight as a government 
statement. The government also used the 
agency for 'trial balloons' to test public 
reaction to contemplated moves. Although 
IIavas received no open subsid: izat: Loix, the 
ovcr. ý: lient was one of its bes L'-pa; -.; gig customers 
in getting ne, -. s services for government 
e: 1iploy yes and colonial papers. In 1931, 
for instance, the "overii: ncat pay-men s to 
Iiavas totalled 36,000,000 francs. "1 
Birth of AFP 
The situation for AFF aftcr World , -Tar Two so far as 
dependence on ,; otrerllllerlt 1 even le I: as concerned was 
similar, c:: cept that the advertising business was no 
longer associated with the news c: gency, and the s: ig itL 'icancc 
of revenue from government sources therefore seemed all 
tlic greater. Biet il' ; overn: aeiit control rras greater, t1l; re 
tiros also a more open iarlce-t and ruore colllpctit. Loii on the 
liome marke t. 
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The war years sau, the demise of IIavas as a ne-Ts agency, 
and th3 e tergence of the nucleus of the post-. war . ern. 
The War does : Huch to explain the character of AFP and 
its Position cin both and foreign umarkets. Most 
i _z»rtant of all is the situation of. political fragmcntat. i. on 
in ; which it : as created, and this has had a seemingly 
permanent effect on the outlook of AFP employees and the 
kind of news service they produce. 
At the start of the Vichy regime, the old Havas ceded to 
OfCice Francais d'Information. This agency was dependent 
upon the government for 90°, e of its revenue. Strangely17 
OFI never became as strong a monopoly in France during the 
War as Havas had been before it, since it was one of 
several official and unofficial news and -propaganda 
services under Vichy and because its activities were 
subservient to the strategies of the Germans. OFI 
exchanged news services with its Franco-German equivalent 
in the Northern zone, Ag 
., 
ence Francaise d'Information de 
Presse (AFIP), until under an agreement between OFI and 
the German news agency DNB, OFI assumed the management 
of AFIP. The other German agency, Transocean, had an 
exchange arrangement with a private French agency, Inter- 
France-Information (IFI), which distributed Transocean's 
foreign service to provincial, papers. 
In London meanwhile, ex-Havas journalists established 
L'Agence Francaise Independente (AFI), and others 
organized a French-language radio service with the 
co-operation of the BBC.. AFI 00-operated with British 
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of ric_i. a .l 
in£ort ation services and ii li I: cuters. Ex-. Ii-vas 
correspondents abroad .,, cre divided as to ti": hethcr they t": ould 
with OFI or with BFI, depending ; ither on personal 
choice or political necessity. A non-Gaiillist branch of 
AFI emerged ißt Algiers (AFA). i, heri _%FP emerged after the 
war, therefore, it contained the seeds of numerous factional 
possibilities : collaborationist OF I against non-collabor- 
ationist AFI journalists; Gaullist against non-Gaullist; 
communist against non-communist. 
APP bean in political strife, as Agence France Independents. 
In March 1944, the French Consultative Assembly placed a 
Gaullist, Gerard Jouve, at the head of AFI (t; which had 
recently agreed to work in conjunction with the other 
Free French agency, AFA), and this caused a renewed split 
between API and AFA, with many resignations from AFI. In 
July of that year the Assembly gave to what it now called 
the 'French Information Agency', later called Agence France 
ht of circulation of foreign news, and Presse, the sole rig 
imposed a ban on the formation of other French agencies. 
This killed off the remaining; n:: cleus of AFI wh: Lch had no 
independent finance, and caused a cry of protest from the 
British and American agencies, which had been planning, to 
cultivate the French, market after the liberation. UP's 
Jo]ui Dognndt for example, lind imrkocl his i,. -, Ay from 
Cllerbou to Paris via the underground before the liberation 
to set up office there with five Frenchmen and four trans- 
lators Z, hc) Iiciped hina put out a service in French : chile he 
worl.. ed out tentative contracts iri th ncic: spapers t.: hicli 11n(1 
not oven boon licensed by the rrovisional Governmen-t. 
18 
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Reuters and AP severed their connect-Lois with ti j(-, new 
French agency in response to tue government decree. 
In Septcmbcr 19411, Jouve was replaced by Loon Ro11i__i, who 
told AP's Managing director, Dent Cooper, that AFP would be 
modelled on the lines of AP,. Possibly in response to 
American pressure (America provided most of APP's equipment 
in the earliest years) the Assembly lifted the bail on 
f. orei. 1n agencies. Rollin was shortly afterwards forced 
to resign under pressure from the Communists and was 
succeeded by Claude Bourgeon. Under Bourgeon. it was 
decided that the agency would have a civil j. dcnt: Lty, 
financial autonomy, and its losses (200,000,000 francs in 
the first year), would be covered by the Government. In 
April 1945, Dourgeon, an anti-Gaullist, was replaced by 
Francois Crucy, an authoritarian man with a mysterious 
'double agent' reputation from his pro-war years in 
Bucharest. Crucy was replaced by Maurice Negro in 
December. The government had promised to turn the agency 
over to the press but this never came about since the press 
was too weak financially to support it. Negro was succeeded 
by Paul Louis Bret in 19117, an anti-Gaullist who passionately 
believed in the agency's responsibility for objectivity, 
and zdho had proposed a system whereby AFP would be funded. 
from co: Iunini. ty money collected through a tax on newspapers. 
The ;; ýýýrernLiie11t carne iiectr to accelpLing this, but eventually 
rejected the proposal. It finally decided that the money 
should come : front the agency's commercial receipts, and 
that any deficit would be made up from an annual 'national 
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contribution 
19 Ncgrc as reappoi_1-ted in 1950 and held 
the office of Director-General for four years, until 
replaced by Jean ? lariii in. 19511 who was appointed President 
Director-General under the a;; ency s formal constitution. 
it, 1957, and i: clia stayed imti'. 1975 
The frequent change of AFP Dire ctor-Generals in the post- 
1,, ' .r period mirrored 
frequent changes of government. The 
situation of political instability made it seen all the 
more desirable that there should be 'institutionalized' 
spokesmen of France abroad - not necessarily to spread 
French propaganda but simply to malte the voice of France 
felt in. the international arena... 
The 1957 coastitution put an end to the provisional 
status of the agency, and made it into : co-operative 
controlled by a Director-General who was elected from 
a board made up mainly of French daily newspaper 
directors holding, eight out of fifteen seats. The 
remaining seats : rent to ORTF (2), public service clients 
or ministries (3) and AFIP employees (2). There was no 
purge however of ýýrc-1957 personnel, and there was criticism 
of the new arrangement whereby the Director-General alone 
had the power to appoint the Chief Editor who was to have 
overall editorial responsibility. 
Competition from the Global Agencies 
AFP very quickly regained its neirspaper clients after Olle 
Second World War, both at home and abroad. This 'was 
because of pri. v: i_1e-od access to gove2"ri! neýit i. zi or: n- 
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ation; and because international cable networks and domestic 
networks to provincial. newspapers , ti-ere made available to 
AFP rather more quickly than to the other agencies. But 
, at home it was obliged to accept the competition of the 
American agencies and of 'Reuters. : 111 three of those soon 
had French-language services operating in France. AP ts 
was the most extensive French news-gathering o, peration; 
Reuter and UP found it convenient to subscribe to APP's 
domestic news service. In other words, Reuter and UP 
tried mainly to sell their services as supplementaries to 
AFP, concentrating on translated international news, while 
AP tried to compete in French news as well. By 1946, every 
daily paper in France received one or other of the American 
services. AFP tried to contain this competition by an 
unsuccessful proposal for an exchange arrangement with AP, 
on condition that AFP would have the sole right to distribute 
AP news to French papers. The political conditions in 
which AFP emerged did not earn it much confidence amongst 
French proprietors in its early years: 
"As I made the rounds of Paris newspaper ofC±ces 
and asked about the new AFP, Agence Francaise 
de Presse - several editors shrugged their shoulders 
and i; h ispcr c: l ' to me 'plus de propagande' . They 
insisted that even though they might take AFP, 
:; he must have the cot:: pletc : corld ncics service and go the objective reporting supplied by American agencies. "" 
AFP was not only discredited at home, but the Post-, car 
experience formed a strong negative impression in Anglo- 
Sa_: on and American journalistic minds, eager as they were 
to accept this image, which remained current long after 
the reality had improved, and perhaps adversely affected 
AFP'S sales chances in the difficult markets of North 
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America and Britain permanently. By the time of the 
Algerian , car, when AFP openly maintained an independent 
and impartial line despite government pressure to the 
contrary, French press confidence iii the agency had bccn 
greatly restored. PTO French ne spaper could afford to 
be without it, because like any national agency it had 
privileged access to important news sources who generally 
released information to AFP first for foreign agencies to 
Pick up from there. 
As AFP's service improved - greatly propelled by the need 
to provide an extensive foreign service and so undermine 
the main reason for press subscriptions. to the American 
agencies - so the clients for American services dropped 
in number. But in 1965, UPI in France still sold to most 
Paris dailies, many of the leading regional dailies, two 
radio stations (Europe 1 and Radio Lu:; einbourg), L'Llysce, 
Qual cl'Orsai, and some African embassies. There were 
two clients for its English-language service: The \Tci% 
York herald Tribune and the New York Tinies. AP in the 
early 1970's sold both nc s and photo services to most of 
the larger circulation papers (100,000 plus) , and photo 
services on jy -i: 'ero 
talon by many of the smaller papers. 
Reuters and UPI both stopped depending on AFP's domestic 
service in 1972-73. Reuters struck up in c change 
c : 'rai1ýýe! llen with a smaller agency, Agence Celltrale 
Parisienne dc Presse (ACP), and UPI with another smaller 
agency, Aigles. This was an attempt to cut news-cratherin g 
costs (by dropping the purchase of AFP's domestic service) 
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and to increase editorial independence (through (rester 
investment in direct nears-gathering). An economic 
recession rras beginning and several papers leere dropping 
one or more subscriptions to international agencies. 
ranee-Soir for instance stopped taking UPI news, but 
continued with UPI photos. Reuters distributed less 
c,: toils ivcly than the other international agencies. Its 
main clients were the leading Paris dailies - in addition 
of course to clients for the economic services - but its 
arrangement frith ACP meant that some Reuters news went 
to the provinces through the smaller agenc jr. 
?1 
TndeDDenden-L Provincial Aa. 2jicics 
The appearance of new domestic competition since the 
War caused some apprehension, at : \F1? 's Paris Head Office, 
primarily because both Agence Centralc Parisionne dc 
Presse (ACP) and Aigles have close links with powerful 
provincial newspapers-, and this despite the attention AFP 
has given its ; provincial market through its tailoring 
services for regional needs. P. CP was founded in 1951 by 
Gaston Deferre, Mayor of Marscili3, and based on the co- 
endeavour of a nor±'. 1Crn news )aper 
(Nord- 4atin) 
and a southern (Provencal) which agreed to have a common 
editorial office in Paris. Its growth slow and in 
the early s ýentiCs had not iiany more than twonLy newspaper 
and broadcast clients. Regional daily newspapers own 
over fifty per cent of the agency's shares. Netts-cot erage 
is mostly doz: iestic but extends to North Africa. Clients 
receive the exclusive right to ACP's service within.:. their 
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c: irciilation areas, al . l'lc_igl: the degree oC e: _cli. is: i. N LL has 
loon rela.: ed over time. The agency subscribes to . cutcrs 
world service and also provides cuters with some ne s of 
1? r: 1ncc. ACP also subscribed to AFP, but in 19721, when 
Reuters ceased taking \FP, AFP decided to drop its contact 
with ACP. Oth_er:, ise, . euters might have had free access 
to AFP's service throug1i its arrangements with RCP. ACP's 
aim is to provide a service more in line with specific 
requirements of its clients than AFP's general service for 
provincial media. For this reason, editing and ro ritiuiS 
occupy proportionately more time than hard new gathering 
and transmission. Its world news dispatches, according 
to ACP sources, tend to be more precise than AFP's and 
designed for iuunediate use by the client ratifier than for 
further editing. Foreign assignments for ACP reporters 
occur in response to specific regional press needs. 
Otherwise most of the foreign news is of the tround up' 
variety. 
L'Agence d'Informat: Loiis Cxencrales, Locales, Economiqucs 
ct Sportives (Ai J_cs), was initially created as a news 
photo and feature 4. -cncy depending on the combined man- 
power resources (400) of the to leading clail: ies in Liic 
important fhonc-Airs rcJioii (covering 15 depa-irtinents). 
The p Vers, Le Dau iti. nc and Le Progres made their decision 
to co-operatc in 19G7, c, f. to 3-cars of intensive compct: Lt. L011, 
and Ri les i: "as dcsi;; riec1 to meet the slpec_Lf. ic news 1 equi2"e- 
rnents of seven dail: i. cs in Lyon, Grenoble and Saint Etienne. 
It noiý sells its services to AFP, AP and UPI. For a 
while it maintained an exchange relatiorrship with UPI. 
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Ai;; l. es has six Cull-ti.: ýe journalists in Paris, but can call 
upon the services of the Paris offices of its founder 
members, which employ about 35 journalists. The copy sent 
irr Aisles to i. ntcrno do al agoncies is gencrally 1 cI, ýr: L t ten 
from initial reports w", riLLcti for clients. Li the Rhonic- 
l. pes rcgLo+i, Ai; les has Forty-f. ive correspondents, and 
sends corrospondents abroad to cover stories likely to Dc 
of specific interest to newspapers of that region. It 
has plans to develop news-coverage of all of France, but 
primarily within the field of features and photos. The 
photo service is important precisely because : A'n's photo 
service is weak and does not compare in any tiny with those 
of the United States agencies or of the British PA. (AFB 
tarried down the chance of operating a joint photo service 
with ORTF) . 
In some ways the services of Aigles and ACP are similar to 
those put out by the London offices of provincial newspaper 
groups in England, and as such do not appear to represent 
a major threat. But the aspirations of tose trench 
agencies, their l: 1.? f s .,. ith global agencies other than AFP, 
the develop pent of. Aigles as a photo agency and the ; ener"al 
-foar that n-c:: -spape mergers mr dc possible by . Ugics-type 
arran;; ezncnts could lead to a rcduct: i. on of titles and oC 
clients, did cause some concern. Especially v, hen it hecwne 
r lei trc: 7t that ! 1i -les at lcz: st -v. -as scekiii to :: iwiopulize 1> 0 
news sources. For a while (1967-73), AFP actuall. y reduced 
the size of its Lyon bureau and depended more for its ncl, s 
of the region on Aig1es, because sta. ef of 1ead: in papers of 
the region irould no 1onl er work as stz"i_iýcrs 
. 
for AI II. 
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The cost of subscription to Ai-lcs was recouped through z 
the cessation of ýýayments to strip gers. This initial 
policy of submission to local coi ipet: it_iont, if it had ever 
been form ally articu. ula ted, was rejected in princ: i. p. l. e by 
the board of AFP in the early 'sevent: i. es. In Nice the 
bureau was ex panded to take over some of. the work of an. 
overloaded Marseille bureau and this was thought to si-iji-N, 
AFP's position of strength in the South. In good time, 
perhaps, because by early 1976, ACP appeared to be meeting 
with greater success than earlier forecasts had predicted. 
It now included 26 daily provincial papers amongst its 
clientele, some of whom had abandoned AFP altogether, thus 
increasing the pressure on ACP to duplicate some of the 
services hitherto the sole preserve of AFP (e. g. racing 
results) although it had no intention of becoming a global 
news agency. As a domestic agency it declared itself in 
direct competition with AFP, while chargin a' little less. 
With a staff of 50, of whom 35 were journalists, it no 
longer stressed its 'socialist' origins; its new editor, 
Michel Bassi, had come from the conservative Le Figaro. 
Despite the threat posed by domestic sources of competition, 
AFP'S position on Lise lionie market since its statutory 
confirmation in 1957 has in many ways been one of increasing 
strength. In the 1950's a 'double frequency' or two-wire 
service was introduced, with one wire for domestic news 
and orte for foreign hews. The new service cost a great 
deal more, but in 1966,29 provincial papers subscril)ed, 
and this increased to 47 (out of a total of 
87 1ýrovi; icial 
dailes in 1959) 56 in 1963 and by 1970 all provincial 
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dailies received the c: panded service. A number of 
editorial improvements were introdticed - the se vice 
fl-as 'Americanized' in certain respects, with the preselit- 
ation of for e.: ample, in the 'inverted pyramid' 
style, and ready for immediate use by clionts; a tele- 
printer horse-racing Service Zeas Set up and an economic 
and financial news service. 
But the death of soi e no sýmpers brought about an 
inevitable decline in the total number of dailies served. 
Whereas there had been 101 provincial daily newspaper 
clients in 1953, mergers and deaths reduced this number 
to 87 in 1956,83 in 1963 and 72 in 1971 (in addition to 
21 ORTF clients, which had increased in number over tiPne). 
When the Paris-Jour and Centre-Natin disappeared in 1971-2, 
the total number of French dailies (provincial and Parisian) 
taking AFP fell to 85. Local government measures had 
reduced the number of clients among prefectures to only 
3 in 1970, but in 1971 an official decision determined 
that all regional prefectures would receive the AFP 
services before the end of 1972, indicating a sizable 
increase in State-originating revenue. In Paris, many 
client losses over the past decade have been made up by 
new adclit: ions, including Raris offices of recently merged 
provincial newspapers, embassies, niuit nAio al corupanies 
and ministries. Some of these clients received special 
services not generally available. In 1966, for instance, 
,,,, FP undertook to , provide the weekly 'Express', with 
regular articles, either requested br the inn azine or 
proposed by the agency. 
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The-future of AFP's domestic position is in large part 
bound up with its political pol, er to obtain the resources 
it needs for a continued rate of improvement and expansion. 
Given the nature of its board structures the agency's 
clients (and especially the representatives of state 
organizations) have had the poi-,, er to hold clown rate 
increases below the level considered, desirable by the 
agency's administration. ' Alternatively, the board may 
seek än expansion which is then blocked by government. 
This has meant that the newspapers are served in the 
short run' by ' an agency service cheaper' than it' might 
otherwise be (though more expensive than services of the 
competing world agencies, who arehowever, unable to 
provide comparable services of domestic' French news); 
but which in the long run may be unable to sustain its 
present strength. The seriousness of the economic crisis 
is in part the explanation for the government's failure 
to encourage Jean Marin to seek a' renewal of 111 s post as 
Director General, despite his eminent record over twenty 
years' serviceýin 1975. The passage of the ýägency's 
budget was that: year blocked in Assembly under protest 
that its 11=01, increase 'in' subscription'- charges liras too 
high. Noverth"eless, 'ithas still been possible for tarn 
in the'mid-'seventies to greatly improve its accommodation 
and to instal a computerized 'system nod; dissimilar to 
those in operation in'the other global agencies. 
Finally it needs tobe said that in addition to. AFP, there 
are . as in England and . 
in the United States many smaller 
French local ýclicics, of : ": hi. ch A: i_ales and AC_' are the 
11arcst. Viere were fort--ci llt Trench domestic press 
vJcncics in "197:, and of t}1 `se about seventeen , ýrov: i. ýlccl 
nei: s c::, glf celsaue is t erll l t: ozc1 : ict er itl sonic -cner: 1. and 
The rest were spec i. Fl17St, reature, or pbotC1"_':? y)1iic C11C: Les. 
Conc]. usi01: 
For Reuters, the they- to domestic stron"th lay in its 
relationship with the P^., its relations with the Government, 
and most of all j. 1-1 the evolution of a broad media ownership 
structure. For Ilavas the struggle was possibly fiercer, 
since it was its own domestic ncý: s supplier. Here, the 
uncertainties of the med: i. cn marlcet w". -ere cushioned by 
revonuo from the sale. of advcrti. i. lg and through a zrclation- 
sllin with the Government t. rhich much more substantial 
in financial, terms than anything enjoyed 
by. "Reuters. The 
operat- on of AFP, : Izil. e totally divorced from the advertising 
activit'. i. cs of il;. vas, is still dencailoat n-, t: L OILS 
-cro: u Stnt:: clients for its col. ti_2ued viab_il: itty. This, 
to ether 1::: th the ßr01:. -t''1 of rcgiO; lc 1. do: nosti% nu-'s agencies 
in comp etitio_L with A? P, is the source of a rcater marl, -et 
i. n stab: Llity than is treue of. the doiaestic situation of 
,; enters. At the same time is it enjoys a. strong domestic 
position, Retters' domestic r even`ue accounts for a 
considerably smaller proportion Of total revenue than is 
true oc any other -1ol)a]. : 1, rcucr. teilt both British and 
French nüencies envoy domiliaiit dnnlcstic' inilrlzCt pos: Ltio22s. 
Competition fron other Iobnl , '1ýonc: ies is : Ra: Lnly U., II i to (I 
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chapter, as in succeeding chapters, I do not 
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note is made in: Reference (25 Y to to the 
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general argument. about, the way in which the 
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CHAPTER THREE: -. Domestic Oligopoly - USA 
At the turn of the twentieth century the American 
newspaper market was the wealthiest in the world on 
most counts: large enough to support two, even three, 
major agencies. Yet these had to compete fiercely 
in the effort to maintain or improve their market shares. 
Monopoly may not have been an economic necessity here, 
but it was certainly'an aim. The-early history of the' 
dominant American, agencies is largely one of conflict 
between rival client. groupings in their search for'the 
right mix of excellence of news service and financial 
viability. ' This chapter considers certain divisions 
of the American market which help explain early 
differences in character between the agencies: e. g. 
metropolitan/non-metropolitan, East-West, morning/ 
afternoonpress, press/radio. It then"examines the 
contemporary market situation for the dominant agencies, 
the role and. importance of the supplementary agencies, 
and closes with an account of agency political and 
government affiliations. It-argues that the leading 
agencies have tended to abandon their earlier concern 
for specific segments of. the. market in favour of a more 
broadly based market strategy, and that-there isunlikely 
to be. any major-challenge to their domestic leadership 
in the.. forseeable future: 
The Metropolitan Interest 
The. struggle for a monopoly control over the'agency 
business: by New York. interests is the dominating theme 
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of the first half-century of American. agency history. 
Of particular note in the complex pattern of rivalries 
and alliances which. characterize this period is the 
intervening role of, first, foreign agency sources of 
overseas news, and second, the interest of the telegraph 
companies. Associated Press was the creation in 1848 
of six New York dailies, and the New York influence was 
an early source of resentment for many non New York 
clients. Editors of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, for 
instance, included among their many complaints about the. 
AP service which they received in the 1860's that it was 
too much dominated by news from New York, and trivial news 
at that, while other cities of more proximate interest 
and distance to Memphis, like New Orleans. Galveston, 
or Charleston, received hardly any attention at all. 
1 
The formation of a western AP by mid-western papers in 
1862, designed to counteract this bias, was inspired 
by local reaction to the New York. City emphasis that 
became apparent in the agency's coverage of the Civil 
War. Western papers were also concerned about the AP's 
policy of confining itself to routine news so that 
smaller papers would not compete too much with the 
metropolitan press. When the western papers were admitted 
to, a role in AP's management, they "demanded more enter- 
prise and a report of. a more varied character. The 
policy of limiting the field to 'routine news1 was 
abandoned, and the institution began to show evidence of 
2 
real journalistic life and ability". 
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The original AP of Now York (NYAP) still controlled the, 
incoming flow of international news', ''because it controlled 
the transatlantic cable head in'the. United'States. This 
monopoly did not survive long, butlater"agreements'with 
the European agencies secured for-NYAP by far, the most 
important source of overseas news. The New York agency 
still. worried about its Western counterpart, which like 
NYAP had declared territorial autonomy and forbidden its 
. members to. take any other service. " This seemed to arrest 
the possibility of expansion by-NYAP on its own accord, 
in exploitation of its central position in the system of 
news exchanges between it, Western'AP and otherAP's which 
appeared throughout the country. WhenWestern'AP 
contracted with the German-agencyWolff -(in`1885), at 
that time`in conflict with'the other two, -leaders of. the 
«European cartel, toexchange its news for'European news,. 
NYAP'sfears were justified., It even went as. far as 
seeking a deal with the major rival'agency. to'the AP 
system, the ' original United -Press''-'(no_t' th'e same UP 
which emerged at the turn of: ',, the century)", '. in the hope 
that''UP' could undermine' the posi. tion of Western"AP. 
(UP's base was bothEastern and Mid-Western;: ' its main 
supporting papers were the Boston Daily Globe and the 
Chicago 'Daily Herald; it took a 
, 
foreign'-news supply 
from Central News 'of London. ) Western Union-, the major, 
telegraphic company and which carried most'of, AP's traffic, 
upset this'plan when it chose to side with'Western AP 
rather than UP. In their own struggle'for döminance, 
the telegraph. companies looked. for heavy-traffic customers. 
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Equally, -they-were anxious to destroy potential heavy- 
traffic clients unwise enough to do business with rival 
telegraph companies. In this instance therefore, the 
Western Union sided with Western AP in its attempt to 
destroy the business affiliation between UP and`Mackay's 
Postal Telegraph Company. In doing so it postponed 
the surreptitious deal between NYAP and UP. 
The failure of the NYAP-UP. deal was followed by. a ten-year 
truce between NYAP and. Western AP until in 1892, Western 
AP exposed a new secret trust between NYAP. and UP. 
Riding high on. the ensuing scandal, Western AP effectively 
became the AP, with a , Chicago base, -and for a time the 
New York influence was contained.: UP .. signed a cartel 
arrangement of very short. durat±on with western AP. AP's 
operating base was broader than UP's,, and because it won 
an exclusive contract with Reuters, for which-it bought 
the. world service for $17,500 per annum, in addition to 
enormous service commitments and a. supply of: -AP news, UP 
was forced into final ; bankruptcy; in,; 1897. Membership 
of-this new AP of. Illinois, as it was called, was 
extended 
to include old UP subscribers. Some Scripps: newspapers 
however, which had formed the backbone of the old UP's 
clientele, were excluded-fromthis concession in order to 
protect the market interests of existing, AP members. 
But under Illinois law. AP could fall under State surveill- 
ance as a public utility,,. and as such could be forced to 
sell to anyone who could afford to subscribe to the service. 
This was unacceptable to the new AP managers, headed by 
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Melville Stone, who had succeeded in their struggle partly 
by assuring members of their continuing exclusive rights 
to the AP service within territorial limits. In 1900 
therefore, AP was 'incorporated in New York. 
The New York influence persists today. Most of AP's top 
executives are located in Rockefeller Plaza and it is 
there that the major editing functions are located. In 
addition to organizational centralization in New York, 
the agency has been accused of domination by big-city. 
influence generally. Schwarlose (1965) analysed. the 
period 1893-1964 and concluded that the wealthy! large- 
city properties had continually been over-represented 
on the-board during that time. Certain states were 
over-represented such as. New York, Pennsylvania Missouri 
and California,, and were mostly dominated by papers in 
one or two large cities. 'By `contrast, many of 'the 
under-represented states were those with many small 
newspapers not productive 'of large revenues for AP, ' such 
as Kansas, the Dakotas and Iowa. The-'influence of the 
-big city'newspapers is 
contained to the extent that each 
member is restricted to a maximum of forty votes. The 
votes are in ratio to the AP bonds purchased by: the- 
member, with one vote per bond. This is a constitutional 
provision and there' are other safeguards to' ensure 
representation on the-Board of Directors` for small 'as 
well as large newspapers (e. g. At least 3 , 
'or the' 18 
Directors must each represent a newspaper published in a 
city of less than 50,000 population and which is not 
controlled by any other newspaper published ina'city 
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of more than 50,000 population). 
East-West Imbalance 
An extension of the theme of New York control is a 
persistent belief held among west-coast editors that 
the agencies are controlled from. the east. This reflects 
the general character of news flow in the United States which 
contrasts ironically. with the character of much global 
news flow: 
"News flo's east to west and seemingly is 
incapable of flowing west to east with 
Washington and New York the news hub. "14 
The problem was subject of a workshop report of the 
California Newspapers Publishers Association Editors' 
Conference in June 1974. Nineteen out of twenty-four 
editors responding. to a question posed by a Californian 
wire editor thought AP's 'A' wire was biased to the east-. 
The bias was identified in four . areas: pegging of all 
stories to Eastern Daylight Times; a slowdown of news 
flow from New York after close of business in the east 
but before close-down in the west; direct omission of 
western points in roundup stories; ignoring west coast 
stories of equal significance to east coast stories. 
In reply, AP representatives pointed. out that the Los 
Angeles bureau alone accounted for 17% of all non- 
Washington and foreign stories on the 'A' wire and that 
the four states in the Los Angeles regional news area 
produced 30% of non-Washington national copy. -5 But 
'non-Washington' news is-not as great as-'night be thought. 
Wes Gallagher, AP's president, told a later APME Conference 
that same year that: 
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"in the past two years the proportion 
of Washington news in - the- report has 
grown enormously due largely to, Watergate 
.. and the economic 
crunch. It-has reached` 
fifty or more per cent of trunk wire copy 
on many days. ii b 
Gallagher claimed that it was AP's intention to'return 
to pre-Watergate proportions: 
"The Associated Press is doing'this__and intends 
to do more by giving main trunk wire space to 
roundups dealing with all of'the country, by 
taking the best; of the'stories on-thestate 
level and giving them national 
distribution. 7 
It may not be true that wire service Head Office executives 
tend to come only from the east coast as is sometimes 
claimed. But in the past, there has been atendency to' 
promote men from the west-or mid-west in a geographic 
step-by-step fashion. through mid-west. bureaux till they 
reached the east. This may have helped exaggerate the 
psychological. importance'of the-"east. Another consideration 
is the dense. newspaper population of eastern states, and 
its. consequent revenue importance. 
UPI has a reputation for being less 'dominated by east 
coast influence. ' This is largely related to the'fact 
that it is ''by- far the' most popular news agency in 
California. It also-produces its radio/wires and 'B'. 
wire in Chicago. The. ' Scripps paper's which originally* 
established the agency-were all western or mid-western. 
The east-west division is probably less important than 
the division between media-wealthy states and-'the others, 
which overlaps but does not coincide with the east-west 
division. This-is the factor that helps explain why 
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only one man should report Alaska forýAP, or why it was 
not until 1966 that a local state-wire service was 
established in. Puerto Rico, while many east coast bureau. 
staffs run into double figures. 
A. M. and P. M. Paters 
Asecond major division of interest which affected the 
development of the American news agencies was between 
the morning and the evening press. Differences between 
the`agencies in their respective connections with the 
morning and evening press relate-to differences of 
politics and style. The morning press was AP's 
special constituency in its early days and concentration 
in this sector (over-night telegrams were cheapest), 
helped create its own competition. 
In 1869 the American Press Association (APA) was 
established, mainly to represent the evening papers 
which felt that AP's service was too much geared to 
morning press needs - little news was. provided for 
example after morning press deadlines. It was APA that 
later became the UP which was so badly routed by Western 
AP in 1892. The evening press complained of discrimin- 
ation not just from AP but from the telegraph company 
whose favourable rates underwrote AP's early growth: 
Western Union. Western Union charged APA too heavily 
and forced it to turn to other, weaker telegraph companies. 
UP never did secure the kind of relationship with a 
telegraph company that AP enjoyed (and suffered)'with 
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Western Union. 
Much as they tried, Western Union . and 
AP never, successfully 
established a monopoly, in the. field`of press, communications. 
In 188o, AP had only-36.6% of'the daily market. When AP 
of Illinois took over,. it. started. with only nine-clients 
in 1892, -and this rose to 709 (daily,; non-daily and 
private) by 1898. ; During this period it never had more 
than 20-30% of: the total daily market. For all the help 
`it received, its. alliance with Western'Union was still 
..:. 'costly. - about; 
three 
. 
quarters of all its revenue went to 
the telegraph company', until, underKent Cooper attempts 
were made . 
to seek less exp'ensa. ve routes. and-to: employ 
competitive bidding. The ; initial expense may have been 
necessary, - and the alliance, between,, Western Union , and AP 
certainly . 
created, difficulties for' the. competition, and 
in the process may have briefly hindered. the developt:; ent 
of the afternoon press in America. 
In 1880,, 3,000,000 press-telegrams were, handled by. a' 
Western Union,.: largely-. for AP or. its affiliates, out of 
a_total of 3,154098 handled on non-leased circuits. by 
all telegraph: companies. , 
AP's competitors;, did not. "; 
perform quite so badly as. this-implies: -UP, failing 
to get cheap standard'rates, started:, leasing. wire 
circuits. To counteract AP's hold over. news from Europe, 
'' UP took overseas news from. Central News oflLondon, 'one 
of`Reuterst early: competitors. ~ 
AP's. larger members (mainly A. M. ); were reluctant to see 
the agency. expand too rapidly. 
164. 
Theyýdid not want smaller 
papers (which included many P. M. papers) to be given a 
service that would enable these to compete with them. 
They wanted to restrict AP to coverage'of the most routine 
kinds of news. ' Such limitations could not be maintained 
for long in face of the sure expansion of. the'se smaller 
papers anyway, and of the competition against, AP which 
such policies helped generate. 
Yet it took AP a long time before it was ready to consider 
the afternoon paper as equal to the morning paper. The 
morning paper dominance was in fact accentuated in 1900 
when the reconstitution of AP gave extra voting privileges 
to existing members by issuing low denomination bonds 
that carried voting rights The=result was that the 
larger and older morning papers kept-control, of the Board 
of Directors despite the growth of--evening, papers and the 
entry of many smaller dailies into the, ýAP. The reason 
for this initial dominance of the morning market was 
that the earliest papers tended, to, be morning papers 
anyway, especially the larger, prestigious ones; and that 
the afternoon press when it did emerge tended to be populist 
and sensationalist in tone, so that a fairly conservative 
news agency like AP was not anxious to be seen to be 
bothered with it. 
"The Associated Press had been founded. mainly 
by morning newspapers. The most powerful 
members of the organization were still in'that 
field. They were jealous of their rights; 
they had insisted thatthe 'evening'; wire!, 
should close at four o'clock - that any news 
which 'broke' after that time of day should 
belong to the morning newspapers. This 
precluded those 'sporting extras' which have 
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become of late years such a prominent 
feature of journalism, for . almost . all: ,.; 
sporting events, notably baseball games, ' 
are finished after 4 `o'clock. in the 
afternoon. "8 
AP's fault lay in its failure 
. 
to acknowledge the difference 
between morning and evening newspaper, which meant that. 
the structural bias of the organization in favour of the 
morning. press was not corrected . until. much 
later.. But 
the tide of new publications was heavily in favour of 
evening newspapers, and despite AP's apparent lack of 
concern for them, evening sheets (mostly small) already 
accounted for, half. the AP membership by 1900. One. 
reason for P. M. press growth wasthat, it was considered 
a superior advertising medium for women to the A. M. 
press, ata: time of huge increases, in department store . 
press advertising. ) The agency's leased-wire mileage, 
however$ was twice as great at might as , by day, a"differ- 
ence which could only be accounted for by-the financial 
strength of the morning papers and the structure of the 
AP Board.,. 'A few years later the number of evening 
papers; served by AP. had almost caught hup on the', number 
of mornings, although they still accounted . for' a much 
1 revenue. In 1908 there, smaller proportion of, tota 
were 
. 
774 AP: newspaper members, "of whom. 438 were morning 
and 362 were evening. The evening figure steadily'and 
rapidly increasedso that soon not only had it overtaken 
the number, of. mornings, but by 1930 was actually twice 
as great., In 1930, of 1286 newspaper members, 389 
were mornings and 897 were. evenings. 
166. 
The new United Press came into existence when AP was still 
dominated by morning papers in almost every sense. UP 
had been preceded by three other press associations, 
representing west coast, mid-west and eastern papers 
respectively, set up by E. W. Scripps (whose papers were 
all evenings) after the collapse of the old UP in 1897. 
These were merged in 1907 to form United Press Association. 
UPA, later simply called UP, concentrated on the afternoon 
market and on that other neglected market, Sunday morning 
papers. Another major publisher whose interests had 
been affected by the. exclusivity of many AP contracts, 
and who also owned evening papers whose interests were 
not adequately served by AP, was William Randolph Hearst. 
He established two agencies in 1909-10, one for morning 
papers (International News Service), one for evenings 
(National News Association) and these were combined into 
one, International News Service, in 1911. 
UP set out to do for afternoon papers what AP did not. 
It abolished the principle of exclusivity - any news- 
paper capable of paying for the service could have it 
(although later, perhaps even then, exclusivity crept in 
by the back door). Instead of aiming to present an 
official, authoritive and colourless style, UP risked 
being brash and colourful. It installed a sporting 
service that ran between four to seven o'clock in the 
afternoon, and included in the sporting service any 
important news which 'broke' later in the afternoon; 
so that UP clients, unlike AP evening clients, could 
publish 'late night extras. 
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It first of all: established, a 'sporting wire' in imitation 
of UP, and then in 1915 extended its full.. service to 
afternoon subscribers, from 9.00a. m. to, 9.00p. m. This 
worked both ways.. ' In, 1919, UP; started a service for 
morning papers, after a suggestion to this effect from 
the newly-founded New York, DailyNews whichhad been unable 
to obtain an AP franchise. Many of.. these-first night-wire 
clients also received AP , reports, 
because_in1915 AP had 
also revoked its rule prohibiting members. . 
from buying 
other services. ' (The movement in: this direction was of 
long standing. Melville Stone records, how the paper he 
once edited, theevening. Chicago Daily News, had the AP 
franchise. A problem arose,, when the same, newspaper 
group started the Chicago Morning-News in 1881. Since 
the AP franchise was in the hands of the evening paper, 
the Morning News had no alternative but to take the 
(old) UP.;. AP protested ; that. this infringed its rules, 
since-both papers belonged to the same ownership, and 
therefore should not, take, UP. But the ruling., was not 
enforced: A. few. years later in 1883, Stone successfully 
persuaded one of his morning-competitors, which had the 
AP franchise, to allow him,. to use AP also for, the Morning 
News)9 
" 
(-The numberýof UP's morning ; clients rose. slowly, and had 
reached only 118 in, 1928,. 150 in 1935,. It is UP's early 
activity in the evening field which is its most important 
claim to distinction for that period: 
"With a good deal of justification, ' the up,, 
has insisted that the`. development of the 
afternoonrnewspaper_andýits. advancement 
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in power and prestige, as compared.. with the 
morning press may be traced directly to the 
projection-of this agency`concentrating upon 
news especially for the afternoon field. t1 10 
Since AP actually had a greater number of evening members 
however, it very. early on established a dominant position 
in both morning and evening fields. Table. 3 shows the 
relative position of the two agencies in each field, in 
terms of. the number of daily papers each service reaches 
(in percentage terms), and the number of papers whr. oh 
subscribe exclusively to one or other service, for four 
separate years in the period 1934-1974. 
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TABLE THREE 
















M(1) E. (2), M(3, ) E(4) M. (5) E(6) M(7) E(8) 
1934. , 45.4 38.8 68.2. 50.3 13.0. 26.9 35.8 37.4 
1948 33.3 40.1 58.3 53 9.6 26'1 34'. 6 39.3 
1962 34.3 43.1 83.0 62.9 14.4 31.8 63.1 : 
51.6 
1966 36.9 44.7 82. o 64.5 15. "4 
. 
30.8 6o 5 50.6 
1974 .: 37.6 
48.6 77.2 65.0 "17.4 29.4' 57.0, 45.8 
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These figures indicate. that AP's total penetration of the 
evening market has risen steadily between 1934 and 1974 
(see Column 4,. Table 3) from-50% to 65% of the total. 
. 
Its penetration of the morning market (Column 3) has 
always been higher than that of the evening market, but 
after rising to a peak of 83% in the early sixties began 
to fall to 77% in 1974. The proportion of morning 
papers which take AP only (Column 1) has fallen since 
1934 from 45% to almost 38%, but the fall has not been 
even, and since the early'sixties there has been an increase. 
The proportion of evening papers subscribing to AP only 
has increased steadily since 1934 from Almost'39% to nearly 
half the market. 
The proportion of all papers. reached by UP in both morning 
and evening sectors (Columns 7 and 8) improved dramatically 
in-the early 1960's, possibly reflecting the merger between 
UP and INS, but the improvement has not been maintained. 
UP's penetration in the morning field has dropped by about 
6% between. 1962 and 1974., and by about the same in the 
evening field. The proportion of morning papers taking 
only UPI (column 5) has risen consistently from 13% to 17% 
between 1934 and, 1974 except for a low period just after 
the war. The proportion of evening papers taking only 
UPI is higher, and has fluctuated around ä few percentage 
points from 27% in '1934 to 29% in 1974. ' 
AP's penetration in both fields is considerably higher 
than UPI's, and likewise its share of-the one-service 
market in both fields. Consideration of the share of 
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the market held byINS while it still survived, or of 
the absolute total numbers of daily newspapers in these 
years does not add or subtract very much from the general 
. 
implication of these findings. INS sold. mostly. as a 
supplementary service, and in ' 1934. reached, 11.4% of the 
morning and 7.5% of the evening markets;, in. 1948 her 
penetration of the morning market, -had increased to 30.5% 
(actually higher than UP's)', and 12.7% of the %:: evening 
market. 
12 In 1974 thereýwere: also nineteen,. 'All'Day' 
newspapers, i. e.. which had several,. editions throughout 
the day. Eleven of these took AP. only,, and seven-sub- 
scribed to. both. One recorded neither. Of nine 
additional papers which had both morning, and evening '' 
editions,, three took AP only, one, took UPI only, three 
took both, and one took neither. 
13 
Accommodating Radio14 
One: important client sector which was sorely under- 
"privileged for quite some time in the 
matter of agency 
sources, was the radio market. AP was especially 
reluctant to enter this field, although when it did 
eventually do so it achieved a market saturation point 
of 47.5% within two years, ''and maintained this within a 
"few percentage points up until the mid-sixties. 
'Radio news was problematic for the agencies. Newspaper 
members or. clientsregarded radio newscasts as a form of 
competition which would hürt. their circulations. There 
was no supporting evidence for this belief. Yet they 
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regarded themselves as the rightful owners of news and' 
were determined, for the most part, to keep news away 
from radio. 
In March 1934, a Press-Radio Bureau was established by 
publishers to control the use_of"news by broadcasters. 
Signatories to the agreement which established the 
bureau were the American Newspapers Publishers Association 
(ANPA), AP, UP, INS, Universal Service, the Scripps-Howard 
'Newspapers, the Columbia Broadcasting Systemand'the 
National Broadcasting. Company. These organizations 
agreed to elect a committee, whose main function would 
be to select a limited volume of daily bulletins of state, 
" from the wire services national and international news 
for use by broadcasters. Each bulletin was restricted 
to thirty words (this clause was later dropped as imprac- 
tical), and the broadcast periods were restricted to. two 
a day', not exceeding five minutes each. . 
Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) agreed to terminate its on 
agency, Columbia News Service Incorporated, and the ' 
National Broadcasting Company (NBC) agreed not to enter 
the news-collection field: they could hardly afford 
at that point to be'blacklistedby the major news organ-, 
izations. 
The background to this development was the crystallization 
of press opposition to radio around 1930, although even 
in the 'twenties AP, had expelled . 
members. who allowed AP 
news to be broadcast on stations which they owned or who 
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engaged in independent-news-gathering for radio news. 
There was a short. period in which publishers experienced 
a decline in! newspaper+; advertising. revenue`, while radio 
advertising increased... In retaliation, some papers 
ceased to'print programme listings, -but; irrere obliged 
to restore ' them' iri response to public demand. - AP 
members successfully exerted power to cut radio chains 
off AP's customer list. An AP referendum in 1933 
established that the'AP board would permit only AP 
members to use AP bulletins. The idea of'sponsorship 
of AP broadcasts was considered out of the question. 
And in South Dakota, AP obtained an injunction which 
ýforbade. radio stations to -read fresh `newspaper reports. 
For"the: time being, smaller newspaper members of AP 
who did not have radio affiliates of their own had won. 
A later'decision by a Seattle court held that the AP 
had no property rights In news after publication. Till 
. then 
many radio stations went to UP-and INS for their 
news supply. But UP withdrew from the radio field in 
response to the same client pressures that had forced 
AP to withdraw. ' `At this point CBS organized its own. 
news-gathering organization, . Columbia News Service, under 
the direction of an ex-UP journalist'; Paul White. The 
CBS service-tookla supply of foreign news from Reuters 
and Central News in England. The existence of the CBS 
service was: the'. major impetus to the eventual compromise 
-solution'represented by-'the Press-Radio Bureau. 
Under the Press-Radio agreement therefore-the radio networks 
174. 
agreed to stay outof the news-gathering business; to 
broadcast only news furnished by the Press-Radio bureau 
and then only after it had been published; and to refrain 
from selling. news programmes to advertisers. All news- 
casts had to mention something , about 
'public servicet, 
and to urge listeners to read their local newspapers for 
full details. 
The great weakness of the Press-Radio bureau agreement 
was that it could apply-only to network-affiliated 
stations. At that time there were 28. stations owned 
by the networks, and 150 affiliated with them, out of a- 
total of 600 in the country. An ex-editorof the Columbia 
News. Service, Herbert Moore, gathered together a group 
of his colleagues to. set up a rival organization to the 
Press-Radio bureau-. This was financed as a co-operative 
venture by a group of independent stations, and started 
operations a week. before the Press-Radio agreement., came 
into effect. The, new service operated with great tech- 
nical efficiency, but the co-operative ownership structure 
came apart. Western-broadcasters dominated the organiz- 
ation- (perhaps in*response to the dominant east. coast 
interests reflected. in the Press-Radio. Bureau. agreement) 
and eastern: stations protested against too much western 
and mid-western news. Herbert. Moore-consequently looked 
for alternative backing , which he found, and started the 
Transradio Press Service, incorporated in New York. Within 
three weeks it was making. a profit.. A subsidiary organ- 
ization, the Radio News Association, was organized to 
perfect delivery for remote and. not-too-wealthy stations 
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which could"not afford to. pay"tolls on Transradio news. 
One hundred stations subscribed to this service alone. 
Transradio reached 150 stations by mid-1935,260 by 1936. 
As in the casecCthe now defunct Columbia'News Service, 
foreign news came from Reuters, Central News of London.. 
and its own foreign correspondents`. 
This appearance of Reuters on the scene deserves some 
comment. The British agency was retaliating for AP's 
withdrawal from the European cartel. At home in-Britain 
it also combined with publishers to control use of news by 
radio. In Britain the government via the Post Office 
had established a' radio monopoly (albeit 'autonomous') in 
the form of the BBC. This meant that newspaper and agency 
interests had only to negotiate at one level'of control 
rather than compete in commercial--terms with the infant 
medium, and they thus found it easier to maintain effedtive 
control over radio news than their American colleagues. 
The Press-Radio bureau had 160 clients shortly after it 
started, but this number dwindled rapidly up until the 
time of the bureauts demise'in December 1938. In addition 
to competition from Transradio and Radio News it. had also 
to contend with the New England based Yankee Network News 
Service and other smaller centres of resistance to the 
1935 agreement that were encouraged by the Seattle court 
decision. When the influential WOR Newark'station with- 
drew from the agreement in early 1935, others followed. 
By the Autumn of 1935 there were four hundred stations 
using news obtained from some source other than the Press- 
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Radio bureau. In an attempt to halt the collapse of Press- 
Radio, ANPA called a meeting in April1935 to renew the 
original agreement but with major. concessions. The 
meeting gave UP and INS the right, if they thought it 
necessary, to sell news to radio - which of course they 
quickly thought necessary (within a month in fact). A 
further ANPA meeting early in 1936 decided on a co-operative 
strategy with radio, by which. time it was too late for 
strategies in any case. In the same year, UP inaugurated 
a teletypewriter circuit on an eighteen-hour basis to 
twenty of its fifty radio subscribers. The bureau ceased 
operations altogether in December 1938, and two years later 
AP entered the radio news field. AP had supplied some 
services in 1936, following UP and INS, but it. did not 
lift its ban on the use of its reports on sponsored news 
programmes till late 1939. (UP had sold to sponsored 
programmes since 1936. ) In. 1949the AP board gave the 
General Manager authority, to contract with individual 
radio stations and with broadcasting networks. 
The entry of the major US news agencies into the radio 
field. eliminated many. of the established sources of radio 
news supply. Transradio ceased operating in 1951. Now 
that AP and UP were as strong in the radio field as they 
were in newspapers, they stood in powerful relation to 
broadcasters. Broadcasters were given associate member- 
ship in AP only in, 1946, and board representation in 1976. 
Both agencies were given to imposing tough contracts: for 
instance, requiring five years'subscription in advance. 
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In 1967, however, the FCC adopted a rule prohibiting 
broadcasters from signing news service contracts which 
extended longer than three years. 
Client Characteristics 1974. 
,. The author's. computations from data provided in the 1974 
Editor and Publisher: Yearbook`showthatin that year AP 
was. a very clear leader in the overall daily newspaper 
-field: There was a total of 1754 daily'newspapers of 
which `820 (46.8%) subscribed. only -to AP of the ' two major 
news, services, and: 472 (27%) subscribed only to UPI, while 
366'(20.9%) took both and 96 (5.59%) recorded neither, 
'agency.., OAP's total market penetration was, 67.6% as.. agaivt 
UP's-47.8%. 
If subscriptions are considered by States, it appears that 
for 1974,. AP has more' subscribers than UPI.. in 36 out of 51 
states `(70%); UPI leads in 11 . 
(22%);.. and. they tie in 
four:. cases. In 16 cases, APIs . 
lead, is by 10 or more 
clients (in Iowa it led by 27), ' whereas UPI's lead is of 
this: dimensionin only one state: '.. 'California, where it 
has-26 more clients than AP. : UPI leadsin our more states 
than it did in 1963, but the overall pattern has not: changed 
much in thirty years. There is a slight tendency for UPI 
to do rather better in the west and south than 
elsewhere. 
This is'very evident in California, but UPI also leads 
in'Nevada, Oregon; Utah; -'Wyoming and-in the mid-west_it 




During the period 1966-73 there has been a further decline 
in the proportion of newspapers taking both major wire 
services, from. 24.3% in 1966 to 20.9% in 1974. The 
proportion of papers taking two or more major wire 
services has never. exceeded`30% in the years for which. 
figures are available, and when three major-services were 
available only 10% took all three. 
Table4 shows the distribution of all: subscribers 
according. to the agency or agencies to which 'they subscribe 
and the populations of the communities they serve. Over 
half of all papers serve communities of . 
25,000; persons or 
less. As community size. increases the proportion of total 
newspapers serving such communities declines rapidly.. 
---------------------- 
TABLE FOUR. 
AGENCY SUBSCRIPTION BY SUBSCRIBERS' COMMUNITY POPULATIONS 













AP only 28.6 8.9 50 3.2. 0.62. 0.1 
UPI only 18.7 4.3 2.0 1.3 0.3 0.3' 
AP. & UPI 1.6 3.7. 5.7 7.2 2.0 0.7 
Neither 3.9 0.. 9 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 
Totals 52.8 17.8 13.5. 12.1 2.9 1.2 
SOURCE: Figures computed from the 
Editor and. Publisher Yearbook 1974. 
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Table 5'shows'that the proportion ofpapers taking only AP 
declines consistently as community population' size increases. 
In the case of newspapers taking"only UPI'the same is true, 
except that newspapers in largest communities are almost 
as likely to take only UPI as newspapers`in the. smallest 
communities. Thel, iklihood'of dual subscriptions (to. both 
AP and UPI) increases with community"size'up to 500,001 - 
1,000,000 and then falls `off. -' ' In' the three largest 
community size categories, `dual subscriptions-outnumber 
single subscriptions' by a_good margin. ' These figures' are 
broadly similar 'to those of Schwarzlose for 1966.15 
'However, in 1966 the largest communities were 'a'little more 
likely rather than less likely to subscribe to both major 
services. This may suggest that smaller papers in the 




DISTRIBUTION OF AGENCY SUBSCRIBERS WITHIN COMMUNITY SIZE 
CATEGORIES: ' 
(% for 1974) . 
25,000 25,0017 50,001- 100,001- 500,001- 1,000,001 
less, 50,000 100,000 . 500,000,1,, 000', 000 & over 
AP, only, 54...?.. 50.2 39.4 26.4 -: 21.69.5 
UPI only 35.4 ' 24.1 14.8 10.. 8 9.8 28.6 
AP &. UPI -3,. 1 20.9 42.4 59.5. ' 68.6: 57.1 
Neither 7.3 4.8 3.4 33 0.0 4.8 
Totals 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Figures computed from the Editor and 
Publisher Yearbook 1974. 
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Table 6 indicates. that as a. general rule, single-service 
subscriptions decline with circulation. size while dual 
subscriptions increase very dramatically with circulation 
size. These figures correspond quite closely with those 
for 1966. A previous study has indicated that the presence 
or. absence of competition is a factor determining whether 
there is dual or single agency subscription for. smaller 
papers: competition increases dual or multiple agency 
subscriptions - but large dailies tend to maintain relative- 
ly high levels of agency resources, whether as monopolies or 
as competitors. 
16 
Schwarzlose found a tendency for smaller 
, 
circulation papers in competitive situations to prefer UPI 
over AP. 
TABLE SIX 
AGENCY SUBSCRIPTION. BY SUBSCRIBERS' CIRCULATIONS 













AP only 48.2 56.3 42.0 37.0 21.2- 9.1 
UPI only 38.8 26.6 14.1 6.7 7.1 0.0 
AP & uP 3.5 13,5 42.0 54.1 70.0 90.9 
Neither 9.5 3.6 1.9 2.2 1.7 0.0 
Totals 100.0 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Supplemental Services 
Since most American papers tend to use agency reports as 
they come off the wires, the dominance of just two major 
services has led to some concern about. the diminishing effect 
this might have on editorial diversity, within a context of 
increasing concentration of newspaper ownership. In 1973, 
165 groups controlled 977 daily papers, or about 55% of the 
total number of dailies, an increase of 117% since 1945. 
On the other hand, an increasing number of papers are going 
'public'. There were public stockholdings in 247 dailies, 
controlled through nineteen groups, in 1973, representing 
14% of all; dailies, and 24% 
of circulation. Although con- 
centrationis increasing, actual number of 
dailies was 
increasing even, up until 1974. . 
The total has fluctuated 
since the , 
war, but there has been an absolute increase of 
. about eleven 
dailies since 1946. There has been a heavier 
growth of large dailies with 
circulations of 50,000 or 
more, which have. increased from 199 in 1946 t'o 255 in 1973" 
Growth has been more prominent in the south than in the 
north - almost 15% in fourteen. southern states between 
1946 and 1973; accompanied by .a 
circulation gain in southern 
18 
states of 83/. Overall circulation in the period 
1960-75 
has fallen, and likewise the percentage of advertising 
revenue spent on the press, but irr the same period suburban 
morning papers have gained 29% in circulation and suburban 
afternoon papers gained 50%. It is primarily the large 
metropolitan papers who have suffered. 
Structurally therefore the conditions for'editorial 
diversity in the industry as a whole are not necessarily 
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very much worse than they were thirty-years ago. Yet 
multiple agency subscriptions are decreasing, This would 
not in itself be a matter of concern if alternative sources 
of news were being utilized more fully. In the United 
States there are as elsewhere a large number of smaller 
agencies, ranging from syndicated feature distributorsto 
relatively large-scale"teleprinter networks for general news 
services. Subscriptions to the smaller news services 
(supplementaries) are registerd in the annual Yearbooks of 
Editor and Publisher. Over sixty are recorded. -there for. 
1974, but only 12 of these have more than 10`daily clients. 
Most important of these are the New York Times'News Service 
which distributes to 141 daily newspapers in the United 
States, and the Los Angeles Times - Washington Post News 
Service which distributes to 108 daily U. S. clients. 
Both these services use material initially written for the 
newspapers which control them, and both have extensive 
overseas sales as well Table 7 shows the leading smaller 
news agencies. 
An examination of the position of the supplemental agencies 
suggests several important features of the agency market 
and the implications for the future. of news diversity; 
(1) it is the papers who seem least to need the supplemental 
agencies, those already supplied with many services and with 
generous facilities, that most use them; 
(2) Supplemental agency services are rarely taken as 
alternative sources to the leading agencies and are therefor 
little threat to the market dominance of those agencies, 
although there is a slight tendency in this direction; 
i83. 
(3) the supplemental agencies themselves reveal links with 
the promise the major agencies ý which would reduce any y 
might hold for future diversity; 
(4) .; _,. the experience of-INS'suggests that the prospects of a 
third major agency emerging are slim indeed. 
----- - -- - ---- 
TABLE SEVEN 
LEADING SUPPLEMENTARY NEWS SERVICES 
IN ORDER OF THEIR OUTLET STRENGTHS 
'Source:, Schwarzlose ( 1966)'-' an& figures 
computed from 
b6 k 
the Editor &Publsiher 
o Ypar 
1966 1974 
News Service "`. 
% News Service: 
1 New York'Times (NYT)14.5 New York Times (NYT) 20.0 
'2. 'Chicago 'Daily News Los Angeles Times- 
(CDN 12.7 Washington Post 
(LAT-WPN) 15.3 
3. New York Herald Chicago -Daily News 9.8 
Tribune (NYHT) 10.2. 
4. North American News- Newspaper Enterprises 
paper'AllianceOTANA) 9.5 Association (NEA) 9.3 
'5; Newspaper Entei*ises North-American News- 
Association (NEA) 8.6 paper Alliance NANA) 6.1 
6. Chicago Tribune-New Copley News Service 
York News'(CT-NYN) 83 . 
(CNS) 58 . 
7'. Reuters News Service Gannett'News Service 
(RN) 7.3 (GNs) 4.8 
8. Dow Jones News Service Dow Jones News`Service 
(DJ) 6.1 (DJ),.., 4.7 
9. CopleyNews Service Reuters News Service 
(CNS) 5.4 (RN) 4.0 
10. Los Angeles Times- Christian Science 
Washington Post Monitor (CSM) 2.0 
(LAT-WPN) 4.7 
11. Gannett News' Service ý Chicago Tribune-New 
(GNS) 2.9 York News (CT-NYN) i. 8 
12. Scripps-Howard News- ' Scripps-Howard News- 
paper Alliance (SHNA) 2.3 
. 
paper Alliance (SHNA) 1.7 
13. Hearst Headline Service New York Herald" 
(HHS) 0.5 Tribune (NYHT), 1.3 
14. Other 7.0 Other 13,2 
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Three hundred and ninety papers, 22.2% of the total number 
of dailies, subscribed in 1974 to some other news. service 
in addition to AP'or UPI. These papers tend to be the 
large circulation big-city newspapers, the ones which tend 
to have several news services in any case. Of the 390, 
almost half (48.7%) served populations of over 100,000, 
(whereas only 32.4% of all papers are situated in this 
population. category), and almost half (46.9%) had circu-. 
lations of over 50,000. Nearly half of them already sub- 
scribed to both AP and UPI (49%). A higher proportion 
of mornings subscribed to the supplementary services than 
would be expected from the proportion of mornings'to all 
papers. Of all the papers taking supplementaries,, 30.7% 
were mornings. ' 38.6% of all mornings took supplementaries 
compared with 18.3% of all evenings. 
Only 191 dailies, or 10.9% of all dailies,, appearto take 
a supplementary as a substitute for. an alternative major 
news service. These papers subscribe either to AP or 
UPI, but not both, and have ; one: supplementary in 
addition. 
72% of these papers take. AP. for theirmajor. news service. 
AP subscribers therefore are more likely to take a 
supplementary service than UPI subscribers. 
The percentage of dailies which subscribed to supplementary 
services in 1966 was only 16.4%. This, represented an 
increase of 7% over the previous year. In 1974, as we 
have seen, the percentage was 22.2%, so that there is a 
tendency for more papers to-take supplementaries. Not 
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much of this increase has occurred among the larger papers. 
In 1966, the proportion of papers taking supplementary 
services which had circulations of 50, '000 or more was 51.8%, 
There is a 'very slight tendency but in 1973 was 48.7%. ' . 
for smaller papers to take-supplementaries 
" over- time. 
Slightly fewer 'papers' taking supplementaries now are those 
which already subscribe to both AP and UPI., In 1966, 
56. '9% of these papers took both major services and this had 
fallen to 40-in 1973`" There may be a' slightly increasing 
tendency for papers to choose a supplementary as an 
alternative to a second major wire service. 
The sets of percentages in'"Table 7 may not be strictly 
comparable because smaller agencies included in' 1974 may 
not have been included in 1966. 'However`, 'one' or two 
changes do stand out. ' Most important of'these is the 
-rise to strength in that period cf time of. the Lös Angeles 
Times-Washington Post News Service, and the increasing 
.. ; -.: - "'strength in: the supplementary market of the New York Times 
News Service. (which in 1953 only had 31 clients; the 
Chicago Daily News was most important that year with 45 
clients)'. Both these services have built up"respectable 
foreign clientele: the New York Times Service"sold to 119 
foreign newspapers in 46 countries' in' 1972; the Los Angeles 
Times-Washington Post went to 100 papers in 46 countries. 
The presence of other global news agencies in North America 
will be discussed at' greater length 
inChapter4; if any- 
thing, Reuters appears to have lost ground as a newspaper 
supplementary since 1966, and' AFP, `like' 'TASS, has only two 
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recorded newspaper. clients for 1974. 
There is an increasing trend towards concentration in the 
supplementary field. The three most , 
important services 
in 1966 accounted for 37.4% of total outlet strength, and 
45.1% in 1973. (This trend would be more noticeable if 
the two sets of figures in Table 7 were strictly comparable. 
)4 
In 1974, two of the smaller news services decided to join 
together. These were. KnightNewspapers and the Chicago 
Tribune-New: York Daily News, Services. A joint sales 
operation between the New York Times News Service and the 
Chicago Daily News/Chicago Sun-Times Service was dis- 
continued in 1974 as the result of an anti-trust suit but 
the two services continued to share a transmission wire. 
The other major supplementary, Los Angeles Times-Washington 
Post News Service, leases a special wire channel from the 
Associated Press , as of 1974. 
Two of the supplemental wire services, one small and the 
other of moderate size, have indirect links with UPI by 
way of the Scripps-Howard newspapers. One of, these is 
the Scripps-Howard . Newspapers. Alliance 
(SHNA), founded in 
1917, with 12 clients in 1973 and. distributed to Scripps- 
Howard newspapers. (However the Scripps-Howard service 
decided that year to make its service available outside 
the group-, on a world-wide basis, moving an average of 
eight stories, a day, six days a week, and concentrating 
on supplemental features. ) The other is Newspaper 
Enterprises Association (NEA) founded by Ellen Scripps in 
the 1920's, and which in 1973 served 66 clients, in 
*cf. note 4, p. 958 
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addition to overseas sales. Whereas SHNA goes only to 
papers which have either UPI or UPI and AP (but not AP 
only), NEA is taken by more papers whose major agency is 
AP rather than UPI, or. who take both AP and UPI. One of 
the news services, Gannett News Service,. has a temporary 
relationship with AP. Chairman of Gannett Newspapers is 
Paul Miller who is also at the time of writing Chairman 
of Associated Press. Both Scripps Howard and Gannett 
newspapers are amongst the top ten U. S. newspaper groups 
in terms of the number of papers they control. Gannett 
had 54 papers in 1974, Scripps Howard had 16, with aggregate 
weekday circulations of approximately 2- and 1J millions 
respectively. 
As concentration increases is it possible that some of the 
traditional supplemental groups will challenge the major 
wire services? "' To some extent this is happening and may 
continue to happen where papers which before might have 
had both major American wire services decide to take only 
one major. service and a supplementary. But most papers 
only take one major service in any case. Certain of the 
supplemental services have large resources at their disposal.. 
In Washington for instance the New York Times has an 
editorial staff of about 35, the Washington Post has 49, 
and Gannett has 11.19. The New York Times has 28 overseas 
bureaux staffed by 42 journalists; the Washington Rost- 
has 11 overseas bureaux staffed by 35., At home they have 
15 and 4 bureaux respectively. 
These kinds of figures are sizable, but do not match the 
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leading agencies. AP has about 80 editorial staff in 
Washington, and as we have seen earlier, over a hundred 
bureaux at home and over sixty abroad. The leading 
supplemental agencies are too closely identified with 
certain newspapers. In many cases the material they 
carry is material which appears or is written for the 
owning newspaper, and is usually of the feature variety 
rather than spot news material. Not much systematic 
evidence is available concerning the subject breakdown of 
the supplemental agencies. One content analysis of the 
New York Times News Service for overseas clients, however, 
indicates very heavy emphasis on American and, in"particular, 
on Washington News. 
20 
If this applies also to the domestic service, the implication 
is that the largest supplemental agency cannot hope to 
compete with the major agencies in the provision of a 
comprehensive foreign news service. There is also the 
consideration of what happens in an economic recession. 
Individual newspapers may be more inclined to cut news- 
gathering costs, thus affecting their subsidiary news 
services, than a news agency; but even if they cut back 
at the same rate as a major. agency, the cut will affect 
their news coverage more seriously than'the major agency 
because they have fewer resources to begin with. 
Evidence of possible cutbacks accumulated when New York 
Times profits before taxes dropped from just under £10,000,001 
in 1973 to slightly over X4,000,000 in 1974, and early in 
1975 the paper was studying ways of trimming page size to 
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save at least £2,000,000 a year. The ; Los, Angeles Times 
also planned to. reduceýpage size in 1975, and closed down 
21" 
its UN and Australian bureaux. 
Whatever. the, emphases and limitations of the supplemental 
agencies, it is. -clear. 
that they:. perform an important role 
for the larger 
, papers, 
and that thisýrole is likely'to 
persist. Privileged though the , 
domestic clients of the 
major agencies may be-in, comparison. with overseas clients, 
it is apparent that even in their domestic coverage these 
agencies may be, and have. been criticized for certain 
shortcomings ; and. ommissions.. -.: Alaska's state capital of 
Juneau, for instance,, with'a state. payroll of 11,000 persons 
and 18 regular state committees. was the responsibility of 
only a single AP staff correspondent in 1974. The normal 
AP or. agency explanation, for-this kind, of situation is 
., 
that. resources: have to be distributed somehow, and that 
it is always possible to rely 'on the local newspapers' to' 
" supply newsto; AP. Bud-from anothersource=we are`warned 
that such reliance cannot always ,.. be, justified: - 
"None of the state's (Alaska) daily newspapers, 
including the only one in Juneau, has seen fit 
to assign a full-time staff, reporterto cover 
the legislature,, and they rely almost exclusively 
on the superficial coverage provided-by the 
Associated Press bureau there. "21 
Some commentators have felt that the wire services' coverage 
1 of domestic news is consistently skimpy: - 
"Largely because of, the competition, both AP and 
UPI have begun cutting corners. Many, of AP's 
108 T . S. bureaux 
are skeleton staffs in cramped 
quarters with inadequate files.: Like UPI's: 
190. . 
100 bureaux they are usually located in newspaper 
offices. Both services depend largely on local 
newspapermen to do their, reporting for them on. a 
part-time basis. In small towns they use housewives 
and students, paying a flat $5 an item. ""23 
Not even the prestigious Washington Bureaux are exempt: - 
"Overworked AP and UPI staffs routinely make. 
collection runs, visiting a number of committee 
hearings on any given morning, dutifully 
collecting witness's speech texts, and going 
back to the House of Senate press gallery to 
dictate or to grind out several stories. 
Far from its being digging reporting, it 
is not even routine reprting. 
It is skimming....... 4 
These criticisms suggest two things. The first is that 
there will be a continued need for the supplementary 
services on the domestic U. S. scene, which 'can concentrate 
their resources in specific news-gathering areas (as they 
do in Washington) in order to meet the more specialised 
requirements of their readers; but the second is that if 
the major wire services with their much larger'clientele 
can still draw severe criticisms for their lack of com- 
prehensive reporting, it is even less likely that any 
supplementary agency will find the resources to do better. 
If a supplemental agency were to expand and become as 
sizeable as one of the two major wire services, it would 
probably eliminate one of these two in the process. - Until 
1958 there were in fact three major agencies, although 
International News Service tended to sell like a-supplemental 
agency. Examination of the INS experience does not suggest 
the liklihood of a third'major US agency appearing in the 
forseeable future. In 1957 it had. a total newspaper 
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clientele in the United States of: 334, of which only 60 
relied on INS as. their primary source of general national 
and . int erndional news.,.,,,: 
It was something of a maverick. organization. The British 
and French governments. banned it from use of their cables 
in, 1916. because they complained. ' that the Hearst newspapers 
published German as well as allied versions of the war 
news. After. the war it lost face when AP successfully 
charged INS with. stealing AP. news-, for, its own distribution, 
and of using the Hearst newspapers. which subscribed to AP 
as its., source of supply. 
INS sold mainly for the quality. of its writing and its 
features. 
. 
The overseas.. marketfor INS services had grown 
to about 2,000 in 1957,, -from only 
40 in: 1934. At the time 
of merger UP claimed a. global total of 5,000 clients, and 
INS, a total of 3,000..,. The. mergercame as"a surprise to 
many. In 1957 INS had recorded - a.. gain of 249 new clients. 
It'did not. have, as, extensive. news-gathering resources as 
the rival: agencies, but could use Reuters for news of the 
Middle East and Africa, and had . 
sole. right. of distribution 
at that time for. DPA's overseas service in the western 
hemisphere. Chief stockholder.. of the resultant UPI was 
annbunced, as. the, E. W. Scripps. Company of Cincinnatti, which 
was also ,a 
heavy, stockholder in Scripps-Howard newspapers. 
Hearst interests, also. acquired'stockin the'UPI, and this 
was,! reliably reported . 
to . be' less 'than , 
a. published figure 
of 25%t.. 
25 It was said. that INS had'gone intö-the red 
by ,, as much as 
$3P, 000, '000, most of it covered by Hearst 
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newspapers at a rate, in its-last three years, of ', 512 
million a year. Because the most important clients were 
U. S. newspapers which mostly. loöked to INS'as a supplemental 
and not as a major source of news, they resisted attempts 
to raise subscription fees to an economical level. As for 
UP, 'The foreign. service kept in the black. but the domestic 
26 
operation was in-and-out of red ink by small margins. t. 
UPI's penetration of both morning and evening newspaper 
markets in the United States improved considerably after 
the merger, although, it slipped back a little later on. 
There were immediate improvements in service: an additional 
hour of news for morning papers for example, and a 
revamping of mail services. - Hearst began a new supplemental 
agency, Hearst Headline Service, and copy from it was made 
available to UPI. in non-Hearst areas. 
In the wake. of the merger UPI made. a bid to become America's 
leading news agency. It promised a relaxed-relationship 
with its clients: whereas AP members were obliged to feed 
(routine 'non-exclusive) news of national` interest into 
the agency, and were. forbidden to provide anyone else with 
news, UPI would not demand to be furnished with"its clients' 
news. There was a set-back that same, yeär when increased 
rates for private line teleprinter were' announced. whic. h 
fell very heavily on services to. the smallest, outlying 
clients like small radio stations, a field in which UPI 
was strong. In any event, UPI never did''catchup with 
AP in the newspaper field, and a general fear of. media 
concentration elicited predictions from Drew Pearson and 
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other commentators that the UP-INS'merger might soon be 
followed by an AP-UPI " merger. This has not yet material- 
ized. 
Politics 
The agencieshave_largely followed . their newspaper clients 
in'a drift towards the political centre, the 'middle market', 
and have avoided the kind of overt links with Government 
interests that characterized the European agencies before 
the last war. At one time there appeared. -to be a very 
clear political distinction between the two agencies. UP 
was the creation of the Scripps newspapers, and the Scripps 
papers were. radical:. 
'The Scripps. newspapers. gave birth to the United 
Press. The quiet power of these Scripps news- 
paper. s. is little, understoodin the. United States. 
E. W. Scripps, genius of the organization, believes 
in publicity. for others, effacement for himself. 
To mention him. at all is, to anyone who: knows, him, 
almost a breach of journalistic confidence. His 
string of twenty-five or.. thirty metropolitan and 
small city newspapers have one definite policy -. 
the interests of. the working-class. They. -are 
humble-looking sheets, published generally in 
dingy basements and; by young men. On; the, young 
man Scripps lays particular stress. Youth, in 
its period of struggle, is radical and, nearto. the 
people; maturity and age are conservative and 
apart from the people. TheScripps newspapers 
give youth and the people their fling. '27 
Scripps. first. worked for the Detroit: 'Evening News' in the 
1870's,. and he later_described. this paper-as the founder 
of 'personal. journalism'-- a style; that. concentrated on. 
"exposing, the rich, 
and respectable wherever their actions 
were, at variance with their official roles.. The first 
paper Scripps edited was the Cleveland Penny Press., 
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"As editor I was always on the side of the; working 
man and the poor man. I was always against the 
rich man, whether I was right, or wrong. I had 
an almost instinctive hatred for all men in power, 
whether the power was derived from political sources 
or based on economic suucess. " 
He understood UP as an outflowing of a similar hatred. 
"I believe the most valuable service I have rendered 
to my country has been that of thwarting the plans 
of greater, abler and richer men than myself to 
establish a monopoly of news in the United States. " 
And in 1917 he wrote: 
"Were it not for the UP, I am convinced that , 
the 
men who hold a controlling interest "in the present 
AP and Mr. Hearst would inevitably combine it into 
a trust. " 
This would happen because most American newspaper men 
were-conservative. 
"I knew that at least 90% of my fellows in American 
journalism were capitalistic. and conservative. I 
knew at the time at least that unless I'came into 
the field with a new service it would be impossible 
for the people of the United States to get correct 
news through the medium of the Associated Press. 1t28 
When Roy Howard was appointed by Scripps in 1908 to manage 
the UP operation, Howard was still in his early twenties. 
Howard was a journalist after Scripps' own fashion, who 
set out to inject something of the Scripps tradition into 
news agency reporting. Where the AP provided accounts 
of debates of Parliament and war' rumours,, the UP looked 
for the human interest angle and the political' reality: 
"When King George was crowned at Westminster, the 
Associated Press reported the pomp and parade of 
the event, told of the massed regiments, the 
cheering crowds, ° the splendid mediaeval ceremony 
in the Abbey. The United Press did that and more; 
it tried to find:. just. how much of the-cheering 
of the crowds was real enthusiasm and how much 
-was false; it pictured the hungry mob of`Whitechapel 
pouring out to see their King pass; it showed the 
outcasts struggling for the food dropped-'from the 
picnic-baskets of more fortunate spectators. "29' 
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At home UP gave greater attention to_the labour side in 
industrial strike' stories-like the Textile workers' strike 
at Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912, singled out by Morris 




, year, when. 
Reuters approached, UP to suggest an exchange 
deal. Reuters. was especially. interested to know whether 
UP could provide the English agency. with a comprehensive 
.. stock-market 
report. Howard considered. this,. but, 
. appreciating 
the limits. which the Reuter alliance had set 
on AP's activity, broke off negotiations, and'this preserved 
the agency's. reputation for independence and non-conservatism. 
The radicalism of UP; like that of Scripps, was of, the 
11 
populist kind, without any strict ideological base, a kind 
of radicalism which lends itself as easily: to economic 
inventiveness as to political. And as time, went. on the 
populist strain of UP. became increasingly. apol'itical in 
character. This is tied up with its ', early; concern for 
the' afternoon press which was usually'less', 'serious' in 
content... than the morning press. The 
acquisition of. wealthy 
clients' overseas, especially La Prensa. in Argentina, 
`forced' UP` closer into line with the other agencies in the 
extent and character of itsforeign"news coverage. 
The conservatism . of 
'AP against which UP set itself was not 
primarily `political"in origin, although it had'-'political 
consequences,, but". had to do' with the kind of' authoritiveness 
which certain media organizations attract' and' encourage, 
and it arises out"of'a cultivation"of. 'important Establishment 
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sources, superiority of news-gathering facilities, longevity 
in the field, and the relative socio-economic status of 
readers or clients. 
Possibly the main source of AP's Establishment appearance 
was its very long cultivated Washington connections. AP 
had a Washington correspondent in 1853, and maybe even 
before that, some fifty years or so before tle"Scripps 
UP was founded. This first correspondent, L. A. Gobright, 
"saw the Associated Press replace the official 
journals as the medium for, transmitting the 
complete text of official documents. It 
moved telegraphically extended start-to-finish 
accounts of congressional proceedings. 
Representing papers of varying political opinions, 
it, avoided the highly opinionated flavour that 
then characterised newspaper writing, thus'-' 
contributing to the objectivity that later 
marked the American press. t131 
In=1861, AP took over the role of transmitting official 
announcements that. had previously. been left to. an 
., official 
Washington newspaper. Furthermore, during the 
first year of, the Civil War, when telegraphic censorship 
was . 
imposed, on. despatches, from Washington intended for 
publication, and which related to the civil or military 
operations of the government, Gobright's file for AP and 
any other stories containing the same facts as those 
offered by AP, were specifically exempted.. Gobright was 
one of the 'special correspondents, ' who received copies 
of certain of the telegrams received at the War and Navy 
Departments from the, field commanders. AP was especially 
favoured by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton who was 
actually disliked by many newspaper reporters for not being 
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very co-operative. Evidently Stanton found the AP an 
excellent'means of controlling press information at a, 
time of crisis. 
By 1866, the AP rather. 
-than 
the WashinSton, papers was 
the normal machinery through which routine floor pro- 
ceedingsof the two legislative houses were reported 
in the start-to-finish sequence still used by the press 
of the time. '- The AP gained a desk on the' floor in both 
houses between 1866 and 1873. 'Public interest in 
routine floor proceedings, however, was declining rapidly 
and in`1890 the AP dropped such routine stenographic 
reports and paid'more attention to committees. Around 
-this time AP put down a direct ' telegraph wire from the 
White House to-its Washington office. Until the turn 
of the century, AP very nearly enjoyed a monopoly on 
pressagency'privileges in both Houses. Not 'until then 
were rivals'accommodated. (A UP representative, Paul 
Mallon, ' causeda mild stir in-1928-9 when he published 
some Senate 'secret' proceedings and refused to reveal 
his source. A move' to ban UP : from the -fl"oor was un- 
; 
successful. ) 
A notable foreign correspondent, John Gunther, summed up 
'the differences between the U. S. agencies of the'between-" 
the-wars period in the'following-way: 
"The great agencies have their editorial leanings 
. 
too.. The. AP tries to be strictly. non-partisan, 
but was bornconservative. The Hearst services 
change policy frequently;. - 
but they have. a fairly 
permanent-isolationist 'bias. ` Witness -the Hearst 
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Campaign against the World Court. . 
The UP is 
agressive, independent, and, as the Scripps- 
Howard papers at home, definitely liberal. 
I do not think that employees of agencies ever 
get instructions to editorialize; their head- 
quarters in New York keep them far too busy 
chasing facts. Just the same, witness the 
staunch old AP handling the Soviet disarmament 
proposals at Geneva, and. describing their 
-rejection as the defeat of a.. nefarious plot, 
actually as if M. Litvinoff had suggested 
cutting the ears off all the babies in the 
world, instead of having ha'd the temerity to 
come to a disarmament conference and suggest 
disarmament. "" 32 
In recent times it has been common practice for. the two 
major services to be lumped together in discussion about. 
the American media industry, and no political difference 
is commonly discerned, although UPI is still considered 
Traciert in its approach to news than AP. AP on the 
other hand now provides much the same kind of feature 
coverage that was considered innovatory for agency services 
before the second world war. Both services came under 
attack in the re-awakened radical, political conscience 
of the tsixties. for. conservatism of practice., Whatever 
the reality, it is clear that. the American daily press 
tends not to recognize any political difference (although 
of course the American press itself is often described as 
generally conservative). 
Most daily newspapers in the United States in 1974 had no 
formal allegiance to a political party or party line (66.9%). 
Less than 
'a 
quarter (17.9%) followed a Republican or 
Independent`. Republican line, and fewer (13.7%) followed a 
Democratic or Independent Democratic line. There is a 
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clear. tendency, for papers which have a formal party 
political preference of this kind to take -AP rather than 
-UPI and to rely solely on AP than to subscribe to both 
major news services: ° 
Out of the total daily newspaper population many more 
newspapers subscribe'to AP only than subscribe to UP 
only or to both, services. In fact, sole AP'subscribers 
are 74% more numerous than sole' UP subscribers and 1249/6 
more numerous than ' dual` subscribers. But if one takes 
just the politically independent newspapers, the number 
of sole AP'subscribers is 151% greater than sole UP 
subscribers' and 194% greater than dual subscribers, much 
greater therefore than for the population as a whole. ` 
And-among the Democrat or Independent Democrat papers, the 
number of' sole AP subscribers is 160%, greater than sole 
UP st. bscribers and 263% greater than dual: subscribers. 
(There was one newspaper in New York which' professed to 
be left-wing, and this subscribed only to UPI. ) On the 
other hand'there was a 'slight tendency for the general 
preference for AP to be less marked in the case of 
Republican papers. 
These findings may. indicate that there is 'a general feeling 
in favourof AP as anauthoritive source "öf regular national 
political` news. ' 'It should be remembered' that the informal 
political preference' of the' American press is much more 
heavily'Republican. 33 ' But in any case in some respects 
'APi s more suitable on prima facie grounds for; a paper which 
gives moderately heavy domestic political coverage, since 
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it devotes more resources to in-depth reporting from 
Washington. In the eyes of Washington news-sources 
however, there is no evidence that, AP and UPI are 
treated differently as a rule, or as anything other 
than the most representative of press organizations. 
Some professional commentators on the press would be 
happy for example to see the White House left to both 
the major news services, thus freeing some of the news- 
paper correspondents stationed there for other work: 
"The wire services have long since demonstrated 
that they are thoroughly qualified to handle 
the routine fare ofWhite: House news. Frank 
Cromier, Frances Lewine, and Gaylord Shaw of 
the AP, and Helen Thomas and Gene Risher of 
UPI are all fast, informed and professional 
reporters. Yet, very few news organizations 
have been willing to rely'on the wire services, 
freeing their White House reporters from 
straight news requirements to 
do 
analytical 
and enterprise reporting. Some newspapers 
still demonstrate a bush-league complex by 
parading their staff bylines on routine 
White House stories. It is not only an 
expensive and unnecessary habit;. it expends 
valuable time, energy, and enthusiasm of the 
reporters. 1134 
Authoritive though the wire services have. both become 
over time, there is no evidence that suggests. the kind 
of close collusion between agencies and theU. S. Government 
that existed in France and still does, and in Britain 
between the World Wars, although it is difficult to believe 
that in specific, circumstances the Government has always 
refused the temptation to exploit, albeit surreptiously, 
the power of influence at the disposal of the agencies. 
Certainly there has been recognition of common interest 
at times. In 1920 for instance, Congress directed the 
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Navy to open transpacific radio circuits to news at_a rate 
low enough to permit competition with British and. Japanese 
charges. This was in response to pressure from AP, which 
argued that AP's dependence on Reuters,. at that time, for 
transmitting news: to the Far East and for obtaining news 
of that area, meant, that. the British had the power to: 
influence the American image in the Far East, and could 
dLstort Far East news for U. S. consumption. On the whole 
the record of the American agencies has been. better than 
the European.. The American agencies did riot open their 
wires , 
for. actual propaganda, purposes as. did the European 
agencies in the First World War for instance. - The. 
Federal Government even seemed to avoid contaminating the 
agencies where it could. have done so. without their consent. 
At the beginning, of., the First World War for example, 
President. Wilson set up a Committee on Public Information,. 
one of whose functions was to. combat German propaganda in 
Mexico.. Its Mexican director, Robert; Murrey,. proposed 
'to make discreet, arrangements to issue. a proclamation 
through the. American Chamber of Commerce of. Mexico, City 
thus obviating direct connection with the CPI = to cover 
partly or in whole, if necessary, the cost to. interior 
newspapers of the Associated Press reports'. However, 
Murret' was instructed from Washington not to subsidize 
papers directly or indirectly, or to make'financial 
arrangements with allied committees without. further 
consultation, which appears not to have occurred. Spanish 
versions of the CPI service were distributed to, papers in 




During the Second World War, AP, UPI and INS contracted 
to provide Government information organizations, OWI and 
OQAA, with news for dissemination around the world. But 
the wire services resisted an attempt by the Government, 
under State Department's William Benton, to-co-opt their 
help in a post-war government information programme for 
the world. It was one thing to provide news as a patriotic 
duty in time of war, AP and UP managers said, but quite 
another to do it when the war was over. Their concern was 
commercial. If foreign papers could receive agency news 
through freely distributed Government information services, 
then why should they bother to subscribe to the agencies? 
Benton replied that these services would be available in 
such a way only in areas where the American agencies did 
not distribute or where newspapers were too poor in any 
case. In early 1946 AP cancelled its contract to provide 
the State Department with. its wire service, and the UP 
followed, saying'that if it did not, AP would be able to 
tell its clients that UP was corrupt. . 
(INS and Reuters 
kept their wires in the State Department. ) The AP and 
UPI'did not resume their wire'services to the State 
Department for Government Information' use, even though 
several important editors of member or client newspapers 
expressed their disagreement with the line the agencies 
36 
had taken. 
Formal collusion of course can be less important than 
coincidence of value, and there is scope for argument 
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that a. Government-pursued policy of Cold War was eventually 
,, successful, 
in-,. shaping the attitudes of agency foreign. 




services and attended agency conferences. 
Nevertheless this is a chosen .; agreement. and rather 
differ- 
ent.. from. Government-dictated policy, one. which can end as 
easily. as'it_begins, as it seems to have : ended: with Vietnam. 
The inspiration of such independence in the,. case of the 
.., 
American-agencies,; especiallyUPI, is, -largely commercial. 
Both had argued in the pre-War years that their services 
... 
were better, for the world than the European agencies because 
............... 
they . were not alliedto. 
Government.,. and, because their 
Government was not in any. case an,, Imperial Government. In 
other words,, they preached free trade, and believed they 
would fare; best under -a free trade system. . 
And if. -Govern- 
ment I. s post-war policy of -: 
freedom: of . 
information around 
.,. 
the, world"'was-sinister in some respects,. the agencies' 
sympathy for that . policy,; 
did not.. follow from, quitethe 
same` reasoning. The U. S. agencies. did-not need arelation- 
. ship"-with 
the Government. Their revenue-basb amongst the 




The major American news agencies developed in response to 
the needs of rather different constituencies. Their 
continued survival in a competitive situation required 
o expand to embrace new sectors of the market, and them t 
to do so without alienating the old. In doing so they 
eliminated many of the possibilities of competitive 
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-challenge from outside. UP was 
generally more open to 
new markets and new innovatory practices because it was 
in the weaker position of the two agencies and less fett- 
ered by established market ties. AP followed a little 
way behind. AP's loyalty to its original clientele 
was progressively weakened from 1915, the year in which 
it started a service for evening papers and when, to 
further attract their custom, it lifted the rule which 
prohibited its members from subscribing to alternative 
news services.. The final AP membership' restrictions 
however were. not struck down until the United States 
District Court in 1944 prohibited AP from excluding any 
newspaper from membership by reason of its competition 
with a member newspaper. The Association's bye-laws 
consequently forbid members or directors, when voting 
upon an application for membership, 'to take into con- 
sideration the effect such an application, if successful, 
might have'on competing members in the same city or field. 
Even supposing that the bye-laws can-in'fact eliminate this 
possibility, there are still ways in which AP (and UP) 
can make things awkward for new entrants on to the market 
in order to cushion the competitive impact on more 
established customers. Such cases were uncovered before 
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 1967.38 Publisher Evan Mecham told the 
subcommittee that UPI charged very heavily and demanded 
advance payment when his paper in Tucson 
(circulation 
15,000) wanted UPI, because a rival paper in the area 
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already subscribed tothe service. He had to deposit 
X53,000: to get the wire'tin the door'. "The service. is 
available- if you can afford 'the price", he'said, which 
-was not thecase necessarily with' features or 
columnists. ', GeneStipe, State Senator from 'Oklahoma 
and publisher of McAlester` Democrat , 
in Oklahoma, related 
how 'AP had failed to-keep ` appointments 'to "discuss the 
possibility'of providing him with'its service. " When he 
`approached UPI itrequired him to'pay for'5 years' in 
advance'onanon-'cancellable contract,, but later reduced 
this to 1-year in advance. He thought the wire services 
were more lenient with radio stations. Michael G. Dworkin, 
president of the Daily Press. in Detroit,. said. that after 
a four-month strike in 1964 he was unable to continue 
publishing partly because UPI, refused to provide service 
at reasonable. rates. UPI asked for a five-year contract- 
at close, "to, $2,500 "a week and to pay the last year in 
advance - an amount in excess, of $128,000. William Loebb 
of the Haverhill. (Mass. ) Journal said he eventually re- 
ceived UPI service by signing a two-year contract and 
paying one year in advance, although : Loebwäs brother- 
in-law to Charles Scripps, head of. E. W. Scripps Company. 
Thus, although. "-the. wire services are obliged to provide 
their services ' to whoever-is able to pay they can make 
it difficult-for their. clients to pay if-it so suits -them. 
Despite thisd"evidence of oligopolistic practice, it remains.. 
the' case, that a situation -of market monopoly-by a single 
agency in- theUnited States was never e. conomically'necessary, 
as it. arguably .. 
was necessary in European countries.. 
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The market was strong enough to bear two major services, 
and public antagonism to the idea, of a monopoly agency, 
if not strong, was at least discernable.. Each agency's 
share of the media market still exceeded in revenue terms 
the entire media market revenue of-most other countries. 
Backed by such support and without. the taint of evident 
Government control, these agencies were from the turn of 
the century able to mount a growing challenge to the 
European agencies, and to establish a global network of 
news-gathering and distribution facilities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: The Struggle for Foreign Markets - 
Europe and North America 
The early Reuterian principle of equal service to all clients 
has never stood up to thorough examination of the agency 
system as a whole. Not all parts of the world are of equal 
interest to the agencies, so that clients in certain areas 
are bound to be disadvantaged'by comparison with others. 
Europe and North America in particular attract a very sub- 
stantial proportion of all news-gathering resources. 
This chapter and the one following it are concerned with 
the factors that help explain the wide variations that 
appear from country to country in the resources for news 
coverage that are committed by the major news agencies as 
well as variations between each of the major agencies in 
the different world regions. It begins with a brief 
note on the distribution of the larger agency bureaux 
around the world (this and related factors are further 
discussed in Chapter 10). It then proceeds to an exam- 
ination of the relative agency commitments in the two 
wealthiest media markets - Europe 
and North America. In 
Europe it concentrates on the slow emergence of the American 
agencies on the European market; '. in the North American 
section it concentrates on the problem of why, given the 
wealth of the North American market the presence there 
of Reuters and Agence France Presse has not. been stronger. 
Chapter Five goes on to consider the nature of agency 
involvement in the Third World.:; 
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Whether a country attracts considerable or only slight 
attention from a global agency is not simply a factor of 
a countryts geographic or population size, nor even a factor 
of its political power in the world. These considerations 
have some importance but far from determining importance. 
Otherwise a"country, -like Indonesia, with 125 million pop- 
ulation, would require a much larger editorial representation 
than, say, Italy, "-with"much'lessthan, half that ' population: " 
But Italy invariably receives more attention in this sense 
(cf. Table. 8) . Similarly, if;: political power was a 
determining-factor, Moscow bureaux would be much larger 
than bureaux in Buenos Aires. - But the reverse is true. 
The survey of:. major. world regions which: follows suggests 
ýa number of. factors'which. ýhelp explain such differences in 
the strength of agency.: representation<°in different countries, 
as well as disparities in agency content (discussed in 
;, Chapter 12). -: The. most.; importantof these-can be'categor- 





(ii) logistical, - referring to differences': between 
countries in their importance as possible. strategic, or 
communication centres for coverage-of wider geographic regions; 
-(iii) political `factors arising from controls or 
restrictions imposed by given countries on-visiting 
correspondents . and 
(iv) most important of all these, commercial factors 
arising out of differences. of market-pull-between different 
areäs of the world,. and"_differences in the responsiveness 
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of the agencies to the news requirements of different 
markets. Among the world regions, the European and 
North American markets have special 'pull' in market 
demand because of the media wealth they represent, and 
for the same reason the so-called 'general world demand' 
elicits responses which are heavily. weighted in their favour. 
Factors that Determine the Location of Major Bureaux. 
A country is typically covered by an editorial staff of 
between one and five persons per-agency., Regardless of 
the number of editorial staff, very few of these are 
actively engaged in news-gathering above and beyond mon- 
itoring the local media, rewriting and translation - generally 
one or two. Only a handful. of countries are covered by 
agency bureaux exploying tenor more editorial staff each. 
Most of these countries appear in the sample of bureau 
sizes in Table 8. In Europe there are (1975). bureaux this 
size in the United-Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany and 
Belgium. Not all the agencies maintain large bureaux in 
each of these countries: in Italy it is only the American 
agencies; in West-Germany, only Reuters and AP; in Brussels, 
only Reuters and UPI. 
To take an example, London is important as; a market, as a 
centre for news of interest to the world, and also as a 
logistical or support base for the rest of Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa. But UPI recently shifted its European 
Head office (for Europe, the Middle East andlAfrica) to 
Brussels, so naturally Brussels is one of its largest 
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TABLE EIGHT 
FULL-TIME BUREAU EDITORIAL STRENGTH IN'30 COUNTRIES: 
ONE AMERICAN AGENCY 
(Source: Interview data 1971-5) 
City Country Population Agency 
'71 Editorial 
(000,000). 'Stäff .. 
1. London.. United Kingdom 53 40 
2. Paris : France 51 26 
3. Rio de Janeiro Brazil 93 21 
4. Tokyo Japan 105 16 
5. Beirut Lebanon 3 15 
6. Saigon S. Vietnam 18 14 
7. Rome. Italy 53 13 
8. Buenos Aires Argentina 23 11 
9 Cairo Egypt 34 9 
10 Hong , Kong Hong Kong 4 8 
11. Vienna Austria 7 6 
12. Bangkok Thailand 35. 6 
13. Brussels Belgium 10 5 
14. Djakarta Indonesia 125 3 
15" Manila 
.. 
Phillipines -. 37 3 
16. Taipei Taiwan 15 3; 
17" Hague Netherlands ' 15 3 
18. Athens Greece -9 3. 
19. 
_ 
Moscow U. S. S. R.. 242 3 
20. Bogota Columbia 20 3 
21. Canberra Australia 13 2 
22. Seoul Korea 31 2 
23. ' Phnom Pehn" Cambodia 7 2 
24. Singapore: Singapore 2 2' 
25. Dacca Bangladesh 65 2 
26. Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 10 1 
27. Oslo Norway 4 1 
28. Copenhagen Denmark 5 1 
29. Nairobi Kenya 11 1 
30. Prague Czechoslovakia 14 l,, 
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bureaux. Reuters maintains a sizeable staff there because 
Brussels is an important news-centre, but especially so 
for economic news stories - a. special interest for Reuters. 
France and West Germany are important markets and news- 
centres; Italy is an important market, but no longer (1975) 
considered one of the leading news-centres. 
In the Middle East, only the Lebanon (up to the Civil War 
in the mid 170ts) has bureaux of ten editorial staff or 
more. This is because of Beirut's strategic location for 
coverage of the Middle East conflict story, as well as being 
a news centre and a moderate market. There'are no bureaux 
of this kind of size on Continental Africa. In Asia, major 
bureaux are to be found in Japan (all agencies), Singapore 
(1 agency), Hong Kong (1 agency) and up to the end of the 
Vietnam war in South Vietnam (American agencies). Japan 
is both a news centre for a story of global interest (Japan's 
economy) and an important media market. Singapore and 
Hong Kong are regional communications centres, and moderate 
markets, but do not themselves generate much news of global 
interest. South Vietnam is of course a major news centre 
but is almost non-existent as a market or as a communications 
centre. 
In North America the European agencies naturally maintain 
sizeable bureaux in New York and Washington, but until 
Reuters" recent attempt to cultivate a stronger clientele 
in the United States, this has not been an important market 
for them. In South America, the major bureaux are to be 
215. 
found in Brazil and Argentina, where the American agencies 
in particular have high editorial strength - exploiting 
the major South American media markets,, even though the 
agencies-do not typically. consider these to be major. news- 
centres for news of global interest. 
Within-- the, major, world regions there are great differences 
of emphasis therefore. In Japan, the Western global 
agencies. collectively maintain, around fifty editorial staff;. 
whereas Indonesia, with a 20% greater, population and five 
. 
times the land mass, . 
is host to only eight or ten agency 
editorial staff. One might-well wonder whether figures 
of ten or more editorial staff per,. 
agency are anywhere near 
adequate. The, leading Japanese papers. after all,. Asahi 
and Mainichi, employtotal.. staffs. of 
8,000, persons each. 
Nostof the countries in which there-are sizeable news- 
, -gathering 
teams are also-countries the agencies consider 
... at 
least fairly.. important_as revenue. centres. There is 
not necessarily -a direct relationship between placing men 
:., in a country, and 
drawing revenue from, it,, but interviews 
,,,. I,, 
with bureau, chiefs suggest that it-. certainly helps to be 
able. to show that local revenue exceeds local cost when 
it: comes to requesting additional staff. All the agencies 
encourage their bureau chiefs to think, in these terms, and 
bureau chiefs have become; progressively more involved in 
business considerations and client-relationships as a 
result. 
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In revenue terms there are important differences between 
the major world regions which help explain the continued 
emphases in agency wires on news of Western Europe and 
North America (which are the wealthiest media markets) as 
well as some of the other content characteristics discussed 
later in Chapter Twelve. One region which all four 
western global agencies regard as a-profit centre is 
Western Europe. This is the most important region over- 
seas for the American agencies, and the single most important 
region for the European agencies. North America is 
Reuter's second most important revenue centre, although 
that revenue cannot be regarded as profit-to be. invested 
outside of North America - it is still consumed in costs. 
For AFP North America is primarily a cost burden; other- 
wise the French agency's overseas markets outside Europe 
are fairly evenly spread through the other. major world 
regions. ` Reuters is about equally'involved in Asia and 
the African - Mid East region, but has fewer revenue 
possibilities in'South America than AFP. The American 
agencies on the other hand are strongly entrenched in 
South America which is their most important region out- 
side Europe? followed by Asia and, a long way behind, 
Africa and the Middle East. 
New Agencies in the Old'World 
The principal structural feature of agency organization-in 
Europe until-well into the Twentieth Century was an 
oligopolistic division of the market in which the American 
agencies figured hardly at all. The gradual expansion of 
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American agency invasion of foreign markets was triggered 
in the first place by the competition between them, for 
`domestic clients, 'butwhat'is most remarkable is their 
very modest progress (especially in the case of AP), in 
establishing overseas markets, relative to post World 
War: II developments. Expansion was especially. rapid and 
competitive in the immediate post-war period, but the 
salience of ` American. agency expansion in Europe has arguably 
declined iri recent years. 
For about. seventy years the national media of most 
European' countries had but one main source of,. international 
news apart from their own foreign=correspondents-. This 
was because the cartel agreements between, -Wolff of Germany, 
Havas in'France and Reuters in Britain, and which were. also 
signed by newly emergingnational: news, agencies elsewhere, 
eliminated market competition. Within the larger countries 
-., like Central there. were a" few. small alternative sources 
News'in London; 'as we have seen - operating outside the 
cartel -system, but these were never of primary significance. 
Within ; Europe, Havas news went to France and Southern 
Europe; Wolffs news wasdi. stributed to Austria-Hungary 
and' Northern-Europe. Reuters in fact-did not have a. strong 
business presence-on the Continent-after 1870-except in 
the Low ' Countries. . Each of the big three,. agencies would 
take news from the other two, and distribute a selection 
of this news; along, with'its own, to clients within its 
exclusive territory. 
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After the First World War, Reuters. and Havas divided the 
overseas markets of Wolff between them, confining the German 
agency for the most part to its home. market. Reuters be- 
came a major supplier in Northern Europe; Havas extended 
its influence in the region that had once been: the Austrian- 
Hungarian empire. 
Up until this time the European (retail) media were hardly 
aware of the American agencies. AP began placing corre- 
spondents in Europe after the Spanish-American war, encour- 
aged to do so by some European ambassadors (who were possibly 
aware that Reuters acted'as main filter of European news to 
America, and thought AP might do well to cultivate its own 
sources), but there was no question of it selling its news 
service independently in Europe, and it was a long time 
before AP considered the desirability of doing so. 
UP-on the other hand had no obligations to the European 
cartel. Almost as soon as it was, established in 1907, the 
agency began organizing a news-gathering and distribution 
network primarily in Europe. By 1909 it had bureaux in 
London, Paris, Berlin and Rome, headed and mostly staffed 
by Americans. This news was supplemented by arrangements 
with smaller European agencies, like.. Extel in London, 
Hirsch bureau in Berlin and Fournier Agende in Paris. News 
exchanges with such agencies helped UP compete with AP's 
foreign news sources, and helped the. small agencies compete 
against the large. There. were also exchange arrangements 
with some of the larger metropolitan papers. 
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Competition from UP spurred AP to further overseas invest- 
ment, and helped bring about AP's secession from the cartel. 
In 1900, AP had four forwarding stations in Europe, in 
which itsrepresetatives put together cable dispatches from 
reports supplied by theseveral European agencies. By 
1910, the number of such offices had grown to 16. But 
the major. news sources were still the large European agencies. 
The purpose of the forwarding bureaux was primarily to in- 
crease the speed of transmission of news to U. S. clients, 
and to rationalize the selection of European news (and 
other-. world news channelled through Europe at that time, -" 
including Asian news) for the American market. 
'The First World War. Served to augment the; representation 
of'the American agencies in Europe. There has been no 
factor'ýmore. powerful than war to explain the major, 
expansionist periods of the agencies. Wars also encouraged 
other media to increase their foreign staffs, to print much 
larger quantities of foreign news, and thus to create a 
public 'appetite for it. 
ýý World War: broke out practicallyall When the,. 
of; the American daily newspapers; were served 
,: foreign news by. the press associations. The 
bureau menin-foreign. capitals, -who relied 
heavily, for-their-material' onthe local press 
and'. on.. he press associations in the. countries 
in which they operated, were not "-equipped to 
cope with the sudden demand for large volumes 
ofýnews from belligerent countries. Con- 
sequentlythe press associations rushed scores 
of . men 
to Ewrope-late-in July and : early, in, 
August of 1914. These reporters weresupp- 
lemented by an . army 
of. correspondents sent-by 
large metropolitan newspapers and by magazines, 
and by-free-lances who soughtto, get"a ring- 
side seat at the arena. where the story of the 
century was unfolding. "]-. ' 
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In 1916, UP acquired its first major South American client- 
La Prensa of Buenos Aires. La Prensa wanted European 
coverage which was less partial than the service it 
customarily received from Havas. But it did not want the 
sentimental populism which had helped establish UP with 
the American. evening press. It wanted terse, factual 
material, and UP learnt to provide it, and reports to La 
Prensa from Europe had to pass through New York where 
editors were exposed to the new style. La Prensa was UP's 
wealthiest overseas client, and its subscriptions helped 
pay for the expansion of the agency's European network. 
By 1933, UP could claim 350 overseas clients for its services, 
accounting for 20% of its total income. "For UP abroad 
is not only an, army of newshawks. In part it is also an 
army of salesmen of UP's export business. "2 Clients were 
concentrated in two areas: Europe and South America. And 
UP had a strong lead. 
"Both (AP and UP) then set about ramifying their 
services throughout Europe and the East, so that, 
certainly as far as the UP is concerned, their 
work in Europe is almost as largely the dis- 
tribution and sale of news'- to European clients - 
as the gathering it for America. The UP services 
go to papers in Hungary, in Spain, in England, in 
Japan, in Germany, in a dozen other countries. 
The Hearst services attempt the same thing. But 
no other organization is half so successful at it 
as the UP. "3 
In the 30's, UP claimed'to have 30bureaux overseas, as 
against AP's 20. American agency expansion was helped 
by a relative decline in the foreign news-gathering strength 
of independent American' newspapers. In. 1930, only seven 
U. S. papers had extensive foreign services of their own; 
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of these, four were in New York,. two in Chicago. 
Incoming press telegram matter to the United States'was 
more than double the volume of outgoing material between 
1916 and-1929, 
' 
nd 1929, but while incoming matter increased 22 
times in. that period, the volume. of.. outgoing news quadrupled - 
indicating. both the expansion of overseas news service 
sales and of foreign press coverage of the United States. 
AP was long, inhibited by the European cartel agreement. 
It began to break away from the. cartel not in Europe but 
in South America where UP had achieved its first major 
overseas successes, and in South 'America it was not Reuters 
that was challenged so much as Havas. Despite their co- 
operation in maintaining their separate markets exclusively, 
Reuters and Havas were ambiguous in their feelings for 
each other's prosperity and Reuters may secretly have wel- 
comed Havas' misfortunes at the hands of the American 
agencies in South America. ' After South America, AP 
challenged Reuters more directly, but in Asia. " Not until 
AP'. s participation in the cartel came to an end in the 
'thirties, did it begin to sell in Europe. When it finally 
broke away, AP signed an agreement with UP, whereby both 
agencies pledged never to enter into exclusive agreements. 
with any European agency (which would exclude the other) 
and never to accept any such unfair advantage in coverage 
of news in European countries. 
Neither agency did especially well in Europe, with the. major 
exceptionof'British United Press in the United Kingdom, 
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which distributed UP overseas news to the British press. 
Europe was a very problematic market. . 
Havas was especially 
well-entrenched. in France and had plenty of scope for 
retaliation against any paper which subscribed to alter- 
native global agencies. The main British market share 
was of course held by Reuters. In most other countries 
there were strong national agencies with links to the cartel 
and which distributed foreign news to their respective media 
clients. They might have had the will to subscribe to 
alternative agencies, but few were prepared to. risk ex- 
communication from the cartel, and it is doubtful-whether 
the American agencies could have provided at that time a 
service of European news that was in any way comparable 
with that of the major European agencies. 
UP suffered one particular disadvantage in overseas sales. 
Because it did not have exchange relations with the major 
national agencies and the agencies which organized the 
cartel, it did not have access to their official news - 
many of them were in any case official news agencies - and 
official news, even if it is the easiest to collect, is 
very important to be able to provide, and to provide at 
the greatest speed. After AP broke from the cartel, it 
too had to cultivate its own sources of official news. 
The American agencies were of course important sources of 
American news. But on the whole the demand for news-of 
the United States between the wars was nowhere near as 
great as after the Second World War. There was too much 
223. 
happening in Europe. The PEP report on the British 
press in. 1938'drew attention to what it considered the 
particularly conspicuous inadequacy. of reporting. from the 
United States. Only two British papers at that time, the 
Daily, Telegraph-and. theTimes, had their'own full-time 
correspondents in the United States, outside of New York, 
and some national papers had no correspondents in America 
at all.. The report concluded: 
"Some part of Anglo-American misunderstandings 
must be attributed to the inadequacy of the 
press mechanism Ininforming British readers 
of what America is thinking and doing. "5 
Like the First World War, the Second brought a new flood 
of American journalists to Europe. In the immediate post- 
war e. ra, the American agencies had some strong, though 
temporary advantages. The new French agency was struggling 
into existence, unable to find sufficient media revenue, 
therefore dependent on State help. Whereas Reuters had 
suffered the war loss of clients and facilities, this was 
a less important factor for the American agencies whose 
overseas facilities before the war. were not as elaborate 
in Europe, the. Middle East and Asia as those of the 
European agencies. The domestic markets of the American 
agencies were left intact after the war. 
In France, as we have seen, the American agencies quickly, 
settled themselves into the market after the Liberation. 
UP had, only three clients in France before the war; a 
year after the Liberation it had 46. AFP could not imm- 
ediately establish a comprehensive foreign service and in 
France itself was not yet fully. trusted: these factors; 
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together with the increased demand for American news after 
the war, worked to the advantage of the American agencies. 
In most West European countries, the American agencies 
registered an increase in the number of clients after the 
war. In some countries the agencies had first begun to 
sell their services in the war years. AP for instance 
moved into Sweden in 1943, gained three clients, and after 
the war had 24. But Spain, Portugal and Turkey required 
global agencies to distribute through national agencies, so 
that these countries were not growth markets. Poland and 
the Balkan countries were poor, their media had little 
money, and no important gains were achieved there. 
Czechoslovakia was more promising. But of course gains in 
Eastern Europe were short-lived. 
Before the Nazi rise to power, the German market had been 
a fairly controlled one, in the hands of two or three. major 
German agencies, and under the Nazis'it was completely 
controlled. After the war, the occupation authorities 
cultivated a new media system. 150 or so newspapers were 
licensed by the occupation authorities, most of them in 
the western zones. Each occupation authority set up a 
news agency to cover its own area; the agencies of the 
western zones were to form the nucleus for the founding of 
DPA in 1949. The first clients for the zonal agencies 
were the newspapers lioensed by the authorities. These 
western-approved newspapers had a strong market advantage 
by the time the licensing system ended in 1949 and publishers 
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who had operated before 1945 were allowed back. The 
German market was sufficiently . strong, 
for, bothAmerican 
agencies to act independently there. In 1970 there were 
1330. daily newspaper editions in West Germany controlled 
by 494 publishing. houses. 98% of these were served by 
DPA. But as many a. s; 40% were also. served byAP, and 
37% by. UPI. Reuters at, that. time sold to DPA. In 1972 
however, UPI, as part of 'its rationalization programme in 
Europe, decided. that the effort. of. translating for the 
German market. was. too, costly, and competed for the DPA 
contract,,, which it won. DPA was especially, interested 
in UPI's photo. service. Reuters wasthen obliged, to 
distribute, independently in.. West. Germany., began, its own 
translation service and gave more attention-to domestic 
German news. 
Of all media clients to agencies, in. West. Germany in 1973, 
nearly all subscribed to DPA... AP's . penetration of 
the 
market, was 45%. .. 
Neither. Reuters , nor 
AP _benefitted much 
from UPI's decision to, sell to DPA. the exclusive German- 
. 
language rights...,, Instead, a-new agency, -7. Deutscher 
Depeschen Dienst - was,. formed and staffed partly byex-UPI 
journalists. This retained most of. UPI's old clientele 
and, quickly achieved a market penetration of 40%, while 
Reuters'. penetration was, only i4% (concentrated in the 
radio field) .. 
In Italy there, had been strict government press control, 
under the Fascists, before the war and which monopolized 
distribution of international news. The number of'daily 
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titles increased in the immediate post-war period, from 
about 60 to 100 in 1946, and 138 in 1958. (During the 
1950's it began to fall again, as it did in Germany, to 
around 100, and by 1970 stood at 82. ) The Liberation 
improved market opportunity: of the 100 daily papers which 
existed in 1946,75 subscribed to at least one American 
service. During the Liberation period, the Allies dis- 
tributed their own news through the Psychological Warfare 
Branch (P. W. B. ) which also established its own newspapers. 
P. W. B. 's news was taken from the major private agencies 
and Allied Government Information services. After the 
liberation of Rome, Reuters and the American agencies 
pressed for the right to distribute independently. From 
January 1945 they were allowed to operate privately - the 
agencies which did so were AP, UP, Reuters, Extel, and INS. 
But at the same time the Italian news agency, ANSA, was 
established as a co-operative by leading daily newspapers. 
This was later to become the main client for global agency 
services, so that today only AP distributes in Italian 
language independently of ANSA. Fortunately perhaps, 
6 
the dissolution of Stefani was not accompanied by the 
slicing up of Italy into zones of news influence as in 
Germany. 
Arguably, the American agencies have become, "if anything, 
rather less significant in Europe since the immediate post- 
war period, although their presence is, much more firmly 
established than it was before the war. In the immediate 
pow-war period there was relatively weak competition from 
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distribution through national agencies seem preferable in 
many cases. When a global agency undertakes its own 
translation it must translatea moderately high proportion 
of the original service in order to provide the client with 
a reasonable choice of stories. When the national language 
rights are sold to the national news agency which then 
undertakes the translation, the national agency translates 
only the stories it intends to send out over the wires, so 
that it does less translation than the global agency would 
do., and at less cost. AFP distributed mainly to national 
agencies in Europe for most of the post-war period; Reuters 
likewise - with the major exception of France, -and recently 
Germany. UPI turned to this kind of indirect distribution 
more readily after the mid-60's, and even AP's policy of 
independent distribution is less firm than it was. In 
some areas the American expansion into Europe continued 
very slowly. AP for instance did not start a nationwide 
service for Spain until as late as 1963. By agreement 
with EFE, the AP Spanish-language service is distributed 
through EFE communications, but on a separate wire. In 
Portugal, AP had no clients at the time of writing. 
Coverage of Eastern Europe' 
The activity of the western agencies in Russia and the 
Russian sphere of influence has always been fairly restricted, 
so that today Eastern Europe bears no comparison as. a source 
of revenue, or as an important news-gathering centre attract- 
ing substantial editorial manpower, to Western Europe. 
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This in turn greatly affects the scope and quality of 
reporting by the agencies of matters concerning the socialist- 
countries. The national agencies of Eastern Europe 
provide at. leasta basic source of both official. news and 
revenue; they also represent a number. of. models for the 
political. control of agency operations which: have since 
been adopted , 
extensively in the Third World. 
The. activities of the-western global. agencies in Russia 
and the, Russian sphere, . of, 
influence have always been 
fairly limited. There was. a Russian agency; (RTA) in 
St. Petersburg at.. the endof the nineteenth century which 
from 1893. received a , substantial 
subsidy ; from, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. This agency had a news-exchange agree- 
ment with, the German. agency Wolff.. The agreement 
originated with the, formation. of; the cartel in 1870, which 
recognised Russia as, part 
of Wolf fIs commercial field. 
The Russian, Minister of,. Finance_. in. 1902 set up an alternative 
agency. outside the cartel,, called the Trade, Telegraph Agency 
.. 
(TTA), to. offset. Germany's power over foreign news supply 
to Russia. .. The same 
fear. explains-how it was that Melville 
Stone of AP was-able to win a , 
lower press-rate concession 
in 1903for. sending news, out of; Russia. - 
;. 
-The TTA competed 
with RTA and, tried.. unsuccessfullyto, establish its own 
relations. with national agencies in Europe.. So in 1904 
the Czar Nicholas. II decreed that the TTA and RTA should be 
merged to form. the St. "Petersburg Telegraph Agency, under 
the. control, of the Ministry. of Finance, and subsidized by it. 
The connection with Wolff remained, but was no. longer so. 
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problematic since relations with Germany had temporarily 
improved. 
The Petrograd Telegraph Agency continued to function as a 
government news agency upto and throughout the First 
World War and the subsequent revolution, even retaining 
the same editorial staff until trained Bolsheviks could 
take over. During World War One, Reuters and AP both 
maintained correspondents in Russia; UP relied on 
available reports in London. Reuters' correspondent 
in Petrograd was instrumental in helping several editors 
of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency to escape. The PTA 
became ROSTA in 1918, succeeded in 1935 by TASS. 
UP, not a member of the-cartel, secured an exchange 
arrangement with ROSTA in 1923 (see below. ). Some of 
ROSTA's early teleprinters were bought from UP. As for 
the cartel, the link between Wolff, ' Havas, Reuters and the 
agencies of the Balkan countries for transmission of news 
to Russia was retained after World War One, although in 
other respects the role of Wolff on the foreign field 
subsided into insignificance. The link lasted till 1929 
when the perfection of the Reuters multi-address radio 
system meant that'it was easier for Reuters to transmit 
its own news direct to Russia, without the need therefore 
to pass through German communications.. 
As for coverage, AP's correspondents were expelled from 
Russia after the revolution and so were Reuters'.. UP'S 
Berlin correspondent, Frank J. Taylor, got to Moscow and 
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., persuaded: -ROSTA 
to buy. UP before he was expelled to, Finland. 
UP's-New York management decided to ignore Taylor's contract, 
and covered, -Russia-for a while from Riga, - Warsaw and 
Bucharest:;,, In 1924, ROSTA dropped its arrangement with 
UP, shortly after Russia became signatory%to'treaties in 
which Britain and France recognised the-new regime, and 
joined the cartel. Agency correspondents were now allowed 
to. report from-Moscow. ; AP was allowed' to : 'distribute TASS 
-news in the-United States, 
and-in Moscow it had access to 
, -Soviet news 
transmission facilities witheld from UP. This 
. situation lasted till-1933 when ROSTA`announced it would 
make separate agreements with the agencies, UP included. 
Agency representation in Moscow-has'greatly improved since 
World War Two, but the number of correspondents is still 
restricted. ] The-restriction`is negotiated through 
diplomatic ' circles, ; and is" related . to the 
number of 
Russian"-diplomats permitted: in the west. The maximum 
for each agency in the early 1970's was five, although 
AP, Reuters and UPI had_only four-staffers each in Moscow 
at"that time. TASS'subscribes-to'all the major western 
agencies on'-an exchange` basis. As in other communist 
countries,., the western agencies cannot supply media 
. 
directly other than through -the national agency. 
`- Penetration of"-Eastern Europe by the American`` agencies 
before-World WarTwowas not extensive. Inthe 'thirties 
ýUP'served three media clients in Poland, two in Austria 
and a 'scattering' in the Balkans. The principal agency 
232. 
for the region at that time was Havas, whose news services 
were channelled through the various national agencies of 
the region., East Europe was a prolific media area 
before World War Two;. there were 1,100 dailies and 
weeklies in Yugoslavia alone. Most of these of course 
were small. 
Many national, agencies of the Balkan and East European 
areas emerged out of the old agency of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire - K. K. Telegraphic Correspondence 
Bureau or Corrbureau. One of the first independent 
agencies that grew out of the network of bureaux 
established by Corrbureau for example, was the Hungarian 
Magyar Tavirati Iroda (MTI) in 1881. The Czech national 
agency, Ceckoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar. (CTK), started 
after World War One, on the basis of the two Corrbureau 
outposts in Prague and Brunn. Corrbureauwas also 
forerunner of agencies . 
in, Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey. 
During World War Two the, agencies of this area came under 
the control of the Nazi agency, Deutsches Nachrichtenburo 
(DNB), as little more than translation centres for DNB 
reports. But resistance movements in Albania, Slovakia 
. 
and Yugoslavia created their own agencies. After the 
war, the Slovakian resistance agency merged with CETEKA, 
the official pre-war agency, which stayed independent 
until the Communist coup of. 1948; the Albanian resistance 
agency became the official Albanian Telegraph Agency. 
The old Polish agency, Polska Agencja Prasowa (PAP),. was 
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taken over by the new government and MTI in Hungary was 
taken over by the coalition parties, ultimately to become 
a part of the Hungarian. Ministry of Information. Tanjug, 
agency of the Yugoslav resistance, is today theoretically 
independent financially, but its director and managing 
board of ten members are nominated by the Chairman of 
the Council for Science and Culture of the Yugoslav 
government. The Rumanian agency, Rador, operated with 
French assistance until 1948 when the communist Agerpress 
was formed. Like the Bulgarian agency, Bulgarska 
Telegrafitscheka Agentzia (BTA), Rador is also government 
controlled. In East Germany a new agency was established 
under the Soviet occupying powers Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Nachrichtendienst - to become the socialist equivalent 
. of 
DPA. 
The agencies of Communist Europe take their main supply 
of foreign news from TASS. But TASS has not been the 
sole source of supply. The East: European agencies 
generally subscribe to the 
major western agencies on an 
exchange basis., While. Communist 
agency sources usually 
receive 
more attention on their wires, this is not 
uniformly so. Yugoslavia's Tanjug uses western material.. 
liberally. A. study in the late 'sixties found that of 
copy used by Tanjug, 45% came from western agencies and 
the United States Information Services (USIS), while only 
10 
14.2% came from the Communist agencies. 
Today the agencies of the Communist countries are. very 
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major sources 
much of whose 
monitoring of 
each maintain 
is more scope 
of news, alth, 
of news supply to the Western global agencies - 
area-related activity is committed to the 
these services. In Moscow, where the agencies 
staffs of four full-time journalists, there 
for attempts to get beyond official sources 
Dugh the opportunities to do so are limited. 
Nevertheless, the agencies'have performed particularly well 
in their terms on the issue of Russian dissidents, so much 
so that by the early 'seventies other media were tending to 
regard coverage of dissident activities as a 'routine' story 
they could leave to the agencies. Critics claim that the 
attention given to Russian dissidents masks the impotence 
of western media in their general coverage of Russian State 
affairs. 
The Moscow bureaux of the western global agencies are 
autonomous, and report directly to London or Brussels. This 
coverage is generally not linked directly with coverage of 
other European socialist countries. In other words, 
reports of news from, say, Belgrade, are filed independently. 
There are in fact two other centres for coverage of Eastern. 
Europe. These are Berlin and Vienna. Berlin has declined 
in importance with the political institutionalisation of 
the Berlin Wall, but. is still the main centre for coverage 
of East Germany. Berlin correspondents report either 
directly to London, Brussels or Bonn. 
Vienna has increased in importance as a news centre for 
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Eastern' Europe. ' For the western agencies this is the main 
bäse'from which Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
and Albania are covered. There are variations in the 
independence of the bureaux in East European countries in 
relation to-Vienna. -In AFP's case, all of them. file through 
Vienna. 'UPI's full-time'staffin Eastern Europe file 
directly into UPI's computer-controlled distribution system, 
but', their copy is monitored from Vienna. 
The news services of the East European agencies are received 
and monitored mostly in the Viennese bureaux of the western 
agencies. -Vienna is a 
'convenient location for this! purpose, 
close as it'is to the borders of Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia. It is in fact a communications centre for 
the entire news flow between west and east, barring Russia. 
The Austrian news agency, Austria Presse Agentur (APA), 
. make 
this controls the communications infrastructure that' 
possible. East European-agency services are provided in 
English, except the Albanian service, which arrives in 
French. This translation-of their services into western 
languages by the Eastern European agencies is in some cases 
a recent development indicative of greater awareness of, 
western news media requirements. While it must help, the 
western media considerably, it is also said by some to have 
a'badeffect on the style of eastern agency reporting. 
Since-the eastern agencies are obliged for political reasons 
to translate their stories almost word for word into English, 
this can produce what to western'journalists appears a very, 
tedious and laborious style of. coverage, not helped by the 
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official character of the news. One respondent considered 
the Czech agency to be the best translated: until 1968 
he claimed some English socialists worked for the English- 
language desk of CTK; although they were later expelled, 
they had a lasting and positive linguistic and editorial 
influence on the quality of the news service. 
11 
The Viennese bureaux of the western agencies house staff who 
can be sent to any East European country; Vienna itself 
is not considered very important as a news centre. AP 
has two newsmen in its Viennese bureau (1974).; and one 
photographer. There is an American staff correspondent 
in Bucharest, and a Czech lady in Prague. Budapest is 
covered by a Hungarian stringer. Yugoslavia is covered 
independently by two staffers who file on AP's 'B' wire 
via Vienna. Warsaw is also covered independently. UPI 
has one newsman in Vienna, in addition to staff who translate 
the service into German for Austrian clients. There are 
full-time staffers in Warsaw, Prague and Belgrade. The 
Prague man is Austrian; an American covers Poland and an 
Englishman covers Yugoslavia. Local stringers have 
responsibility for Bucharest, Budapest and Sofia, and file 
to Belgrade. The full-time staffers file directly into 
the computer system, but editorial surveillance is maintained 
in Vienna, with which there is almost daily contact. AFP 
has a staff of four in Vienna, and French correspondents 
in Prague, Warsaw and Belgrade. Local stringers cover 
Budapest and Sofia. There is nobody for Bucharest. 
Reuters has 3 journalists in Vienna, and one full-timer each 
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in . Warsaw, Prague, ; Belgrade. The. other countries are 
, 
covered by stringers or by visits from Vienna. None of 
the agencies. covers "Albania: 
it is very difficult to get 
,.. 
permission to enter, -and Albania is not considered greatly 
news-worthy. 
Excluding Russia; but including-East Germany, each western 
,. global agency: maintains 
around five toeight'full-time 
correspondents on coverage of Eastern Europe, at least a 
quarter of whom are based in Vienna. There are eight 
countries involved, with a,, combined. population'öf over 
126 million. Coverage has of course been politically 
restricted in the past; at present the extent of western 
news-gathering from inside East Europe is probably increasing 
as trade relations increase and political tensions reduce. 
At least two of the global agencies,. Reuters and UPI, 
reported an increase in full-time sta'ff.. for Eastern Europe 
during the 'seventies. 
The only clients forti, estern agency services in Eastern 
Europe are the East European national news agencies, who 
pay part of their way through exchange arrangements with 
the western agencies. The agencies are paid in 'frozen 
funds', that is, in 'soft' or local currency that cannot 
be exchanged for western currencies, except in the case of 
Yugoslavia and Hungary which have recently transferred to 
hard currencies. Not able to export their revenue, the 
agencies simply invest it in local news-coverage, which, 
slight though some might consider it, has the merit of paying 
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its way. On the other hand, the problem of foreign 
exchange can complicate the negotiation for new contracts. 
And since a lot: of the. coverage is in fact done from Vienna, 
outside the East. European block, there are still heavy 
expenses to be met in addition to the cost of maintaining 
correspondents within the block. Austria is a moderately 
good market for the western agencies, and so this helps 
support the maintenance of Vienna as a regional news- 
gathering centre. 
Conclusiön to European Discussion 
Before World War Two, therefore, the supply of international 
news for European countries was in the control of the three 
major European agencies: Havas, Reuters, Wolff. (Wolff 
or Continental was succeeded by DNB after 1933). Of these 
three, Havas was the most visible in Continental Europe. 
Reuters' main area of overseas activity apart from sales. 
to Europe via the cartel was then Asia and the Far East. 
The American agencies increased their presence in Europe 
up to World War-Two, with UP well in the lead; but they 
were truly'well-established in only one place, and that was 
London. For AP, South America was a more important 
overseas market, and for UP South America certainly competed 
for attention with Europe, while both agencies. were also 
keen to open up Japan and China. 
The contemporary market dominance of Europe and North America 
in the agencies' foreign news-gathering activities therefore 
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is in some respects a post-war phenomenon. . 
Unable to 
penetrate Europe to the extent they would have liked the 
American 
. 
agencies at that time devoted proportionately 
more attention to South America; while Reuters, with 
little to gain in Europe outside of the UK and of its sales 
to the cartel ' devoted. more attention to Asia. 
After World War Two, the American agencies built up a 
relatively strong presence in Europe, and were much helped 
by the tempörary. setbäck of the British and French agencies, 
whose loss of markets in many parts '. 6f the world was con- 
siderable, and'by the generally freer market conditions that 
prevailed'by-comparison with the*pre-war era. This expansion 
never' obl 
'. _... ._:; _:. . literated the European agencies and in-recent years 
there has been some'reduction of American agency activity 
in Europe, which nevertheless constitutes their most 
important overseas revenue-area. There is certainly a far 
greater. choice of news agencies open to European newspapers 
now than at any time before the Second World' War. 
For political reasons, western agency coverage of Russia 
has always. been closely-restricted, both before and after 
the 1917 revolution. Coverage of'Eastern Europe has never 
been extensive by comparison with Western' Europe, but appears 
to have improved slightly, in the' last 
, 
two decades. Russia 
and Eastern Europe are not important markets for western 
agencies, though they do help to cover'the costs'of news- 
gathering, nor doesnews'of this part of the world figure 




Old Agencies in the New World 
The United States is the world's largest single media 
market. Yet for over'one hundred years, neither Reuters 
nor AFP seemed to. pay it much attention. In the 'sixties. 
Reuters at last appeared to give the U. S. market priority 
attention but AFP's North American presence has improved 
only slightly. Perhaps the longest-standing failure of 
the European agencies was their reluctance to adopt innovat- 
ory and aggressive tactics in relation to the-United States. 
To some extent this seems to contradict the general principle 
that wealthy markets attract the most agency resources. 
But the strategies of the European agencies in relation to 
the United States were for long blunted by the oligopolistic 
control established over that market by the American agencies 
themselves, and bj the European reluctance to put Lp the kind of 
capital that would have been necessary to fight such control. 
Their failure is both testimony to the advantages enjoyed 
by an agency on its domestic ground, and also to a certain 
laziness of mind engendered by the cartel framework of 
European agency operations before World War Two. 
Reuters began well: the Baron's reputation was greatly 
enhanced, according to Storey, by his agency's coverage 
of the American Civil War, and in particular by his special 
'American telegrams', which had demonstrated the advantage 
of regular, factual surveys of. events, over the longer 
commentaries of newspaper correspondents. 
12 
On the North-East coast of. America these telegrams might 
not have gone down so well had Reuter distributed them there, 
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American agency. He did not want to become involved in 
the risk and expense of ä big independent news-gathering 
and distribution network of his own in the United States. 
In the late 1860's and 1870's in fact, his news service 
could hardly pay. its way by itself; only the commercial 
department and the service of telegrams to arrlfrom the 
east kept the company financially afloat. 
In the late 18501s, news of America would arrive in London 
or Paris byway of incoming ships, and news transmission 
could take between twelve to fifteen days. Reuters and 
Havas had stringers in the United States, but they could 
not afford full-time correspondents. Nor could, AP of New 
York afford'a full-time correspondent in Europe. There 
was no mutual co-operation between the agencies at this 
time; France had little interest in news of America; and 
the news which was distributed tended to consist of very 
short bulletins followed by Stock Exchange quotations. 
The Civil War, which began in 1861, helped stimulate 
European interest in America. When the Federal frigate 
San Jacinto arrested the English Trent, Reuters sent a 
'correspondent to the United States for the first time. 
The French expedition to Mexico meanwhile also stimulated 
French interest, although the: story itself was covered 
very inadequately - the fatal climax and Maximillian's 
death were reported by an Austrian ship captain at Vera 
Cruz, who crossed to New Orleans and telegraphed: the news 
to the Austrian Minister in Washington, who in turn tele- 
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graphed it tothe Austrian consul inNew, York and to 
Ballplatz. The news came; from there, to, _Brussels 
by boat 
and was picked ., up 
in Brussels, by Havas.. 
News flow improved dramatically with the successful laying 
of the,. Transatlantic, cable, in 1865. ;.. The; project was 
headed by Cyrus Field, "a_New. Yorkbusinessman with news- 
paper interests, but, the , capital-, came_: mainly, 
from Britain - 
in particular, the Magnetic Telegraph, Company, '. and with 
some British Government support. as well., Very. little 
American , capital was raised for _the successful: venture. 
Not long afterwards, - in 1866-67, AP, opened a. London bureau, 
and concluded an' exchange arrangementwith. Reuters. Havas 
was more . interested . 
in 
, 
the, Latin countries, , both of Europe 
and. South . America:, ' Because of Reuters' agreement with the 
government of Hanover'in 1866 for use of the. England-Norderney 
cable,, Wolff,, a. Prussian agency, decided to' deal. independ- 
entlyof. Reuters for, its, supply of American. news, and 
signed an exchange agreement: 
with Western AP. - Reuters: 
sought a foothold on -the. German market at, this . 
time,. so 
ý. successfully that' by 1869, . 
Wolff was willing to return to 
the. -fold and negotiate. ' In 1870 the: three. European agencies 
signed the agreements that were-. to,, establish, the European 
cartel..:.; Wolff agreed -totake US. . 
dispatches from Reuters. 
At first the United States was regarded as neutralterritory 
as far as selling-their-own services was concerned,, where 
-the agencies: could-operate freely. But the first-general 
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treaty between AP of New York, Reuters, Havas and Wolff 
was signed in 1875, and this was negotiated by Reuters, 
which clearly had a closer relationship with the American 
agency than the other European agencies, by reason of 
language, history and geographical location. Under this 
agreement, the European agencies would provide AP with 
their information, and AP would provide them with news of 
America, through Reuters. AP agreed not to sell its 
service to anyone else in Europe; nor to sell in South 
America (which under the 1870 agreements was Havas' 
territory). The European agencies undertook not to deal 
with anyone else in North America. 
When Western AP broke away from AP of New York in 1885, 
it once again signed up an-exchange agreement with the 
German agency, Wolff. The 1870 agreements were coming 
up for renewal in 1890 and in Europe Wolff was considering 
ways in which Havas' dominant position could be'crushed, 
thus endangering the alliance. By 1890, however, the 
crusade against Havas had failed, and Wolff returned to 
the old position of 1870. In America, Western AP 
exposed the secret trust between AP of New York and the 
old UP, and thus established itself. as the. -leading agency. 
Western AP competed with UP for-. the contract with Reuters 
(a deal with Wolff alone could not have provided the full 
European'service in any case, without the co-operation of 
the other agencies). On the recommendation of its own 
New York correspondent-manager, Reuters finally decided to 
award the contract to Western AP in 1893, thus helping to 
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secure the defeat of the old UP. 
In the 1890's therefore, Reuters had one correspondent in 
New York who helped channel selected AP and general American 
news to Europe. : This correspondent represented all the 
European agencies. Havas suggested to Reuters that they 
ma ht us n 'g efully set upa common agency bureau in New York 
in`1891, but this was not followed up. In 1902, Havas 
considered having a separate New'Yorkbureau, but did not 
actually do this until 1913. 
By the'time*'Reuters and'Havas were becoming more interested 
in American news, the American agency situation had begun 
to. consolidate. The expense of establishing an adequate 
. 
internal. communications network, for new-gathering and 
distribution, however, would probably have, still deterred 
the Europeanagencies'fröm trying their. luck in the American 
market.. Instead . 
they, were defensively, inclined'to make 
concessions to the growing, -power,: of AP-hoping,, to'cöntain 
AP's. potential_. within the cartel framework and. recognising 
as territories: in which AP had a, natural. right: to sell its 
service Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, the Philippines and 
Central America. APalso, expanded its news-gathering 
. facilities. inEurope. 
After World War. 
'One 
the' American agencies , we'r. e 
decidedly 
on`'thecffensive, and while they invaded South America and 
the Far'East, the European agencies do not seem to have 
considered'invading, the North American : market, and they 
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might have thought the cost prohibitive anyway. Only in 
the 1930's, when AP had formally disassociated itself from 
the cartel, did Reuters seek to enter the general market - 
by selling news to dissident radio stations at the time of 
the Press-Radio Bureau agreements. This market lasted 
only as long as AP and UP refused to deliver news to radio 
unconditionally. Coverage of North America by Reuters 
and Havas was minimal. Some French newspapers complained, 
and concern was expressed in Britain abou the shortage of 
American news in the British Press. 
Agence France Presse in the United States 
AFP did not conclude an exchange agreement with AP until 
1949. Previously, it had tried to persuade AP to accept 
an agreement which would have prevented AP from selling 
independently in France, but, -this was unacceptable to AP. 
Before 1949 AFP had an exchange arrangement with Transradio 
Agency, which died with Transradioin 1951. For a short 
while in the early 1950's, INS had an agreement with AFP, 
and distributed some AFP news to its U. S. subscribers. 
INS undertook the selection and translation. Apart from 
a few French-language papers in the United States, AFP had 
no other presence in the American market until 1961 when 
it began to sell, where it could, on an independent basis. 
The service was provided in French. Not until 1967 did 
AFP provide an English-language service for the United 
States. 
For AFP, the United States continues to be an expensive 
247. 
(probably the most expensive) news-gathering centre, where 
few of the costs' can be 'offset against sales. - In New York 
and Washing-ton-size-able bureaux are maintained, with 12 and 
6editorial staff ' respectively, ` in addition to three sub- 
AFP office editors ät`. theUnited Nations in New York. The 
is located''inside. the-'AP' bu±lding on Rockefella > Plaza,, 
andAFP still-'subscribes. to the. AP domestic service,. for. 
which in"part exchange the AFP domestic service is available 
to AP. 's Paris; office. . 
In addition to the exchange,: AFP 
"'in: 1972 was paying AP approximately'$200,000a 
year. 
Evidently the AP domestic report is the'backbone of"the 
ý., AFP'Amer cari news service. A senior AFP' executive in the 
United'States'claimed that AFPfs Washington coverage 
originated 50% of the time ; from its own 'reporters -. the 
rest originated from American media. 
Communication costs are the major inhibiting factor that 
prevent AFP building. a stronger US clientele.. To sell 
direct to the Los Angeles. Times-'in 1972, for instance, 
would have cost something in the order of. 
$3, '000 a month 
on communication. costs alone, so that the 
charge to the 
LATwould have'been even greater. - Whatever AFP had to 
offer it had nothing whichtheLAT wanted that badly. 
Even if. communication costs had been cut by half it would 
still not have been an economic proposition for AFP to 
sell. direct to papers in the west. If there were numerous 
clients on the route-to the west, or in the. region of the 
wire terminus, perhaps it might have been conceivable. 
But only . 
the large papers in the United States 'consider 
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taking supplementary services as a rule, and these are well 
spread out geographically. In practice, the particular 
problem of selling to LAT was taken care of when AFP signed 
a contract in 1973 to sell its service to the Los Angeles 
Times-Washington Post News Service. This was partly a reward 
for_AFP's remarkable scoop that year on the Munich Games 
assassination. 
installed in the 
after the scoop. 
the AFP story, ai 
AFP already sold 
The new contract 
Teleprinters for the AFP service were 
Washington Post office only a few days 
That same week, the New York. Times used 
ad mention of it. was made in. Time magazine. 
a partial service to the New York Times. 
meant that the AFP service had only to be 
fed into the Washington Post, which has its own teleprinter 
communications with the Los Angeles , 
Times. 
Reuters in the United States 
When AP finally withdrew from the cartel in 1933, Reuters 
was in a poor situation economically, as a combined result 
of the American initiative, bad debts and the general 
depression. There was no question of a major drive on 
U. S. markets, although, as we have seen, it did try to 
enter the radio market while that lasted. The client 
situation improved after World War Two, when Storey says 
there was a record increase. Reuters began regional 
transmission to North American clients after 1944, put out 
by the British Post Office in morse, and had 30 newspaper 
clients there in 1946, Two years later the North American 
-desk in London was first established, and 
remained there 
until 1972 when it was transferred to New 
York. 
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By'1,966 Reuters reached. 7.3% of-the American. dailies which 
subscribed to supplementary services, but this had fallen 
to only: 4% in 1974.. The Editor and Publisher Yearbook 
for 1974 records. only 218, daily newspaper subscriptions to 
Reuters;., 18 of these are-on the east coast; nearly all 
(24)-serve the. larger, communities (over 100,000); 22 are 
in the larger. circulation brackets, (50,000+; ); and 17 were 
morning papers, all-day or both. morning and. evening papers 
(a much. higherproportion. than for the total daily paper. 
population).;; Eighteen of the'Reuter subscribers also. 
took both AP and UPI;. of. the, other. ten, 8., took"only AP. 
and 2. relied only. on UPI. 
14 
Most-newspapers-taking supplementary services in the 
United States are_. the larger-big-city newspapers, and 
. 
Reuters'; clients. are, therefore. no. exception. They 
include for instance the.. New York Times and the. Los Angeles 
Times. But. there are some others which. are mildly surpris- 
ing,, Iike. the: 
_Rapid;. 
City. Journal, an evening, paper in 
South Dakota with. a-, circulation: of 34,000. Reuters is 
nowhere. near. 'as, strong in. the United. States,. newspaper 
market as the; leading American. supplementaries like the Los 
Angeles. Times-Washington Post news service or New York Times 
news service. 
But-: this disguises 
, 
someimportantEdvances made by Reuters, 
in North America: in. the -'-sixties and 
'-seventies.. In' 1967, 
AP refused to: renew theexchange; arrangement, it had main- 
tamed with Reuters since the end of the cartel, 
'whereby 
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AP made its domestic service available to Reuters and the 
PA was made available to AP in London. The exchange was 
an equal one, involving no additional cash. By 1967, AP 
considered that America was too important a news-centre 
to justify an equal exchange, and said that the provision 
of AP's domestic service would now cost Reuters an addition- 
al £110-120,000 a year. 
It was absolutely necessary for Reuters, as it was for AFP, 
to maintain reasonable coverage of the United States for 
overseas clients. AFP, also-faced with a heavy increase 
in subscription to AP that year, _decided 
to pay up rather 
than substantially increase its North American coverage. 
Reuters on the other hand, already enjoying the consequences 
of a greatly expanding-operation in the field of economic 
news services, decided it could afford to go it alone and. 
do without the'AP domestic service. 
Reuters-immediately began to build-up its reporting strength, 
going beyond New York and Washington to establish new 
bureaux in places like Chicago, San'Francisco, Miami, 
Atlanta and Houston. -New journalists were paid on a 
scale that competed with those-of the American agencies. 
This helped substitute the AP service, but not to sell the 
news service in the States. .. Reuters? share of the 
supp- 
lementary market fell in the daily newspaper field, and 
the company's 1972 report admitted that the American media 
market was 'difficult 
.v 
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Reuters Economic Services'inthe United States, ' 
Reuters, ' main, advance on the United States market occurred 
in the economic news services. The British agency had 
started selling economic news in the 1920's with its 
'American Markets Service' for non-media clients, and this 
had always tended to do rather better than the media market. 
Under the post-war 'Comtel' label, it had what one senior 
HQ`executive described as a 'ni`ce tidy liIttle business of 
about a million dollars turnover'. 
15 This service was 
principally a commodity service that is, it dealt mainly 
with prices for metals, cocoa, coffee and items for which 
there is no major US production but some considerable 
consumption.. For other kinds of economic news, Reuters 
had an exchange arrangement with Dow Jones, the leading 
American economic news agency, whereby each provided the 
other with economic and financial news. Reuters broke 
from Dow Jones around the same time as it broke from AP, 
but this time it w ,.., 
,,.. 
was an entrepreneurial decision' by 
Reuters to go it, alone in the economics field. 
Reuters had ä good if'not dominating reputation in the 
field of international commodities on the United States. 
market, but not for domestic commodities. These were 
p because the Unite ed Stat tes is more self- important though, e 
sufficient than most communities, and it was here that real 
money was to be made. The domestic. commodity markets were 
mostly centralized in Chicago, where up until 1068Reuters 
had no correspondents at all. 
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Communication facilities across the continent-had already 
been improved in the wake of the rupture with AP on the 
general news side, and were in any case far more substantial 
than those maintained say, by AFP, because of the existing 
commodities service. 
The principal competitor in commodities was the Commodities 
News Service (CNS), which had, been established in the field 
since the 1880's. This agency had achieved an almost 
monopolistic position in domestic: commodities, and. tended 
to be complacent with it. It was also dependent on UPI 
for its source of foreign news. Reuters, which had its 
own international news supply of course, could tailor this 
service to its commodities needs, and feed it in faster. 
The Reuters challenge was effective; it did not directly 
compete in all areas, but where it did, as"in the grain 
and bacon markets, it made rapid advances, and CNS declined 
considerably from its peak position. A senior Reuters HQ 
executive in 1974 claimed that Reuters had 60% of the 
commodities market. In 1973 Reuters decided to transfer 
its editing for the Commodity Report, as well as for the 
Financial Report, to Chicago, America's principal commodit- 
ies market-place. There it established offices in the 
Chicago Board of Trade and the Mercantile Exchange, with 
a full-time staff in 1974 of eighteen, and 'a full-time man 
in Kansas. Before then there had been only, one or two 
full-timers in Chicago, for the General News Service. The 
total Economic Services staff rose considerably therefore 
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in the late 'sixties and early. 'seventies, (in.. 1971 there 
were 40 full-time reporters and editors for the economic 
services, and 40 stringers; most of. the full-timers and' 
stringers 
were American). 
Success came less easily in. the field of financial as- 
opposed to commodity news. Here the major, competition 
was Dow Jones,, which until Reuters came along, had. the 
" entire brokerage market - estimated at around 5000 tickers 
in 1967. Dow Jones was strong because. it. had,. been the 
financial news agency for so. long, and because. it. was an 
off-shoot of the Wall Street, Journal, America's most 
prestigious financial newspaper, and the nearest thing to 
a national newspaper,. with four different printing plants 
across the continent. . 
Overseas it started a joint news- 
gathering and distribution arrangement with, AP, and also 
subscribed to UPI. 
Reuters linked up with Ultronics Incorporated in. 1967 
to form the Reuters Ultronics financial news report. 
Ultronics. provided the hardware, especially the communicat- 
ions; Reuters took care of the, editorial.,.. In 
. 
197.1, the 
domestic Ultronics arrangement was severed. when, it was' 
thought technological developments had outdated. the. Ultronics 
equipment, but overseas Reuters still continued to market 
Ultronics services. In the United States that. year, 
Reuters had a communications network linking up 450,, cities. 
The main problem-in building up. the market for: the Financial 
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Report was attracting news sources who would feed in 
material. regularly to Reuters. A great deal of the initial 
work consisted of eliciting promises from corporations to 
provide the agency with their quarterly figures. For most 
corporations there was a particular advantage in going to 
Dow Jones, because through Dow Jones they hoped for a 
mention in the Wall Street Journal. This was not helped 
by the fact that American Stock Exchanges recognized only 
AP and UPI as suitable news-gathering organizations to which 
company figures should be released. Reuters worked at this, 
and eventually persuaded the Stock Exchanges to change their 
manuals, and include Reuters as an equally suitable organ- 
ization. 
Reuters executives were optimistic in the early 'seventies. 
They had after all broken revered traditions and given two 
monopolies cause for concern - CNS in commodities, Dow 
Jones in finance. In the past Dow Jones had bought up the 
competition, but Reuters was not for sale. Reuters was 
delievering news faster at first - 100 words per minute 
against Dow Jones' 60 wpm. - until Dow Jones developed a 
ticker that would deliver at equal speed and took on more 
staff. Every subscriber Reuters picked up was either a 
customer who had cancelled his Dow Jones subscription, 'or 
one that Dow Jones would have had before Reuters came along. 
Furthermore, it was not a growing market, but perhaps even 
a shrinking one. A 'particular point in Reuters favour was 
its pricing system - based on the simple number of tele- 
printer machines in operation, whereas Dow Jones charged 
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total of Dow Jones installations of 3200, according to 
Reuters sources, which put its share of the financial market 
at almost 18%. In these terms still a considerable feat 
for a newcomer. The fact that it got so far was partly 
because some large brokerage companies had encouraged 
competition, believing this would bring down Dow Jones' 
rates and that competition was editorially beneficial. 
Although Reuters did sell to companies in the large multi- 
branch bracket, it did particularly well with one-office 
clients (which perhaps explained its liberal pricing 
system), or in other words the smaller companies. 
What is certain is-that Reuters, by the end, of 1974, was 
happier with its . excursion, 
into the commodity news market 
in the United States than it was with the invasion of the 
financial news market. Meanwhile, the Dow Jones connection 
. with AP in the sale of economic news"overseas had failed 
to make quite the same kind of dent that Reuters had 
achieved on the American scene, andýin that sense there 
was an additional, though hidden, victory behind Reuters' 
assault on the North American market after 1967. This 
study was written up too late to assess the significance 
of a joint CNS-UPI economic overseas news service estab- 
lished in 1977. 
In 1973 it was estimated that about 60% of. all the reporting 
costs for Reuters' Economic Services were incurred in the 
United States. - One day's analysis of all RES files in 
1971 showed that about 40% of the World Financial-Service 
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came from the United States. New York in particular tended 
to generate the most importalt financial and economic news 
for international distribution. The Reuters Financial 
Report is distributed in Europe without intervention for 
U. S. clients in Europe. Similarly in Hong Kong and Japan. 
(This is in-additiön, of course, to the'numerous other 
economic services available. ) 
Since the economic-services generate well over half of all 
Reuters' revenue, the importance of the United States as a 
cost, and revenue centre for economic services clearly had 
important implications for the company as a whole. In 
the late 'sixties, the prospect of an independent Reuters 
. operation within 
the United States caused'some heady feelings 
amongst staff there'. Some talked of Reuters in North 
America separating from the London office and setting up 
as an independent corporation. This kind of speculation 
may have followed a sense of frustration as business grew 
faster than' management structure could change to cope with 
it. At that time there were only two managerial personnel, 
and the rest were editorial, a clearly. inadequate ratio for. 
a. business that was to generate-betweenthree and five 
million dollars a year. Recognizing the need for stronger- 
guidance of the North American operation, London sent over 
a manager for North-America who had'abackground in the 
economic services, and had been in charge of. the computer 
services department during its period of major growth, 
1963-68.. The growth of economic services in the sixties 
was closely, tied up with developments' in computer'. technology. 
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Under a clearer management structure, definite policy 
guidelines emerged for the early 'seventies. One was 
a decision to abandon the. attempt to sell the general news 
service as the 'world agency number three', a strategy now. 
considered unlikely to be successful, but to sell it as if 
it were a supplementary service, just like the New York 
Times news service. It was to do a very complete job 
on important stories, not to attempt exhaustive coverage 
of the United States, and to steer clear of routine state 
news coverage. This was considered too great an investment 
for work that was personally unrewarding to Reuters report- 
ers, and financially risky. But it may be that Reuters 
is now in a better position to go for the middle-level 
American daily. newspaper. And the agency in 1974 
introduced 'justified' service - ready in other words for 
automatic feed-in at the client end. It followed by only 
a few months the decision of several of the leading supple- 
mentaries to do the same: New York Times News Service, 
Los Angeles Times-Washington Post, Knight Newspaper Service. 
(Reuters also sells to the Knight newspaper group. ) 
The relative success of the Reuters push into North America 
had been based mainly on the economic services. In New 
York, as in Tokyo, there was a feeling that both economic 
and general news activities should be treated as more inter- 
related than was customary elsewhere. Because of the 
international interest in the economic development of Japan, 
the Tokyo bureau had already integrated economic and general 
news operations with the same group of editors and filing 
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editor for both. In 1972 the Tokyo bureau chief, Lee Casey, 
was transferred to: NewYork, where a move towards integration 
was planned at: the editorial more than the reporting level. 
The managerial ' division of labour' between economic and 
general news services seemed less logical in North America 
than in`London. ' The accounting system related the two 
services in a way ; that. seemed 
to economic service staff to 
. -, penalize-them.,. 
Each bureau had to put in annual budgets 
to'both divisions; news-gathering costs were meant to be 
divided so, that the economic services would pay the general 
news services for whatever general news facilities they 
used. 
This was difficult to do where both were closely integrated, 
and caused unnecessary friction., ", 
Furthermore, when New 
ý. York management contacted 
London they would contact general. 
news or, economic services staff'according 
to the character' 
of. the problem rather than 
according to their own formal 
place. in the 
divisional structure, andthis caused some 
--confusion of responsibility. 
"It: was an. 'unsatisfactory situation, 
rrand brought to a head 
some, general"problems about the relationship' between the 
General News Desk and Reuters Economic Services. Eventually, 
the two-divisional structure was scrapped ` in favour of a 
four-divisional structure. There-organization at the 
beginning of 1974 recognizedwhat had-already been the case, 
namely theiendency to-autonomy in the North-American operation, 
and. the. illogicality. of a management structure which separated 
what. in practice were nearly ' inextricable functions. The 
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North American operation was now recognized as a department 
of its own, with a manager who would sit on the Reuters 
Executive Board, and who consulted the Board on all import- 
ant problems (as happened during the strike in New York in 
the Spring of 1974). But henceforward North America could 
assess its profits and losses on. the basis of operations 
for which it alone was primarily responsible. 
Reuters North America was making an overall loss in the 
mid-seventies, but looked forward optimistically. to a 
profit situation by the late 'seventies. One reason 
given for the slow progress was that outside the United 
States, prices. for the economic. services could be increased 
more readily because of the absence. of close . competition, 
while inside the United States it was thought more difficult 
to increase prices without losing clients as competition 
was too strong. ' 
Meanwhile a number of new services have been introduced 
that are particularly suitable for the American market. 
The Reuters Audio service was started in; 1972 with a 
studio base in London. Its most important client is 
Multibroadcast in the United States, which takes about 
five voicecasts a day for redistribution to its affiliate 
stations.. In 1973, the news-film agency partly owned 
by Reuters, Visnews, penetrated the United States: market" 
and beat the parallel rival drive of UPITN., During the 
same period, the sale of news services to CATV systems 
greatly increased. Reuters pioneered a new system for CATV_ 
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with wordsfed electonically on to the screen - whereas the 
American agencies; had started with cheaper methods which 
simply televised their own normal teleprinter outputs. 
Reuters now holds a respectable share of the. United States 
CATVmarket for agency services, is"behind AP but ahead of 
UPI (1975). In the first instance Reuters 'offered a 
financial servicefor'CATV systems and followed this with 
sports and general news services--In addition, Reuters 
now runs the New York Times Towerelectronic'news ticker. 
A. major new development occurred in 1974:., "an information- 
. retrieval 
system by which subscribers could have instant 
access in their homes to_a wide range'of'news services via 
closed circuit television. The news service was jointly 
initiated by Reuters and Time Incorporated, for general;;,.., 
news, horse racing'and sport. At-first it went only. to 
brokers, bankers and businessmen in Manhattan via Channel 
26; on the. Manhattan CATV. in New York city, but was made 
; available to home subscribers in 1975-6. A"subscriber to, 
this system is given an index of subjects, each with a; 
key-number. He punches out the number: on a device which 
calls up the information he requires. The system: is capable 
of delivering, and one. day may do so, 'hard'' newspaper-style 
copy. 
These new services are in addition to'innovations in 
economic, news services. of which more will be said in 
Chapter Six. One of these is Reuters' Business Beat, and 
a 1974 advertisement for: this service in, Editor and 
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Publisher illustrated the hard-sell commercial style Reuters 
has adopted in recent years: 
"REUTERS BUSINESS BEAT 
is for Business Editors who want copy-that is 
LIVE DISTINCTIVE AUTHORITIVE 
RELIABLE FAST CLEAR CONCISE 
and any one half a dozen other adjectives that 
Business Editors subscribing to BUSINESS BEAT 
are using to. sing its praises. 
They like..... 
*the way the service is edited and the 
good flow of copy they receive in time 
for-(heir deadlines. 
*the distinctive writing and the Stock and 
Commodity market reports and exclusive 
" bylined features and interviews. 
*the neat presentation of company news and 
statistical information 
*the early (midweek) delivery of lively 
weekend features 
*the fact that BUSINESS BEAT is based on 
Reuters' unmatched national and international 
business news resources. The same resources 
that are used to produce special services to 
meet the exacting standards of other experts - 
bankers, brokers, commodity traders and 
money managers. " 
The scope and succes of Reuters' activity-in the North 
American market is an extremely important consideration 
in any attempt to assess the future viability of Europe's 
leading news agency, and its ability to continue to compete 
with the American agencies in technology, ideas and quality 
of news services. 
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Canada 
In Canada. the news agency with the highest market penetration 
is Canadian Press, the national agency. . Of 111 Canadian 
'dailies listed in the Editor and Publisher. Yearbook for 
1974, information, on agency subscriptions was. not available 
" in` 22 cases, 'but. only three of the remainder did not 
subscriber to CP. `AP went directly to 29 papers (26%), 
UPI to 17 (15%), and Reuters to 19 (17%).. AFP went directly 
to only one client, 'in Quebec. Reuters appeared to do 
better in Canada therefore than'UPI, and it also, did better 
thanthe North American supplementary services. -; The New 
'York Times News' Service had six clients, " and, the' Los 
Angeles Times-Washington Post had five. 
Amongst the global agencies, the American agencies together 
have always,. ' dominated the'Canadian market. '.. In the 1870's 
. Canada 
figured; as'one of those 'neutral' territories where 
the'European agencies could operate freely, indicating an, 
absence of strong interest. Canada , was more 
important to 
Reuters as a communications link than as a, market. In 1902 
for'instance, the English put down. the first transpacific 
cable uniting Vancouver-in Canada to-Brisbane in Australia 
and'Auckland''in'New. Zealand, passing through the British 
territories'of Fanning, - Fiji. and Norfolk. This. was but 
one"year before the United States put down a' cable from 
"San Fransisco to Manila, ' passing through-Honolulu, Midway 
and Guam, -which in turn had connections'to Japan'and China. 
AP first began selling in Canada in 1894; UP in 1907. In 
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other words, as soon as AP of Illinois was established,. and 
as soon as the new UP was formed, each agency looked for 
clients in Canada in the same breath as they took in America. 
UP's first client was the Winnipeg Free Press. Later, in 
1922, the British United Press wasformed by one Charles 
Candall, who distributed UP's foreign news. BUP's operations 
in Canada were turned over to UP in 1941.. 
After the First World. War, Reuters took a greater interest 
in Canada. The British and Canadian-governments tried to 
promote the distribution of Reuters ; there,. but this project 
was abandoned after a few years, in the face of criticisms 
of the arrangement from CP which distributed , the: service. 
CP was a co-operative agency which started as. two separate 
organizations: the Western Associated Press in,, -Winnipeg 
in 1907.: and the Eastern Press Association,.. founded in 1908. 
The newspapers supported these organizations as a way of 
freeing themselves from dependence on the inadequate service 
otherwise provided by the railways: - . the Canadian Pacific 
Railway held the Canadian rights to the Associated Press 
service from the United_States,. but in 1910 surrendered the 
AP rights to a holding company formed out of: -: the two 
Canadian agencies under the name of the Canadian Press 
Limited.. This lasted until 1917 when the two agencies 
merged to form one single Canadian Press... -CP, subscribes 
today to Reuters, AP'and. AFP. It takes these services 
in New York, and. retransmits some 60,000 words edited out 
of them each day to Canada. It also distributes AP photos. 
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Reuters does. little direct news-gathering. of its own in 
., 
Canada, 'preferring to rely on CP, which it takes in New 
York. This has not been an entirely. happy editorial 
relationship, since the CP service, tailored'carefully to 
avoid offending one-or other language group., and to meet 
specific internal Canadian needs, -requires a good deal of 
"editing for international consumption.. In. 1975 Reuters 
appointed its first full-time. correspondent in Canada 
since the War. This initiative was taken by the Reuters 
North American: division HQ in New York in. -the expectation 
of an expanding market in Canada for its economic services, 
and in the CATV field. 
AFP maintains a bureau'in Montreal with a. bureau chief, 
-three editors and a secretary, 
and an additional corres- 
pondent in Ottawa. Its Canadian-material is filed out 
to Europe through New York. The North American AFP 
service has been received in Canada, in French, since 1964. 
Conclusion to North-American-Discussion 
In their overseas operations therefore, not all the agencies 
benefit directly from all the wealthier media markets. But 
where therzis wealth there is generally news, and through 
gLthering such news for international markets the. agencies 
reap indirect benefits. 
While Western Europe is regarded by each of the four agencies 
as a major market (the most. important overseas, market for 
the United States agencies; the most important non-domestic 
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market area for the European agencies), the interest of 
the European agencies in sales for the American market has 
been surprisingly weak. The reasons for. this are historical. 
The cartel experience of the European agencies accustomed 
them to the idea of a news-exchange system based on domestic 
monopoly situations. When the cartel broke down the world 
was in a period of deep economic depression, and the 
European agencies did. not have the resources they needed, 
let alone the necessary spirit for competitive overseas 
endeavour. Then it is doubtful whether they could have 
done-well on the domestic US market. ýEven today their 
position is extremely weak in the newspaper sector. But 
whereas Reuters has made a significant advance on the basis 
of economic services that no-one else is providing or 
providing in quite the same way, AFP has no comparable 
claim to distinction, noris there 
.a 
forseeable possibility 
that AFP's director-clients will want to put. upor find the 
money required to establish the agency. in the-domestic news 
business for U. S. clients. 
Whatever the actual status of the'European agencies in the 
United States market, there is no doubt that this market 
is extremely influential. It is the source of demand 
which basically controls the United States agencies and 
their major source of revenue; for Reuters it is the 
major testing ground for new innovations, and may determine 
which of these will eventually be extended elsewhere. For 
Reuters and for AFP it is a major cost area - unavoidable 
because it has to be covered rather more extensively than 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Struggle for Foreign Markets: The Third World 
In many areas of the world, 'the leading Western global 
agencies do not all compete with equal intensity. In 
North America, as we have seen-, the American agencies 
control the bulk of the market; of the two European 
agencies, only Reuters has a significant U. S. presence, 
and that is in the field of economic services to non- 
media clients rather than in the traditional newspaper 
market. 
There are in fact only two major world regions in which 
the four western agencies appear to compete with equal 
intensity. These are Western Europe And Asia. In 
South America the American agencies lead the field, 
followed by AFP, whereas Reuters does not have a strong 
presence on that continent. The European agencies are 
dominant in Africa and the Middle East, although American 
interest in the Middle East specifically has increased in 
recent years. 
The nature of competition in 'the provision of international 
news in the non-socialist world is. therFfore rather more 
limited than it at first seems. This'is of course a 
common feature in media systems: everywhere multi- 
ownership, syndicated services, the shared values of 
professional orthodoxy and vulnerability toýsimilar economic 
patterns decrease the real magnitude. of editorial diversity 
and press freedom. 
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This chapter briefly examines the: roleof the global 
agencies in South America and Africa and then-at greater 
length, in Asia. The study of their development on these 
continents shows, first, the extent of local media depend- 
ence for their supply of international news on these American 
and West European organizations. With a few notable 
exceptions, this dependence is nearly total. 
Countries do respond to this situation however, often by 
reducing the diversity of sources still-further. This 
they manage by establishing national. agencies, which are 
given the exclusive rights of distribution. To the dangers 
of imported cultural conformity in news supply they add 
the further threat of local political conformity. In this 
they are sometimes encouraged by the global agencies them- 
selves, who sometimes doubt whether there is money to be 
made in a free-for-all distribution. 
The competition between the global agencies is in any case 
often limited: there is a tendency for each agency to 
concentrate on certain markets and not others, and the 
choice of markets still coincides to some extent with old 
colonial interests or with the market divisions established 
in the days of the great cartel and which were usually 
initiated to supply the home market, or for propaganda 
reasons, rather than to meet specific requirements of 
overseas clients. 
The global agencies mainly supply the established media 
systems which enjoy larger circulations (and audiences), 
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high-revenue from advertising, and/or', the cushion of 
government patronage. Prominent amongst the newspapers 
in this category-is the English-language press (Asia and 
Africa), -and sometimes the leading vernacular papers (South 
America, Asia): but for the most part'the small and poor 
vernacular papers . are, greatly`disadvantägedin news supply. 
, 
Cheaper agency rates for poorer papers disguise the limited 
availability- of agency services in rural and' provincial 
ar. ea"s, where- communications facilities are. negligible and 
reception equipment difficult to obtain. In Asia the 
.: agency-, services 
have tö be translated into the vernacular 
by the papers themselves at relatively 
high cost, so that 
they often do without. Whether or-notit is'inevitable, 
the structure of: agency`öperätions and markets mirror the 
gradations ofsocial wealth around the-world. This also 
applies to news-gathering and editing activities,, which 
are almost, always concentrated in ' thewealthier,. more 
westerniz'ed-regional centres. 
South America 
The dominant feature of the South American market-isthe 
predictably strong presence of the North American agencies. 
The surprising feature is the relatively strong position 
_there 
of the French agency, AFP, and the very, weak position 
of Reuters. - This is a`directresult of earlier patterns 
.. established . 
in' the - days~ of the 
cartel. 
The cartel agreements of 1870 onwards to 1933 recognized 
South America as Havas territory.. - Havas seems to. have 
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. established 
itself as a Latin agency, since the cartel had 
already recognized Southern Europe as Havas territory, and 
in Spain, the, agency Fabra actually came to be known as 
'Agence Havas, Madrid'. 
The 1876 agreement followed the first cable communication 
between Brazil and Europe, established 1874. Havas sent 
a correspondent to Rio de Janeiro the same year, and 
Reuters sent one to Chile the following year. Each 
correspondent worked for both agencies. At the same 
time a Havas bureau opened in London to receive the cables 
from Brazil, which arrived there first, and at-the time of 
writing AFP's London bureau still has a small Latin 
American desk in addition to the main one in Paris. After 
1876 Reuters withdrew from South America, and Havas corr- 
espondents alone covered Chile, Rio. de Janeiro, Montevideo 
and Buenos Aires. Services to papers in those cities were 
very brief and very expensive, until in. the 1900's Havas 
rented its own cable network from the Western Co., increasing 
traffic. and reducing costs. The most important clients 
were La Nacion and La Prensa in. Buenos Aires;.. `Mercurio 
in Santiago. 
Indicative of the importance of-South America to Havas was 
the appointment there in 1902-of Charles Houssaye as 
South American manager, who was the nephew of'. the agency's 
news director and was, later to become news director himself 
in 1914. 
The First World War weakened the Havas position: three 
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quarters of the agency's personnel were called up; 
censorship in Europe prevented the transmission of dispatches 
from Germany to South American clients, many of whom were 
pro-German or at least neutral; and' the American agencies 
were looking with great interest at the market possibilities, 
UP signed'up La Nacion in Buenos Aires on the strength of 
theHavas; inability to transmit-'dispatches from Germany, 
(butwhen America entered the war, American censorship 
caught up with European). Insufficient revenue to Havas 
from the Antilles, Mexico, Central America, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Brazil led to a cessation of'. the Havas 
service after the War. 
Two factors saved the Havas presence. The first was 
radio-telegraph which cut communication costs considerably.. 
The first regular radio-telegraph' service was started in 
1921 for Argentina. " By 1923 Havas could again claim to 
be making Profits in-South America'. Uaing`shortwave 
PTT transmission it temporarily took backLaNacion from 
AP and Mercurio from-UP. ' This alone would probably not 
have produced consistent enough profit for a'continued 
South American presence'had it not'beenfor the very 
active insistence of the Quai D'Orsay that Havas should 
stay in that market. The Quai D'Orsayoffered to cover 
any deficits incurred by'theLatin American service. Thus 
began a monthly government ' subsidy. which reached 300,000. 
francs by 1930 . 
In 1927 Reuters and Havas allowed each other certain market 
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concessions. Reuters was interested in South America and 
there was some prestigious moral support behind the idea 
of expansion into this area, as was made clear in: an, 
address to the Manchester. Chamber of Commerce by the Prince 
of Wales in 1931: 
"We are sadly behind. the times in the field of 
advertising, If we are going to 'put our goods 
across' we must take a leaf out of the United 
States' book. One of the first things we need 
to do is to improve the present very inadequate 
British news service to South America. "1 
That same year Reuters started a radio service to. South 
America, and allowed Havas to do the same in the -Far 
East. 
Reuters' European Manager explained to the Post Office 
that 'it was most desirable from the national point of 
view that the. dissemination of British news in South 
America should be. fostered at the present time inevery 
possible way'. 
2 He certainly had reason to press a 
sceptical Post Office for lower rates: in 1931, between 
June 23rd and November 30th, Reuters paid the Post Office 
£3,619 for Rugby World Service radio transmission, and 
took in the sum of only £335 in receipts from clients. 
c 
But the Post Office needed to be convinced of the liklihood 
of, a sharp increase in traffic. 
There was little room for Reuters in South America. Even 
as early as 1922, for example, nearly every paper in Mexico 
was. a member or subscriber of AP. By 1933, Benet's 
Fortune article alleged that 95% of the important South 
American papers which could take and pay for a news service 
received UP. 
3 Competing as a European agency, 'Reuters 
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also had. to contend with Havas which had fifty years, 
experience of this market, ten years experience of radio 
transmission to South America, and a Spanish-language 
service. Havas also enjoyed direct government subsidy, 
which Reuters did not. 
In his tour of South America in 1931, the Prince of Wales 
secured the-co-operation of La Nacion and of the Buenos 
Aires Herald in establishing a daily news service from 
London. The Prince had noted with some dismay how nearly 
all news of England in South America was. transmitted by 
non-British agencies. Three years later, the Buenos 
Aires experiment was abandoned, and one observer noted 
that 'South America is little better off in the matter 
of British news, and world news carried through British 
channels, than it was ten years ago'. 
4 
By contrast, 
Hauas transmitted a substantial 15,000 words a day. 
Reuters transmissions to Buenos Aires did continue again 
in the late 'thirties, but with no more success. One. 
disappointed client wrote to the London Manager, noting 
that AP and UP were. able to send their copy at greater 
speed, and at less cost to clients, and complained of the 
'spasmodic and restricted wireless news' of Reuters: 
"In these days of slackness in Argentinian 
trade and of high paper costs we are forced 
to cut down expenses in every direction and 
sentiment' falls by the wayside . "" 
5 
The U. S. agencies had superior transmission facilities, 
helped by special "rates conceded to them by-- U. S. ' telegraph 
corporations'in the promotion of US. business in South 
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America. Because they were much closer geographically, 
they could afford communications by cable. In 1936, press 
rates from South America to Europe were almost twice as 
expensive per word as rates between North and South America. 
During World War Two, the Reuters position improved 
temporarily. When Havas disappeared with the German 
occupation, Reuters took over the eight Havas bureaux in 
South America, -and received heavy government backing to 
6 
pay off the existing Havas debts. This subsidy was 
withdrawn after the War. Meanwhile AFP's predecessor, 
AFI, co-operated with British information and Reuters in 
a world distribution of a French news service. After the 
War, Reuters' General Manager, Christopher Chancellor, 
nobly returned whatever his agency had taken from Havas 
in South America back to AFP. Within seven years AFP 
had restored its pre-War position and even improved on it 
by opening new bureaux in Columbia? Venezuela and Peru. 
Reuters' market position deteriorated rapidly. Even in 
the most important South American market, Argentina, it 
had relatively few clients. For a while it did serve 
the wealthy liberal paper La Prensa: when Peron tempor- 
arily shut down the bureau of UP in 1944,. La Prensa lost 
its major agency service and Reuters stepped in, offering 
its service free of charge for an initial period. A 
few years later, in. 1951, in another phase of Peron's 
battle . with 
La Prensa,,, the, paper, was taken over. UP, in 
protest, refused to supply its service to the new government- 
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'approved management. " But Reuters . continued to supply it. 
When the publisher, Gainza Paz,, was eventually re-established, 
he cancelled the Reuters contract.. 
-"By'`1958 businesshad deteriorated ' to : 
the. point that the 
"British agency withdrew from 'general news; provision in 
South America. ' 'In the, period immediately prior to this 
withdrawal, Reuters had only 8 clientsin. Argentina, and 
of these°, ' '7' used the service only as .a supplementary, in 
addition°to American and French services,, and., paid rather 
less for it. Reuters iri facthad never transmitted the 
same volume . of 
news to South America: as" other agencies. 
In 1950 for example, , while 
it filed , 12,000, words a day to 
Argentina, "AFP's wordage was 20,000,: AP's-30,000 and'UP's 
6o, ooo. 7 
'`But ' Reuters tý general news service 'r. eturned, -in 1964, shortly 
'after Gerald Long became General Manager. ý, Long felt that 
Reuters-, should"have'a`presence'in.: South'America-to qualify 
as a world-wide agency. But. business prospects were not 
good. 'A few years later=the-agency was'Japproached by a 
group of leading conservative South, American newspapers, ' 
who hoped to establish a co-operative continental agency.. 
The group included 3 : Brazilian papers, 2 , in Chile, 1 in 
Columbia, "1 in Ecuador, 1 : in Mexico, 2 ; in Peru: and2 in 
Venezuela. " -Reuters agreed to .. provide. 'the' new agency, 
Latin, with technical and administrative 
assistance. It 
also: now sells to Latin, " 
which translates , portions of the 
Reuters service- 'into Spanish and Portuguese..;.; A handful 
j 
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of independent Reuters news-gatherers are maintained in 
Argentina and Brazil. 
AFP is still the stronger of. the European agencies, by 
virtue of-tradition, relative continuity of. service, and 
a reputation for good . 
football. coverage. It has a Latin 
American desk in Paris manned by thirty. editorial staff 
who translate the service into Spanish and . tailor. it 
to. 
the market. This is only ten persons fewer; than the 
English-language desk which services the rest. of the non- 
French speaking world. 
The American agencies have too many natural: advantages 
in South America however ever to. be. seriously threatened 
by . the European agencies. Innumerable , sources for all 
South American countries clearly indicate that, AP and UP 
- but especially UP - were the dominant agencies, from the 
1930's, if not before. Just previous to. Reuters' with- 
drawal. in 1958, UP had a total of . 
487 clients in South 
America, including clients to its controversial Special 
" °Services, 'but before the; link-up . 
with INS. This had 
increased to 654 in 1963. 
AP's development of. the South American market 
, 
lagged. behind 
UPI's, but in the 1960_'sthere-was a very determined AP 
effort to catch up. Constant references in the AP 
annual volumes for the"'sixtiesmention the, acquisition 
of new South American clients. In 1962 the agency added 
; more: new subscribers in South America than in any ; single 
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year since World. War Two. In 1965. there was a gain of 
48. new subscribers for, general, news and 22 for photos. 
The President's address in 196,7: claimed that 'remarkable 
growth in news and photo, distribution'in Latin America 
during the past five,, years has placed AP in a position 
of. leadership'. t But. it was not until 1969 that AP 
began a . 
Portuguese language service for. Brazil, for which 
it gained a further 10 subscribers for general news. and 
8, for photos. 
Not, only. are the American agencies extremely influential 
in the presentation of world news for. Latin American 
readers, ; but also in the formation and dissemination of 
national news in many South American countries, most 
notably, in Chile and until recently Argentina.. But in 
1973, 
_ 
government decree prohibited foreign news agencies 
from transmitting Argentine news within the country. ' UPI 
.. at-that time served 
70 news organizations in Argentina 
,,., 
witha domestic . news, service'which, 
it. started in the 1930's; 
and AP's service, established 1962, went to 33 media 
organizations. The. European agencies have'not had 
comparable influence in South. America since the nineteenth 
century.: Unlike Asia or Africa this influence of the 
U. S. 
. agencies 
in particular traditionally has. not been. - 
mediated by the.. formation of powerful national news agencies, ... 
although Argentina's. new co-operative"agency, Noticias 
Argentinas', (staffed mainly by former AP and UP personnel) 
and the strengthening of Brazil's AJB; agencymay herald 
a. new, pattern. 
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This brief examination of agency history with reference 
to the South American market demonstrates anumber of 
features which are-common to other markets as well: 
(i) competition between the four leading western agencies 
is not everywhere as intense as the number of'agencies would 
suggest. This is partly explained by (ii) the fact'that 
agency-client relations still follow patterns of economic 
or political imperialism that either did exist or continue 
to exist. In this case the North American agencies'are 
exceptionally strong on the South American market; and this 
state of affairs cannot be disassociatedfrom2the general 
political and economic relationship between`the, two 
continents. (iii) k third feature to note'is the kind 
of political concern that lay behind the involvement of 
the European agencies' in South America` before the' war, and 
which in part determined'the scale of their activities 
there at that time': this throws light on the national 
political role that some politicians expected of the agencies, 
even in the democracies, and while such expectations are 
muted today in the West there is little reason to-suppose 
they might not be revived in some future period of 
comparable political and economic isolationism. 
(i. v)'Finally, agency treatment of South America is incon- 
sistent. There is no regular coverage at all of many 
South American countries. Instead, it is the media-wealthy 
countries which tend to receive the most consistent 
attention. Argentina for example has been exceptionally 
well-covered since the last century, by. comparison with 
agency coverage of Venezuela, or even"Columbia. The reason 
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has to do with the early'. pattern'of'European and American 
investment in-South America, 'the high demand for western 
agency news from a few very wealthy Argentinian newspapers, 
and possibly, the superior communications between Argentina 
and the western world.. 
(ii) Africa 
The American agencies have to a considerable extent left 
coverage of Africa to 'the European agencies. Before the 
wave of independence in-the 'fifties and 'sixties, AFP 
generally had local bureaux-in French African colonies, 
which were later turned into national agencies, sometimes 
with little change of-staff or operation. Of eleven' 
national news agencies 
in former French Africa in 1969, - 
all but two, Guinea and Mali, 
wErestarted by AFP. Most 
of these agencies depend on AFP 
as their-primary source 
of international news, even where Reuters and UPI services 
are also taken. 
tpossibly' "few clients 
in Black Africa, and UPI has AP has 
recently ceasedtransmitting its 
service''to'West Africa: - 
it 'found that`'clients were' unwilling to pay for the service 
even when they used it. 
9" 
Reuters' respondents maintain 
that African clients are reliable provided time is allowed 
them to find the foreign currency; itis possible that' 
the American agencies adopt commercial standards for 
Africa which are i. nappropriate'. 
Even Reuters is relatively new to Africa. British 
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colonial officials did not like foreign correspondents as 
a rule, and the colonies could rely on British Information 
Services and the. BBC for their international news (although 
these organizations were Reuters' subscribers). There 
was one major West African client as early as. the 1920's 
in Lagos,. but even in 1945 the major Nigerian client' 
received only 800 words a day, by morse. In East Africa 
Reuters served the Standard newspapers. 
North Africa has figured in agency networks for some 
considerable time. Havas and Reuter operated Egyptian 
bureaux from the 1860's, and Havas had correspondents 
in Tunisia and Algeria from 1897 and two correspondents 
in Madagascar from about the same time. South Africa 
has been very well represented by Reuters, which has had 
close ties with South Africa since the days when Roderick 
Jones was Reuters' representative there and founded the 
South African News Agency, SAPA, in 1912. SAPA became 
independent of Reuters control only in the 1930's. It 
is still a main supplier of news of South Africa and 
Rhodesia to Reuters, and distributes news in both countries. 
A survgy of Black Africa by Reuters' Patrick Crosse in 
1960 concluded-that there was a demand for an international 
news service, especially if it contained a high proportion 
of material of spe, cific. _African relevance. 
This was 
followed by a major, expansion of Reuters' African commitment. 
London-appointed Reuters staffers are now located in 
Algiers,., Addis Ababa, Cairo,. Nairobi, Johannesburg, 
Salisbury, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Lagos and 
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Accra: 22 main correspondents,., although. several of these 
are in. fact' stringers, who work. for other,. organizations 
like the BBC or a local . news; agency. 
Full-time Reuters 
correspondents, excluding locally-recruited editorial 
assistants, probably number about a dozen. * There are 




(French), East African, -and a 
combined English-Arabic 
service in North Africa, put together 
in Beirut. Hachten 
reports that Reuters has had. difficulty in penetrating 
Francophone Africa:. access to officials is difficult for 
English-speaking nationals; and it is cheaper to, file 
10 
news stories to Paris. from these-countries than to London. 
Where Reuters does have. contracts with governments in West 
Africa, it usually received much less in revenue than AFP. 
On the other. hand: AFP. operates, with similar difficulties 
in Anglophone-Africa. AFP maintains a. larger African 
staff, of full-time. correspondents than any other agency 
for general news services - about 24, in addition to 
locallYrecruited, full-time staffers-and stringers. 
In the, late 'Isixties, 
Reuters, was , 
received. in 39 African 
countries;.,. AFP in 33: This compared well with AP which 
was-receivedin. 14, ", and UPI in 19 
(now rather fewer). 
TASS,, given away free, is, received in. 19_countries. 
Reuters ; 
andýAFP. therefore have a clear lead in Africa: 
AP in 1969_had only 6 staffers, and. 44 stringers of whom 
only 17 were in the Francophil area. UPI in 1968 had 
-only five full-timecorrespondents (none. of them American), 
but did have rather more clients-than AP. 
* Total number of full-time staffers is 22 (1974) 
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Like South America, Africa also demonstrates the continuing 
patterns of long-established colonial links as they are 
reflected in agency-client relations. Indeed, the 
penetration of the American agencies in Africa, in terms 
both of clients and of news-gathering facilities, is so 
low. as to. almost disqualify them from the league of 'world- 
wide' agencies, if indeed there is such a phenomenon. 
What is certain is that Africa is still the 'dark continent' 
in agency terms. While this is almost inevitable given 
the structure of the media industry there, the political 
and communicational constraints, it does imply serious 
consequences for the level of information available to 
the West and to other major world regions about Africa, 
and for the level of international understanding. At a 
time of political fragmentation and change, such under- 
standing becomes ever more vital to political relation- 
ships: in the days of colonialism there was at least 
some regular source of information, albeit prejudiced, 
through the body of colonial administrators. Today of 
course such an elite no longer exists. Commercial 
interests do not have the same obligation to share what- 
ever information they may have. With the result that 
there does not exist a steady source of 'Intelligence 
leakage about Africa to the professional communicators 
and interpreters, yet these have to behave as though they 
know whatever it is necessary-to know. 
What coverage there is of Africa, - even by'Reuters and AFP, 
tends to concentrate either on that part of Africa which 
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is involved in the Middle ' East Arab-Israeli conflict, a 
source of much more direct concern to the pockets and 
passions of Washington ' and. London, or on White Africa. 
It cannot be said'that the agencies provide anything like 
a daily record of events of. most African countries.. -., Some 
get much more consistent treatment'- Kenya or Nigeria for 
example - than others;, but while there may be a regular 
coverage for a temporary period (Uganda under Amin). the 
extent of agency coverage in Africa tends to be controlled 
rather more by. the fads of. western media interest than it 
is elsewhere. To these problems of cultural selectivity 
is added the very real difficulty which the western agencies 
face in establishing reliable news sourees. in those African 
like Ethiopia, Angola, countries in the late. 1970ts, 
Mozambique, which lean strongly towards the communist block. 
(iii) The. Middle East 
The agencies have.. traditionally shown greater interest in 
the Middle East than in Africa. This area was primarily 
Havas and Reuters : territory, until some ; time after World 
-War Two, and the. Ameri.. can, agencies. have made. important 
inroads into the Middle. Eastern market onlyin relatively 
; 'recent years. At the same time the tendency for either 
Reuters or AFP to-dominate any one.. particular... territory 
in'this region has. diminished, " indicating therefore an 
-absolute growth in diversity, of., agency sources. 
After the First World War, Havas had a news monopoly in 
Syria'and the-Lebanon,. territories over. whichFrance'was 
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assigned mandates by the League of Nations. Rates were 
modest, and the service was not cut off if editors did 
not pay: Havas' function there was evidently political 
as well as commercial. In 1941 the territories were 
taken over by British and Free French forces. AFI took 
over Havas facilities; and AFP continued after the Second 
World War in much the same way as Havas had done. It 
serviced most of the 30 dailies in Beirut in the early 
'fifties -a good lead on its major competitor, the Arab 
News Agency; both services sold more cheaply than Reuters 
or UP. Reuters had one client, while UP had six. 
After 1956 Beirut became much more of an international 
press centre, becauseAFP and Reuters were not especially 
welcome in Cairo after Suez, and Beirut. progressively 
became a more convenient communications centre and 
listening post for coverage of Cyprus, the Arab-Israeli 
war, and latterly, oil politics. In 1972 Reuters had 
`37 clients in Beirut for its news-! " about as many as AFP. 
Between the wars, `Iraq, Transjordan, ''Palestine and Egypt 
were under-British mandate or'occupation. No. private 
agencies` operated in Iraq-or Jordan before the Second 
World War. Reuters was the only agency supplying the 
Arab papers of Palestine. ` In Egypt, both Reuters and 
Havas gathered news; but;, Reuters had the leading market 
position in Cairo' and Alexandria; though probably operated 
at a loss. 
After-the Second -World War, Reuters was=distributed 
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throughout , much; of, 
the Middle East by the Arab News Agency. 
,., Th. is. was first established 
during the War, under the control 
of. Hulton Press Organization in London. Most:: of its. 
employees were Arab (many . 
Palestinians). but top management 
was British, It is very unlikely that the agency paid 
-its way,, and-is widely thought to have , been. subsidized 
indirectly by the British government. In some places 
(e. g. Baghdad),.: ANA initially distributed, free of charge. 
: Reuters continued to. gather most of, its own news, at first, 
but tended to rely more and more on ANA over time. ANA 
,:, ,, was r. enamed,. 
the. Regional News Service (RNS) after 1956, 
when two of its. correspondents were arrested in: Egypt on 
spy charges and the word 'Arab'; beganto seem unnecessarily. 
contentious::: 
'In,. the late 'sixties,. Reuters began to reconsider its 
position in-the Middle. East,: prompted by, the Arab-Israeli 
war of . 
1967 and the re-emergence of the region as a major 
source, of_. international news., The -: Reuters, contract with 
RNS was ; not renewed after-1969. This, contract had been 
essential to RNS' survival,.. soihat with, the withdrawal of 
Reuters RNS -forces disbanded,. some of them, to be re- . 
employed by. Reuters in its own expansion of news-gathering 
facilities. 
A' survey of.: market possibilities in ; the Middle East, 
similar-to the African survey a decade,. -earlier, -established 
.: the. existence of a demand for an international news service 
with regionalized material :... This was forerunner to the 
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setting-up of an Arabic service in 1972. The service is 
today (1974) prepared and translated in Beirut, transmitted 
to London, and from there distributed to various client 
centres in the Middle East, as a substantial part of the 
overall daily service. The following year AFP tried to 
do the same by starting anArabic service translated for 
it by the Egyptian news agency MENA. Both Reuters and 
AFPnow maintain between 30 and 40Tfull-time staff in 
Beirut, of whom between a third anda half are editorial. 
The Arab states, especially the oil-producing states, are 
considered a current growth area. ' 'A 'recent study suggests 
that in one powerful Arab country, Reuters is the leading 
international news source. The Saudi Arabian Broadcasting 
organization in Riyadh and Jiddah subscribes to Reuters, 
AP and UPI. Each agency transmits for similar periods 
of'time, virtually all day, but Reuters transmits in 
Arabic for five and a quarter hours. While 609/6 of 
Reuters. material is-used in news operations,. only 40% is 
used from AP and 35%`from UPI; Reuters material', moreover, 
is more heavily regionalized: 
"It has been found that the ratio of international 
news relating to, the Middle East and the Arab 
countries used by those stations is about 30% 
from Reuters, 20% from UPI, 30% from AP and about 
60% of Reuter's product in its Arabic service. »'11 
The American agencies did not. have a visible Middle East 
presence until after the war. By 1953 AP and UPI had 
some 11 clients among the 32 dailies that then existed 
in Cairo and Alexandria= UP had a few sales in other 
Arab' countries, notably to radio stations. The main 
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centre of. operation today is Beirut; where AP has a 
bureau of comparable size to its larger European. bureaux, 
with a full-time staff of 26 . in 1972(15 editorial); 
UPI's bureau is the smallest, with only 4 full-time 
journalists and as many. support staff. In Cairo, AP 
has a total bureau-size of 15; which compares well with 
AFP (19) and Reuters (9). UPI. had a staff of only 5 in 
Cairo in 1972'. 
12 
In staffing terms the American agencies up to'the mid-1970's 
have concentrated their attention on. the Middle East con- 
flict, by placing most of their full-time correspondents 
in Beirut and Cairo, with few elsewhere; while Reuters 
and especially AFP have better representation in some of 
the, other Arab 'capitals. 
In'Israel in. 1973 AP. had the largest agency representation 
with- a full-time journalist-staff of 5, followed by 
Reuters (4), UPI (4) and AFP (3)., This'wasa remarkable 
increase' by comparison -with pre-1967 
days, ' when no agency 
... 
had more than one correspondent covering Israel'andin 
slime cases Israel was. not even. that. man's'. sole responsibility. 
Reuters and AFP bureaux-continued to be headed by bureaux 
chiefs who were Israeli citizens, and who shared strong 
national sentiments. 
With the possible exception-of AFP, the global agencies 
concentrate more manpower in', the Middle East than in 
Africa, and the Middle East is more important as a revenue' 
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centre. It has also been a heavy news-producing area for 
most of the post-war period, and especially since 1967. 
In many, if not most, 'African and Middle Eastern countries 
the agencies distribute through national'news agencies. 
This is true of most of the recently independent Black 
African countries and of the Maghreb. In 
many 
cases, it 
is a matter of obligation; elsewhere a matter of conven- 
ience - there being few clients other than the respective 
national news agencies. 
There are a number of remarkable aspects to the agency 
`story in the Middle East. One is the extremely poor represent- 
ation in Israel before 1967, and the fact that both 
European bureaux were headed by Israelis up to the. time 
of writing, although the ques'tion of the, desirability of 
having nationals at the head of bureaux is, a complicated 
one which is discussed in Chapter 10 at greater length. 
Rather more remarkable is the extraordinary role played. 
by the Regional News Service as a source of news about 
the Arab world, on'which Reuters depended for a. good deal 
of its news supply, and for all of its. news distribution, 
until the late 'sixties. However it should be. no. surprise 
.., that with the economic development of the Arab countries 
and the massive"accumulatiön o f 'oil wealth the views agencies 
are now showing greater interest in this region'. 
(iv)" Asia: The Need. for News 
Asia is an especially. appropriate area for rather, more 
prolonged discussion, both because of the wide variety of 
responses that have occurred there to the phenomenon of 
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'media imperialism', but also in view. of the tremendous 
significance this world region has for the future balance 
of political and economic power. Asia was also the 
location of. a case study analysis conducted by the author 
for this research during . 
the Spring of 1973. 
. 
This section 
looks first of . 
all at the evidence for media dependence 
on the agencies in Asia, and then focuses on the history 
of agency involvement in. India, China and Japan up to 
World War Two, following this with a post-war analysis of 
-these. same countries. It pays special attention to the 
development of. national agencies in. Asia, and how these, 
in different: ways, have affected the. role and importance 
-of. the global agencies 
(for a more general discussion of 
this relationship between national and global agencies, 
see Chapter 8). 
Available evidence, indicates, first, 'that the global 
agencies are. 'extremely important news sources for Asian 
mediasecond, that in-the opinion of many Asian journa- 
lists, these agencies are'nonetoo concerned about specific 
Asian. news. requirements., ' An IPI study of the news flow 
into Asia in 1956 concluded that the world agencies 'are 
by far the most important sources of-Asian news for the 
press in Asian countries, and this. also applies even to 
those few papers that have correspondents in'Asian centres'. 
Many Asian editors complained to IPI that. the world agencies 
reported Asian news from a non-Asian angle. Perhaps this 
helped account for their heavy use'`of what the world agencies 
were good at giving: news of the . west,. 
since in. almost 
all-Asian countries Asian news represented only one-fifth 
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of all foreign news carried by the press. AP produced 
data for IPI which indicated that during the period of 
study a fifth of AP's Asian report consisted of Asian. 
news, two thirds of which actually originated in Asia (but 
cf. Chapter 12 for further comments on news 'regionalization'). 
Despite some impvvements in the provision of regional 
copy by global agencies, remarked on in a UNESCO conference 
in 1960, it was the opinion of one senior executive of a. 
national agency (Indonesian ANTARA) that the world agencies 
'still fail to give. the gist of Asian developments in their 
reporting of eventst. 
14 His sentiment was supported by 
the then managing director of Japan'sKYODO agency, who 
affirmed that 'the world agencies are by far the most 
important sources of Asian news for the Asian press and 
the world press'. However, 
"Although the world agencies practically never 
miss any news, development it: may be pointed 
out that in their reporting from Asia they 
often overlook, at the first stage, the back- 
ground or perspective of news and the possible. 
continuity of developments. Such shortcomings 
are not to be found'in their treatment of news 
from, say, Europe. n15. 
The continued criticism. of the global agencies on such 
grounds was still very much in evidence in New Delhi, 
1976, when the conference of 56 non-aligned nations. 
passed a, resolution supporting the establishment of a 
Third World news pool (news exchange agreement) in an 
effort to reduce dependency on the global. agencies. 
Why should the global agencies worry. about Asia?. Taken 
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as a whole, the Asian market is not especially important to 
them. In the mid-fifties the region accounted for only 
3-4% of UPI's total revenue, , '3% . of: 
AP's and 10% of Reuters, 
according to informantsquoted. by, IPI. in. its 1956 study. 
There is no reason to think these proportions have changed 
dramatically since then. "In 1972, Reuters'derived 11% 
of its revenue from_theAsian market.. Since Reuters' 
dependence on overseas revenue is greater than for other 
agencies, and since-it includes the economic services for 
non-media clients, the proportion is certainly much greater 
than. for the American agencies.., (AP', s economic service, 
AP-Dow Jones was. not as, well established as ReutersRES 
in 1972 in Asia as a whole). 
At the'same'time western interest in Asia is limited, and 
this influences media coverage for the'western market. 
Hohenbei g's'1967 study of American newsmen in Asia, found 
that nearly all'found it difficult to 'sell' anything to 
their editors other than, politics='Vietnam and Red China. 
In his period" of study', ' the New York Times gave 4.2 
columns to Asian-affairs ' out of total of 18.27 columns 
given over 'entirely'to radio and cabled foreign news on 
the average day. This was the highest volume of Asian 
in U. S'news a ers that were examined. 
16 
news-found Pp 
Asian. media nevertheless have. a substantial appetite for 
western Hohenberstern and foreign news.. g reported that 
leading'Tokyo papers devoted a greater proportion of 
their space to foreign . 
news than the New York Times. 
U. S. and European news was prominent. Garver (1962) 
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found that Seoul papers devoted an average of 32% of their 
news space to world news; Sunwoo Nam (1970) who studied 
41 Korean dailies, showed foreign news accounted for 239/6 
of total newsprint space, excluding comment or articles, 
most of which came from the western agencies. A study 
of Pakistani dailies in 1956 found that 15% of total 
newsprint space went to foreign news. Snider's study 
of the Afghan national agency (1968) showed that of the 
stories transmitted by it, more than half had to do with 
foreign relations. 
17 
Bombay to Yokohama: Up to World War II 
Asian media have long based their day-to-day view. of 
world events on the output of western-based agencies 
which had little or no incentive to adopt Asian. 
perspectives. These agencies were concerned in-the 
first place to feed news-demands of clients in, the United 
States and Western Europe; and second, to feed the news- 
demands of colonial authorities,. local business elites 
and 'modern' Asians who wanted news of the United States 
and Western Europe. The agencies. had no real interest 
or understanding of the needs of Asian . nationalists,. or 
of those Asian religious. communities who'supported the 
first truly indigenous, vernacular publications. 
The study of global agency activity in. Asia reveals a 
general pattern of local media dependence, but this 
dependence has gradually spread in the course of. a century 
or more from single. dependency to-dependency on more than 
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one outside agency. The process. is more marked in some 
regions than in others. Principal factor behind it is 
that of competition between the agencies, fostered by the 
" diplomatic anxiety of each agency's home government, and 
also by the rise of nationalist movements. 
In keeping with British imperial interests, Reuters 
established a major presence in Asia not very long after 
its own inception, 'but this was before the era of great 
cable expansion. By 1872, Storey tells us that from 
Bombay to'Yokohama Reuters was becoming another British 
institution in the East. 
18 In the very earliest exchange 
agreements between the European agencies Asia, like North 
America and Africa, had not figured at all: these terri- 
tories were'considered inaccessible to the agencies and. 
no communication. line went beyond the extreme East of the 
Mediterranean. But all this had'changed by the 1870 
treaty, which recognised most of Asia as belonging. to. 
Reuters for market purposes. 
The majorcable_routes to and from the Far East were de- 
veloped-before 1872, and by British cable companies. 
Reuters and Havas agreed that the marketsof Australia, 
the East Indies and the Far East. generally, with the 
exception only of Indochina, wouldbe reserved for 
Reuters. Because British communications dominated, Havas 
was even disadvantaged in the one market it was allowed: 
Indochina. The first Havas correspondent in Saigon 
arrived in 1883, and in the same year a correspondent was 
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recruited for Tonkin. But there was no cable linking 
Haiphong, Hue and Saigon, and the cost of communications 
from Hanoi back to Paris was 9. Fr. 50 a word. Communi- 
cations between Tonkin and Hong Kong were better than 
between Tonkin and Saigon, but Hong Kong was British and 
it cost Havas twice as much to report news from this part 
of the world than it did Reuters. In practice, Havas 
depended for most of its news of China and Japan on Reuters. 
Reuters' leading position. in the Far East at this time 
reflected the state of international commercial relations. 
Frederix points out that of 3000 strangers who obtained 
passports to travel to interior Japan in 1858, for instance, 
the English accounted for about 1200, Americans for about 
1000 and the French for only around 360. 
In the Far East, Reuters' advantage in communication was 
longer-lasting than across the Atlantic. Communications 
between North America and the Far East remained very 
expensive for a long time to come. In 1936 for example, 
when the cost of communication from New York to'Europe 
was just 5 cents a word, the cost from San Francisco to 
Shanghai was as high as 25 cents and to Manila 6-12 cents. 
At the urgent rate, a message from Tokyo to San Francisco 
cost $2.16 a word! The American agencies grew. accustomed 
to receiving most of their Asian news via London. 
India was the first major target for Reuters' Asian expansion. 
The Bombay Times received Reuters news by mail for the 
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first time in 1860,, but it was not until,, 1878 that Reuters 
established a bureau., there .:, This bureau's principal 
function, was to supply, market. quotations,; to commercial 
houses and merchants. Thus, in India Reuter followed the 
pattern of development.. as in Britain. and. many places else- 
where. A littlewhile. later, on. the back of this financial 
security, the service., broadened out into, a regular supply 
of., foreign news summaries for Indian newspapers. The 
summaries, were brief , -. 
typically.. they would occupy a mere 
half column on the- front . page. - 
but ; not as, brief as the 
supply of telegrammed Indian news, which 
would. typically 
occupy 
. only . one , eighth 
of a column.,,,,.; The small amount of 
.. 
Indian news reflected. the. initial absence of an internal 
news agency. 
The first major domestic . Indian agency was formed in-1910 




dispute;. within. APIled its founder, K. C. Roy, to establish 
the News Bureau in competition with API. A third comp- 
etitorwas the, Indian News Agency. _,. This competitive 
., _., situation 
was not considered politically satisfactory by 
the Colonial, Government, which invited. Reuters. to manage 
all. of them. ' Reuters, consequently formed the Eastern. 
News Agency, under the credit-line of API, and this was 
directed by K. G. Roy'ýtill 1931. 
Attempts, -to counter., 
the Reuter monopoly were , not very 
successful.., An ex-Reuters employee, _S.; _Sadanand, 
established the Free, Press of_India. in. 1925. This was 
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a clearing house for news of nationalist movements from 
all parts of India and Burma. Through exchange arrange- 
ments with Reuters' smaller London competitors, the Free 
Press obtained'a supply of world news fivm 1932. But the 
following year the Government ` closed. the agency and 
sequestrated its securities in retaliation for what it 
considered to be 'seditious reporting' and alleged lack 
of press support. The Calcutta editor'of Free Press then 
set up a different, agency which he called-'United Press of 
India, which employed most of those who had previously 
been with the Free Press., The major weaknesses of United 
Press of India'were that for many years itýcould not match 
API in providing teleprinter transmission to provincial 
towns, andihat it did not have an agreement with a foreign 
news agency for its supply'of foreign news. Of course 
it was poor, and tended to be Calcutta-based. ' But it did 
survive as a smaller, alternative and more indigenous 
agency till well into the post-World War Two era. 
Despite the competition from'United Press of India there- 
fore, the API-Reuters remained the most powerful of news 
providers until after the War. Neither AP nor UP could 
make any headway here before'then. The importance of the 
imperial connection was such that even the major alternat- 
ive agency up to 1933, the Free 'Press, had'looked to 
smaller London rather than American agencies for its 
foreign news. Elsewhere in the East the threat to the 
British agency of nationalist feeling and competition was 
clearly evident before the War. China and Japan are 
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In 1925 there were-358 daily newspapers in China and 
this number had risen to 910 by1935, in addition to some 
200 or 300 so-called 'mosquito' papers which specialized 
in sex and crime. 
20 
Many of the dailies were small, their 
existence"transitory. Advertising revenue, was slim, 
communications-were poor, and a cumbersome alphabet created 
havoc with production. ' But China was an open market and 
an exotic' dateline, which the American` agencies, UP 
especially, could not afford'to ignore for long. They 
began to -make their presence felt in the late 1920's. 
Yet'Reuters remained very powerful because it had long 
cultivated a market for its economic services among 
business communities. 
"The. . most distinctive growth in the representation 
of papers and press associations-of the Unites- 
States in 'China, dates from the civil 'unrest- there 
in 1927-1928., American journalistic interest 
was led by the AP, was-carrie'd on by certain 
newspapers and by other press associations, 
with the UP especially active, until now the. 
North American journalistic position in the-Far 
East is as -strong, and perhaps stronger than 
the British, ' although the dependence of the. 
East upon Reuters for' commercial-figures is an 
important item in `'any such °assessment". ir2l 
In the years immediately following the First World War, 
AP continued to depend for most of its Far Eastern news 
on the Reuters service. This began to change when the 
American. Government was persuaded of the undesirability 
of such a state` of affairs. U. S. Navy radio was. opened 
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up for press dispatches as far as Manila and Honolulu, 
after which users had to pay for cable transmission 
and the U. S. Government established a news service for 
China tocounteract Japanese propaganda there. ý AP 
developed its own news-reporting strength from a bureau 
in Shanghai. 
UP penetrated China in. 1925 with the sale, of,, a-brief ý report 
to Peking newspapers. In that year the American agency 
had negotiated an, agreement with RCA fora reduction of 
Pacific wireless rates to Japan. andto China by over 50% 
(from 27 cents to 10 cents a word to Japan).: Cable rates 
also came down from 35 cents to 20, cents a word for China. 
The Japanese Government refused to reciprocate on this, 
but there was no problem with China. Later UP extended 
its report to Shanghai, Hankow and Tientsin, but in the 
late 'twenties it would still . 
be t, sever, al. years before 
important progress would be made in opposition to the 
powerful Reuters agency', according-to Morris. 
22 
The 
structure, of. news-gathering was, a shaky affair for the 
young. agency: - 
"In many, instances American missionaries served 
as stringers - and often very good; ones too - 
but there were, alsoyouung'businessmen and even 
a, few American newspapermen in cities like 
Hankow who covered for"the' UP. "23 
Dependence on stringers was all the greater the more 
remote was the location of news. 
In addition an important duty of' correspondents 
-in the Far East was to make friends with. American 
naval and State Department officers in remote 
stations, in the hope, often justified, that they 
would tip off the Shanghai or Peking bureau when 
important news broke. "24- 
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The increased presence of American media representatives 
and news. services may have contributed to a trend observed 
by Vernon Nash in. 1931 towards an Americanization of 
Chinese newspaper style. 
"The most marked tendency of the last eighteen 
months has been a steady swing . 
towards. American 
types of affirmative headlines, and away from 
the British style of labelling stories. The 
Chinese written language with its ideographs, 
especially in the literary style, is very 
stenographic in character and therefore 
particularly well adapted to the writing of 
good headlines. t125 
But the market could. not adequately support the large 
volume of international news which was now directed to it- 
often to serve propaganda rather than commercial objectives. 
The consumption of foreign news by the Chinese newspapers 
of the time was not considerable. A study of seven 
-leading Chinese papers in the 'thirties. found that on 
average they devoted only 10% of their relatively small 
news-space' to foreign news, although this increased to 
17%-when news of sino-foreign relations was included. 
26 
At the same'time the global agencies could not satisfy all 
market requirements, nor did their supply, of Chinese news 
overseas commend itself to all observers. This was partly, 
because most Chinese' newspapers were`based-in the coastal 
regions, and had fairly limited resources, and because 
there was no nation-wide news agency for vernacular papers. 
ice the quality of service of the global agencies tended 
to reflect the quality of local press coverage, the trans- 
mission of. Chinese news overseas was probably limited in 
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a similar way: 
"The leading Chinese 
the services of the 
and other 'foreign' 
their coverage in C 
especially from the 
papers buy and translate 
United Press, Reuter's 
press associations but 
hina is far from satisfactory, 
Chinese point of view. "'27 
There were a great many small internal agencies, 120 
according to one Editor and Publisher. figure from the 
early 'thirties, but most of these were probably public 
relations organizations rather than-news agencies in the 
European sense. Much of the domestic political 'news' 
in Chinese papers was publicity copy issued by 'politico- 
militarist' organizations-. - Nash mentions the Chung Yang 
and its English-language sister Kuo Min agencies as 
'propaganda organs of the National Government'. 
29 He 
regarded another agency, the Kuo, Wen,. as, the nearest to 
an American idea of, an agency. _This was 
owned by Ta 
Kung Pao, a leading vernacular . 
daily of North China based 
in Tientsin. None of these was truly nation-wide. The 
agency which was to become of very great importance later, 
Central News Agency (CNA) was established as early as 1924, 
but did not become prominent. until the early 'thirties.. 
This was subsidized by the government and 'faithfully 
imitates the propaganda methods about which all Chinese, 
government officials included, complain so. bitterly in the 
conduct of the foreign news agencies operating in this 
30 " country. ' 
The need for a 
. 
better supply. of Chinese news, and the lack 
of adequate market support for all the global agencies 
then operating, helped promote the development of a strong 
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national agency.,. This would`containýcompetition between 
the globals, assurethem some profit, and. improve domestic 
news supply. . 
In addition. to the leading global-agencies 
-. especially UnitedPress; and. Reuters - there were several 
smaller. -- international-agencies' whose, objectives were prim- 
arilyýpropagandistic,, and'these, sold at littleor no cost. 
They. included the Japanese : agency Rengo, the German Trans- 
Ocean, the Russian TASS. ''After 1933., "Havas. also appeared 
on: the -stage.,, - 
In 1927 following the exposure of a link 
between: CNA and-the German, agency Trans-Ocean", 1, French 
diplomatic pressure. favoured a stronger; Havas,: presence in 
'the East. The growth of CNA possibly helped the leading 
agencies 'financially' - it was .a secure client at a, 
time 
of savage price-cutting: competition and-, when the'number 
of newspapers was declining as 'a result of the war with 
Japan. 
CNA's first pact with an`international. agency, was°with. 
Reuters'in,. 1932. Reuters. was evidently: happy. to' have 
CNA: worry about distribution'`. to , the ; 
newspapers, while 
it retained the: 'lucrative; commercial market., The 
following'year Nash recörded the, installation by=Reuters 
of teletype machiiies'in several, banks and'other business 
offices, in Shanghai-, to''facilitate the rapid transmission 
' of one'of. its specialities, commercial and financial news 
31 
Further pacts were signed byCNAýwith Havas in 1933, 
Trans-ocean in 1936, and UP, in -1938. ý INS also wanted to 
deal,: with: CNA, but: 'the, plan was blocked : 
by UP which claimed 
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the exclusive right as American agency-to exchange news 
with a Chinese agency. AP had only a news-gathering 
presence in China before the War. Reuters was therefore 
first to do business with the agency of the nationalist 
government, and the American agency UP held out until 
last. But despite the-alliance they both appear to 
have done their own translation, and resorted'to employing 
an increasing number of Chinese journalists. (In Nanking 
and Canton Reuters' bureau managers were Chinese. ) This 
may have been to minimize distortions-by CNA", or a way of 
subsidizing an allied agency. 
CNA's pacts were exclusive'- theagencies: could not 
distribute independently. By: the: late 'thirties one 
observer claimed that more than 95% of the news in any 
Chinese paper was derived from the wireless service of CNA 
:2 
The reason for this was that the fighting with Japan had 
destroyed a greatnumberýof papers, and left many behind 
Japanese lines, so that under such-conditions the official 
agency of the military nationalist government was best 
suited'to news-gathering. In--1939, CNA had 9 divisional 
offices, -20 news bureaux, -, a powerful radio station and a 
staff of able journalists, including many university 
graduates from the U. S. That year it followed Chiang 
Kai-shek to his emergency mountain headquarters of Chung- 
king in the south-west, serving a greatly diminished 
clientele. " Before. the Japanese invasion:. there had been 
Two-thirds of these had been 1,014 Chinese newspapers. 
based-in' Nanking, Hankow, Peiping, 
. 
Tientsin and most of 
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these no longer operated. 
CNA could afford hardly any foreign news-gathering of its, 
own, although it did send 
.a 
correspondent to Geneva in 
1933" Its dependence on the foreign agencies was there- 
fore almost total, Nafziger claimed that the 'Chinese 
reading public is not satisfied with the service from 
foreign sources', but. did not elaborate. 
33 
When Chinese forces withdrew from Shanghai in 1940, the 
international agencies now served the local vernaculars 
independently from CNA for as long as they could. Reuters 
had a bureau in Shanghai. which put-out a separate service. 
The Shanghai office of Havas received its news from the 
French Indochina possession of. Annan, which it translated 
into Chinese and relayed by wireless to Chungking in 
Chinese code. UP had reserved the right to distribute 
an English service in Shanghai. 
(UP's office in Shanghai 
incidentally was with the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, 
with which it had a special relationship. It's editor, 
Randall Gould, had once been head of UP's Far Eastern 
branch. The paper, considered to be the 'most progressive 
and liberal daily in Shanghai', second only to the British 
North China Daily News, was founded by United States resi- 
dents in Shanghai in 1928. ) 'Before the Tapanese'invasion, 
Shanghai had: been the main communications centre for western 
newsmen, and 60% of telegraphic communication between China 
and other countries went via the Chinese Government Radio 
Administration, situated in Shanghai, (the rest was handled 
by British, Danish and American companies), but after the 
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invasion this was moved to the interior. Despite the chaos 
in China throughout the 1940's, the western agencies were 
able to maintain a sizable: presence and were pushed back 
only with the Communist advance. CNA moved with Chiang 
Kai-shek to Taiwan since when it has maintained a powerful 
overseas network of correspondents and clients, especially 
among the expatriate Chinese communities of South East 
Asia. 
Japan: Asian Prize 
Developments in-Japan followed a similar path: initial 
control of the foreign news supply by a single global 
agency, followed by an opening up of the market'by the 
American agencies, and then regression as one national 
agency bought up the exclusive rights of distribution 
within its territory. As in"China it was Reuters which 
lost the most ground in newspaper' markets because it had 
the most to lose. But it is clear that for many nation- 
alists of the Third World, Asia in particular, the greater 
diversity of sources represented by the expansion of the 
American agencies even before the Second World War did 
not overcome the division of interests perceived between 
west and east. 
The leading national agency in Japan before World WarI 
was Kokusai, founded in 1914, and linked to the European 
cartel through Reuters, whose service it distributed 
exclusively. In 1926 Kokusai became a co-operative of 
national newspapers and changed its name to Rengo, and in. 
the same year Reuters bowed to the inevitable by allowing 
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AP, 'at that time still a member"of the' cartel, to enter 
into a. separate exchange arrang6me 
its first major confrontation. with Reuters had already 
entered into. discussion with Kokusai. ' Japan was of even 
more importance to AP and to the American Government than 
China; it was concern for the American image in Japan in 
particular, and the quality of news coming from Japan 
which led the Government to open up Navy traffic to press 
users. Kokusai was eager to establish relations with AP: 
it was frustrated by Reuters' hold, and sought to-break 
from it by turning into a co-operative styled on the AP 
pattern. The real inspiration came from Japanese 
businessmen who saw no future in the British connection. 
An alternative agency emerged around the same time, Dempo 
Tsushin, which subscribed to UP. From 1931, Rengo was 
also supplied by Havas, following agreement on mutual 
concessions between. Havas and Reuters. In 1936 the two 
major agencies,. Rengo'and Dempo Tsushin, merged' together 
to form Domei, the leading official Japanese ; agency . until 
the country's defeat at the. end, of the Second World War. 
Domei subscribed to all the leading agencies, including 
AP and UP. Reuters' position was therefore more quickly 
and-more effectively challenged. in Japan. than. in-China. 
"At Domei'. s very door are laid, down subsidized 
telegraphic services. which in; volumeand; cheap- 
ness far surpass. anything that Reuters, pursuing 
-its course. as an ordinary , 
trading:, concern,; can 
hope to place at. Domeit. s. disposal. The services 
are abundant in : 'scope and-on the whole . not badly 
compiled and edited. Their. price to the Japanese 
press being a fraction of an equivalent British 
service, it is hardly surprising . that they. find 
a ready market and a measure of publicity that 
is gravely prejudicial. to British interests,.. 
and that makes the British- presentation<of world 
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news more and more difficult and less and less 
conspicuous and effective. Amongst the forces 
contributing to this displacement of British 
news must be'included the services originating 
in the United States. Cheap transmission 
rates across the Pacific, and a readiness on 
the part of the controllers of these services 
to considerations of policy, place the American 
services in a category second only to the 
subsidized foreign services as. destroyers of the 
market for British news. 1134 
Domei grew to be one of. the leading national agencies of 
the world, rivalling Germany's DNB. Like DNB it was a 
government agency. In 1937 it had bureaux in Hong Kong, 
Geneva, Rome, Vienna, Warsaw, New York, Washington, London, 
Paris, Berlin and Moscow. A few years later in 1942 it 
had three zonal bureaux and 28 branch offices in the Far 
East alone, and in China during the Japanese invasion it 
maintained 500 correspondents. Its New York bureau was 
especially. important: it was housed in the AP building 
where it received AP, UP, Dow Jones,. and Reuters Commercial 
Services. This was in operation right up to the declar- 
ation of war between Japan and the United States. 
European news to Tokyo went via Domei's New York office. 
At the beginning of. the European war, but before Pearl 
Harbour, there was a heavy representation of Domei news- 
men on European war fronts. Because the Allied European 
censors were particularly lenient in dealing with the 
flow of news to North America - as part of a policy to 
persuade the United States to join the war - Domei 
correspondents also benefitted, and through them perhaps, 
the Axis powers. 
In the first weeks of-the-American occupation after the 
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war, Japanese reporters. actually experienced fewer 
restrictions than their western counterparts who laboured 
under military censorship. In this atmosphere of 
comparative freedom,;. Domei, which had been described by 
an American reporter as 'one of the main pillars of a 
totalitarianJapant, 
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continued in operation until it 
. fell 
foul of American reaction. to some allegedly false 
scandal reports about occupation troops which appeared 
on its wires. On, 15th September, 1945, General MacArthur 
ordered Domei to be suspended, allowing it to-continue-a 
little while later under strict censorship. On the 24th 
of that month,,. the Japanese Government was then ordered 
to eliminate its : control over the press, and, -no prefer- 
ential-treatment was permitted Domei.. In reaction, 
Domeies Board of Directors voted the . agency's 
dissolution, 
which was effective from.,, Octob, er 31st, 1945.36 
1945 Onwards: Post-War Japanese Independence in News Supply 
Two new agencies emerged to replace Domei: "Kyodo and 
Jiji. Kyodo was co-operatively owned by the Japanese 
^daily press,. and Jiji was 'a private company. This. pattern 
was inspired and encouraged by the American occupiers who 
thought Japan would benefit from a, competitiye situation 
similar to the one in-the United States, where the 
-leading agencies were also a co-operative and a private 
company. In practice . it. worked out rather differently. 
`Jiji began to'specialize'in economic news; Kyodo in 
general news. This. was a-partial return to an earlier 
pre-1936 pattern, when Dempo-Tsushin tended to specialize 
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in economics, while Rengo was major source for general 
news. 
Japan is the single most important market within the 
Asian region for all the major agencies. Reuters 
employed a Tokyo staff of 35 in 1973, ' of whom'11 to 14 
were journalists. All but two of these were bi-lingual 
Japanese. The Tokyo bureau was the sixth largest in the 
agency's network, beaten only by New York, Washington, 
Paris, Beirut and Singapore. AP at the same time had a 
staff of 16 journalists and 54 support staff, putting 
this bureau third place amongst the agency's overseas 
bureaux, behind London and Paris. UPI's bureau had 10 
journalists, the fourth or fifth most important UPI 
bureau in the world. AFP placed, rather less importance 
on this centre, which with. eight journalists-ranked only 
ninth among the overseas AFP bureaux. 
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Major clients for Reuters in Japan are Kyodo, which 
takes the general news service, and Jiji which subscribes 
to the economic services. Asahi Shimbun subscribes 
directly to Reuters and likewise the English-language 
Japanese Times, and the economic journal Nihon Keizei. 
Television-terminal economic news services are made 
available through joint operations with other companies, 
including Nikie Hihs Keizei (NHK). Jiji-press has a 
right to RES teleprinter services in Japan from 1972; 
and Quotation Information Centre, partly owned by Reuters 
in any case, has a right to certain of the RES computerised 
services. 
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Tokyo stories are filed by Reuters both to London and'to 
regional centre in Singapore. Other countries the Asian 
in the region file only to Singapore, but the dual filing 
system for Tokyo is tö ensure that certain important and 
mainly commercial clients in London, receive all Tokyo news 
instantly, without editorial intervention by Singapore. 
The file that goes to Singapore is incorporated in the 
regional service prepared there for South East Asian clients. 
The -Singapore bureau also transmits the regional service, 
in a specifically tailored form to Japan. The news 
services flowing into Tokyo from Reuters are actually 
rather shorter than most. This 
is to facilitate trans- 
lation into Japanese by the Japanese clients, but also 
because, these clients are so well provided with news from 
their 
_ .,.... . 
own and other sources, they explicitly require less 
wordage. The Reuters wires to Tokyo are rather less 
regionalized than 
others, since the leading Japanese media 
have 
... ... . 
very extensive representation in Asia, and Kyodo 
exchanges news with. all the agencies in the region. 
Tokyo was a regional centre of operations for UPI until 
1968, but increasing communication costs from Japan (which 
does not observe ITU rate recommendations and sometimes 
charges almost three times as much as the PTT's of other 
countries for comparative communications), 'and the rising 
cost of living in Tokyo, inspired a move to Manila. 
Manila proved less convenient as a'centre than was hoped, 
and the move there was followed by a further move of 
regional centre to Hong Kong in 1971. Hong Kong had the 
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advantage of good communications; it was a thriving 
business centre with a reasonable local market for agency 
services to offset costs; and it was also close -to 
Saigon, one of the most important overseas news-producing 
centres from the mid-sixties to the end of direct American 
involvement in 1973. 
UPI sells its service to the general news agency,, Kyodo, 
and directly to Mainichi and the broadcast organization 
NHK. " Because Kyodo sells only to provincial papers in 
Japan, agreements with Kyodo cannot prohibit direct sales 
to the Tokyo giants. Since 1963 UPI has developed a 
special local economic service for Tokyo papers, banks 
and business firms. The sale of Mainichi is on a limited 
exclusivity basis, or in other words prevents UPI from 
selling to other Tokyo newspapers; this is the result of 
private negotiation. The third largest Japanese paper, 
Yomiuri, used to take INS, but at the time of the INS-UP 
merger AP managedto persuade Yomiuri to switch agencies. 
It was able to do this because UP was bound, by the ex- 
clusivity arrangement with Mainichi. 
AP sells to Kyodo, and to two of the three Tokyo giants: 
Asahi and Yomiuri. This makes it the strongest foreign 
agency in the Japanese newspaper markets. Yet AP's 
service for Tokyo is not specially tailored for the market 
in regional-interest terms. AP's service to Asia passes 
through Japan, and it is possible for the Tokyo bureau to 
add to the wire stories from Japan of specifically regional 
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importance. Other, bureaux in the region with stories of 
special interest to Japan cantelex them dir. ect'to the 
Tokyo bureau, but this happens only occasionally. 
Japan is the major overseas success story for AP's economic 
arm, AP-Dow Jones. Unlike RES which concentrates on non- 
media clients, AP-Dow Jones' wire., to Asia is its newspaper 
wire (in Europe it has two wires, one designed for media, 
the other for private business, clients). Kyodo uses 
AP-DJ heavily. In. 1971 AP-DJ had as many London credits 
in the Kyodo news service as Reuters and AP put together, 
and also outdid both AP and Reuters in credits from 
Washington. AP-DJ accounted for 85% of all agency credits 
on Kyodo wire stories from Frankfurt, it. equalled Reuters 
on Geneva stories and equalled Reuters and AP combined 
on Zurich stories. 
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Kyodo is primarily 
.a 
general news service. As it has a 
wide network of its correspondents abroad it is less and 
less. dependent on the global agencies for general inter- 
national news, although it subscribes to all of them. 
It makes no special provision however for financial news. 
Of the two possible sources, RES and AP-DJ, the latter is 
preferred by media in Japan because it is a media-orientated 
service and not"a company-oriented service like RES. The 
general news service of Reuters does not provide as much 
detailed economic news as AP-DJ. Although AP-DJ sells 
to Kyodo and is its. most important global source of. 
economic and financial news, Reuters Economic Services are 
*cf., note 3, p., 957 
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also strong in the Japanese media market since they sell 
to Jiji, the second national agency. Jiji has a large 
private non-media clientele. 
AFP is less evident in Japan than the other three western 
global agencies. In the United States, England and Japan, 
therefore, AFP is in a weak position in comparison with 
the other agencies. This is partly the cause of its 
fourth place in the global hierarchy and partly the result. 
It sells to Jiji (both French and Japanese language rights), 
to Kyodo (Japanese rights only) and directly to NHK. 
Until Hong Kong was established as AFP's regional commun- 
ications centre in 1973, AFP's file out of Tokyo was trans- 
mitted by satellite directly to Paris, whereas now it goes 
to Hong Kong and is put together'there with Parisien 
material and material from the region for regional distrib- 
ution, Japan included. This service is reported to be 
approximately 20% regionalized. 
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The importance of the Japanese market in Asia certainly 
seems to threaten the balance of the global agencies' 
interests in that part of the world. Tokyo consumes 
much of total agency commitments in Asia, and is a 
leader in datelines. On the other hand certain factors 
appear to arrest the imbalance. One of. these is the 
location of regional headquarters in centres other than 
Japan: Singapore 'and Hong Kong. Second, there may be 
a limit to 'the development'of the media market in Japan. 
Japanese newspaper circulations increase now not so much 
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by gaining new readers, but by gaining new members of 
subscribing families and in any case, are close to 
saturation point. There are not many new publications, 
and the economic mightof. the. great Tokyo dailies is no 
longer quite as awesome as it once was.. The, limitation 
of language imposes severe, restrictions on further diversity 
of distribution since none of the agencies translates into 
Japanese, on its. own account. Third, given that the 
,., 
Japanese media have on tap nearly all possible sources of 
foreignnews. and. very, extensive resources'of their own, 
the western global agencies may: have less scope, for rate 
, 
increases in future, and may find-that Japanese_, media 
will be prepared to drop certain services. at times of 
economic recessi, on., Kyodo has 37 full-time, overseas 
correspondents, about the same number maintained by the 
New York Times, and inthe early 'seventies this number 
was increasing at a rate of two or: three a year. Eleven 
correspondents are; posted in North 
America. and in Western 
Europe. ' Most of, the rest are based in Asia. . 
There is 
, only: one 
correspondent however for Africa, onefor South 
America and one for the Indian sub-continent. ., Kyodo 
simply, reflects the imbalances' also common', to, the western 
., global. agencies. - 
During_ the 1_fifLLes,, Kyodo', s overseas 
coverage, resembled that of.,. other national agencies, focusing 
particularly on affairs. that were of, _special. 
Japanese interest. 
The tendency changed in the 'sixties, and now Kyodo looks 
at. world events-from. a general--international perspective, 
even though it writes these up,, in a, fashion which exploits 
any relevant Japanese interests. The difference means in 
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practice that Kyodo is more independent of the western 
agencies than it used to be. 
In 1973 informed sources estimated that 50% of the Kyodo 
news report derived from its foreign correspondents, and 
that a similar' percentage of foreign news'in all Japanese 
newspapers derived from Japanese press correspondents. 
Of course, all media tend to make as much use as they can 
-news-gathering resources, where they of their own foreign 
can afford any at all. More alarming from the global 
agencies' view-point is this: that of incoming-inter- 
national agency material, according to Kyodo HQ executives, 
only one half of one=percent is actually used, despite 
efforts taken by the global agencies to'reducethe. volume 
of their wires for Japanese consumption. Kyodo does not 
undertake exact translations of the gestern agencies, but 
it extracts summarized and . precise reports of 
what the 
agencies say. The Japanese press as a whole'appears to 
be using less foreign agency material. One well-informed 
Asahi source claimed that his papers use-of foreign 
agency copy over the five year period ending1973 had 
gone down by half. This was partly accounted for by a 
trend towards greater emphasis in Asahion`backgrounders 
and 'wrap-ups',. ' "Asähi had 25 full-time, correspondents 
abroad in 1971; . 
the total ` numberof full-time Japanese 
correspondents abroad rose from 150 in 1965 to 250 in 
1971. Total Japanese press representatives abroad in 
'1972 was 330. This reduction`in the use of'foreign 
agency material occurred during aperiod of increase in 
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the average number;, of-pages of Japanese newspapers, which 
grew in the: late 'sixties in response-to increased advert- 
rising.,. Average size rose from 20 to 24 pages in 1969-70. 
An internal Reuters' survey. illustrated the impact. of these 
same trends over a, period'of three 
months 
in 1973.40 
Kyodo relied on-its own: correspondents for: 4091o of its 
total. foreign news, and this represented. an increase of. 
`33% over. -the previous year. At the same, time, Reuters' 
share of the total: foreign news usage dropped'from 20% 
to 17%. This was still ahead of the other agencies: 
AP -14%; =UPI 12%; ' AP-DJ 
8%; and 10% for all the others. 
": Of the 
600,000 words that, pour daily into Kyodo's Tokyo 
Headquarters: from some 30, national and global; agencies, 
Kyodo: 'now. used -only 1,000,. or, about half of, 
what it used 
ten years previously. But this does not take into account 
the use to which-full-time Kyodo correspondents may put 
foreign agency material abroad. - For instance,,. in Washington 
the domestic-service of an American agency is. invaluable 
for Kyodo correspondents there, even though the stories 
which Kyodo eventually uses will largely be those of its 
correspondents and not the agencies. In fact, foreign 
agencies may be more important at-the initial stage of 
the news-flow than in the final Kyodo, outpu: t, as Japanese 
correspondents tend to act in concert, use very similar 
contacts and prefer print rather than personal sources 
(because of language difficulties). Most of Kyodo's 
foreign news comes from those parts of the world where 
the global . agencies are most active: 
55% from. the 
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United States and Western Europe in 1971 and 1972. 
There was a preference for AP as agency source from the 
United States, and for Reuters from Western Europe. 
The present indications are that Kyodo does not. intend to 
try and become a global agency. This was confirmed by 
senior executives in interview in 1973. The world 
region which Kyodo is perhaps most competent. to.. cover, 
the rest of Asia, is not a lucrative nor a, reliable 
market, and there is considerable distrust of Japanese- 
activity there by local nationals. Furthermore,. language 
difficulties would greatly ; inhibit competitive; coverage 
by Kyodo from the United States and Western Europe. But 
in Japan the indications are that newspapers will increas- 
ingly prefer to take their foreign news: from, Kyodo and 
not' direct from the global agencies. 
India: Controlled Market 
The alternative to. dependence on the global agencies for 
supply of international news is either independence or 
controlled dependence. Japan is an example of independ- 
ence, achieved on the basis of one of the strongest media 
markets in the world and a national agency with consider- 
able news-gathering facilities abroad (and a turnover 
comparable with Reuters). Much the same is true of 
China,, although commercial terminology is, inappropriate 
for that situation. India's solution is one of the 
most common: continuation. of dependence on the global 
agencies, but through the filter of a national news agency. 
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Global agencies in other words are obliged to distribute 
through the. national agency, whether. they want to or not. 
The country cannot collect its own news on a comparable 
scale, but it can at least exercise editorial ' discretion 
over what is received before it is relayed on to individual 
media. Countries which adopt this solution differ accord- 
ing to the precise nature of the control that is exercised 
over the incoming news flow, and this is often reflected 
in the character of relationship between the national 
agency and the government. 
Reuters continued to be the leading agency in India in' 
the immediate post-war period. In'1948'it established. 
a special relationship with the new nationalist agency 
and successor to API, the Co-operative ' PressTrust'of India 
(PTI), which was brought into the commonwealth ownership 
structure instituted at the end of the War. ' PTI was 
assigned a zone of news coverage from Cairo to Singapore 
for which it was responsible, in return for the continued 
provision of the world news service. A similar 'relation- 
ship had been established between Reuters and Australian 
Associated Press (AAP) for coverage ofSouth East Asia. 
Under this arrangement with AAP, the . 
Australian agency' 
undertook to provide the first four correspondents for 
the area (Singapore, Djakarta, Nanking, and'Tokyo), and 
Reuters would top up. The system was of considerable 
help in the relatively impoverished years of the late '40's. 
It meant that PTI had quite .a considerahleýforeign 
presence. 
The Indian agency maintained correspondents not only in'"' 
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South East Asia, but also in the Middle East, Washington, 
Geneva and London. In London, PTI journalists situated 
in the Reuters office selected the world news they wanted 
for transmission to the PTI India, a. privilege Reuters 
had only previously conceded to South African and. Australian 
media (and which no longer exists), and which for a time 
was extended to some allied European agencies. 
The Reuters-PTI partnership survived only four years, when 
it was terminated at the initiative of PTI. Instead of 
. 
the partnership, an exchange arrangement was signed with 
Reuters in 1953. PTI has to contribute an additional 
. 
cash payment; but for Reuters the Indian sub-continent 
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is considered one of the poorest of all the world'markets. 
Independence opened up the Indian market a little to other 
*_global agencies, although no further than-allowed by the 
obligation to distribute via national agencies. UP first 
penetrated the Indian market in 1942; after the war it 
sold to the 'Express'. group, until in 1960 it was obliged 
to distribute only through a national agency. AP sold 
to the 'Times of India' group until 1960-61. AFP served 
the second Indian national agency, United Press'of India, 
but this closed down in 1958, having made heavy losses 
over a number of years. Two years later, two companies 
combined to set up an alternative, the United News of 
India, which had its own teleprinter network and sub- . 
stantial press support. Its directorship included a 
wider range of newspaper editors and proprietors than 
had the United Press of India. Main source of foreign 
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able' news'supply. This kind-of increase however could 
only be supported by State-funds. 
Up to 1975, PTI subscribed to Reuters, UPI and'AFP, and 
it used more Reuters. than UPI or AFP material; AP distrib- 
uted through the other, smaller agency, United News. 
Other agencies with a foothold in the Indian market were 
TASS, DPA of West Germany (which went'through United News), 
Kyodo and ADN of East Germany. PTI claimed to pass on 
about 50% of the international material 
received from the 
major agencies. 
4ý 
One reason for the fairly high volume 
of news passed on by PTI and now Samachar is the 
absence 
of language problems in distribution: 
PTI distributed in 
English to over 200 daily newspapers. 
PTI employed about 300 full-time journalists. About one 
third of these were based in Bombay and New Delhi. Another 
50 worked from Calcutta and Madras. Then in each of. the 
17, state capitals there were two or three PTI 
journalists. 
The remaining third were distributed through the larger 
cities and towns, often where there were subscribing news- 
papers. 
Although the control exercised over incoming news-flow by 
the India national. agencies up to 1975 was moderate in 
comparison with many other countries, there was a strong 
government presence in and around PTI operations which placed 
a caution on its value as news-source, both for subscribers 
and for global agencies. This was manifest in news-gatherin; 
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first of. all, insofar.. as'PTI carried a lot of government 
news, speeches by. leading politicians, official state news. 
Inýthis. respect; it was-similar to most national agencies. 
Second, many-of. its. clients were government clients. 
About 25% of all. PTI's. income derived from embassies, 
national and all 17 state governments, several national. 
government ministries, and the national broadcast s-ervice 
AIR (Air India Radio) which was the single largest client. 
This didnot include those commercial. clients who were 
state-owned-, or state-controlled., -, There were about 200 
commercial' clients, and these.; were believedto account for 
. 10% bf income.: 
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The agency; distributed domestic, economic 
and commercial services. similar to. _those of Reuters else== 
. where. (Reuters, Economic Services. were. also. taken). The 
remaining. two. thirds of revenue' came from newspapers. 
There were''indirect Government subsidies, which took the 
form of reduction of rental on. the lease, of teleprinter 
lines., and'-'the provision: of better facilities for news 
. transmission 'at a cheaper rate. 
The Government'also 
made it easier for the agencies. to.: importnew equipment., 
Finally, although PTI was a co-operative, there were four 
places. on the Board for. 'eminent men' who were generally 
. 
fairly; establishment-type individuals, chosen by-the rest 
of: the Board. (An . example; 
given of<one'eminent' man on 
the Board, was an ex-Chief.: Justice , of India). But this 
extent of' government.. involvement. was' actually very modest 
by comparison with, -say, the majority of African news agencies. 
PTI was by far the largest'agency. ., 
UNI', which was a 
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co-operative of only eight newspapers and was based, in 
New Delhi, had less than a quarter of PTI's clientele, 
and many fewer correspondents. There were other smaller 
agencies, like Hindustan Samachar, founded in 1948, which 
distributed news in the vernacular for papers in the 
Bombay area, but had no independent link with a global 
agency. 
PTI had no facilities for photo-transmission, and here 
the American agencies could operate freely. For many 
years however they operated in competition with their 
-own government*'s. imformation services which provide free 
feature and picture material, and similar services from 
other governments, notably TASS, which are very attractive 
economically to the poorer, vernacular newspapers. 
There is a greater diversity of foreign news sources in 
India now than at 'any time in its pre-War history. 
But availability of-these services is-limited by Govern- 
ment regulations which'oblige the global agencies to dist- 
ribute via national agencies. Up to 1975 AP character- 
istically'sought to get round the spirit of this'require- 
ment_as much as possible-by going through the smaller 
agency, United News, and arranging with that agency for 
distribution of its full service-to a selected few of the 
agency's clients.: The government's requirements for 
indirect distribution of global agency material may have 
had the function of creating a ready demand for the more 
propagandistic material of foreign governments: if allowed 
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to operate freely, the global , agencies, would 
have had to 
have charged lower rates in some cases where by doing so 
they could compete with use of handout material, whereas 
going through national agencies they-could not-control 
pricing structure. 
As this section was written, the situation in India was 
one of rapid change inwhich thefuture. outcome--was 
difficult to discern. The. state. of emergency introduced 
by-Prime Minister Indira Gandhiin mid-1975. was accompanied 
by the issue of, severe press guidelines, . 
the insistence 
that foreign; correspondents"sign a pledge. (modified under 
negotiation) acknowledging awareness of the guidelines and 
taking full" responsibility for their services. -; Reporting 
. conditions were made considerably 
more. difficult. The 
Government's relationshipwiththe PTI, perhaps. the single 
most important news source for foreign correspondents, al- 
ready strong, became much closer. And-in September 1975 
India's Information Minister, V". C. Shukla, outlined plans 
to merge all-the country's domestic: news agencies into a 
single agency, Samachar, run by trustees independent of 
the Government. The effect of this would be to oblige 




be virtually identical to PTI, except 
with a stronger . monopoly position', 
and more susceptible to 
influences originating from the government. He claimed this 
was being done as part of the Government's policy of building 
a strong and independent press free from outside influence. 
O even less revenue importance than India for the global 
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agencies are the northern countries of the Indian sub- 
continent, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the late 'sixties, 
before the secession of Bangldesh from'Pakistan, there 
were about 100 dailies in the whole, country, most of them 
extremely small, and accounting for most of a combined 
newspaper circulation of only 500,000. After the partition 
in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan, the local bureaux 
of what had been the Associated Press of India and the 
United Press of India became AssociatedPress of Pakistan, 
and United Press of Pakistan (APP and UPP). APP is the 
main agency at the time of Writing and has been indirectly 
financed by the Government since 196i. It has no foreign 
correspondents otherihan'in India, and relies for its 
international-news on Reuters and AP, and also has an 
exchange agreement with Kyodo. - It. distributes photos 
and a commercial service. - UPP is much smaller, has no 
contract with a major global agency, " but takes Antara of 
Indonesia and a small West German agency. Another small 
agency,. Pakistan Press'International, specializes in' 
Moslem affairs. 
4- M -1,4- 
With the departure of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1949 
the market in China virtually disappeared. Reuters' 
lucrative commercial services, distributed-to business and 
commerce from Shanghai before the Communist victory'had 
associated the agency with the nationalists' cause, and 
there is some evidence of local Reutererian reluctance 
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to cover the'Communist side for fear of reprisals from 
the nationalists, that. would' have damaged it commercially. 
Reuters. withdrew as. the Communists advanced to Nanking 
and then. to Shanghai., 
The official! British attitude to Chinese Communism was 
never as unambiguously, hostile as. "'American. For that 
reason `it was possible, " in , 
the "mid-fifties, for Reuters 
to negotiate 'a return to. China. in 1956. In the same 
year the Chinese°. New China News Agency (Hsin Hua) began 
to subscribe toReuters* general and commercial news 
services. 
The continuity of Reuters' representation'in Peking since 
1956 has been broken only by th'eýinternment ofits corr- 
espondent Anthony-Grey-during the 
Cultural Revolution in 
1968. AFP has had acorrespondent since the-Communist 
victory virtually. without interrupt on,, and. AFP's Jean 
Vincent was not interned during'the Cultural Revolution. 
The ; Frenchagency has had a better reputation in'the eyes 
of the Communist world than the other western agencies. 
For-the American-agencies coverage. of China has been 
much more restricted: Until 1959, " the United State*s 
...:: 
State Department actually. forbade the entry of American 
newsmen into China. When the-ruling was lifted that 
.,, year. a UPI reporter sent on assignment was arrested on' 
spy charges. (rather foolishly perhaps, UPIhad-sent a 
Chinese national born in'Shanghai). -, Other American 
328. 
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correspondents had difficulty obtaining Chinese Visas,, 
and there has been no continuous representation of . 
American agency newsmen in China since 1949, There was 
great hope at the time of the Nixon visit in 1972 that 
the United States agencies would at last receive permission 
to establish Peking. bureaux, but despite encouraging noises 
from the Chinese, this had not happened by as late as 1977. 
Coverage of China therefore is very-much based-in Hong Kong 
or Tokyo, for the American agencies. certainly, and also for 
the European agencies who are not allowed more than two 
correspondents in Peking and are also subject to many 
news-gathering restrictions. The 1972 thaw did achieve 
formal news-exchanges between the Chinese and American 
news agencies, whereas before they had simply monitored 
each other's. services unofficially. Monitoring of over- 
seas agencies is one important function for the New China 
. 
News'Agency (NCNA): it has access to all the major. world 
services. 
NCNA is by far the. most important source of news for 
Chinese media in. China, and one of the few easily avail- 
able sources of news of China-for the west. Newspapers 
in China do not typically have correspondents outside their 
-own 
areas, but. rely completely on NCNA... -NCNA has about 
200 overseas- correspondents, :. whose functions sometimes 
overlap with orthodox (or not. so orthodox)-diplomatic 
ones. NCNA services: for overseas are widely available, 
usually in bulletin form.. 
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The pre-Mao Chinese agency, Central News Agency (CNA) 
moved to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek. This is now the 
national agency of Taiwan, and also'has`a surprisingly 
large overseas news-gathering and distribution system. 
It has eight'domesticand twenty-two foreign bureaux. 
Half of these are in the Asian areaand'one in the Middle 
East; the'other half are in North America and Western 
Europe. CNA subscribes to most leading western news 
agencies, including the big'four. Despite its ownover - 
seas resources which include 30 full-time foreign corr- 
espondents, three quarters of its foreign news, accounting 
for 43.1%'of its output, comes from foreign news agencies. 
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CNA is a company owned on a non-cooperative basis whose 
shareholders include most-of Taiwan's media andSsome 
Chinese-language papers overseas., Of its 259 domestic 
clients in 1973, only 77'were media organizations; the 
others included 60 government departments, diplomatic 
missions, foreign organizations, '22 nationalized industries, 
14 banks, 67 commercial organizations and 19 others. 
There were 45 overseas clients, ' almost all of whom were 
South East Asian.. Half of these are newspapers, most of 
the others, with the exception of 5 news. -agencies, are 
non-media commercial organizations. 
CNA houses both AP and-UPI. bureaux' in Taipei, and these 
agencies are''by'far the strongestýin`Taiwan, both in news- 
gathering strength and in terms of news'-distribution, 
reflecting perhaps, American (and -specifically, 'CIA) 
330. 
involvement with. the island in the post-war era. 
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In 
1973 AP had a total staff of 6, headed by an American 
bureau chief; UPI had a staff of 3 headed by a 
. 
Chinese 
mainlander. Reuters and AFP were represented by one 
journalist each; both were Chinese mainlanders. In 
a country where there has been considerable tension 
between Chinese mainlanders and local islanders, there- 
fore, three. of the western agencies. employ mainlanders as 
bureau chiefs., The global agency services were distributed 
in. part by CNA. Direct distribution does not appear to 
be forbidden, but it does not happen. Taiwan is one of 
the few places where AP, distributes through a national 
agency out of apparent choice. CNA's own services are 
distributed in, bulletin form; but newspapers can take 
the global agency services by teleprinter through arrange- 
ment-with CNA. Eight or nine tapers took UPI by tele- 
printer and fourteen took the photo service. Photo 
services are distributed by the American agencies directly, 
as-in most countries.. Apart fr. om'a New York Times stringer, 
the American agencies are the. onlyU. S. media represent- 
atives in Taiwan (1973)" 
Reuters was the first global agency to 'sign a 
, 
contract 
with CNA in 1932; -. this lapsed after the -war, ostensibly 
because CNA could no longer afford the service. Until 
1947. CNA relied only on UP, and. then on AP . and 
UPI, 
until in the mid-fifties it. renewed its Reuters connection. 
AFP has been taken. only since recent years: the French 




Hong Kong, but its bureau on the island is a computer 
centre for the whole Asian region. Hong Kong is a 
communications centre for AFP'as well, and the French 
agency has a total staff of 24,13 of whom work in an 
editorial capacity. The smallest of the agencies here 
is AP, with a staff of 18, of whom 8 are editorial. 
In client terms, Reuters leads on the Hong Kong market., 
In 1973 it claimed to have 22 clients for the general 
news service, and another twenty subscribed to its special 
wire for foreign correspondents. Most important of all, 
Reuters is the sole agency taken by the Government Inform- 
ation Service (GIS), which acts like a national news agency 
and distributes Reuters foreign news along with domestic 
news to 67 clients, including newspapers, agencies, broad- 
cast stations and local Government offices. (Its radio 
department also subscribes to UPI. ) The two leading Hong 
Kong English-language dailies subscribe to a large number 
of services. Both the South China Morning Post (circulation 
35,000), and the Standard (circulation 30,000) in 1972 
subscribed to Reuters, AFP, AP and UPI. The Morning Post 
did not take Reuters for a long while, partly because it 
was 'too expensive', partly because they obtained a version 
of it anyway through GIS. The Standard. decided to drop 
AP on the grounds of expense-in 1973. Both also take the 
New York Times News Service. 
The other agencies have a modest sales presence in Hong 
Kong. AFP for instance in 1973 distributed to 11 clients 
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service of the American agency -. having dropped the general 
news service in retaliation, it is rumoured, against an 
AP story, objected to by the Singapore Government. The 
Straits Times also takes RES, the New York Times News 
Service, and the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post. '.. 
UPI uses Singapore. as a sub-regional centre for monitoring 
the coverage of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia. 
The Malaysian and Indonesian bureaux are considered by 
all four agencies as in some way subordinate to Singapore. 
All bureau chiefs in Singapore are%sestern,, whereas in the 
surrounding countries this is not generally. the case, and 
communications tend to centre in Singapore. AP used to 
have a-kind of Asian centre in Singapore as well, in the 
tsixties, but now has nothing which really fits that 
description. Singapore was AFP's regional. editorial 
centre before the move to Hong Kong in 1973. 
Reuters does more business in Singapore and Malaysia than 
the other agencies, followed by UPI. There are many 
more. media in Malaysia than in Singapore, and there is 
also a national news agency, Bernama. AFP is weak in 
Malaysia, and was the first agency to sign an exclusive 
distribution contract with Bernama in the early tseventies. 
Only Reuters heads its Malaysian bureau with a western 
staffer. In Malaysia, the Chinese papers are considered 
the most important: the Chinese community is wealthier 
than. the Malaysian or the Indian,. and. the. leading Chinese 
papers, Nan Yang Siang Pau, -and Sin Chew Jit Poh, attract 
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a good deal of advertising. ` 'RES goes to all banks, and 
some of the large companies; Reuters general news service 
sells to 9 papers (2 English-language, 2 Malay, 3 Chinese 
and 2 Tamil). 
Largely 'because of RES', Reuters. also does more business 
. 
than the other agencies in_Thailand, and it was tradition- 
ally the principal foreign 
agency. Iii general news, the 
market is 'evenly divided. . 
Reuters claimed 40 "clients for 
general news in 1973, of which-7 were teleprinter clients. 
" The teleprinter clients are naturally the wealthiest, 
concentrated amongst-the'English-language and leading 
Chinese" papers. Thai papers-tend not-=to use as much 
foreign `news,. and to rely more on the 'American agencies. 
The services of all agencies are distributed in'English, 
except for AFP which distributes bulletins in Thai and 
Chinese. In addition to-its' general news-service, Reuters 
distributed ecönomic services to 120clients. All clients 
are based in Bangkok, ' because t Bangkok is. ' Thailand' , and 
there are no daily papers outside the capital. (Perhaps 
thisis. a self-fulfilling prophesy: no dailies - no news 
serviceno dailies? ) Yet, '-"up-country there are a large 
--number number of 
non-dailies-which are issued once every five days, 
_run between k and 32 pages, and carry a respectable volume 
of advertising. 
AP has 14'teleprinter clients in Bangkok and 4 'bulletin 
clients. ýý AFPhas a total of 25, many°of them bulletin 
clients. UPI's is not known, but the second-American 
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agency. has'a policy of not distributing bulletin services, 
. in line with 
its general policy of rationalization and 
concentration only on. the main markets. 
In terms of staff the agencies are fairly even in Thailand 
(1973). Reuters employed a. bureau manager (Thai), one 
main correspondent (Burmese) and around half ,a dozen 
operators. AP had an American bureau chief, two reporters 
and three photographers; UPI also headed its bureau with 
an American, assisted by a local reporter and business 
manager; likewise AFP, except that its bureau chief was 
French. The western correspondents tended to assist in 
general Indochina coverage during the Vietnam war, espec- 




in Thailand faced the nominal compet- 
ition of USIS, but the USIS effort was directed mainly to 
the. up-; country papers which did not concern the agencies. 
In 1965,42 out of 64 Thai radio stations, most of them. 
owned by branches of the armed services,: used some USIS 
and Voice of America material. 
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The US agencies do not 
provide services to USIS or. VOA on a matter of principle 
established: immediately after the last war, although 
they do serve American Forces Network. USIS influence 
is likely to be scaled down. in any case, in the future, and. 
certainly in Thailand if the mid-seventies': rapprochement 
between, Thailand and its newly communist neighbours 
continues. 
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In neighbouring Burma, the international news of the 
agencies is distributed by'an official news agency, which 
has traditionally relied on Reutersfor'the bulk of its 
news. Coverage of Burma is conducted largely from 
'Thailand: -partly because reporting conditions are 
difficult=in the Burmese capital, but also because 
Bangkok is host to different Burmese opposition groups, 
of whichthere are many, just'as Beirut is a kind of 
political"centre for many-Arabic groups. 
American: Lead 
In this part of South'East Asia, Reuters, ' appears to be 
thestrongest'of the agencies '. in terms of clients and in 
manpower, although'much of this leadership is due to its 
RES divisional activities. The American, agencies'lead, 
as we have seen, in 'Taiwan, 
,. 
and also, further 
, 
South, 
in the' Philippines, linked to America by old colonial 
ties and continued business investment. The news. media 
of the Philippines have long been dominated: by American 
news values; and it was America' which liberated the 
islands from the Japanese in 1945. For most of the. post- 
war period, the Philippine press , 
has been regarded as one 
of,.. the freest in Asia, if not the world (it. was the only 
Asian country in which newsments sources were legally 
protected). But it has numerous problems that afflict 
other Asian countries: shortage of newsprint, control 
by big business interests; relatively low readership. 
In the 'seventies, the advent of martial law brought about 
the closure of many papers, and the introduction of close 
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government scrutiny. But the reduction in numbers: may 
have helped Phillipine media - especially broadcasting 
and television - to become more-prosperous. 
Before the Second World War, Reuters distributed in 
Manila through a local agency, Overseas News Incorporated. 
After 1945, it closed. its bureau down until 1958, and now 
has one locally recruited correspondent and an editorial 
assistant, and services two teleprinter; clients with 
general news. It'does have a sizeable clientele for RES 
services (about 400 in 1973), even though the Philippines 
is one of the few Asian countries in addition to Japan 
where AP-DJ also sells. The AFP bureau is headed by a 
Filipino, assisted by an editor. The service goes mainly 
to private clients. The American bureaux are much larger. 
UPI for instance employs a staff. of 12 to 14, of whom 3 
are newsmen, 3 are photographers.. It puts out a local 
financial service (as it does in Tokyo),. which, atypically 
for UPI, is distributed mostly by bulletin. The sales 
position of the American agencies was upset at, the intro- 
duction of Martial Law, which saw the elimination of many 
papers, and clients. AP suffered a . 
temporary decline 
in revenue of 70%. There are no sales to provincial 
papers, which are mostly weekly and very poor. The U. S. 
agencies have distributed, independently for most of the 
post-War period, although Manila papers did combine to 
form a Philippines News Service. Its successor under 
Martial Law, the Philippines News Agency, did make a move 
towards monopolizing incoming foreign news, but this did 
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not. immediately materialize. 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is about equally well, or badly, covered by 
the international agencies. The Indonesian bureaux tend 
to be subordinate to the Singapore bureaux: in an 
editorial sense for Reuters and UPI, in a communications. 
sense mainly, for AFP and AP. The agencies are obliged 
to distribute through national news agencies, and there 
is a choice of national agencies. This was made mandatory 
in 1972-3. Reuters and AFP had in any case distributed 
through Antara, the leading agency, before then. UPI 
joined them that year. AP, characteristically, chose 
to be distributed by adifferent national agency, KNI, 
formed by. 11 Djakarta newspapers. in 1966 which wanted an 
agency free of any political affiliation. However 
the entire service of news and photos was not available 
even to clients who may. have wanted it (as happens in 
Taiwan where AP goes through CNA). The agencies try 
to head their bureaux with staffers, and each bureau chief 
has around half a dozen editorial assistants. 
French Lead 
AFP has its own small area of influence in Asia: Indochina. 
But then are few Indochinese media, and those there are 
are extremely. poor. The number in Saigon was drastically 
reduced in the decade%1965-? 5, and-were served by the 
national newsagency, which subscribed to AFP and the American. 
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agencies. AFP was more important there before the. 
escalation of American intervention, and had the largest 
bureau of all up until. 1963. The press hardly existed 
in Cambodia and Laos. In Laos there were 11 dailes in 
1958, with circulations of under 2000. They got their 
news from Xat Lao, the leading paper, or by monitoring 
the BBC, Voice of America, or USIS. The only international 
agency subscribed to was AFP, taken by the government paper 
Lao Presse, and used verbatim. AFP was also major source 
for the National Lao Radio, and when the teleprinter broke 
down, which it did frequently, it would listen in to the 
BBC, Voice of America or Radio Australia. So very poor 
media do have the option of foreign broadcasts, although 
these also (with. the exception of the BBC and Voice of 
America) take nearly all foreign news from. the global 
agencies. 
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The Indochinese situation has changed greatly 
in the mid-seventies, and the likely pattern for, future 
years is the establishment of strong national'agencies in 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which will be Government 
organs having complete control over incoming foreign news 
and its dissemination. 
Australia and Oceania 
Of all global agencies Reuters has had the strongest ties 
with, al}d interest in, Australia and New Zealand. The 
Australian Associated Press (AAP) is part-owner of Reuters, 
and helped in its coverage of the entire South East Asian 
region after the War, but is no longer important in this 
respect. The AAP and the New Zealand Press Association 
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in Sydney. Commercial branches established for telegrams 
and advertising could also serve as news bureaux when the 
need arose, but they declined in importance at the begin- 
ning of the century. 
Between 1915 and 1925 Reuters resumed direct distribution 
of news to its clients in Australia, then reverted to 
allowing Australian agents to select the news in London. 
Some bad feeling emerged in the 1930's between Reuters and 
its clients over suspicions in Australia that Reuters had 
Government connections. These were smoothed over 
sufficiently by 1934 for Reuters to sign a contract with 
the newly-formed co-operative, AAP. After the war, the 
practice of AAP selection of news in London died out, 
especially with the development of regional bureaux, and 
regular Reuters-AAP conferences on regional affairs. AAP 
now also subscribes to AP and AFP. UPI goes directly to 
the Murdoch newspapers, ostensibly because Murdoch objects 
to AAP's monopolization of internal news flow (which 
prevents any of its members from having the luxury of an 
international service if other papers cannot also have it), 
but in practice his concern may be economic. The NZPA 
takes its foreign news from the AAP's Melbourne office. 
UPI also distributes independently in New Zealand. 
In the Pacific area in 1974,50 there were 8. daily papers, 
4 papers appearing 5 days a week, and 20 weeklies. More 
than half of these wereestablished after 1960... . 
Only the 
larger of them take international news agencies: AP, UPI 
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and the two. leading. U. S. supplemental, agencies go to the 
Gannett-owned 
, papers., 
of' Guam;, the Fiji Times subscribes 
to. a file ofýReuters,. AP and UPI prepared for it byAAP; 
and ; the Post` ; Courier' 
in, Papua New,. Guinea also takes AAP. 
In Tahiti the news media share, the, cost of a 3,000 word 
daily report from AFP, which also serves two of'Noumeaz's 
papers, ; and 
three papers in. Papeete. The. Government of 
American Samoa uses:, the,. UPI broadcastwire, for, iits 5-day- 
a-week. News Bulletin. The globalagencies, have all'pene- 
.' , trated 
the Pacific therefore, but 
. 
Reuters rather less than 
the others. 
Summary. and Alternatives 
The agencies in Asia distribute mainly to the wealthier 
media who can afford to take them. The English-language 
press is a particularly lucrative market, because this 
goes to elite audiences, attracts high advertising revenue 
(often from the multinational corporations, or handled 
by multinational, especially'American', advertising agencies), 
. and prints a relatively 
high volume of foreign news.. In 
general, English-language papers are charged more than 
leading vernacular papers; even when their circulation is 
less, because their ability to pay is so much greater. 
A study in 1965 found that of thirty English-language 
papers in this region, 27 credited an average of 3.4 
news agencies and 2.0 special news services per paper a 
week. The English=language dailies have 25.3% of the 
newspaper reading population. 
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Vernacular pap'ers'tend not to print much foreign news, but 
this may be due in part'to the absence of international 
news material. This material' is often not available 
outside the capital, in which case there-is complete 
reliance on the truncated version provided by the national 
agency; or in the absenceýof anataional agency, on the 
provision of government information services such as USIS 
and BIS, or the monitoring of overseas' broadcasts. USIS 
in particular concentrates its news activities in areas 
not served by the American agencies for lack of-commercial 
suitability. If, as seems likely, there will be a reduction 
in this kind of official activity, there is a danger of, 
greater undercover political. pressure_on the American 
agencies to perform the kind of function traditionally 
performed by USIS. 
The vernacular press is generally very poor. An IPI study 
in 1968 showed that of 149 Chinese dailies published in 
Asia outside Mainland China, only 10 were making sub- 
stantial profits, and the rest were working on a shoe- 
string. A survey of 36 Hong Kong Chinese papers in 
1966 showed that only 9 owned their own equipment - and 
for international news they tended to use agency dispatches 
of larger papers without crediting them. There are news 
editors in Hong Kong whose jobs consist entirely in re- 
-writing AP and UPI copy from other newspapers. 
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vernacular press usually has to pay for the cost of 
translating agency services from English. 
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The agencies are theýmost'impor. tant sources. of inter- 
national news. -. 
Most Asian countries have national agencies 
which take-. the. bulk of. their foreignnews. supply from. the 
global agencies.., Alternative sources include other 
national agencies and.. foreign", broadcasts, but much of 
this material does in any . case originate with the global 
: agencies. 
The, global agencies tend'to concentrate. their manpower and 
- office : facilities in a' few leading capitals of the econ- 
omically most advanced countries, namely Tokyo, Hong Kong 
and: Singapore. Of course, staff from these centres, can 
be deployed in. other parts of the region, -. and"often are - 
but on a 'news-crisis' basis - which on most counts is 
inferior to having a resident'ýcorrespondent. with well- 
established contacts. -But-the agencies prefer not to 
: have too"many 'fire-fighting'. reporters. . _Such 
individuals 
rank highly on prestige,. butare a .. 
threat to. thebureau- 
chief system of authority'precisely: because 'they are mobile, 
and. in any; case-are. soon pilfered by newspapers . and news- 
magazines once they have established themselves. 
Alternatives to dependence'on'. the global.. agencies by 
local media have been tried. There are. basically three 
" kinds of. alternative.. One. of-these we have explored 
already: ': 'the development, of a. national. agency with its 
own foreign-correspondents. - -This has really worked only 
in one Asian country - Japan. Many other countries set 
up'national agencies which -have the power to prevent 
direct distribution-by the global agencies. This seems 
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if anything to detract still further from. editorial news 
diversity withoutadding. very much except the possibility 
of national political censorship. Censorship, of course 
rather than diversity, is increasingly the issue and the 
aim. Its justification is often couched in language of 
discontent about the western media, including the western 
news agencies, and western media sins of omission and 
commission with respect to the, non-western world. Much 
of this discontent of course has perfectly rational grounds. 
There are nevertheless other solutions to the problem of 
western media dominance. Two other solutions that have 
been tried are the regional news agency, and. the exchange 
oflnews services between national agencies. ` 
Regional news agencies have been attempted in. all the 
major Third World regions. In Africa and the Middle East, 
the Ghana News Agency and'the Middle East News Agency 
respectively, have largely failed to present themselves 
as convincing independent agencies'with the better interests 
of Africa or the Middle East at heart, although each has 
tried to win itself that reputation. ' In South. America, 
the agency LATIN has some claim to success. In each case 
there was still dependence on the'global agency for extra- 
regional news. ' One interesting Asian example was the 
Asian News Service, which folded in March 1973 after 
eighteen months' operation as a teleprinter-distributed 
general news service.. -The agency was run and staffed by 
Asians, and produced some remarkable editorial copy. The 
reasons for its demise were principally economic - insuff- 
icient capital to cover; losses in the first few years, and 
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insufficient executive experience. ` But there was also a 
shortage of interested newspaper` clients. The papers 
which most needed ANS were perhaps. the very papers which 
> found it so difficult to pay for sucha service - the 
poor vernaculars, . 
rather than the wealthier English- 
language and western-oriented papers of the major Asian 
capitals. Communications costs were considerable.. 
Since-ANS leased its wires from Reuters, it-could not 
hope for priority at a time of news crisis, but a. time 
of crisis was precisely the time it needed to be able to 
demonstrate its capacity for speed as well as for hard 
copy. Another difficulty affecting speed was that the 
language of , the service ' was'. 
English, the' lingua franca 
of-the region, 'but: English was not the 'first tongue of the 
correspondents, who could not-therefore operate quite as 
freely' in` it- as western correspondents. Finally, some 
correspondents did. have"nationalistic prejudices which 
seemed to affect the-agency's image in other countries. 
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The second style of solution; to dependence on global 
agencies is intra=regional exchange between national 
"'agencies. ` This 
in, fact` occurs on aý large' scale in 
Europe, and to alesser extent in Asia 'and Africa. Out- 
side Europe'a major'difficulty about such exchanges is that 
the national agencies are very often government-controlled, 
and this naturally"restricts the value of their output. 
This output is often not`very voluminous, ' and the exchange 
sometimes seemsmore-diplomatic'than journalistic in in- 
tent. It does". not really'helpAsian countries towards 
348. 
self-sufficiency, of news-gathering, but does help widen 
the spread of dependence. It seems very likely that for 
most kinds of international news, the global news agencies 
are highly convenient sources, since news of different 
regions is already packaged together. -, whereas a large 
number of exchange agreements increase: the amount of 
editorial work of a national agency-without eliminating 
the need to monitor global agency coverage of the region 
in. question, since at least on some. subjects it is likely 
to be superior in speed and content. Agency exchanges 
affect the output of agencies, but not of individual media 
organizations directly; this is important where the 
national agency is government-controlled or. in. any way 
sub-standard. The main advantage. about exchanges between 
national agencies is that reception is. generally free, 
although cost is involved in-transmitting aservice over- 
seas. However, the considerable improvement of intra- 
regional satellite communications in the late 70's (the 
Asian Telecom Highway connecting 15 countries from Iran 
to Indonesia was scheduled to become. operational by 1977-8) 
coupled with the substantial support for-the Third World 
News Pool expressed at the 1976 New Delhi conference of 
non-aligned nations. (keenly endorsed ; by the agencies of. 
Yugoslavia and India which had already made significant 
advances in this direction),. suggests that this, form of 
rationalized news-exchange may yet. be., the most effective 
counter, to the_influenceof the western global agencies. 
For: example, the news pool-operated by Tanjugfrom 1975 
(forerunner to the official pool) gave heavy emphasis 
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to news of, Third, World development (47%) although 60% of 
the Pool's content, was, contributedby. just seven countries, 
of which.. only 1 had an established tradition of. press 
, freedom. 
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In brief, the alternatives torglobal agency domination 
do 
. exist, 
but are ; limited 'in scope. This is serious 
or not, so- serious,, -depending 'on one's political and 
.. cultural point of 
view... The choices of Asian news-editors 
are not, for example, ; -. necessarily very divergent'ý'from those 
,. of western news editors: jindeed, one recent. comparative 
; study between American, -and Indian groups of . news. editors' 
judgements. of newsworthiness reported an'overall similarity, 
; with. the most . 
significant differences: occurring, on judge- 
t ments about. levels: of , conflict and on' degrees ; of. cultural 
proximity. 
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But. perhaps this simply reflects prior' socialization of' 
Asian newsmen into western, and as some would stress, 
capitalistic frameworks of value, mediated bysocio- 
"- 
political interests of Asian elites. Nevertheless, there 
are two focal points of concern which are worth reiterating 
in conclusion to this section: the first is the 
, 
question 
of whether Asian media generally can , 
hope to exercise much 
leverage on the western agencies if they do-not constitute 
a major source of revenue for those agencies; the second 
is whether the vernacular and non-metropolitan Asian press 
in particular can- ever; hope to receive the kind, of compen- 
satory attention it needs from the agencies. if physical and 
economic obstacles in the information flow at its end are to 
be overcome. 
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There is no easy answer to either. question. In the case 
of the-first it may be that the agencies have never really 
been tried: there has been no sufficiently concerted or 
passionate attempt to change the content'. of agency services 
for Asia in any radical fashion, despite frequent complaints. 
This may reflect cultural identification of Asian elites 
with the west. But it is doubtful that this. can be a 
permanent phenomenon: the possibility of new emergent 
informational needs in the course of social change is. high. 
Social change, however, is often in the direction-of various 
forms of socialism, and a 'switch of media dependency from 
one power block to another. Perhaps there is the possib- 
ility of changes in philosophy and content of the western 
agencies which could make this switch less of an automatic 
thing, `but the importance of the market factor militates 
against this. 
In answer to. the second question, it is quite possible 
for the agencies to explore new services - new in the sense 
of packaging as well as in the sense of content - for the 
vernacular and poorer media, inside and outside the major 
cities; and while it may not be possible for them to 
derive much in the way of profit, perhaps. the dominant aim 
should'not be not to make a loss, but to do as much as 
possible without making a loss. 
No. one could accuse the agencies of excessive profiteering 
in the absolute sense: but it is possible that the new 
consciousness of market factors characteristic of the 
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CHAPTER SIX: Big Business in Non-Media Market's 
The agencies are not concerned exclusively with media 
markets.. The European agencies in particular have 
always been as much involved in non-media as in media 
markets, even if they have remained close to the kinds 
of service which media organizations are best equipped°to 
provide. This is true of many aspects of the media busi- 
ness: techniques and practices that are suitable for journ- 
alism are good also for public-relations, - advertising, 
intelligence and propaganda. 
To understand any organization it is necessary to look at 
the beneficiaries of that organization's output; clients 
are generally one of the most important groups of benefic- 
iaries, and they are the ones who, in a market situation, 
put up the cash on which the organization's continued 
existence depends. This is not to ignore that there are 
other beneficiaries too - the employees amongst them - whose 
interests shape the organization's real 'goals'. But 
if the organization needs a cash relationship with those 
for whom it provides a service, then it must of course 
produce something that gets near to what those clients 
want or have been led to believe they want. In short, 
the nature of the clientele is an important clue as to the 
nature. of the organization. 
With this in mind it is useful to make a distinction 
between media and non-media clients for the further under- 
standing of global agency operations; on this distinction 
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rests the issue of*survival so far as at least one of the 
agencies is concerned and indeed, the viability of the 
concept 'news agency' `as commonly used in the western 
system. 
A media client is one who uses the agency service as a 
contribution to his own communications package, designed 
for-sale or distribution to a 'mass market (i. e. a hetero- 
genous market which stands in relation to the media 
'organization primarily as audience). A media client 
is typically a newspaper, radio or television station, or 
a national news agency. A non-media client onthe other 
hand buys the agency service for his own immediate use, 
with no intention of distributing it in some or other form 
for other audiences, except perhaps in the very 'limited 
sense of his own organization or except in the case of an 
advertiser. But in the latter case it is not the sale 
of a news 'service that is important but the sale of a 
communication facility which is then used by the advertiser 
for' the'distribution of amessage in the construction-of'', 
which the news agency has usually had no role. Although' 
'important for this study, the question of advertiser 
non-media clients is largely historical. The needs of 
non-media clients today, then, are primarily informational - 
as-in the case of an embassy, government`department or 
priväte club; ' and may or may not be profit-oriented. 
If profit-oriented, the client is usually a'stock-broker, ' 
finance institution or a'large commercial` organization. 
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There have been three major categories of non-media 
client in the history of the agencies: 
(i) Commercial and finance institutions 
(ii) Advertising agencies or advertisers. 
(iii) Governments 
These categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance, 
finance institutions are often related to State organizations 
and advertisers may be State organizations or-finance 
institutions. We have said that an agency relationship 
with an advertiser is usually of a different order from 
other agency relationships. In its relationship with an 
advertiser the agency is not simply offering, a news or 
informational service. It is , actively, assisting 
the 
advertiser, in any of a number of ways, in the promotion 
of information or publicity material which ;. 
is. clearly and 
deliberately designed to further the particular objectives 
of the advertiser or the advertiser's client,, and there 
is usually no pretence to the contrary. Even here there 
is possible overlap with other agency functions, since some 
critics would argue that in devoting a considerable pro- 
portion of their news-gathering resources to the routine 
coverage of State activities,. agencies do assist Govern- 
ments in the fulfilment of their objectives in ways which 
belie. the agencies' formal claim to neutrality. But this 
is a question which must be left for later evaluation-of 
typical news-gathering practices. 
This chapter is concerned mainly with the first two 
categories of non-media client: commercial and financial 
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institutions, -and advertisers. In servicing these 
categories of client the agencies have tended to. employ 
distinct news selection criteria, for the. provision of news 
services of a very different character than those generally 
provided media clients. Governments . on 
the other hand, 
. although 
they_sometimes. subscribeto these different : 
services as well, usually look to the agencies for the same 
kind of general news services which are provided for 
ordinary media clients. 
The importance of non-media. clients. varies between the 
agencies. For Reuters, non-media. clientsfor its services 
of econömic'news have.: always been, 
important as sources of 
revenue, ' but never, more. consistently as 
in the period 
following World War Two,.. when they have. come to account for 




AFP's predecessor, Havas, operated as an advertising as 
well as a news agency. ' This . 
was a major. source of revenue 
in the inter-war period, and. greatly influenced the relation- 
ship between the agency, government and commercial advert- 
isers, and its newspaper clientele. Since the Second World 
War, AFP has had no advertising activities, of the kind 
cultivated by Havas, but does run an economic news service 
for the non-media market. Its major non-media client 
category however is the Government and Government departments 
or agencies. 
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The American agencies do not depend on a non-media market 
to the extent that is true of the European agencies. 
Nevertheless they have substantial economic news services 
for non-media clients, the most important of which (because 
it is international) up to 1975 is a joint operation. 
involving AP with America's largest economic and financial 
news agency, Dow Jones. 
Why should these non-media markets'be considered important 
enough for separate investigation? In the first place 
because they are intimately bound up with the origins of 
the agencies and if one regards the originating process 
as one in which certain basic choices are made which can 
have and usually do have long-term consequences, then 
they can scarcely be ignored. Secondly, their sheer 
revenue importance in the case of the European agencies 
must be considered a significant feature, given the common 
opinion that he who pays the piper. plays the tune. And 
in fact investigation does indicate new directions, new modes 
of organization and distribution that have been adopted 
which reflect the interests of non-media clients. 
(i) Reuters Economic Services 
The agencies are primarily service organizations. They 
define their activities in the rhetoric of service, and 
because their clients include mass media whose products of 
course are consumed by the public, there is ,a 
tendency to 
think of them in terms of public service institutions. 
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To an extent this is certainly. true. But; it should 
not blind . one's, attentionto 
the fact that in their 
earliest days, in the case of. the European agencies 
especially, the idea of service was no more prominent 
than the idea of profit. , 
In a similar but-more lucra- 
tive way, banks combine the most rigorous service ethic 
with the ingenuity of any profiteer. It is necessary' 
to see the European agencies therefore as the inventions 
of entrepreneurs, and their expansion as. the application 
of business. acumen and the. shrewd eye. This: is, manifest 
in innumerable ways: the personalities of, the: founders, 
the first location. of their offices, the, character of their 
first-clients,, the stress, on the ; gathering. of - economic 
news, and the general. character of. their entrepreneurial 
activities. 
. 
Reuters and Havas were conceived as business operations, 
and the originS of both lie in the demand for financieal 
intelligence from an increasingly international European 
business. community. , 
Havas was., a financier before he 
started his agency, who. was describedby Storey as a 
'rich merchant from Oporto', and: business clients were 
,. among his, most important in. the first eight years, of, the 
agency's.. life.. First location for. 'L'Agence. Havas was close 
to, the Bourse 'de Commerce, in Paris. Reuter's. first London 
office was. established as`near as. possible to, the., Stock 
Exchange,. which is where'he installed one: of his first 
correspondents. For thefirst seven years of` the agency's 
history, the most important clients were financiers and 
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merchants, (prominent amongst whom were Greek merchants), 
and who took a service that was primarily economic. The 
German agency, Wolff, was supported by both Government and 
banking houses. The first exchange agreement in the history 
of the three major European agencies was for an exchange 
of news of Bourse and trading activities. 
Economic news generated more speed in the activity of 
journalists in those days than anything else except War, 
which was usually considered important because of its economic 
implications. Sales competition in economic news was 
great: competition was the reason Reuter left the-Continent 
of Europe and came to London. Even as the relative 
importance of non-media clients for economic news declined, 
he, expanded the agency's involvement in alternative revenue- 
promoting fields of only incidental relevance to general 
news-gathering. Economic intelligence wasalso'one of the 
agency's major attractions to the English press. One reason 
why: the Times was last of all Fleet Street papers to sub- 
scribe to Reuters was because it had its own service of 
market prices; one of the first advantages of a subscription 
to Reuters that attracted the-Times was'the possibility of 
an American Money Service. Reuter's most important and 
earliest groups of clients in Eastern Europe, India and 
South America were generally merchants. Before South 
America was signed over to Havas, Reuters. 'ran a commercial 
service between Rio de Janeiro and the main Continental 
markets. ' In Australia the market for economic news and 
the private telegram`servicewas more profitable than 
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newspapers. t Much later, when Reuters switched to radio 
from cable, the first wireless services dealt in commercial 
news, followed by general news services some eight or nine 
years afterwards. All this raises the qüestion: why did 
Reuters move into general news at all? The requirements 
of financial and economic news clients also favoured a 
.: general news srvice, since the'two were not always to be 
distinguished. General news was a means of public legit- 
imation for aGerman national who was sometimes considered 
with suspicion by the London Establishment. Newspapers 
were an obvious secondarymarket; '`and they were an ex- 
cellent''advertisement. They were also rather more exciting 
and prestigious. One of Reuter's early colleagues, 
Sigismünd'Englander, who'did much'to build up the Continental 
Service* and a`reputation as apolitical'radical, ', en- 
couraged Reuter-to take political news seriously. Finally, grow- 
ing interest in general news was encouraged by cheaper tele- 
graph rates,, which allowed for wordier dispatches. 
Baron Reuter had'other business interests. One of the 
most successful of these was the' private telegram business. 
The agency created itsown'codes to allow`f'or exceptionally 
cheap transmission of private messages. - Other ventures 
were not so successful : he bid 'for a concession from the 
Shah of'Persia to build a railway from'the"Caspian Sea to 
the Persian Gulf, and to`operate it for' seventy years. 
'Otherwise ill-fated-, this venture had one`favoürable out- 
come. -". In satisfaction of his 'claims for `indemnity for 
'his initial outlay in the railway project, Baron Reuter was 
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given the right to found the Imperial Bank of Persia, of 
which he was to become one of the directors. In 1891 this 
bank advanced a large loan to the Persian Government and 
was to play an important part in stabilizing the country's 
finances before the First World War. One especially blatant 
instance of the Baron's, shrewdness in business. dealings 
occurred in 1870, when he secured the. exorbitant sum of 
9726,000 from the state, for his. sale of the Norderney Cable. 
- which had cost him £153,000 in 1866. 
Neither Reuter nor, -Havas, Storey tells us, were above 
accepting a few subventions to help , 
pay the.. costs of 
communication. For twenty-five years each-agency received 
a thousand pounds a year from the-, Khedive of_Egypt towards 
the expense of cabling messages to and from the Egyptian 
Government. The. Viceroy of India used to, pay-Reuters 
the transmission costs, for: some of his speeches to be 
telegraphed home to England. In turn, Reuters was of quite 
considerable importance to some of thetelegraph companies. 
A report of the: Indian Telegraph Administration. of 1888 
during the Afghan war said that its increased revenue was 
due mainly, to 'the length and. frequency of Reuter messages'. 
Jealous ofHavas' success in advertising, Reuter tried and 
failed to purchasea share in that agency in 1874. But 
later on Reuters made its. own entry to this field in an 
efforttn off-set mounting deficits in the general news 
operation. The Reuters Advertisement Branch,, established 
in 1891, had little success - largely it seems because of 
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executive incompetence. The. Telegraph Remittance business, 
however, which involved the cabling of money,, paid off the 
losses incurred in the advertising venture, ' and. contributed 
greatly to the overall profitability of the agency. In 
1912 a Reuter's Bank was founded .7 
the 'British Commercial 
Bank. '. Capital . from. this, venture was, also employed in the 
setting up of a Reuters Financial: "PublicityDepartment, 
which met with strong opposition from both the press and 
regular advertising agents, and was later closed. The 
telegram traffic-department_also closed. down in 1915, 
after a prohibition which applied to. all-private cabling 
codes. "This. -threw 
the Bank into jeopardy by unstabling 
Reuters' main source of. profits at.. the time, ýand created 
the conditions in which. a new private company, 
inspired 
by formed Herbert Reuter, º. s successor Roderick Jones, was 
to 
. 
take over Reuters. The company was later bought by 
Roderick Jones, who in any case put in much of the capital.. 
The bank was sold off to a; c, ommercialgroup.. 
1914: Change of Strategy: 
The role of commercial information continued to be important 
after the First World War, although the agency's image 
was 
much more bound up with its general news services.. The 
main non-media activities after all had folded; and under 
new ownership, the agency's strategy changed. It sought 
security through respectability. This took 
several forms, 
most important of them being the fostering of good relations 
with the government by placing at its disposal-the agency 
resources for a service of Allied communiques'and"official 
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news to neutral countries, British Empire and Allied troops. 
The service was financed by the government, which paid 
transmission costs at the rate of £120,000 per annum. 
. The second corner-stone of 
the new strategy was to involve 
the press more closely in Reuters' activities. Roderick 
Jones initiated a scheme which brought the Press Association 
into part-ownership of the agency in 1925. 
Security, the new Board decided, lay in Reuters' future 
A 
as a British Institution, but without losing its reputation 
for independence; a difficult course to steer, and not a 
successful policy. Having compromised its independence 
in relation to the Government, Reuters was not able to 
benefit from huge subsidies, as the Continental agencies 
had done, without alienating his newspaper clients. Yet 
} 
overseas clients, perceiving. the pro-Imperial bias, assumed 
there was a massive Government subsidy. ` Had there been, 
it would be: difficult to explain just why Reuters did lose 
ground so calamitously during the-inter-war period in most 
parts of the world where before it had been dominant. 
There were some Government connections of course, a great 
deal of Government sympathy, and this threatenedto becone 
substantial had not World War Two and the British national 
press intervened. The policy of having the agency's costs 
underwritten by the British and Commonwealth press, in its 
turn, was unsatisfactory. These newspapers did not make 
that amount of money. A return to Government support was 
inconceivable, both to Reuters staff and to the British 
press as a whole, and probably not desirable even to the 
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development of. a Reuters silk service, 
to keep London silk merchants informed 
of the havoc created on world markets 
by this catastrophe. 
- American markets service. 
- Foreign Exchange service, which set the 
. rates 
for all the major currencies for 
overseas subscriber banks and brokers.. 
Reuters. had ten private lines to leading 
foreign exchange dealers and banks,, and 
the method was to compile mentally a 
progressive mean rate of all the buying 
and selling rates as a reporter made the 
rounds by 'phone. 
-A Wireless. Commercial service. The-first 
use of wireless by Reuters was for the 
commercial service. It was no coincidence 
that the head of Reuters Commercial Service 
in the''twenties was also wireless manager. 
Cotton and other prices, were picked up by 
wireless, through arrangements with'the 
Post Office, from Liverpool,. New York and 
other exchanges, and messages: not more than 
two minutes old were distributed throughout' 
Europe, Egypt, India, China and elsewhere. 
The success of these commercial operations 
inspired the development of cable networks 
in Europe. 
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Well before World War. Two$ therefore, the economic services 
had developed. considerably, and in a direction related to 
current structure,. but today . they have far greater signif- 
'icance; this is partly because they-are'absolutely, more 
important today in . revenue: 
terms, =but; also because before 
the War they were not considered entirely 'respectable' to 
.... merit too much discussion. They were-perhaps more visible 
-, -'in the 'twenties than'in, the''depression years of the 'thirties. 
But even in the 'twenties-there isreason to. suppose that 
Roderick' Jones, anxious>to forget the agency's earlier 
misguided adventures in advertising and. banking, did not 
want them to becometoo important. - For, one thing,. they., 
disturbed the press. ' When members.. oi' the NPA were approached 
about the possibility of joint-ownership of. Reuters along 
with-`the'-PA, one issue raised-was-the separability of the 
commercial from the general news functions.. 
1945 Onwards: Unfettered Expansion 
Such fears are now actively disowned. The economic 
services today are seen as the vital contribution which 
maintains Reuters as a truly 'independent' news organization. 
The post-war years have been ones of intensive activity 
in this sphere, in part matching the growing. awareness 
of economics by the media (in 1950, for-instance, financial 
and business news was a negligible item'in. the average 
U. S.. paper, but accounted for between one and five pages 
in many 1970 dailies) and mostly reflecting the growth-of 
demand for economic information in the non-media market. 
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Post-war expansion began with two important developments 
that greatly broadened the international character: of 
Reuters' commercial news-gathering operations: 
1. In 1946 Reuters bought up a specialist economic 
agency in Latin America - Comtel - by which name 
the economic services were to be known until the 
mid-sixties. This was the main product of Reuters 
activity in the old Havas markets in Latin 'America 
during World War Two. One of the principal: figures 
responsible for the development of Comtel under 
Reuters was Alfred Geringer, who later founded his 
own highly profitable commercial service in-London 
- Universal. News Services (UNS). 
2. After Comtel came a joint operation, with the: new 
West German agency. established in 1949, DPA, for 
German economic news. Third partner in this 
operation, Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienst (VWD), is 
the German Federation of Industry. Since 1973, 
Reuters competes with DPA in the general news 
market, yet co-operates with it for gathering 
and disseminating economic news services. 
Most important market for Comtel in the first 
few years was London, followed by Paris. - For 
a few years in the 'fifties, according to annual 
reports, Comtel even incurred losses, but these 
may have disguised unusual, internal accounting 
systems. 
Expansionary activity increased greatly in the early 'sixties, 
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after the succession of Gerald Long. to theposition of 
General Manager. His first major decision was that the 
economic services should be expanded. He believed it was 
necessary for Reuters to adopt an explicit marketing 
strategy, in opposition to its reliance on the old 'service' 
image. This way, it could fend for itself without resort 
to direct or indirect Government support, or dependence on 
a national press which itself was entering a time of 
financial difficulty. 
Coincident with the expansion of economic services, was 
an extraordinary increase in communications capacity as a 
result of the introduction and exploitation of the telephonic 
cable, and multiplex lines. Reuters-was`the first news 
agency to lease a duplex teleprinter channel to Moscow. 
This was in 1961,. the year the 'Post , Office increased-over- 
seas radio transmission costs by 16%. Shortly afterwards, 
the agency replaced its'North Atlantic radio link with a' 
twenty-four hour., two-way cable; it applied the frequency 
division principle to its'London-Montreal line, which 
meant that a single voice frequency circuit was split up 
into twenty-two duplex teleprinter channels. The principle 
was afterwards applied-to-all its Atlantic communications 
channels. ' Not only did communication capacity ' increase 
but the relative. cost of communication per unit message was 
tending to decrease in real, terms. This was an excellent 
time for-increasing existing' service volume, if desirable, 
or for creating new services. 
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The Computer Era 
Another sign of the rising star over economic services was 
the Reuters deal with Ultronic Systems in 1964. Ultronics 
is an operating unit of the General Telephone and Electronics 
Information Corporation (GTE), New York. The deal gave 
Reuters the world rights outside of the United States to 
Ultronic's market quotation interrogation and display 
systems, and it marked the entry of Reuters into the field 
of computerized services. 
Comtelburo was renamed in. 1966 as Reuters Economic Services 
(RES), identifying the economic services closely with the 
Reuters trademark. Economic services were no longer to 
be considered an embarrassing sideline. With 'Stockmaster', 
a product of. the Reuter Ultronic deal, and similar offerings, 
the character of these services greatly changed in image: - 
Stockmaster 
This was 'a desk-top unit which at the push of a 
few buttons provides the subscriber with an up- 
to-the-minute quotation of any one of more than 
10,000 stock or'commodity prices on the main 
United States, Canadian and some European Stock 
Exchangesl. 
5 
A client could ask for a particular 
market price, or the maximum or minimum price of 
a stock in the previous 24 hours' trading. 




Customprice, the second computer-based service, 
was used for portfolio valuation, safe custody 
charge calculation, general investment admini- 
stration and statistical analysis. It involved 
the collection of 25,000 security prices. It 
provided general data"analysis. for background; 
though up-to-date it is not simply a 'spot-news' 
service. 
Videomaster 
The. introduction. of, Videomaster, in". 1969 greatly 
extended the : principle bf . video-display of: stocký 
exchange quotations'. that had beenintroduced. on 
the United States market in the form of, Lectrascan, 
which provided instantaneous details of transactions 
of; the. New: York and. American Stock Exchanges, and 
s. Videoscan, -a closed circuit. TV display of stock 
exchange- transactions 
. and news. 
Videomaster is 
:a typewriter-sized, information display and re-!. 
'! trieval unit which-combines keyboard and television. 
_. It-can give, 18'pieces'of information about one 
selected'stock simultaneously, or. monitor the . Last 
Sale7price., of up"to 18 chosen stocks. simultaneously, 
or give warning when a. particular stock reaches'the 
:- high or- low 'price limit: the subscriber. - has set` on it. 
_It: . 
can also 'display Reuters general news summaries. - ' 
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The growth of Computer Services has been.. accompanied by 
an equally rapid development of teleprinter services in 
the economic field: the Reuter Commodity Report, covering 
speculative American commodities; Reuter-Agefi in Europe, 
in partnership with the French financial paper Agefi (Agence 
Economique et Financiere); and in Switzerland, the Swiss 
Bourse ticker, designed to meet'the needs of Swiss banks 
for domestic financial information. All this was in addition 
to 'basic' RES teleprinter services. In 1971 these in- 
cluded Comeuro- a comprehensive world economic service with 
particular emphasis on commodity prices, market reports and 
news; Fineuro, a composite of three other services (Reuters 
Business Ticker, International Financial Printer -a fast 
service for European. banks and businessmen dealing in stocks 
and exchanges, and Wall; Street Printer,: mainly for American 
brokers); Midecon, based on Comeuro,. but-including the 
highlights of the Fineuro. service as well as foreign ex- 
change details; Comwestaf, a cocoa; and commodity. news 
service for West Africa;. Comeastaf,. a similar commodity, 
financial and prices service for East; Africa; and Finmid, 
for Kuwait and the Lebanon. 
. 
Depression in the early ! seventies affected the economic 
services and reduced-their rate of growth as activity on 
stock markets declined drastically. - But at least one 
new service was designed to; off-set even this obstacle to. 
profit. The innovation 
, was: 
the-Monitor Service, launched 
in the summer of 1973, on the strength of a. Eurocurrency 
facility of £800,000 raised from Reuters' principal 
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bankers. Reuters' Monitor provided immediate and direct 
access to the money market rates of leading world banks. 
The service was unique in the sense that whereas stock 
, and 
commodity, markets had centralized dealing, floors, 
this was not true of the. money market -. in a sense the. 
Reuters' Monitor was the. dealing floor.. - 
The existence 
of the service directly contributed to changes in the 
nature of the reality it reported, but,; if. anything, in 
the. direction of greater stability. -. In the old system of 
; person-to-person enquiry 
for money rates, the ; enquiry 
itself could have the effect, of. -driving. the market one 
way or another. But the Monitor makes it possible for 
aýsubscriber to interrogate. _the market in complete. anonymity. 
By, mid-1974 ; the _ Monitor service 
was installed in the U. K. , 
United States, Canada, Switzerland, , Germany. and. Holland, 
and extensions were planned for: Belgium,, Austria and Spain. 
By Autumn, -1975,500 subscribers were connected. with. 
the 
Monitor. service with. a. fizrthers150. awaiting, installation. 
The Teleprinter version of Reuters. Monitor is the, Reuter 
Money Report, covering, news of , exchange. rates, exchange 
or capital controls, bank rates, major credit policy 
decisions, gold. and-silver prices, Euro currencies, major 
money market instruments, international monetary and trade. 
negotiations, major domestic and international loans, 
inflation and `interest rates.. An Asian, version of this, 
report-was introduced in 1974, which included market 
repörts and important general news from Hong Kong, Singapore, 
-Malaysia, Bangkok. Manila and Tokyo. The 








o the Money Report rose by about 40% in the 
aided by currency turmoil and fluctuations, 
caused a sharp increase in the cost of news- 
Unsettled economic conditions in the early 
also gave a boost to'activity on commodity 
. 
In developing nations, bulletin services are very common 
- these. are mailed or hand-delivered. They give rise to 
a disproportionate amount of work for the revenue they 
generate, and may eventually be phased out. 
The introduction of computer-based services and the general 
development of the economic news field, have demonstrated 
several important trends: 
(1) Extremely rapid rate of adoption of these innovations 
heralded a period of sudden developments, structural 
changes, and a new dimension of executive decision-making 
in the agency business. Stockmaster was introduced to 
the-leading countries of Europe'in'its first two years; 
by 1966-it was in Hong Kong, - and the follöwing'year spread 
to Italy,, Mexico, Venezuela and Bermuda. The number of 
-Stockmaster units in service increased from 2,000 in June 
1969 to 12,578 in 1971. Customprice, introduced in 1966, 
was selling in Beirut by 1967, Austria and the Caribbean 
in 1968, Australia 1969, South Africa and Kuwait in 1970. 
The number of Videomaster units increasedfrom-300 in 1969 
to 6,477-in 1971, to 24,000 in 1974. Thesystem arrived 
in-Japan in 1973, where subscribers. -can interrogate a 
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London computer, and obtain, a response in four seconds. 
(2 ), Increasing. interdependence with other agencies, 
economic news media and finance institutions. Much more 
than in the general news field, ORES expanded through the 
development of exchangeagreements, for the purpose of 
distribution, greatly increasing, and complicating-, its 
institutional links with the capitalist: system. The 1964 
00 
deal. with. Ultronics was the first major example. Expansion 
of. Customprice, involved many further; arrangements: it was 
made; available,; through Extells Focus. Service-. in, the U. K., 
, the Boersen-Daten-Zentrale 
(BDZ). in West 
. 
Germany; Investors 
Management Services (IMS) -.. a subsidiary, of; Standard and 
Poors in North America; and Nihon Keizai Shimbun - leading 
0 ., 
Japanese financial paper -, in Japan. ,. 
These organizations 
0 
sometimes allowed Reuters exclusive, 'distribution of their 
services on the world market, in return for exclusive. right 
of . 
distribution. of: Compustat (as isthe case-with the IMS 
and. NKS. agreements). 
Some of. the leading_agencies. and institutions now directly 
0 associated: with. 
Reutersthrough the distribution of RES 
services include: - _Cosmo 
in Switzerland, ' now owned by 
Reuters;: VWD-in-West Germany; - ANETA, the Dutch national. 
. agency 
which also services Belgium and Luxemburg; Comtelsa 
-in Spain, which 
is a; joint''venture, with the Spanish economic 
agency Radicor,,. a subsidiary of the national agency ANSA 
in-Italy; -and through the national . agencies- in theScandin- 
avian. countries. Reuters has similar arrangements with 
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associate agencies in India, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, South Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand. It distributedindependently in: Hong 
-Kong, the Philippines, Thailand, Ceylon, Singapore and 
Malaysia. In the-Middle East until 1969, Reuters dis- 
tributedits economic services through the Regional News 
Service (RNS), and now distributes either independently 
or via national agencies in this- region. In Israel, 
distribution was through the Israeli News Agency (INA) 
until 1969; now, Finmid, (a teleprinter service see below) 
goes direct to Israeli banks, ` but the national' agency has 
the rights to, the Comid service. Comidis distributed 
via MENA in Egypt and AA in Turkey. 
(3) Further structural imabalances. The character of 
these developmentsin economic news services have inev- 
itably confirmed and increased the extent to which news- 
gathering and news-distribution functions ' are: concentrated 
in favour of interests of thedeveloped western world. 
The two most active markets ` for RES services were North 
America and Europe in the early 'seventies. Chapter 3 
examined the role of RES in establishing Reuters as an 
independent force in, North America. By 1969 RES was 
trading in every European country with"the exception of 
Albania and Iceland. Three main European profit centres 
were the United Kingdom, France and Switzerland (France 
accounts for about' 10% of all RES revenue). - Even as early 
as then, computerized services accounted for 55%-of RES 
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prof itin, Europe, and this. was, expected to. rise to 65% in 
1970., _Other important revenue areas include, the. wealthiest 
countries of other world, regions, notably South.. Africa and 
Japan. Although RES services consume a great deal of 
technical and routine editorial activity, the number of 
real.. news-gatherers for RES -.. journalists who literally 
go out to . get the news, -. is 
very. small, amounting to 10 or 
. 
11 in continental Europe in. 1971, perhaps. 2 for South 
East Asia. excluding Japan. The reason for this is that 
actual news-gathering tends-tobe, done by . general; news 
journalists or; by Reuters World. Service. personnel. A 
great. deal of economic information is. in any case obtained 
through exchange arrangements with. other agencies, and the 
information is such that much of it. can be gathered almost 
electronically. .,, Finally,,, -Ln somemajor bureaux where 
. economic 
news is generated; in asmuch, volume as general 
: news, the activities of general and economic . news, 
editing 
are closely integrated, and. this_occurs, in North America 
and Japan. 
The main data centres . 
for, Reuters services are located in 
the United States,. Europe,, Australia,. the, Far East and 
South-Africa. Of 25 . 
stock, exchanges covered by Videomaster 
in 1974,12 here. located in North America, 5 in., Germany, and 
the others. were_ in. London, Paris, Milan, Amsterdam, Brussels, 
"Zurich, Tokyo and 
Sydney. The growth, of personnel as a 
result of RES expansion has, therefore; tended to, occur in 
those centres which were best covered by the general news 
services in any case, and intensified structural imbalances. 
that favour the news requirements of the western world. 
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Most clients are non-media clients, because these services 
are not designed for media consumption. These include 
corporate treasurers of multinational companies, commercial 
banks, government treasuries and foreign exchange dealers 
and brokers. Banks are the 'single most important type of 
client for RES services. Computerized services produce 
65% of all RES revenue, although the number of clients for 
teleprinter services is still greater. Most clients in 
Africa take teleprinter services or bulletins. In Europe, 
United States stockbrokers were the single most important 
kind of client at first, but their importance declined 
over time relative to other categories. Elsewhere, U. S. 
clients are still very prominent. The eight 'largest clients 
for Stockmaster in Hong Kong in 1973 were U. S. companies. 
In Kuwait, location of. most Middle East clients`for this 
service in the early 'seventies, the three most important 
client categories were banks, money changers and American 
stockbrokers. 
The system is very flexible in catering for specific 
regional needs where necessary. In the Far East, Stock- 
master services had to be regional in content. World- 
wide services were not sufficiently in demand, nor was there 
sufficient communications capacity. The consequence was 
heavy development of regional economic service teams, based 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. The teleprinter' services, as 
we have seen, are greatly regionalized. 
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( 4) Changing Relationship between Economic and General 
News Services. Developments of the economicservices 
increased the: size of RES in terms of. personnel, and 
accentuated its importance in relation "to the. General 
News division. In., 1966 a new RES bureau was opened in 
Chicago, anticipating the break with Dow Jones, and pre- 
paring for. massive commodities news-gathering operation 
in. North America's largest commodities centre. Expansion 
of-economic services in North Americawas. the main impetus 
behind the opening of Canadian bureaux. for the first time 
in 1975. New. bureaux were opened in Australia Canberra 
(1969) and Perth (1970) -. where before, AAPýhad been the 
main news source, but. AAP, was involved in distribution of 
Stockmaster services in Australia. There were nine full- 
, timers covering Australian, markets in Sydney and Melbourne, 
and further expansion was expected. By 1973 some 70% of 
-;. the agency's revenue could be, traced to, economic. services,. 
and .a 
hefty. proportion of this was from, non-media clients. 
The. rapid growth of RES had changed. the: structure. of the 
British agency, 
, 
and, employee perceptions of. it. ., In 
particular the growth of RES was-related to the expansion 
of Reuters. in. North America, with the, result that in 1974, 
Reuters North America became'a separate division. The 
revenue. generated by . 
RES. made. _., 
the general news. services 
look very-wretched by, comparison, even if they did. contribute 
to. RES output. So in the new alignment of 
. 
1974 the general 
news, side_became a 'cost centre'-,. (with the title of Reuters 
World, Services -a major input. for, the; 'profit' centres 
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which were North America, media services,. economi. c services - 
but which was not itself considered in terms of profitability. 
) 
In this way, the traditional image of the organization, and 
the centrality of general news journalism, were restored, 
at least on paper. Restored so well, in fact, that for 
a while some RES personnel feared they would be answerable 
to colleagues who before had been their equals on the general 
news side. But this did not happ'en, and RES has continued 
very much unchanged at the time of writing. 
3. - 
(5) Growth of R`& D Functions. ' The success of the economic 
services is largely based 'on the development of a technical 
infrastructure at Reuters, able to'ädapt and innovate in 
the area of computer technology. The key to this infra= 
structuralcapability was the data processing section of the 
Technical Department. ''' Economic services benefitted most 
because the media market was not sufficiently wealthy to 
be able lo pay for computer-based services to the same. extent 
as the non-media market; the general news function is in 
any case far more' fluid and its product less amenable to 
computerized presentation on its own'by comparison with 
stock exchange quotes -. there are no homogeneous bodies 
of consumers in general news whose information needs to be 
codified, enumerated and parcelled out as straightforwardly 
as in the economic news field. ' The numerate quality of 
economic services allows for great flexibility in distribution 
according to market 'requirements. '(But by the late tseventie: 
it'seemed that the difference between general and economic 




the organization's own data-processing department did not 
advise on the ADX system. Its own time and energies were 
consumed with the expansion of RES; and feelings between 
RES and General News executives were not at their best. 
In fact economic news services possibly benefit more from 
the facilities that the ADX makes possible for direct 
transmission of news from point of origin to client location. 
than the general news service. The 114 computers which 
were added to the RES system in'1973 were designed mainly 
to increase thenumber. of quotations available on Stockmaster 
and Videomaster. However, the development of international 
information storage and retrieval facilities, to allow 
bureaux and clients to 
select news for themselves from central 
computers may be the biggest computer development of the 
late 170ts and, 1801s. 
Even after the re-organization of 1974, data-processing 
spends 90% of its energies in the economic service field. 
Together with other developmental activities, data-processing 
accounts for about 30% of the Technical` Department's budget. 
The North American division has its own developmental strategy: 
this is a subsidiary company called Information Distribution 
and Retrieval (IDR), which was responsible for the technical 
development of the Reuters' Monitor. IDR is funded from 
London, and its decisions: can be vetoed by London's Technical 
Department. 
Growth of technical development may be expected to inspire 
more internally-generated innovations for the future: - 
even for the agency's own teleprinters. A new teleprinter 
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model installed by'Reuter in the 'seventies was the Extel 
(US) print'er, -which Reuters distributed outside' the United 
States for awhile. '---(The distribution venture was not 
successful, 'possibly. because'there was no exclusivity clause. ) 
The United-States-'agencies-have expended much' of 'their own 
development effort' in= photography, but not so-much in 
general news'services. One reason is`the greater availability 
ofcomputer development consultants and'. manufacturers in:, 
the United' States'. ` But another reason . is that the' United 
States agencies'are"-'not so heavily involved in` the U. S. 
'non-media-market. In the: development ' of Video terminal 
-editing systems (VDT), which allow. for direct-editing by 
journalists onto computer tape' with the aid'of. TV screens, 
AP and UPI 'went to outside consultants, whereas`Reuters 
'. developed its own system. With News-View, the CATV news 
system,; "AP and UPI started by' pointing a camera" at their 
respective teleprinters, whereas` Reuters developed an 
electronic video system, in which words were. fed. ', onto the 
screen directly. '` In all probability the'-U. S. =agencies 
'will 'incr'ease their own ý developmental contribution in the, 
future. 
'Future: Competition 
This close technical identification of. Reuters with the very 
economic soul of western capitalism is what makes possible 
the continued survival of a non-government, surplus-producing 
and non-American agency,. Such is the dominant orthodoxy 
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and it mould be difficult to refute it. How secure an 
economic base is this? The system is vulnerable: to severe 
and continued depression, although there are certain 
services for which , 
there is. great demand at. least in the 
initial stages of a depression - while there is both extreme 
volatility of markets and, available investment funds. It 
may be that Reuters, being fiist. in, the global economic. 
field, has-yet to face the competition that being first can 
sometimes generate. AP-Dow Jones is so far., nearest to, 
being an international competitor, but in most areas of the 
world has not caused Reuters too much; concern. In. some. 
local markets how-ever, there may be revenueto. lose. For 
instance in 1969 the London Stock Exchange implemented its 
own service to compete with Stockmaster,; for City brokers 
and jobbers, based on a TV display system with 20 channels; 
another. and cheaper-service was SCAN. There is the further 
danger that Reuters has identified too. much with the non- 
media market. This not only opens the field to. AP-Dow 
Jones which has economic services specially, designed for 
newspapers, but opensReuters to. the criticism that it is 
not providing a, service of sufficient background, and depth,. 
and is therefore failing in one of its informational functions 
But it is clear for the moment that. Reuters does not regard 
itself as being in the business of investigative or ex- 
planatory reporting, either in. economics'or in general news-: " 
(ii) Economic News Services of the American Agencies 
AP-Dow Jones 
Reuters principal international competitor in the field of 
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economic news is AP-Dow Jones. In the strange patterns 
of competitors' alliances so. common in the. agencyworld, 
it is no surprise to find that whereas AP and Dow Jones 
compete with one another in the United States, they jointly 
operate the amalgam AP-DJ overseas. 
First news agency to cover Wall. Street was. Kiernan's agency. 
Two Kiernan employees, Charles H. Dow and Edward D. Jones 
set up their own agency in competition in 1882, called Dow, 
Jones and Co. . 
This. company gave birth in1889, to a'news- 
paper,. as. the convenient outgrowth of what had previously 
been, abulletin service. The newspaper, was entitled, simply, 
the Wall Street' Journal. But the demand for instantaneous 
news was. such that in addition-to the newspaper, Dow and' 
Jones also established the 'ticker: '. service. 
-, 
The service 
was confined-to New York City till the 'twenties, when it 
was introduced for, the first time . 
toChicago, St. -Louis, 
Detroit, ' Boston, Washington,. Richmond, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles'. The agency penetrated Canada. in 1937. 
At. first,, the, paper and the ticker, confined themselves to 
routine, hard financial news. .. 
But in. the' depression of 
the 'thirties there was not too much'of 'thi. s` about, and 
what-there was was'gloomy., So, instead of slipping into 
the routine of`a. trade magazine for., a shrinking market, 
the company moved into general business news.,,.; To promote 
this new policy. ; 
the president of. Dow Jones,, Hogate by name, 
brought the chief of the Washington bureau ; into New York 
as the paper's managing editor. `This was William H. Grimes, 
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who had been a reporter for UP, and who later became Wall 
Street Journal editor, a post he held till 1958. 
Dow Jones today has more than 2,500 employees with news 
bureaux in most major cities of the United States,. as well 
as Canada and some in Western Europe and Asia. The United 
States news service operates on weekdays, and is operated 
by staff of the Wall Street Journal. 
The same year that Reuters withdrew from the earlier news 
exchange arrangement between itself and Dow Jones (1967),. 
Dow Jones and AP set up a joint news operation overseas 
for gathering and distributing economic news. The operation 
for newspapers 'is Called the AP-DJ Report, running six days 
a week, 24 hours a day. News is gathered by staff appointed 
by AP and Dow Jones, transmitted to the New York headquarters, 
where it is edited by Dow Jones staff, and then distributed 
to Europe, Asia, South Africa and South America. There 
are two basic services: the Financial Report and the 
Economic Report. Whereas the Economic Report is designed 
primarily for newspapers, the-Financial Wire goes mainly, 
" to overseas brokers and bankers. " This operates 21 hours` 
a day. AP handles the marketing of these services over- 
seas. A third. service, the Petroleum News Service, is a 
specialized news spin-off'serving the oil and petrochemical 
industries. In 1971, AP-DJ'claimed'to tie distributed in 
twenty-two countries, serving banks, brokers, government 
offices, newspapers, ' industrial groups 'and hotels. 
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The technological infrastructure for AP-Dow Jones was 
indirectly established in 1964 when Dow Jones began-the 
computerizationof its. news-communication system. This 
was the very same year, significantly, that the Reuters- 
Ultronic deal came into operation, and in the period 1963-4 
both AP and UPI embarked on computerized commercial-financial 
services, for the: domestic U. S. market. 
Although AP and-Dow Jones competed on the home market front 
(with Dow Jones very much in the lead for non-media"clients 
of financialwire services), a partnership inoverseas 
operations seemed a , sound adventure. AP'had a well- 
established international communications and news-gathering 
system, which was especially geared to the needs of the 
domestic U. S. market. It had the general news service 
which would : 
feed. neatly into a broad economic service for 
overseas: newspapers; while at the same time, its name and 
its interests, like those. of Dow. Jones, would especially 
recommend themselves to American banks, brokers and 
. multinational=corporation 
operating outside the. United 
States. It was. also a relatively cheap way of expanding 
both the Dow, Jones. and the Wall Street Journals overseas 
coverage. Before-the formation. of AP-DJ,, the Dow Jones 
company had about 
4 full-time correspondents in Europe 
and 2 in the Far East; AP-DJ maintains-around 22 overseas 
full-time correspondents. 
AP-DJ was a very suitable combination in another sense. 
Both AP'and Dow Jones had reason to be worried about the'. 
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likelihood of greater Reuters activity on the U. S. market, 
and both would have liked to see a reduction in the strergth 
of RES overseas. DJ had earlier considered the possibility 
of co-operation rather than competition, when it approached 
Reuters with a suggestion of a scheme similar to the one 
which eventually emerged with AP. But Reuters had probably 
less to gain than AP, especially in the field of economic 
services. 
In competing with Reuters, as we have seen, AP-DJ did not 
go altogether for the same market. It began with the non- 
media market, but then gave some attention to the media 
market for economic services, which Reuters had rather for- 
saken in favour of the more lucrative non-media market. 
But it did not adopt Reuters' hardware (in video-interrogation 
systems), keeping to teleprinter services in its initial 
years. 
For AP, the AP-DJ deal was attractive because it offered 
a lucrative opportunity of exploiting the greatly increased 
communications capacity allowed by developments in tele- 
phonic cable technology. It was also a means of furthering 
sales, of spreading the name and prestige of AP, and thus 
" helping in the competitive fight with UP and Reuters. It 
fitted into current thinking about the correct competitive 
strategy in the general press fight against television, 
namely, the development of specialized fields. And it was 
another response to the problem of relatively saturated 
newspaper markets. 
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--AP-DJ is a two-headed structure.,. AP's responsibilities 
lie mainly with technical problems, communications and 
sales, and these-functions were initially located. in 
London. They: still are, but in recent years Londori. has 
also taken more responsibility for new-gathering and 
editing ; functions. Problems of cable breaks, and the 
desirability of handing some of the editing over. to those 
in. close<proximity to European- markets, led to. a sharing 
of editorial responsibilities between New York and London. 
London takes-over from NewYork'eight hours 
. a. 
day while 
theLondon. Stock Exchange is in operation. ",. In London 
:: AP-DJ functions are run. by staff recruited either from AP 
or Dow Jones, or from outside on; the: basisof expertise. 
In New York all the editing is done by Dow. Jones. personnel. 
London is AP's principal overseas bureau, and AP-DJ's 
, London-office is located in 
the same building. ., 
The top.. 
AP. man, appointed to the AP-DJ operation was , Conrad Fink.. - 
Fink, had been- AP's New Delhibureau chief; three years-, 
after. his'AP-DJ appointment. he was promotedýto assistant 
general manager of AP in charge. ofsales. . 
The, top Dow 
'Jones man appointe. d-in New: York at the time of: Fink's 
London promotion was Ray Shaw, who later became. assistant 
general manager of-Dow Jones. These appointments were 
-possibly indicative of the growing. importanceof AP-DJ 
in the eyes of its parent organizations.. -:. 
The venture-was initially conceived as a simple desk-bound 
function, which would involve, no independent, AP-DJ. staff 
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as such, consisting only of putting together material on 
the wires. of AP. and Dow Jones. At. the beginning the 
intention was to follow Reuters: and pursue only the non- 
media market.. The Economic Wire for newspapers was 
introduced two years after the financial wire, partly in 
recognition of Reuters' main weakness in this area, also 
because competition in the overseas non-media . market. was 
not going so well - Reuters was very well-established in 
this field. 
.: 
The Economic Wire is not entirely different 
from the financial, simply made up of additions to, and 
elaborations of, the financial wire. Like RES, AP-DJ 
often distributes, its services through national-or other 
agencies, although both kinds of sale, direct and indirect, 
exist. 
It has been an uphill climb for AP-DJ in some areas. But 
performance was good in Japan. As early as. 1967, AP-DJ 
signed up Kyodo as client. Kyodo at: this time was expanding 
further into the economic news field; in competition with 
Japants second agency Jiji, which had always specialized 
in economic coverage. Kyodo's usage of-AP-DJ reports 
from certain major financial. centres was often much higher 
than its usage of Reuters. or AP general news reports. 
By 1972, the revenue from Japan about equalled the revenue { 
frone the whole of, Europe. In Europe,, AP-DJ, confronted 
the same kinds of problem as RES faced in the United States 
-entering a very well-established market. But the problems 
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in Europe-may have been even more -severe, 'since American 
organizations are. 'rumoured to be more"open to new services 
than European. ' In the largest European market of all, 
West Germany, '. -AP=DJ set up a teleprinter, distribution 
system through'a leading German financial-paper,,, IHandelsblatt, 
to compete with'VWD (partly owned by Reuters).. It offered 
six possible teleprinter services. on the financial side: 
management, investment, - money,. general industrial, chemical 
and energy, but `VWD, had. a choice, of 22teleprinter services 
and already'sold to-550 clients. AP-DJ .,, which had 
initially sought a deal with VWD, -had only 12 clients after 
its first- year of operation, in West Germany with, Handelsblatt, 
and reckoned some 250-300 were needed to start makinga 
profit. 
'In''. other. world'regions''AP-DJIs penetration ''has not . 
been 
spectacular. '" Its economic wire'for newspapersis not 
dissimilar-in market behaviour to, the New'York, Times News 
Service. Much, of AP-DJ's content , is `American in origin 
- coming from or.: through the Wall. Street Journal. It is 
basically preparedin New-York,. with'a heavy concentration 
on American "affairs, -and it, distributes, the service 
relatively, unchanged' around : the world;, making. no allowance 
therefore for different market needs . In the Far . East = 
only the Economic Service is sold,.. not the Financial.. The 
-Economic Service iri 
factmay have-been introduced. with 
Japan's. Kyodo agency especially. inmind. ` Sofar as the 
. 
financial-services were concerned' there was theý, problem 
that'RES was'already there and the'fact. that, the, volume 
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of interest in the Far East for western stocks is limited 
and also difficult for real-time reasons, since the New 
York exchange closes at about the time the Japanese opens. 
Reuters Stockmaster tends to concentrate, for these reasons. 
on regional stock exchanges. AP-DJ went to Japan, Australia, 
Korea and Taiwan. Elsewhere, RES. remained in control of 
the market. 
Unlike RES, AP-DJ does not specialize or regionalize its 
service to a great extent. The agency does not'have the 
same facilities, nor does it. want. to put up the necessary 
outlay (upto mid-70's). One initial advantage. behind its 
establishment was the fact that it could. be put together 
largely from existing services - those of AP and Dow Jones. 
The increase of staff in Europe in recent years, however, 
indicates some concession to the needs of the. European 
client, or. simply recognition perhaps of the importance of 
European news for Japan. Total reportorial staff in 
Europe by 1972 was. six in'London and. eight on the continent. 
In the early 'seventies, AP-DJ claimed good sales on the 
basis of its reportage of the money markets, and its news-". 
gathering strength in coverage of North American affairs. 
This competition may haveinspired the introduction by 
Reuters of the Reuters Money Report and Monitor. 
Reuters' main advantage was its superiority in hardware. 
The 1964 Ultronics deal gave it the right to distribute 
Ultronics market interrogation services. Reuters could 
sustain its on technological infrastructure in the United 
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States, while` maintaining the right to-distribute Ultronics, 
Stockmaster and Videomaster in'the-rest of the world. 
Using this sophisticated hardware` allowed Reuters to offer 
services of far greater specialization--for certain market 
or individual requirements, not only in the area of stock 
exchange quotations, commodity prices and similar inform- 
. ation, but even inmarket 
research and management consult- 
ancy material, which would normally take considerable 
preparation for , 
distribution. ' AP-DJhad no desire to 
enter this area. `. The amýunt of investment required was 
a principal deterrent. It"was'also reluctant'to involve 
itself with equipment that might°quickly; be outmoded. A 
technical lag'can sometimes be'more: serious than an editor- 
ial, lag,. and much more difficult to eliminate'. ' 'Something 
of this"kind happened. to' Reuters. over the Ultronics deal, 
'according to AP-DJ'"sources. - But-Reüters. had'built up a 
very strong technical service-and development department 
of '-its ` own and was `eventually able 'to, fend : for itself. and 
iegotiate with itssupplierson-equal terms inrespect of 
hardware development. 
AP-DJ concentrated on improvements of teleprinter service. 
One'of Ultronic's competitors, "Bunker-Reremo, supplied 
AP-DJ hardware, and in 1972''was looking for international 
markets. AP-DJ considered the possibility of 'quota' 
; reports, made possible by selector devices which had 
-süddenly'becomecheaper and more reliable than 'they. had 
ever'been. ": Thee made it possible to instruct a' printer 
in 'a client's office ' to shut off 'during transmission of 
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information which was of no interest to the. client. In 
other words, it allowed for greater , service. specialization 
on the normal teleprinter network. AP-DJ first applied 
the principle on the petroleum wire, and intended to 
extend it'to other services. 
In hardware for economic, services, as. in news. systems for 
CATV, Reuters moved. into the market, with the latest 
technological backing, while American agencies used a less 
advanced technology. In, both cases theAmerican agencies 
subsequently introduced technological improvements of" 
their own. It is possible therefore that the originality 
of Reuters' first moves on the North American market is 
a short-lived phenomenon. 
Early in 1974, the International Marketing Services Division 
(IMS) of Dow Jones and Co. Inc., started , 
to. sign up 
prestigious business and, financial newspapers from abroad, 
for management of their advertising sales and promotion 
activities. After two months it had signed up seven 
different foreign publications, and announced agreements 
with two more: .. 
the Australian Financial Review in Sydney 
and the Het Financieele Dagblad in Amsterdam. The ult- 
imate. aim was a network of business publications that 
could offer access to space to advertisers in any, country. 
The IMS office would provide' demographic, circulation and 
., rate 
information, and place ads for. any client, looking for 
overseas advertising holes,. and eventually the information 
would be stored in a computer 'bank for , easy, 
access. 
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Existing offices of the operation in . 197.4-were New , 
York, `. 
-, 
Los Angeles, Frankfurt and London. ' These offices stand 
. separately 
from the advertising , and. editorial 
bases for 
the Company's Wall Street journal. 
This development wasperceived. internally by Dow Jones as 
an. extension of the principle of providing news services 
to business clients through the AP-DJ wire. 'Like the 
ticker service, the IMS seemed tobe concentrating on the 
Japanese market, where'. it had signed up the national 
business daily, Nihon Keizei Shimbun, and three sister 
publications. Other publications involved in the scheme 
were Italy's 11 Sole/24 and its affiliated business/political 
magazine. Mondo Economic, and Asia's business newsweekly 
the Far Eastern Economic Review. 
The. Dow. Jones tickers involvement with. a. largermedia 
organization-therefore, ' and. AP'sinvolvement°through AP-DJ, 
raises the problem of ? news agency association with; advert- 
ising-ventures-, which RES, despite its extensive business 
market, has largely managed. . 
to avoid. But senior Reuters 
sources" in 1975 reported that clients paid for inclusion 
of, their information on the`Monitor service. ' 
AP and UPI: Economic Services for the United States 
Within the'United States, of course, Dow Jones is in 
competition with AP. Most daily, newspapers which 
subscribe to economic services take AP or UPI. The 
business market goes mostly to Dow Jones,, Commodity 
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News. Service and now Reuters. Dow Jones sold to 33 of 
the larger newspapers in 1973, about the same number of 
newspaper clients that Reuters had for general news 
services. 
Financial and economic services for newspapers have 
inspired some of the most important advances in wire 
service transmission in the United States. . 
Financial 
news, largely a collection of figures, is susceptible to 
highly routine procedures and automatic handling. 
AP's financial operation for the domestic U. S. market 
involves some 40 staff, who produce three different kinds 
of service: business: or 'creative' news, computer tabulation 
or market tables, manual tabulation of : dividends and earn- 
ings information. Computer tabulation of market tables 
began in 1962 with the introduction of the first IBM 1620 
computer. All functions before then. were manual. An up- 
dated system introduced in 1966 with the installation of 
IBM 360-40's eliminated human intervention altogether. A 
further improvement in 1973 increased the speed of data 
computation by about four times, with the help of the 
first IBM 370-145, and enabled AP. to read electronically 
all commodity and security exchanges in North America. 
Major computer operations were first introduced to the 
financial news sections therefore several years before 
they were applied to general news (in the early 'seventies), 
and this was true of all the agencies. UPI'S financial 
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news operations are rather more wedded to general news than 
AP's. There are-two major on-line computer systems 
employing three Univca. Spectra 70's: one 'system for news 
(general and financial), ' one for stock tables and other 
data tabulations, and the' third' system is a 'shadow' 
backup for the first two. (AP did not install a shadow 
when it first computerized, and there were many severe. 
complaints during the initial inevitable' breakdowns. ) 
Like AP, UPI employs around 40 persons for its financial 
news production. ` Reuters, which of course had a'sizeable 
non-media market in the United States for business services, 
: '-, started a'financial service for newspapers only in December 
1973 with 'Business Beat', but this did not include market 
tabulations. 
The"American agencies concentrate-on general financial 
information, the kind likely to. interest a wide range of 
public interest, but without treating single stocks or 
commodities in depth. Within this general field there 
has been a certain sophistication of data. AP introduced 
an expanded' system for afternoon papers in 1974 'on its 
special dataspeed circuit for users of narrow measure 
market tables. One of the. two new tables gives last 
sale prices and price/earnings ratios in approximately 
two thirds of a' standardcolumn, `and another combines 
current last sale prices with previous closing ' prices 
of'is'sues which have not "yet traded during the current 
market day. -This enables anewspaperto provide readers 
with prices of all securities, even in the early editions. 
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Problems arose in September. 1974 whenthe New York Stock 
Exchange voted to extend its trading hours by 30 minutes. 
This meant that many, newspapers would not be able to 
carry closing prices in time. for their final editions, and 
some newspapers even considered dropping, their coverage 
of stocks altogether. 
Recent innovations in UPI's Unistox service; included a price 
indicator that reflects average daily change, of all 1600 
or so stocks on the NYSE;, a high-speed . financial' 
tabular 
service called Unistox Data Two which provides, afternoon 
editions with a series of pre-closing and, at-, the-close 
NYSE stock and bond. tables sent in eight , pica. measures. 
to 
include common stock price-earnings ratios. 
Services ofthis kind go primarily to newspapers,; and 
primarily to domestic clients, althoughUnistox does also 
sell to some overseas clients, including, the International 
Herald Tribune and the Rome Daily American. UPI-had no 
substantial economic service operation.. for overseas markets 
until 1976 when it combined with Commodity. News Service 
for. this purpose. In one or two. countries where,. there 
was a very high demand for such services, these were 
locally produced, as in Japan. On the domestic U. S. 
market the scope for major sales-in the non-media; market 
is limited by the nature of  
American agency conception of 
financial news, and the strength ofthe competition - namely, 
Dow Jones and Reuters. APME's Business News Committee in 
1972 found that businessmen did not . rate, 
AP's business 
; 4oi. 
coverage highly. by comparison with the Dow Jones ticker, 
but that, they did. tend to rate it higher than UPI's. AP 
tends. to. concentrate as we have seen on general market 
requirements. Even here the number of, newspapers using 
AP's. services are limited. Well over half a small sample 
of 23 papers contacted by the committee said they did not 
use AP: graphics charts issued for weekend stock pages. 
Nine out. of nineteen other papers contacted by a committee 
member, expressed dissatisfaction with AP's business coverage. 
Economic services. do not have the same significance for the 
-. major 
American news agencies as they, do for Reuters. For 
Reuters, economic news sales to. non-media clients are what 
keepthe. company afloat at a. time, when media organizations 
around the world face difficult problems of. survival. Not 
only do the American agencies have the benefit of a wealthy 
domestic market, but, thgy have also exploited other media 
channels - in particular, news-photo - which the European 
agencies. do not have or. have ignored. 
Advertising and L'Agence Havas 
of the four major western agencies, the two most dependent 
on non-media-markets are the European: Reuters and AFP, 
which depend largely on revenue from the commercial and 
state sectors respectively. But AFP's predecessor, Havas, 
depended not so much on State revenue (although this was 
important in. its overseas operations), but on revenue, 
received through the placement of advertising material in 
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the pages of its client newspapers, and similar activities. 
The problems these-activities raised concerning the impart- 
iality of the agency's news service, not to mention its 
power of direct influence on the structure and control of 
many of France's leading newspapers, elicited strong 
criticism and suspicion well before World War Two. The 
independence which the founders of AFP sought after the War 
was as much or more an independence from the consequences 
of a Havas-type operation as from Government control. In 
the event AFP achieved the first kind of independence, but 
not the second, although the consequences of its ties with 
the government are difficult to assess. The advertising 
operation of Havas is therefore of some importance in coming 
to an understanding of the contemporary AFP, but of rather 
greater significance is the lesson it teaches'about what 
can happen when a news agency departs too far from its 
primary media function. 
Havas bureau was established in 1832, but not until 1857 
did the agency make its first-venture into advertising, 
by selling news and announcements of Government departments. 
to newspapers. At this time-the agency had 200 clients 
in the Provinces, in addition to its Parisien clientele, 
and was therefore a useful channel of communication for 
the government. The idea was extended to the exchange of 
news in return for advertising space. Havas linked up 
other agencies which specialized in the publicity of certain 
tmaisons. decommerce', and at. the same time as he entered 
into agreements with other international news agencies, he 
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also established liaisons with overseas advertising 
agencies - 'toutes les Brandes maisons de publicite a 
travers le monde'.? Theidea was extended to provincial 
newspapers in 1860, and the' agency came to act'as their 
advertising representative, soliciting advertisements 
and preparing advertising'copy. 
In"1865. this side of the business was formally recognised 
with'the establishment of the Societe Generale des Annonces. 
Under the"new arrangement, the Havers brothers became 
members of an eight-member associated editor-and-manager 
team. ' The company was the property of. Havas, and one 
of the team, Jacques-Edouard Lebey, had_a son who-was 
later to become director of Agence Havas. The Havas 
brothers preferred the informational to"the advertising 
functions, and delegated much of the latter to others. 
In-1879 the Societe was completely absorbed by Havasu the 
same year that Lebey became president of the agency. Lebey 
`actually tried to have some newspaper directors allowed on 
the Board, but was surprised-at the general resistance to 
this idea, , 
which was supported on the ground that a news- 
paper director; would have; privileged access to information 
b. yp s.: probably a comparison , with other clients. 
This s wer 
genuinely. held argument, 'one that . Reuters. upheld, in"a 
rather different way, with regard, to his business clients. 
But'also; the board probably feared that : the presence. of 
newspapers would endanger the political neutrality of the 
. -agency 




Why advertising, and not economics as in the case of Reuters? 
Economics reporting in fact was important for Havas too 
from the earliest days. One'of its first concerns was to 
establish services for the rapid transmission of financial 
and market information from the Stock Exchanges of Paris, 
London, Berlin, Vienna and Frankfurt to Lyon, where the 
agency distributed this information to lending houses, 
banks, money changers and speculators. Havas provided. 
financial news services to the like, of La Banque de Lyon 
et de la Loire, Le Credit General Francais, La Sbciete 
Generale Francaise, and Le Credit Provincial.. Banks 
received such services before newspapers. 
In fact, economic and advertising activities were closely 
linked.. Newspapers were more likely to want to subscribe 
to a service that contained good economic coverage. 
Moreover, financial institutions and other companies, which 
before had paid for the occasional mention in a local paper, 
were very willing to pay for a mention in any agency 
dispatch that went to , several papers. 
"Newspapers. will, subscribe if it's well composed 
and contains not only local news but also the 
commercial, industrial and financial news of 
your'town.... 'This last word'-perhaps contains 
possibilities for a future source of income.... 
You know what some companies pay a newspaper 
for the occasional and very discreet discussion 
of their affairs. How much more they. would 
spend on asheet to be reproduced in twenty or 
more newspapers! ' The four or'five Lyonnais 
credit institutions could devote to this what 
at present they spend less usefully on other 
things Think this over and keep your eyes 
open. " 
In effect, Havas sold the advertising space of his client 
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newspapers to advertisers, who were often finance instit- 
utions,. only this. space was not always clearly labelled 
'advertising' ! Havas acted as a broker for. any bank 
or credit-institution that wished to control. reports 
in newspapers they were unfortunate,, enough not to own. 
The-cost of these, financial:, services varied; considerably 
from. town to town, depending onthe importance of the 
paper and its public. -... They; could, cost anything-from 
100 to , 
10,000 francs and above. Sometimes the agency 
would pay-more attention to the needs of, non-media'clients 
for such services than the' newspapers: 
"While not inattentive to . 
the needs of the papers, 
its. (Havas) primary concern was to distribute 
its news,. and. in the provinces, where the"papers 
were more, dependent on it, if. the. papers failed 
prove interesting clients the Agency felt no to 
compunction in offering its wares to clients 
whose possession of the news might, harm;, the 
papers. This was especially true of news which, 
;; while the -. 
journaux de 
. 
depeches ' were eager to 
include it, was of value. to a specific, "interest 
in the population, be it financial and commercial 
news or share-prices on the official and unofficial 
Paris Stock. Exchange. In"these, instances, services 
of such news were transmitted to. 'negociants', 
'speculateurs', tles-agents de change'.,, banks and 
tsocietes de credit', either, direct or'through. 
various intermediaries of-which papers, were. but 
one among several - cafes, cercles, banks, etc. 
The cloth and silk interests : of. -; the Lyonnais area 
on the one 
hand, the speculative activity on the 
Lyonnais stock exchange on the other, meant that 
'L'Agencel could find markets here that repaid its 
investments-elsewhere; such news was as . 
important 
to these new markets as that relating to grain 
prices andagricultural. goods was to amore trad- 
itional clientele, the communication of which 
" figures large , 
in the . priorities of. the papers in 
rural 'districts. ""g 
By selling advertising,, space to its newspaper clients, 
Havas was able to contain the extent to which the cost of 
communications was charged to its provincial clients. 
The news operation therefore became relatively cheaper, even 
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if adulterated through its association with the financial 
news system, and in this respect suited the clients. Hauas 
was aprofit-oriented enterprise, not a co-operative 
service like the Press Association. It increased the 
competition between provincial papers as well as'that between 
Parisien and provincial press. It could play one off against 
another and in short, had tremendous influence. Newspapers 
I 
were individually weak by comparison; Havas was no servant 
of the press" like the PA; it was -boss. -It It was not guided 
by service considerations: complaints about business 
practice would have had no effect here. 
In all, Havas. engaged in three major kinds of advertising 
activity: 1. Publicite commerciale - advertising as 
normally understood; 
2. Publicite dtinfluence - the kind of 
government propaganda put-out to papers-to prepare the 
public for future decision; and 
3. Publicite financiere - which consisted of 
creating-afavourable atmosphere for the floating of security 
issues. or loans. 
These activities naturally gave rise to a problem of 
credibility. Havas for instance was one of many French 
publications in receipt of bribes from the Russian govern- 
ment before the First World War. The story was recorded 
by Lewis Gannett in 1924.10 The Czar's government system- 
atically bribed the French press from 1904 until the Soviet 
Revolution. This was the period during which the Franco- 
. 
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Russian alliance develöped. The Czarss interest was to 
keep the Paris press quiet'on the subject of the strangling 
of Finland by Russia and the purchase of Czarist bond 
issues-with'fifteen billion French-. francs. More than a 
score of Parisien daily newspapers were on the Czar, ts 
payroll. A'French journalist and Czarist'agent, Arthur 
Raffälovich,, was - consulted 'on the ' desirable methods for 
corrupting the' French press. In his report of 1905, 
Raffalovich'wrbte: '. ; 
"The internal events in Russia:, the disturbance`, 
mutinies, and massacres created a very uneasy 
stateof`mind among the ownersof our securities - 
in France, and it appeared that if the press was 
left. to itself it would'not fail to upset the 
public still more. " 
Of 50,000 francs put at the disposition of this agent by 
the Banque de Paris, 10,000 went to Havas, 7,000 to Hebrard 
of the Temps, 4,000 tothe Journal. Rafflovich continued: 
"In our difficult circumstances the support of 
the' majority of` the : press is - unfortunately 
indispensable to us until the loan is put 
through. The papers have become greedier 
as the loan becomes more distant, and one may 
ý. ' judge what they would -say if given rein 'by the 
tone of a few papers which have remained outside 
the arrangement. `... `. 'We must continue to pay 
100,000francs for three. months, and look: forward 
'to-paying- Havas 10,000 `francs'for an even `longer 
period.... The cancelled cheques are in the hands 
": `of, the" Ministry of Finance. "12 
'The' -subsidies continued, at a lesser `rate of reward, for 
'several" years. Le Temps, which was a mouthpiece of the 
" French 'government and not controlled by'Havas, was the 
greatest beneficiary. 
Importänt'as'the advertising operations' were 'to'Havas, 
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Frederix, the agency's. historian, declares it a myth. to say 
that Havas depended on these absolutely. Between 1879 
and. 1918, the telegraphic business always made a profit, 
whereas the advertisement branch made a loss on five 
occasions in this period; for the period as a whole, the 
telegraphic' operations made two and a halftimes as much 
money as the. advertisement branch, accounting for 70% of 
the organizationt. s total receipts.. One reason for this 
relatively poor performance of advertising. was that advert- 
ising was not as widespread an activity then as , it is 
today. Secondly, the exchange agreements between the 
international agencies cut down on news-gathering expenses 
considerably so that profits in this sphere were not too 
difficult to obtain by comparison, and finally, government 
departments and publicity agents, anxious as they were for 
promotion, were perhaps not that keen to push material 
via Havas if papers did not in fact-use it. 
If advertising did not bring about direct profits, it did 
bring about press control by Havas. In other words, the 
commodity offered by Havas (advertisers) and the commodity 
it controlled, (advertising),. put it in a very strong 
relationship. indeed with. individual newspapers. In 1880 
. 
for instance, Hävas negotiated for the advertising columns 
of the most prosperousof all provincial newspapers, Le 
Petit Marseillais. It considered paying either: a flat 
200,000 francs for control of all advertising. copy, or, 
acquiring control of extra-local advertising, taking a 
commission of 25% on the total revenue from advertising 
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copy furnished by Havas. In 1878, the advertising columns 
of this. paper were considered-to be worth at. least 20,000 
francs, and , 
in, 188oits advertising columns were leased out 
for-125,000 francs a year. 
While leasing out, control of their financial publicity 
, 
populardailies. generally retained control of their 
. commercial advertising. 
Between 1901 and 1914, the four 
Pari-sien giants rallied, to plans 'to group their services of 
both-kinds of. advertising in one conglomerate. It. was led 
, by Leon Renier--. a. co-managing, director of Havas, and est- 
ablished as. Le. Syndicat Central=dePublicite in January. 1914. 
Havas had great influence, thereforeon the larger-circul-ion 
Paris 
_newspapers,,, whilecontrollingthe non-local 
advertising 
copy of many provincial papers. 
After the First World War., the giants, felt threatened. -by. ' 
the,. provincial press -, provincial. -newspapers had lower 
distribution,.. labour and producti: on'costs, and operated in 
what wereoften. monopoly conditions. Provincial papers 
consumed a lot . of; international'. news, 'which-Havers provided, 
and, -were. more-dependent. on the agency. for-this commodity 
than-the. Parisien papers. _Thus,. at 
a. time of growing 
--. conflict; between', Parisien and provincial press, Havas 
managed to maintain: extensive: interests in both parties. 
But-it 
_did 
not -want . 
to see.. the balance. change.. When- the 
Petit Parisien,,. largest of. theihris popular dailies, tried. 
to compete with the - 
larger provincial regional dailies by 
setting, up its'own regional-editions, 'acquiring interests 
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in provincials and even setting. up its own paper in Rennes, 
it was faced with effective hostility from both Hachette, 
the French equivalent of W. H. Smith, and Havas. When 
the wealthy. perfumer, Francois Coty, set up 'L'Ami Du 
Peuple' in 1927 at a price of 10 centimes which undercut 
the other Paris dailies, Havas refused to deal with its 
publicity and Hachette refused to distribute the paper. 
And when Coty went bankrupt, Havas bought up the paper at 
31 million francs, and raised copy price to 25 centimes. 
All the giants were eventually forced back towards the 
regions north of the Loire. Havas had gambled correctly, 
since the old giants were to lose out to a 'new brand of 
popular journalism inthe 'thirties, while the regional 
dailies moved from strength to strength. Total Parisien 
print oscillated around 52 million between. 1914 and 1939, 
while that of regional dailies moved up. from 4 to 6z million. 
As long-established Paris dailies died, regional papers 
were thriving... 
It is the post-World War One period therefore in which the 
advertising operations of Havas -came into their own unmist- 
akably, to acquire for the agency both profit and discredit. 
As a result of the Syndicat agreement accomplished by Leon 
Renier, Havas now had the right to sell the advertising 
space of Paris' five largest newspapers throughout the 
world. Advertising revenues grew considerably, 'starting 
well after World War One when Havas took over the Lagrange 
agency in 1920. But simultaneously the news section 
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suffered, and between 1919 and 1922 accumulated a huge 
deficit, even though, in . 1923 total revenue for all Havas 
operations was nearly. double, that of 1913; ' at about 10 
million francs. While ; advertising revenues soared, the 
news section accepted undertakings from the Quai d'Orsay, 
to underwrite Havas losses in unprofitable markets, most 
noticeably in South America. " At home, advertising oper- 
ations stimulated the growth of a provincial network of 
Havas. offices.: ", Daily newspaper subscribers received 
their 
services , by, teletype from Paris. Merchants and bankers 
wereservedwith news packages put together by local offices. 
The twenties were lucrative. years. In 1929 even the news 
side. covered' its, expenses, and the-advertising-branch 
had-never done so well. `= But. advertising revenue slumped 
30% in-. 1930, at the beginning of the Depression. French 
press ; revenue of 'course declined'; ' subscriptions of allied 
agencies. shrank"orceased'. altogether, dangerously under- 
mining. the-secure. baseof cheap newssupply'which both 
. 
Havas and_Reuters. had exploited through the cartel, and 
which. at. one time'had produced 2"million francs a year. 
The Turkish news, agency for instance in 1933-was in debt 
to the tune of 400,000 francs., And in South America,. the 
American agencies were stealing AFP clients. In 1931, 
Havasuwas persuaded by Briand, with none too great a 
reluctance . 
it -seems, to have the , Department of-Foreign 
Affairs"reimbuse the`agency. up to-as much as 800,000 francs 
each month for-expenses, lncurred in the agency! s rein- 
forcement, of its bureaux and foreign `services. in Europe, 
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America and Asia. The Foreign Office budget for 1932 stated 
that 'the effort of the department was concentrated on. the 
reorganization of the foreign service of our news agencies, 
principally the Agence Havas'. Even so, the agencyts 
end-of-year deficit by 1934 was 800,000 francs. Staff 
were requested that year to accept lower salaries, and end- 
of-year. gratuities were suspended. The French government 
meanwhile, like the British, was alarmed by the propaganda 
services of other governments, and determined not to lose 
out in this (relatively): comfortable form of warfare. 
Never before had the agency fallen in so completely with 
government objectives. Advertising revenue continued to 
slide; news service revenues by 1938 were no longer 
received from the agencies of the United States, Germany 
or Russia and were shortly to cease coming from Italy. 
Debts owed by the agencies of Turkey, Greece, Poland and 
the Balkan countries simply mounted. Meanwhile news costs 
were soaring with the acceleration of international crisis. 
The Ethiopian War for instance-had cost the agency one 
million francs in costs of coverage even though it co- 
operated with Reuters in providing a common news service 
on the war for clients in Europe. 
Yet the depression, by. increasing the dependence of 2000 
newspaper clients on the agency for news and advertisers, 
simply increased its control over the French press. This 
was food for left-wing social criticism of those. yearss 
the New York correspondent of Le Petit Parisien in this 
period was quoted as sayi. ng: - 
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"Most of. the; commercial advertising is handled 
by Havas. To alienate Havas may mean for a 
newspaper the loss of practically all its 
advertising revenue. This power of one 
advertising: agency is of tremendous import- 
ance for the. press and the public, for itis 
known .. 
that in'several cases advertising 
patrons have objected to editorial policies 
and., interfered, directly or indirectly with 
them, stopped campaigns and tabooed topics. ""13 
Pierre Lazareff, editor of Le Petit Parisien, wrote that 
"through its grip on the distribution of news 
and : advertising, 
theHavas agency was able`to 
c. 1 




Laney, . writing 
a short time later in " 1947 said 
that the:;. news supplied'by"Havas 
'was . often, '. if . not 
always, bent to, fit its 
enormous volume of advertising. It enjoyed. 
a practical. monopolyand it., -could and did 
control news. anywhere in France". 
Lazareff,... again, stated 
"De tous les poisons qui debiliterent l'opinion 
publique francaise,. l'agence Havas fut un des 
plus dangereux.! 116 
There was no strong chain to combat Havas. The only. 
'chain' as such was the 'Presse Regionale' in Paris, 
founded by industrialists of Northern France, which 
controlled 11 papers (dailies) in the provinces. and other 
publications and was'Catholic-right. 
17 Havas influence 
was enormous: 
"Leon Renier,. chairman. of. the Board of Directors 
of the. 'Agence Havas, the : largest" news, dissemination 
organization of the country, influences at the same 
-time the leading French advertising agency, the 
Agence Nationale de Publicite, and. the.. giant 
enterprise Messageries Hachette,. `whichpi's the'place 
of disposal for the entire periodical press and'the 
greatest part . of . 
the "book publications'. "18 
In brief, ' was said' Havas had a monopoly on -information= 
exchange"in France, a monopoly on'press advertising, , and 
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that its involvement in advertising influenced the 'character 
. of 
her news output. Frederix tends to deflate many of 
these criticisms. 
19 He says that it was inevitable that 
Havas should be a very powerful distributor of domestic 
news throughout France, -since 
the'press could not afford 
to support as powerful an agency to compete against it. 
Individual agencies could, and did, have their own agree- 
ments with foreign agencies for foreign news. Havas did 
not, he says, have a monopoly over press advertising. It 
controlled directly or indirectly the publicity for the 
Journal, le Matin, L'Echo,. and the Petit Journal in Paris. 
But it did not have Le Petit Parisien, Paris-Soire, 
L'Intravisigeant, Le Figaro, Le,. Temps, L'Oeuvre, L'Excelsior, 
La Liberte, Populaire or L'Hun, anite. In the provinces it 
did not control many of the biggest and most important 
newspapers, such as Le Phase de Nantes, France'de Bordeaux, 
Progres de Lyon, Depeche de Toulhouse, L'Est Republicain, 
L'Echo du Nord, etc. As for radio, Havas had control of 
Radio Luxembourg, (majority shareholder), and of. the Poste 
Parisien, but it did not control the business of six other 
French stations. A campaign to strip Havas of its publicity 
business was dropped. So too was another proposal that 
Havas should be nationalized. However, the Popular Front 
Government did pass a press law which, included a requirement 
that all newspapers publish their finances, and name their 
principal share-holders. It also required the resignation 
of Pierre Guimier,. director-general of Le Journal, appointed 
to that post, byHavas from his position of director of 
publicity. Leon Blum accused Guimier of organizing"a 
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concerted press attack against him and his government in 
1936, and of hurting the Leftist! press.  The alleged 
press attack had involved, some-300 newspapers. '-When Blum's 
accusation was backed up. with"athreat to separate. the 
agency's news from its business operations,. Guimier resigned. 
Rumours of a pending, divorce: between these two. sides of the 
business persisted afterwards. - 
Havas continued in its. accustomed position of'strength 
therefore until, the, Second World War. In.. 1939 it' was 
estimated that . Havas controlled 
80 
, to . 90% , of all,: advertising 
20 
appearing in French. newspapers.. In.. 1949,. the five largest 
Parisien papers ere controlled byHavas, of which one was 
Le Petit Parisien, which before had_been: relatively 
independent. 
The Germans accömplished'what the Left had urged for years: 
separation of advertising from news. The advertising was 
taken over by German interests 'until after the. War when 
the French government acquired it, and which remains 'Navas' 
while the news operation, AFP, is today independent - in 
the sense described in Chapter One. Subsequently AFP has 
taken the bulk of 'its annual revenue from government 
organizations as we have seen, therefore continuing one 
-Havas tradition at least: that of dependence on non-media 
clients''for its economic survival. 
AFP has not succeeded in creating for itself an alternative 
revenue-base, like Reuters' non-media RES, or even the photo 
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operations of the American agencies within the media field. 
One reason for this may have been the reluctance of the 
agency's Board to-put up the money or to agree to a 
search for the necessary capital. AFP's Board has 
traditionally taken a rather more active interest in the 
affairs of the agency than that of Reuters'; perhaps 
because while Reuters' owners sit on the board they are 
not its main source of revenue, whereas in the case of 
AFP's board not only are there representatives of AFP's 
major revenue-. producing clients (State organizations), 
but these clients have no special interest in the 
economic. independence of the'agency. 
AFP Economic Services 
In May 1968, undaunted by the anti-capitalist spirit that 
raged in Paris at that time, AFP launched Le Service 
Economique par Telescripteur (SET). The service was a 
rationalization of previous financial and economic services, 
and was clearly inspired by Reuters' success in this field. 
By 1972 it reached more than 80 public and private organ- 
izations - banks, industries, media - in France,. Belgium 
and Switzerland, and in that year the service was extended 
into the. provinces, Strasbourg, Rennes and Lille. In 
addition to clients in Belgium, and Switzerland, SET also 
went to several-national news agencies, including TASS. 
Since that time a Common Market service for Brussels has 
been developed, and a four to five-hour transmission for 
Africa. SET European wordage . amounts 
to some 20-25,000 
a day (France: 35,000) while the EEC service 
is 10-12,000, 
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and average. wordage for Africa is-10,000. Unfortunately 
for-AFP's. SET service Reuters is well entrenched on the 
French market,, through its arrangement with , Agefi. 
Summary 
Throughout the history of the agencies, and especially in 
the case of the European agencies, non-media clients have 
represented a formidable source of revenue and point of 
departure for innovatory activity. These non-media 
clients have been mainly (i) commerce and finance institutions 
(ii) advertisers and agencies (iii) governments. The 
importance of the first of -these. groups. is particularly 
evident in the case of Reuters, and is the basis of that 
agency's continued. survival in the modern world. Each of 
the other agencies has finance and economic news services, 
but. the largest of these is the joint. "AP-DJ operation, - 
which with Reuters is-'the main source of international news 
of this kind. (In September 1976, UPI announced an arrange- 
ment with Commodity News Services for an international 
economic news service to start. early in '77; first 
information indicated. a similar structure to AP-DJ. The 
deal links UPI with the same organization that Reuters beat 
in"'competition on the domestic US market in commodity news 
in the early.. 'seventies. ) The importance of. government 
revenue is most noticeable today in the case of AFP. " But 
the-overseas clients of all the agencies are also often 
government clients, either indirectly, where a national 
news agency which is sole distributor of global agency 
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services. is financed and/or controlled by its government, 
or directly where government organizations, embassies and 
consulates etc. represent a major portion of the total 
market in any given country. This situation tends to 
arise in many parts of the Third World, and especially 
in Africa. The American agencies stand apart from the 
European in the matter of non-media markets because the 
size of their domestic media market is sufficient to 
maintain them both and provides the bulk of their revenues. 
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States and in a few other affluent industrial societies, 
the mode of final delivery is increasingly via some form 
of computer-based television outlet with keyboard facilities 
for on-screen editing. But well before these recent 
innovations, there'were other developments which took the 
agencies completely away from the teleprinter principle. 
The American agencies for example pioneered the widespread 
distribution of photographs for their newspaper clients. 
Wirephoto involves a distinct transmitting and reception 
technology. For their broadcast cli-ents, 'the agencies also 
introduced voicecasts, and news-film services. It is mainly 
with these non-teleprinter technologies that this chapter 
deals. To complete the review of the total range of 
services and markets, it will look at some of the minor 
spin-offs of agency work which include publishing, 
espionage, and communications-sub-leasing. 
1. Wirephoto 
AP and UPI have diversified mainly within media markets. 
From very early days the newspaper market per se had been 
thought insufficient: "They seem to have reached the 
'saturation point' in newspaper clients", said one 
observer as early as 1931.1 The long-termirend in reduction 
of the number of United States dailies was well established 
by this time. The peak number of dailies was reached in 
1917, at 2,514. This had fallen to around the 1,700 mark 
in the 1970's. Another important inspiration for intra- 
media expansion was the competitive relationship between 
the two agencies. In Europe, semi-monopoly domestic. 
*cf. note 6, p. 95.8 
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markets may have inhibited this kind of expansionary drive, 
and perhaps explain why wirephoto or radiophoto for instance. 
was never, adopted as a major activity by either Reuters or 
Havas/AFP. 
There were still significant moves in the newspaper market 
even as expansioninto'others occurred, most important of 
which was perhaps the introduction and spread of the tele- 
graph printer during the inter-war period, and the spread 
of leased lines across the continent. But the major 
technological development was wirephoto. ` 
"AP members initially rejected the agency's involvement in 
wirephoto. -Many of', the large-circulation papers had'their 
own arrangements at. this: time, anddidnot want competitiön 
from AP. ' The smaller papers-had to rely-on commercial 
syndicates. But in-1926 the AP Board agreed to the 
establishment of. a mail : NewsPhoto Service, sequel to a, ' 
revamped and much improved generalfeatures. service'. These 
photos were usually delivered 6itherýby mail-or a3-r;. on 
special occasions, telephoto was employed, a technique which 
produced only a. fuzzy reproduction and could be used only 
for transmission to the<few cities which , hadthenecessary 
receiving equipment. In 1933, when AT+T. abandoned tele- 
photo, Bell laboratories announced an-alternative. The 
major'agencies were all approached, but ; only 
AP. expressed 
interest. AP approached the larger. papers first; many of 
whom were impressed: by the Bell system because it`promised 
a round-the-clock provision of good. quality photos and at 
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a higher speed than any of their existing arrangements. 
Through AP they would receive photo: service much cheaper 
than; anything they could provide for themselves.: Hearst 
and Scripps-Howard members objected however: Hearst. 
wanted to maintain the competitive edge of his on papers 
which had photo services, and Scripps-Howard members 
naturally wanted to protect the Scripps-Howard agency, UP. 
Despite-the vigorous opposition launched by these two groups, 
the AP Wirephoto system was successfully introducedin 1935, 
: with 46 subscribers out of a total newspaper membership 
of 1,340. 
Expansion of photo: delivery. before the Second_. World War 
was less than dramatic.. Its main, promoters at first were 
the larger and more influential members of; AP,. those most 
likely to be able to afford the greatly increased subscript- 
...: 
ions involved. Distribution. of. photos overseas was limited, 
but in Britain UP did buildup a photo, -service through BUP. 
The War itself was-an important boost to wire photography, 
given the increased appetite : for -foreign news , and for 
pictures to lend it dramatic immediacy.. 
, 
In two months of 
1943, APIs wirephoto carried a, total of'-939, -war pictures 
from abroad,, a rate of around15 aday... 40% of these 
came from a 30-man pool operation. which AP-shared with ACME, 
Life Magazine, International News<Photos. The pool had 
the approval ofthe armed services and worked. in. co-operation 
with them. 
Expansion in, this area really belongs to. the; post-war era. 
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In 1957, AP's wirephoto clients still numbered only. 523, 
less than half the domestic; daily membership; UPI had 
679 that year,, almost half of whom, were acquired in 1951 
when UP . 
tookover. the, photo, agency,. ACME. Between 1957 
and 1963 however, UPIIs total photo., clientele expanded 
to 1,284. Mims Thomason, who was in charge of news-. 
pictures from 1952 and, who; eventually retired as, UPI 
chairman in-1974,. was responsible for : the development of 
UP. radiophoto;. on a regularly scheduled-basis-to South 
America, -. Puerto Rico, Central America, Australia, Europe, 
, 
the Philippines, Hawaii-and Japan. 
Much of the-expansion of photo services has occurred 
only in very recent years. UPI's radiophoto; for Japan 
for.: instance was not introduced until as late as 1963. 
In. 1968, a_beamcast service from Tokyo, aimed. at South 
East Asia, was inaugurated to supplement transmissions 
from the United-States.: Newspicture circuits for land-';.. 
line-distribution were still in the. process of introduction 
in Europe in the early 'sixties and'did not reach Austria, 
Spain or Hungary_untilý1963. -, A picture , network, was 
established*, in, Portugal for the-first time,, in 1968. 
Much the same is true of. AP, -which 
introduced wirephoto for 
«: Russia, and Poland in 1963 
(which before had been served, 
by long distance phone); the'European wirephoto, network 
x. eached. Spain-., in. 1966, the sixteenth country to,, be-hooked 
up.. Its U. S. wirephoto network was extended to Mexico 
in 1969,, the same year-as the European. network. was broadened 
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to include the Czech, ' Hungarian and Rumanian news agencies. 
A photocableto Johannesburg was leased in 1973. Many 
parts of the world, even today, receive their photographs 
by post.. Communication costs and clients' inability to 
pay high subscription charges are major factors. ' 
Newspictures have meant a major expansion of resources and 
activity for the agencies'. Even one-correspondent bureaux 
of the American agencies overseas generally have an additional 
photographer-journalist, if not full-time then on a regular 
fee-paying basis. This new development has inevitably 
-changed the whole pattern of press and agency resource 
distribution as one early commentator was quick to point 
out: - 
"Telephoto system will begin to operate before' 
Fall 10,000 miles of leased wires in the United 
States. Because of its expense it will'have a 
profound effect upon the fiscal structure of the, 
daily press, diverting a`considerable portion of 
expenditures from editorial employees to wire 
'services. ßi2 
Major technological innovations in this field continue, 
and are witness to the great importance of news photgraphs 
for today's newspaper press, justifying heavy research 
and development expenditure. In early 1973, AP announced 
'Laserphoto'. This useslaser beams to transmit photos 
by wire, delivers dry glossy prints, cut and stacked at 
the editor's desk. It was developed by an. MIT Professor 
in conjunction with AP's research-and development'team, 
and introduced in response to. the growth in off-set printing 
and the subsequent, demand for better photo-reproduction. 
The Laserphoto superseded two previous agency systems: 
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Photofax, based on an electrolytic-reproduction' method 
and-employed byUPI,. and Automatic Wirephoto, which AP 
introduced in 1966 and which is based"onthe 'stabilization' 
method. Photofax gives'. relatively poor definition and 
inadequate grey scales. 'Automatic Wirephoto is better 
than Photofax but more expensive., Laserphoto'sadvantage. 
. 
is. speed: ' it is four times as'fast, transmitting and 
reproducing in two minutes instead'of eight. ' The new 
system'usesdigital''lines on` which streams of numbers, 
not levels ` of sound, translate the black and white'tones 
of the picture. ``This°avoids the necessity of using 
'`telephone lilies, ' which are often crowded with traffic, 
distorting transmission and causing irregularities. 
Installment of Laserphoto started: in 1974 and was scheduled 
to cover the United States by the end`of 1976. ' 'Integration 
of the system with the newly introduced cathode' ray tube 
(CRT) editing-system was afeature of its original design: 
editing. ori screen, in other words, in'the same way as is 
now common for original print editorial matter in many 
American newspapers. 
Distribution'of'pho'to'innovations abroad has generally 
lagged behind their introduction in the United States, 
sometimes by many years. Europe is always first 
beneficiary. Overseas installment of Laserphoto was 
initially`scheduled'for 1977 and after. This relative 
rapidity of overseas introduction rests partly on the 
i 
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earlier. achievements in technical compatibility of American 
and European systems. Compatibility of American and Euro- 
pean wirephoto was achieved in 1968. The Wirephoto com- 
puter introduced that. year cut photo delivery time between 
the United States and Europe from 23. -to 15 minutes, and 
whereas before European pictures had to be selected from 
a U. S. receiver (and vice versa) and placed on a U. S. 
transmitter, this was no longer, necessary. The problem 
of incompatibility went. back as-far as 1935, and originated 
with the different qualities of transmission lines which 
had evolved in Europe. and. the. United, States, and, which 
used two different systems of RPM, drum speeds. A U. S. 
transmitter took 8 minutes to deliver, while-it took 
.a 
European transmitter 14 minutes; with one minute for 
change-over, this meant a 23 minute intercontinental 
delivery time. 
UPI have opted for electrolytic, technology, and in 1973 
introduced Unifax II, which replaced an earlier electro- 
static process. The new system went into production 
as recently as 1975. The machines were built by EG &G 
of Bedford, Mass., to UPI specifications, on a contract 
worth $7 million. One thousand newspicture receivers 
were considered sufficient to meet UPI's. near-term require- 
ments, and about 350 papers. and television stations were 
signed up by mid-1974. EG &G also developed UPI's 
Telephoto Scan-Converter, which. was installed in 1973. 
This automatically converted domestic or, international 
picture signals to the desired use on its circuits, or in 
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other words allowed for compatibility between European and 
American systems.. In technological'advance'therefore UPI 
is a few years behind, 'AP., in ' this field (1975) 
2. Radio 
-. A. further major form of intermedia diversification was 
directed towards radio market. Chapter. 3 examined the 
.: _politics of 
this development in the United States. Once 
established there, 'progress was rapid, and after only two 
years, AP achieved 47.5% market saturation. Although this 
percentage. remained relatively constant for the following 
two decades, the absolute number of radio outlets increased 
rapidly.. They overtook the number of daily newspaper 
outlets by 1947, and. today each United States agency has two 
to three_times, as many; subscribers in. broadcasting as amongst 
newspapers. -In 1973,. 3,402 stations took AP, and 3,560 
took UPI. Between 1956-1966, AP added about 1,000 stations, 
and the total-of, that, year,, 2s924, was nearly; three times 
the. figure for. 1950. 
The broadcast; wire services offered by AP. and UPI are 
distinct services (unlike INS radio service when it. existed), 
with,, their own team of editorial, but not reporting, staffs, 
and. which putoutshort news bulletins of about fifteen 
minutes' duration once an hour, specifically designed for 
;: easy , use. -by. programme, 
anchormen. Stations often subscribe 
-., to regular-trunk and. state wires as well. Charges vary 
on a sliding, scale,. according to; -the station's area of 
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dissemination. Regional or hub bureaux feed in local or 
state news onto the broadcast wire just as they do for the 
newspaper wires. (Both agencies increased the proportion 
of state and regional news content in 1963, in recognition 
of their station clients' interest. in this level. ) Radio 
wires are much shorter than regular wires and generally. 
much cheaper. Because few stations have appreciable 
reportorial staff of their own, the dependence of stations 
for their news on agencies is. rather greater,, taking the 
field as a whole, than the dependence of newspapers. After 
salaries, wire service costs'are generally. the second 
greatest expense for radio tations, 
3° 
In 1958, UPI introduced the-'audio' service ofvoicecast 
news reports, and now has' 780 subscribers for-this service 
(1974). When in 1965 UPI took over the broadcast clients 
of Radio Press International (owned by Strauss Broadcasting 
Group), clients received an average'of 65 voice stories 
a day, in addition to an average of five special daily 
reports on major news events, two daily reports: from the 
New York Stock Exchange, a daily farm. show. and reports 
on business, finance, ' sports and the United Nations. 
Major expansion occurred in the late 'sixties when new 
audio studios were built in Chicago, "and aportable studio, 
constructed for use on majorslive programming. Chicago 
has been base for UPI's radio wires since 1957. Continuous 
or almost continuous broadcasts were institutedin 1972 when 
the agency began twenty daily newscasts on its`audio network, 
claimed to reach 'several hundred stations". According to 
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UPI's then President, Mims-Thomason, these broadcasts 
'fr. equently feature the voices of our correspondents around 
the world, and we think. this further enhances their image 
and identification with the. public'. 
4 
In 1974, UPI'had 
745 clients for its 24-hour, 7-day reports. 
AP initiated. a similar 24-hour service in 1974 which put 
out hourly 5z minute newscasts, each with open spots for 
a sixty-second and a thirty-second commercial break. There 
are also six daily pre-edited general and sports news feature 
packages, and business, financial, and consumer affairs 
. ..., ;.., ,:, 
reports. The service started with 100 clients, most 
important of whom were the Metromedia radio network and 
stationsýin eight of the=continent's largest cities. Under 
the contractual'arrangement, these clients would depend 
exclusively on AP Radio for domestic and overseas news 
coverage, reintroducing therefore a phenomenon that had 
been. outlawed in the general news field for newspapers. 
Soon after AP's introduction of a continuous radio: feed, 
Mutual Broadcast-System-filed petitions with the FCC that 
sought the prohibition of; regulations of, AP and-UPI's 
audio': news networks. Mutual 'argued that the audio news 
services were networks and subject to FCC rules. Both 
AP and UPI submitted petitions in turn, in which they said 
that their audio news services were different from other 
broadcast networks in that they contained no commercial 
spots, made no claim on stations for air time, required 
no clearance, -and 
could be broadcast on a delay basis and 
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edited or used as insertions in ,a 
station's regular news 
programme.. 
"AP also suggested that Mutual was asking the 
FCC to apply network rules in a way, which 
would protect Mutual from competition. "5 
Reuters and the BBC 
Like the U. S. agencies, Reuters moved from a position of 
hostility to radio at its inception to gradual welcome of 
it as a market. In the early 'twenties it joined with other 
British press and agency media to restrict its provision of 
news to the newly established BBC. News would be provided 
only between 6 and 11 p. m., for distribution solely in the 
British Isles, long enough for only half an hour's broadcast 
(1,200 to 2,400 words), for use on broadcast programmes 
only and providing that the news source was acknowledged. 
The selection of news moreover was not to prejudice the 
interests of newspapers. Sir Roderick Jones of'Reuters 
took the view that the BBC should neither collect its own 
news nor arrange its own news. The Post Office established 
in its talks with the BBC's constituent companies-that no 
news should be broadcast which had not previously been 
published in the press. This was to prevent the wireless 
companies from becoming competitive with. the news agencies 
'as considerable capital is invested in those undertakings, 
and a large amount of Post Office revenue is derived from 
them'. 
6 
The PA went further and said it did not want. the 
companies to transmit even that news which had already been 
published, for fear that broadcast stations might take 
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morning, newspaper news. to-; use in: competition against 
,, local evening papers. Roderick Jones demanded that the 
power used for ,. 
transmission, of radio be low enough to 
prevent the possibility. . of. 
foreign countries picking news 
up free (and. thereby defrauding the, agenciesý, of their 
rightful revenue)..., 
During. the General Strike the press-BBC agreement was 
waived,. 'and. five news:. bulletins were broadcast each day. 
Afterwards-. a BBC News, Section. was; formed for. -the. -first time. 
In extractinga series of, concessions,,, Reith, the first 
Director-General of:. the BBC,: pulled the BBC out of its 
: position of 
total news dependence. First, of all he 
Persuaded-the-press to-allow the BBC to. broadcast its 
. first bulletin at 
6-30P-m-; then, to. acknowledge the 
agencies . only once a week, 
rather thaninevery bulletin. 
First bulletins were broadcast by, 6.00p. m.., by 1930, and in 
1932 the BBC was allowed-to put news ; out at any; time when 
events of unusual importance occurred., -.: A prohibition against 
the BBC's use of BUP material, Reutexrs American rival, 
,. remained 
in 
. effect until : 
the War.: It was. during the 
Second World. War that the BBC's independent news; operations 
really-got off _, 
the ground.; 
Foreign Distribution: of Voicecasts. 
Reuters=has never provided regular radio-news services 
comparable-to the specially tailored teleprinter services 
for. -radio clients put out by AP and UPI. In 1972, 
however, 
Reuters-joined the American agencies in the audio"field,, 
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which it called the Voice Service. The most important 
market was North America, where it'sold to the Multi- 
broadcast group. Expansion of BBC radio services in the 
United Kingdom, and the opening up of commercial radio, 
has produced more market possibilities at home. Voice 
services of each of these agencies are in English, which 
naturally limits their applicability. Since the U. S. 
radio market is about 30% of the world's total, this is not 
as important a financial` constraint as it might seem. 
Since the senior . editorial personnel of 
the' agencies are 
usually native English speakers it-is also organizationally 
convenient. ' Overseas, AP does not distribute voicecasts 
(1975), but UPI has voicecast studios in London and Hong 
Kong (mainly for local news to be transmitted to the United 
States). ' UPI voicecasts are sometimes used by UPITN. 
The broadcasts are made by regular UPI newsmen, recorded 
and distributed from a regional office. '. 'But amongst the 
editorial and technical staff, about one half are recruited 
from a broadcasting background. 
Regular agency news services distribute to radio stations 
throughout the world, `and areas important in this capacity 
as they are for newspapers as. basicsuppliers'of international 
news. In many parts of the Asian region, radio clients 
outnumber newspapers, for instance"`in both numerical and 
revenue terms. In the more developed parts of the world, 
newspapers are still the most significant client group, but 
with some important exceptions. In Germany for instance, 
Reuters sells mainly to the radio market;. in Britain, AFP's 
435.. 
main client is the BBC: 
Content of Radio Wires 
There have been few published studies about the content and' 
use of U. S. radio wires. One study indicated that the 
radio wire of UPI covered far'less news than the trunks 
wire, and that'the'radio and state wires together added 
relatively little to the trunk wire in the way of new 
information:. this study; looked at the UP wires in the 
''e state of Indiana ='in 1957,; before the injection' of more 
regional news in 1963 therefore. = Radio subscribers could 
take up to three wires: trunk, local state or radio. 
A subscriber to all three could get 6-8% more available 
news at the four deadline times for radio than a one-service 
subscriber. The radio wire generally gave only 24-31% of 
the theme-points covered in all three wires together; and 
the radio and state wires together gave 49% of the three- 
.. wire 
total. But another study reported relatively high 
satisfaction with radio wires by clients. 
8 
This was a 
survey of 49 non-metropolitan stations in Georgia in 1951,. 
of whom 69% subscribed to UP (Georgian-media have tradition- 
ally favoured UPI) and 31% subscribed to AP. UP members 
were75% satisfied: AP 82%. Both groups were least 
satisfied with state and local coverage (later improved 
by the agencies), but UP stations at that time were much 
more. likely to feed local news stories into the service 
than AP stations. 53% of the sample never rewrite the 
agency news they received, and 44%' said it was rewritten 
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'sometimes'. Most of the stations-(81%) were affiliated 
with local newspapers or had news exchange agreements with 
them for local news. 
Most of the studies that have been done indicate heavy 
reliance on agencies by radio stations, e. g.: - 
I'The widespread use of processed news from 
the radio wires of the newsservices made 
it easy for even the smallest stations to 9 
schedule news every hour or even more, often. "'. 
"Newspaper reporters can therefore look down 
their noses at the '. rip and read' boys - 
. 
the announcers who call themselves reporters 
but whose digging consists, of little, more. 
than. picking up the copy from behind the AP 
or UPI printer in the newsroom. "110 
During the post-war period, relatively few of the new radio 
stations acquired network affiliation, and thus their news 
dependence on the agencies was greater than if they had 
been affiliated, since many of the networks produce their 
own news material - even if much of that too originates with 
the agencies. An area of possible growth for the U. S. 
agency radio services is the 'all-news' radio station. 
While the number of 'all-news' radio stations has jumped 
from 14 to 50 in recent years,. and moved'from the cities 
to rural areas, the costs involved in mounting an all-news 
format may be prohibitive of further growth.. Its import- 
ance is indicated by the calculations of one source who 
estimated all-news radio to be the main daytime origin. of 
news for 54% of American city-dwellers. over. the age of 18. 
One study of the major United States all-day radio stations 
found that 40% of the content was state and local news, 31% 
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national and 28% international..,. But all-news radio is 
particularly expensive: overhead costs are, up to 50% 
higher than a.. music-based format. Grouped-station bureaux 
often cover 'hot spots' relatively well, but leave the 
rest to. the agencies,. 
11 
A 1974 study of. radio news confirmed that a high percentage 
originated with,. the wire services, but it refuted the 
traditional ', rip and read'; image of. radio dependence on 
the, agencies. Buckalewl2 questioned ; 33. radio news editors. 
in, 29. radio stations in the US in connection with the 
preparation of two local newscasts in each station. These 
stations, received a, totalof 1,019 news stories of which 
451 or 44% were. actually used for, broadcast purposes. Of 
the . original. 1,019 stories, 
609 or 59% came from the wire 
services and 274 of these or-45% were used for broadcast 
purposes. Other major sources of news for these stations 
were. the stations' own-_'beat. reporters', who produced 13% 
of the input, of-which 46% were used;. and telephone stories, 
accounting. for. 8% , of . 
the 
. 
input, of. which only 14% were used. 
Despite' the heavy. usage of-wire service material there 'was 
not one instance, of a newspaper story being used word-for- 
word in a radio, newscast'. This study also conducted some 
useful, and unusual market analysis, finding that the percent- 
age of, news input, thatoriginated-with the ; agencies increased 
as the-size of the market grew, so that wire news accounted 
for 36% of. the input in small. towns but as much as-69% in 
large towns; -on the other hand, the percentage, of the wire 
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service news actually used in broadcasts declined with 
market size, ranging from 48% in small markets to only 
36% in large towns. The smaller proportion of wire 
service news as a percentage of input to smaller town 
radio stations was explained with reference to the 
'inability of AP or UPI to write copy, except in a very 1 
few instances, that has to do directly with the small towns'. 
But this study only concerned itself with local news pro- 
grammes, and this would preclude consideration of most of 
the material provided an editor by the wire services. The 
concentration on local news programmes may also help explain 
why there was relatively little evidence here of 'rip and 
read' habits, since editors'would presumably' have staff 
competent to check and rewrite on wire stories'thatconcerned 
the'local area, whereas this 'would be unlikely on stories 
of national and international scope. 
Existing information therefore seems to indicate, firstly, 
that radio stations in the United-States are heavily 
dependent on the wire services' for news material even at 
the local level which is the least well-provided for by 
the agencies. Radio stations that rely only on'the radio 
wires of the agencies probably receive much less` information 
than they would if they subscribed'to state and/or trunk' 
wires as well. On the other hand a subscriber to the 
trunk'wire would possibly gain' only marginally in inform- 
ation terms by a subscription to an agency's radio wire; 
but the radio wire would of course afford him much greater 
convenience. 
3. The News-Film Agencies 
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Agency wires, both regular and the special broadcast wires, 
go not only to radio stations but also to television 
stations. Both AP and UPI serve over 300 U. S. television- 
stations in this way. But in addition to the provision 
of traditional news in print form, UPI, 'and more recently 
Reuters, are involved in the provision of news-film on an 
international scale. This-of course is a substantially 
different kind of. operation from normal agency output. 
INS was actually one of the first agencies in the field, 
in 1950, but its material was mainly feature film for the 
home market. UP started in news-film a year later in 1951, 
when it linked up with the film news company, Movietone to 
form UP Movietone News, under the partial organization of 
William C. Payette, ' later to become a director of UPI and 
its Sales Manager in 1960. The arrangement"wasfor 
Movietone to supply the film, while. UP moved it across the 
world. 
It started in Europe, because Movietone did not need UP 
in the United States. First European client was Dutch 
television, followed shortly afterwards by the BBC. But 
the main market at that time was amongst the film newsreel 
distributors'for showing in cinemas. All film was shot 
in 35mm, and reduced for television to 16mm, although at 
first television used 35mm for much of its news coverage 
since this was considered 
to give better quality film. 
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Strangely, AP's involvement in news-film in 1949, was 
extremely short-lived, and the service was suspended by 
1952. AP's quick withdrawal is one of the apparent 
mysteries of agency development: in other respects the 
post-war development of the two agencies has been strikingly 
similar, and this is reflected in the close parallels 
between AP's annual-statements and UPI's Chairman's reports. 
AP may have had its membership to consider. The introduction 
of radio news in the 'thirties had almost split the organ- 
ization apart, and news-film seemed a more problematic 
business. It may have been acceptable for UP to allow 
some other. organization to take responsibility for filming, 
but how could AP so readily hand over the reporting function - 
in celluloid or on paper against possible opposition on 
principle from many of its members. And if AP was going 
to do its own filming, that would take a lot of investment 
and know-how. The primary markets would be outside the 
United States because of established competition at home. 
But AP had never given the same attention to overseas 
markets as had UP, and the idea of this kind of investment 
ran counter to the agency's main concern with domestic 
newspaper members. The commercial attraction of 'the 
venture was not so compulsive. 
UP's relationship with Movietone was unsettled. As the 
number of television stations in Europe proliferated, so 
the importance of that, market increased and eventually 
dominated. This was not necessarily to Movietone's 
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advantage. To service the television market adequately 
.. would mean extensive capital 
outlay and, a diversion. of the 
company's resources into a field that was, in-competition 
with its own traditionalcinema : involvement.. ` 
The problems surfaced only ' gradually and the partnership 
lasted ten - years, sufficient; time for UP to. become known 
in the field. When the break came in 1963, UPI (as it 
now was) decided to go it alone with UPI. Newsfilm Inc., 
described in the agency's presidential address forthat 
year-. as a multi-million, dollaroperation'., (In 1968 the 
annual expense of operating UPITN was., $4,500,000. ) UPI 
was now doing what AP had been reluctant to do over ten 
years earlier putting up its own capital for technical 
equipment and film expertise, in addition to. the. distribLit- 
ion network already in existence. 
But; : by this time 
a-transatlantic competitor , 
had emerged. 
This. was the British , Commonwealth 
Film Agency, established 
in the mid-fifties, by the BBC and, the British film company, 
the Rank; Organization., The appearance of Reuters with a 
smalll holding in this: film agency, amounting to about one- 
=ninth, of the. total, possibly troubled UPI. 
The operations of the BCFA were sufficiently limited for 
the BBC to continue its client relationship' with UPI News- 
BCFA itself, tookon a rather less imperial film-Inc. 
image when in . 
1964: it changed . 
its name-. to Visnews. Three 
years later the BBC, 'which . had: 
after. all considerable 
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news-film resources of its own, decided to drop UPI News- 
film's service. This development precipitated the link- 
up of UPI with Independent Television News,. which serviced 
Britain's commercial television stations with national and 
international news bulletins. The new organization was 
known as UPITN, jointly owned on a fifty-fifty. basis between 
UPI and ITN. ITN paid UPITN for its news-film and UPITN 
paid UPI for the communication and other-facilities provided 
by the agency., 
In effect, UPI had returned to the kind of relationship 
it had had with Movietone, proving that it was difficult 
to go it alone in this field. Had it not been for the 
earlier patronage of the BBC, the: most prestigious client 
the agency could have found outside the United States, UPI's 
news-film experiment mighthave already failed. Without 
the BBC-it needed some kind of equivalent strength, and 
ITN, luckily, -was available. ITN did-not have the over- 
seas reporting strength which the BBC with its various 
radio responsibilities had maintained since the war. Nor 
for the same reason did it have the same kind of inter- 
national communications network. The idea of a link-up 
with UPI, an- American agency, seemed the kind of brash 
inspiration that had already made independent television 
one of the most 'culturally troublesome phenomena, in the 
eyes of the British Establishment, since the arrival of 
cinema. ITN had until now run a small film distribution 
system of its own, as well as a joint television film 
syndicate operation with CBS (U. S. A. ). The syndicate 
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had been ITN's solution to the problem of covering North 
America within a reasonable budget - CBS. would provide the 
North American film needed by ITN in exchange for ITN's 
world film. UPI's activities on the other hand were far 
more extensive geographically, than those of CBS in the 
news field, and there was. not the same danger that com- 
-petitive interests would some day upset the partnership. 
CBS did remain in the field of international news film 
distribution into the 'seventies, 
- 
but in only. a very limited 
way by comparison with. UPITN. and Visnews. 
At about the same time as UPITN's äppearance, 'Reuters' 
share. of Visnews increased dramatically ' from about a ninth 
to about a third of the total. The Rank Organization had 
diversified into commercial television through its acquis- 
ition of part of Southern Television (U. K. ),. which meant 
that it had interests both in Visnews and, indirectly,. in 
ITN (which of course provided Southern' Television with 
its news and was partly funded by it). Rank was obliged 
to withdraw from Visnews. for fear of contravening ITA's 
charter. 
Both news-film agencies are thought of as service ' organ- 
izations by those who work for them. 
14 UPITN aims not 
to make a loss;. Visnews profits 'are ploughed back into 
the company. A very distinctive characteristic, shared 
by both is heavy British involvement: Visnews is mainly 
owned by the BBC and Reuters, eachof'wh'om holds about 
one-third of the ownership, while the remaining"third is 
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divided between the Canadian Broadcasting Service and the 
national broadcasting networks of Australia and New Zealand, 
in approximately equal parts. UPITN, as we have seen, 
was until recently half owned by the British ITN. (ITN's 
control was reduced by the involvement of Paramount in 
1974, and further still when Paramount'sinterest was bought 
out by the Panax Corporation- which in 1977 had a 50% 
interest, against UPI's 25% andITN's 25%)13 
News-film Agencies and the U. S. Market 
. 
Despite the British connection the news-film agencies like 
the general news, agencies, spend a-lot of their time worrying 
about the United States - not necessarily because they are 
loo}1ing for vast, profits from this market,, but simply } 
because they want to cut costs. The United States is 
expensive to cover, but it has to be covered and covered 
.. 
well to meet the news appetites of the western world. At ° 
the same time,, the United States is a difficult market to 
break into. 
ITN linked up with CBS, -first of all, and then UPI, because 
it 
. needed, either. a cheap source of 
North American. film or 
the use of someone else's communications infrastructure. 
CBS was also a client,. -and would continue to be one even 
after the link with UPI. UPITN's newsgathering operation 
is basically split into two divisions. The United States 
division distributes and collects, film within the States, 
and the International Division takes care of everywhere 
else. The International Division has its headquarters 
in the London offices of ITN, acid regional offices are 
located in Paris, Frankfurt and until 1972 in Tokyo, 
during which year the Far Eastern office was transferred 
to Hong Kong. 'There are some twenty'full-time film 
crews, about seven of them for New York and Washington 
and the rest clustered in Germany (Frankfurt) anti France 
(Paris) which have three crews each. London and Tokyo 
account for most of the"rest. 'As a result of the move 
to Hong Kong, however, Tokyo will be covered for ITN by 
CBS in the future. The BBC also takes CBS film, and the 
ITN-CBS relationship"in Tokyo is a minor, examplelof the 
incestuous liaisons that.. so frequently occur in the agency 
world. 
Visnews solved the problem of North America through partial 
. 
reliance on an exchange arrangement with NBC (USA) which 
supplied North American film, especially film from the 
mid-west and west coast. News of the United States is 
so important for the news-film clientele around the world 
that in the case of Visnews it accounts for about one 
third of the agency's film. 
Early in 1973; "Visnewsgreatly extended its involvement 
with American television when it signed up'an exchange 
arrangement with Television News (U. S. A. ), andtook. a 
small percentage of the holding. Television News Inc. 
(TVN) was conceived in the'mid-sixties by west coast 
entrepreneurs who felt. the need for an"alternative source- 
of national, and international news to"thatof the three 
east-coast giants. Finance came from the'Adolph Coors 
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Company of Golden, Colorado. Joseph Coors, Executive 
Vice-President of. the Company, whose major interests 
were porcelain and brewing, adopted the scheme largely 
out of philanthropic interest. In practice this interest 
has tended to be conservative in tone. There has been 
considerable conflict in the early years of the enterprise 
between the professionals appointed to run it and the Board, 
who were convinced that 'East-coast' professionalism was 
actually liberal propaganda. - 
The scheme was finally launched in the, Spring of 1973. 
Aware that it had nothing like the resources available to 
the giants in'New York who spent about four million dollars 
a year on international news, Television News had previously 
approached Visnews with the idea that Visnews should supply 
the international film in return for a share in the owner- 
ship and the right to use domestic film. for its own over- 
seas distribution. To Visnews this seemed an excellent 
way. of expanding its news-film resources from North America, 
while at the same time there was the hope that it might one 
day begin to earn appreciable revenue from its TVN interest. 
TVN does not operate in the same-way as the giants. Each 
day it transmits between fifteen and thirty stories to its 
subscriber stations over leased audio and video lines. 
Each story lasts about. one and a half minutes, and total 
transmission time'is between thirty and sixty minutes. 
Two-thirds of the feed is domestic news of the United States, 
the other third is foreign news.. The basic idea of the 
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scheme is that subscribers can record the daily, feed on 
videotape, select the-stories they want for inclusion in 
their locally produced news programmes, and in that way 
produce their own news rather than depend'on the, creative 
decisions. taken by the giants. Twice in the day before 
the feed the, subscribers. are advised as tothe material 
that will be transmitted, and they receive suggested lead-. 
ins, cues,, timing andýscripts where appropriate. - TVN 
uses no. "anchorman,, and. narration is employed only where 
absolutely, necessary, as in . 
interviews. and, ent. erprise 
stories., " The individual stories are, transmitted without 
identification' of their, source. In all, these ways the 
subscriber, station is, allowed to retain hisown. image and 
autonomy. 
The-scheme assumes that where possible' a television 
'station will Prefer 
. 
to use its ,. own material and to.. retain 
control over , 
the, packaging and presentation of film bought 
from outside. - By using TVN film the subscriber can use 
his own advertising during the . news programme.,, and. retain 
all-the revenue. Under the Network system, '; on , 
the other 
hand,, advertising-is provided by the network,. along. with 
everything. else, and the station gets. only a small cut on 
the advertising revenue.. A station that uses TVNfilm". 
can produce a well-integrated, news programme of local- 
national-international news.. , If it depends on. -the net- 
works, it is obliged. to produce a separate local news pro- 
gramme. Local news is. often visually-uninteresting and 
-:, unless it:, is relieved. with , 
film stories from a, national 
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and international background, such programmes can be tedious. 
TVN has not a tenth of the resources at the disposal of the 
large networks. But it does not have to spend money on 
studios, studio-staff, anchormen and other ingredients of 
the polished package provided-by-the networks. The cost 
of international news is kept within the budget through 
the Visnews arrangement. Revenue from subscribers, on 
per-subscriber basis, is not inconsiderable, and probably 
pitched at some point not far below what it would cost a 
station to continue with the networks, taking into account 
the loss on advertising revenue if"it did so. " 
.. 
e` 
Even so, the advance of TVN has been hindered, by one 
considerable problem. A station that wishes to subscribe 
has to purchase from AT+T a-device called a receive loop 
which brings the-sound and-picture of television trans- 
mission into the TV station. It'costs $2,500 a month, 
and the networks pay the cost-for their affiliates. 
Network affiliates have to pay around $900 a month 
if they wish to switch the loop from the positIon-used 
to receive' network programming-to that used, to'-receive 
TVN. The service' itself might only cost $770` to $88o 
a month (1975). 
This difficulty is one important factor that helps to 
explain why in 1975 the company-wasýfar from making a 
! profit. It had-only forty-clients, but it needed 100 
-to break even., ', One source estimated that TVN lost 
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several. million dollars in its, first year. 
15 A, po. ssible 
.,: solution-is-. the switch to satellite communications., Some 
10-12: million dollars have . 
been budgeted., for a network of 
satellite ground stations. around the country which would 
enable clients to receive the service. by satellite. It 
is very likely 
, 
that rates will be,. much cheaper 
. 
this way 
.. than through AT+T.., A_similar satellite proposal but-for 
regular print news distribution was, mooted two years 
later by AP and UPI'when faced, with substantial leased line 
charge. increases imposed by, AT+T., 
The link-up. between TVN-and Visnews. strangely had no 
effect on the exchange-arrangement between,. Visnews and 
NBC:, This was a time when President Nixon was threatening 
to compel the networks ; to, disaffiliate many of, their stations, 
and NBC might not have 'wished to be seen to be making things' 
too uncomfortable for the smaller competition. So Visnews 
can distribute both-NBC and TVN news-film abroad. It, can 
;, even-distribute NBC, film within the North. _American continent 
if, -it so wishes. But, it'cannot_. provide TVN film to NBC, ' 
or. NBC film to TVN, nor can it. distribute TVN film in North 
America through independent. -channels.. It, can use any 
overseas film which 'TVN, has, shot for itself, for distribution 
outside North-America,, although there is little of this. 
-', Whatever advantage there was in being able to continue 
with NBC, its effect was erodedin, other ways. Not long 
'after . 
the. TVN-Visnews link-up AT+T increased its rates. for 
short-time leased, wire usage. This damaged organizations, 
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like TVN which needed vast communications but only for up 
to one hour a day, while it improved the relative position 
of the long-time users, that is, those organizations like 
the big networks which leased for very long periods of 
time each day. 
TVN started with thirty client stations. in May 1973" The 
stations were attracted by the offer of free film-during 
a trial first month.: Althoughtheservice was designed 
to attract stations not affiliated to the big networks, 
half the stations which initially tried it were already 
linked with CBS, NBC, or ABC. The interest of-the affiliate 
stations may have been; political - fear of losing their 
license's if they were seen to-be prepared to continue in 
their dependent relationship on the big networks, at a time 
when Washington was criticizing the networks for their. 
'liberal' ideological domination of the. smaller stations. 
This was-a'brave venture for. Visnews; if the-idea really 
took off, Visnews would have a share in one of the most 
affluent media markets of the world. No one was in fact 
} 
that optimistic, but UPITN-was worried. . 
UPITN was familiar 
with the basic TVNphilosophy. -, It had served ' the Overmyer 
TV Network in New York with, news and, film when this operation 
had started in 1967. The Overmyer network had been the 
first television network'' established within the United } 
-States since 1948. -Its idea was to make it. possible for 
non-affiliate stations to'obtain'. 'network-calibre'material 
via' cable. UPI President, - Mims Thomason explained at the 
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time that the UPI Newsfilm Division had already gained a 
'very big proportion. of television news abroad', but that 
in the United States it had 'not been able to compete with 
the facilities and news resources-of the big TV networks'. 
16 
The Overmyer network'started with-an initial programming 
of eight'-hours aday for seven days a week, and its 
:. capital came from the-Overmyer Company's interests in 
warehousing, leasing, banking, 'finance and television. 
It, based pits business. strategy' on the" reasoning that there 
had been an increase in the number of television stations 
in the UnitedrStates of several hundred per cent between 
1948, and 1966, from 51 to over 700, while the number of 
networks had remained constant at' three. '' 
The Overmyer network would meet the needs of the' independent 
television operator who could not afford"to' buy sufficient 
top-flight programming. Affiliates of the new network 
would receive their programming free `of charge, and retain 
.; advertising 
revenue on"one-third of the air time, while 
the network pocketed the"revenue for the remaining two- 
thirds of air time. 
;.: Unlike. TVN, Overmyer was clearly a. network, -not'simply a 
source of basic pre-packaged material. It dealt mainly 
with'entertainment, -and_not, as with TVN, just news. The 
extent of UPITN's'involvement with the network was not on 
the same scale as theýextent`of the Visnews involvement 
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with.. TVN, but clearly UPITN did interpret the Overmyer 
deal as an entry. '. tothe U. S. market. 
Before the early 1970's,. UPITN! s delivery of film in the 
United States was mostly-by air, which meant that much 
of the material was feature-oriented rather than hard news, 
-since air travel slowed up delivery beyond, the period 
suitable for hard news coverage. This in. turn limited the 
agency's possibilities on the_U. S. market, in addition to 
the formidable factor of the network competition. 
In UPITN's eyes the link between TVN and-Visnews. threatened 
to spread the image of Visnews, around the North American 
continent in a major innovatory fashion . 
that would leave 
UPITN and its part-owner. UPI out in the cold. Once again, 
the solution was. in the style ofthe original collaboration 
with Movietone. Both TVN and Visnews were-embedded squarely 
in the television news business. UPITN looked once more 
to the world of cinema and came up. with Paramount Pictures 
Corporation. It: announced that seven-day electronic news 
feeds would start early in June 1973" 
Paramount had not produced news-film since its cinema. 
regular, 'Eyes and Ears of the World', started'in 1927 , 
came to an end in 1957. Here it was; -back in the business, 
on the side of television, perhaps vaguely attracted by 
the talk of wondrous. developments in.. the field of cassettes, 
electronic information storage and retrieval, and so on. 
Paramount now. became part-owner of UPITN. 
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UPITN-Paramount started with eight' stations, each of 
which received on the firstday some 25'pieces or film. 
One station, WNEW in New York, used 15 of the stories in, 
its 10 P. M. news programme. All, initial, ' clients were non- 
., affiliates, 
but it was. thought'some affiliate stations 
would soon: sign up.. 
. 
This ; was a new market, =ä new- kind of«operatior for the 
news-film agencies, also an-unpredictable market, especially 
fora commodity like news. Maybe one agency by itself 
could have-succeeded and. perhaps even have set a'major 
trend which the second agency could then exploit. But 
the. two agencies scrambling together-for the same"non- 
affiliated clientsfrom. the very start. and ona rate-cutting 
basis was hardly going. to last. 
After two weeks,: three out of the'thirty, initial clients 
for the Visnews-TVN service signed, up as permanent sub- 
scribers-. '. Six weeks or so after the-new service had begun 
:. only a, dozen stations 
had signed up permanently. :` This. did 
not look like an avalanche by'comparison with the 150 to 
200. stations which took their-nightly news service from the 
. 
three big networks. Some of the initial stations were 
important ones, however, and gave some room for optimism. 
They included stations in Chicago, Washington", New York and 
Los Angeles. By the end` of the year, it was 'predicted, 
there-would be thirty permanent subscribers and by the end 
of the following year it was estimated that the venture 
would'-start showing a profit . 
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In the event expenditure was still considerably greater 
than revenue even well into 1974. But TVN had survived 
the initial plunge., UPITN-Paramount did not. `Almost 
a year after it began, in a joint announcement with TVN, 
UPITN-Paramount agreed in principle to TVN's purchase of 
almost all of UPITN's domestic. newsfilm business. UPITN 
stated that this would not affect its international operations. 
UPITN-Paramount then searched for a new partner who would 
supply North American film for overseas'di'stribution, but 
without success. For a while TVN itself supplied film to 
UPITN. Then 
. 
in_ the Spring_ of 1975, -the Paramount share 
was bought by. the Sacramento Union Corporation, owned by 
John P. McGoff, president of Panax Corporation. ` Panax 
Corporation, a newspaper. publishing and printing firm, 
took 65% of its revenues from: the operation of its eight 
daily and 28 weekly newspapers in the first quarter of 1975, 
the rest coming from commercial printing and typesetting 
operations, and its printingmachinery sales division. The 
corporation. had, experienced a . revenue 
declinein the course 
of 1974 of nearly 10%. A month orso-after the link-up 
of Panax and UPITN, the news-film agency` announced a pact 
with the third largest US TV network, ABC, whereby ITN. would 
receive film from ABC's. home coverage and its ten overseas 
bureaux in return for ITN. film. Whilesolving UPITN's 
greatest problem. - the provision of US film,. it did signal 
the death of the idea . 
of, UPITN as a strong. -and independent 
agency on the-U. S. market.. 
Both news-film agencies had entered the market at a bad 
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time for foreign news. in: the'United States. The country 
was obsessed with domestic problems. -- 
., 
A content analysis 
study of TV`. network'news programmesýin. 1969 showed that 
national news accounted for aver 6o% of all. stories, " and 
of the remainder, over half were stories that were really 
about the United States, only they had taken place overseas. 
Truly foreign news stories accounted for about 16% of the 
total (10% of total time). 
17 
There was. no. `. sign_of improvement in the-, 'seventies. An 
English observer reported in. the fall of 1974 that in a 
typical week of American' television, a week in which there 
had"been no cataclysmicworld. events it is 'true, an 
American network scarcely devoted more than ten minutes 
of its one-hour news programme. to foreign-news stories. 
He went on : toquote a study by. the Television"News Archive 
at Vanderbilt University which showed that during February 
1974 not one big American network used a single story. 
from their Rome bureau,,. and from"Tokyo-only one network 
used one story. 
l8' 
"This. apparent neglect was accompanied 
by'an'extravagance of possibility. Together, the networks 
: spent nearly four million dollars a-year onýforeign news, - 
which represented about-10% of their annual news-budget. 
The=progress-of-'the Watergate-story_'increasod the appetite 
for: domestic'; newsO By the end: 'of 1974.; the major stations 
had increased their-news coverage from-sixty-to ninety 
minutes'a: day, and some: stations increased it to two 
hours. a night while others talked of two and'a-half, even 
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four hours-a day. ' It. was possible that this appetite 
would.. be redirected towards foreign news if. supply and 
stomach for domestic news reduced. But by now it was 
too late for UPITN-Paramount. 
Visnews was protected from the. relative lack of enthusiasm 
for overseas news in America. It. did not have to worry 
about home coverage, which was'TVN's responsibility. UPITN 
could not find a partner like TVN because none was available. 
Between them UPITN and Paramount would: havehad to have 
built up a domestic news-reporting system in addition to 
the few teams UPITN maintained on the, east, coast. for 
coverage of stories of obvious world interest. That 
would have involved heavy investment . of. 
money and energy 
which would not have-fed. directly, into UPITN!. s international 
operations for several years even>i. f things went. well, which 
they didn't. 
The surviving agency`, TVN,. which_had inherited most of 
the UPITN-Paramount. gains, could hardly. have been described 
as. being in: a strong. postion in 1974..,, A. small clientele, 
huge demand-for national news, " increased 'communications 
costs that favoured' the. big networks and.. an economic 
recession, all contributed to its 'failure to live up to 
the more optimistic predictions of. early1973" A cut 
in the size of the` Los Angeles bureau -. that«year by- some 
sixteen men, was 
'interpreted. 
"as : a_ grim... sign by some, but 
TVN pointed in reply to-an increase in;: strength on the 
, New. York side. 
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Other Foreign Markets 
In terms of their relative extensiveness of operation 
Visnews, which, came into the field later, has always had 
the edge on UPITN. In the first half of 1973, Visnews 
distributed to 160 stations in 85 countries and UPITN 
distributed to 98 networks and stations in 66 countries. 
If the sheer number of countries is an important indicator 
of strength,, Visnews has been helped in this respect 
by its Commonwealth connections. In 1972 for instance, 
Visnews did good business with Australia, where UPITN did 
none whatsoever. In Africa Visnews is rather more 
acceptable than UPITN, largely because of its heavily 
British character and its association with the BBC which 
has. tremendous prestige in at least the English-speaking 
countries and which has helped in the establishment of 
African national broadcasting stations. The participation 
of Reuters in Visnews helps in a similar way. From UPITN's 
point of view, on the other hand, Africa is not a lucrative 
market. Neither agency gets much film from African' 
stations because they. do not produce much, and much of 
what is produced is not technically adequate and is in 
any case still black-and-white. This both reduces the 
total amount of film available on African news stories, 
and increases the inconvenience to the news-film agencies 
of the coverage that is provided. 
By far the most important market for the agencies is 
Europe. ' The U. S. market as we have seen is largely 
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controlled by the three major television networks in that 
country. The purpose of selling in America at all is to 
make coverage less expensive rather than to make profit. 
The reason why this is a problem in America especially is 
because a world agency must have substantial coverage of 
America if it is to sell anywhere. (Whereas the same 
does. not seem to apply with Russia or China. ) So just 
as Europe is the most important market for Reuters and AFP, 
so it is for Visnews and UPITN. 
Their film goes to European countries either through the 
Eurovision network or by air freight. Air-freight is 
still used for transportation over relatively short 
distances because, at the time of writing, "film has the 
advantage that it can easily be kept. Electronic video 
storage on the other hand requires special equipment 
which most European television stations do not have, and 
it is also expensive to edit videotape. 
News-film agency material is offered to European stations 
via the European Broadcasting Unit's sound network prior 
to television exchange, in the case of-the film which 
goes via Eurovision. Ofall`Eurovision material in 1972, 
an average of 9.6 
stations 
in Europe received an item when 
it was transmitted. The figure for Eastern Europe and 
Latin America was 3.2. 
In 1972. only two European stations on the Eurovision network 
did not subscribe to either UPITN or to Visnews, whereas 
eleven 'did not subscribe 
access to agency materia: 
of the agency concerned. 
from Eurovision provided 
television station which 
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to CBS.. Non-subscribers may have 
L provided they have the permission 
The agencies can take material 
they have the consent of the 
shot the film, and that they pay 
'the station and any others involved. This film'can be 
distributed only to broadcast 
. 
organizations. 
Eurovision. is useful to the agencies. because it relieves 
them of the worry of flight schedules and customs agents. 
It is. good for theEurovision stations of course because 
it gives them access to world-wide`material. There is 
some criticism of the agencies by'the'European stations. 
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Some say that the advance notices they -give do'not match 
with the final, film which is transmitted. Others complain 
that too many. items are offered. An average of 27% of 
almost 6,000 yearly offers are accepted. ` So it is said 
that. the agencies should exercise more restraint in their 
selections by not' offering items that can be sent by air 
intime for the major newscasts, and by including only 
spot-news film, not the timeless feature stories which 
they also produce. " The agencies on= the other hand 
complain that the EBU roster system is unfair. This is 
employed when two or more identical'. items-are offered by 
the agencies. Only one is transmitted and'the selection- 
made on a'roster basis'. The' agencies say this' limits 'the 
subscribers"-. freedom of choice. They also'dislike the 
rule whereby when a member station's offer` coincides with, 
an agency's offer the member's contribution has preference., 
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Of the 4,564 items transmitted over the Eurovision network 
in 1972,2,271 or. approximately 50% originated with the 
television news-film agencies, by far the. most important 
of which were Visnews and, UPITN, followed by CBS Newsfilm, 
the European Television Service (controlled 
. 
by. the West 
Lerman TV networks ARD and ZDF, the German news agency 
DPA, and Hage, a national film and. television production 
enterprise). This represented an increase of 29% over 
their, contribution in 1971. The total number of items 
transmitted by, E, urovision increased from about 2,700 in 
1968'to. about 4,500 in 1972, an increase of 67%. Most 
of the items offered by the agencies are from outside 
Europe, though filtered through their London offices. 
The dependence of European stations on, the news-film 
agencies thus increases thefurther-the distance of 
events covered by the agencies' film. 
The dominance of the European,. market is the most important 
feature of the television news-film agencies' distribution. 
Although. their distribution is unbalanced in this sense, 
it is on the whole less unbalanced than the distribution 
of audiocasts, because film is a visual medium and transcends 
language"-barriers even if it cannot always surmount 
cultural ones., Agency, film is not accompanied by speech 
sound. It. may be sent out with explanatory sheets, but 
these are not designed, to be read out, only to inform and 
to identify at, the point of reception. Interviews are the 
exception., and are generally left in the original language 
in which they were conducted. Where appropriate, natural 
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sounds are left in - the sound of a hurricane for. instance 
in a disaster story. 
Outside Europe, Visnews is the main agency serving Australia, 
land and Japan. _ It is the 
strongest 
-agency in New Zea 
Africa, where it serves almost every country, and its 
service is more regionalized.. than UPITN', s as a result. In 
South America, UPITN is on : better ground since UPI is more 
established-there than Reuters. Its:: film-goes out mostly 
from London, and sometimes from New York which is in a 
better position to arrange-for flights, to be, meton time 
at their point of destination. 
Both agencies"select theirmaterial: according to the character 
of the'client or at least-the. --client area. -Nisnews does 
this more precisely'thän UPITN..:.. There is a limit to the 
extent that such tailoring to, 'the. market is. possible. The 
time factor - the length of time it. takes to get 'hot' 
news film from-London or. New York, töt, ; the client; - makes 
it-, possible--to-warn the . client about the 'general: character 
of the film -in advance, but impossible for. him to' make the 
selection' himself without causing` intolerable delays. 
The client` will. -usually give the agency'ari idea of his 
" general requirements, -. 
and the agency will fit its selection 
to these. The requirements, can-be updated at any time. 
In making these known, clients tend to say what they do 
not want rather more easily than what they do. want. 
Typical' requirements include: no news of, Communist China; 
462. 
no nude or semi-nude women; no street disorders. One 
positive requirement is Russia's keen interest in film of 
western military exercises. 
UPITN clients receive packages of about twelve stories a 
day, or between fifteen or twenty minutes of film a day; 
Visnews sends about ten stories a day to each individual 
client. The total pool of stories is of. course larger 
than the number of stories sent to any one client; in 
the case öf. Visnews,. about four times as large. - Visnews 
estimates that about one third of the average client's 
package is news of his own geographical region or continent. 
News, that is, which would proably be without interest to 
any other region. Donald Ferguson, editor-in-chief of 
Visnews, has written that. there are few universal or world- 
wide stories that must be distributed. everywhere, only about 
half a dozen a year. 
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Not all°of'the news-agency film. is actually shot by the 
agencies. Just as the general news agencies. often depend 
largely on the services of national agencies and other 
national media, so the news-film agencies take a lot of 
their film from television stations. At least one. third 
of Visnews material comes from other stations like TVN 
(USA) NBC (USA) or NHK (Japan), and the stations of the 
communist or socialist countries 
There is a tendency for the agencies to cover-the under- 
developed regions of the . 
world for themselves. This is 
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because the filmof local stations is often not considered 
adequate, technically or is shot in. black-and-white. This 
is true of Africa and the Middle East. The agencies are 
rather more hampered by, political restrictions than the 
general news agencies. Film from thelocal station is 
rarely . 
likely to be controversial, and. ifthe agencies 
are going to cover, for. themselres it is ; far. less easy 
for them; to, be. unseen than it, is for ordinary reporters, 
and coverage is far, more expensive. 
In. the ; 
developed world the agencies ;. are more' likely to take 
their film,, or some of it,: from, local stations. But there 
are important' exceptions. In. France, Visnews covers for 
-itself in, order to avoid trouble with French unions, and 
because the centralized . character 
of. ORTF (though this has 
now . been;. 
partially, -decentralized) and its links-with the 
politicallestablishment, make dependence. on that'source 
undesirable. The same scruplosity is not, always exercised 
towards other stations, but France is a sufficiently important 
-and regular source. of news to, justify independent coverage. 
Another problem. with ORTF. is.. that the French Government 
distributes-. some ORTF film, to its colonies and. francöphone 
territories where, Visnews also distributes, and it would 
not be politic. for'Visnews to offer film which originated 
from sources, also available to the other .. 
client. ` 
West, German news is ; also,, largely covered'indep. endently 
by 
'Visnews..: One reason is that,: there is 
a. German television 
agency which distributes German news. abroad. Also because 
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there are competing state-controlled stations in Germany 
and'Visnews does not like to favour one over another. 
These same stations may be clients for Visnews film from 
overseas received through Eurovision or by air. Another 
factor is-that Visnews needs film immediately, and some 
stations are unwilling to provide their film until its 
news-worthiness is°safely exhausted, or will have been 
exhausted by the time Visnews has flown it to destinations 
on other continents 'after appropriate processing in London. 
Distribution is generally by air, and'the danger of delay 
is great. In most countries film does not have to pass 
through customs, because it will have been cleared in 
advance of arrival. 'But it must go through a computer- 
controlled package-marshalling system which is not suscept- 
ible to the personal contacts and'manipulation which can 
be'employed`to speed up the process 'when it is done 
mechanically. 
Air-freight is getting more expensive with time and airport 
delays of two to four hours add to that expense. ' In some 
parts of the world however, transmission is by cable. 
Within the United States thisýis'usually the case. Trans- 
atlantic transmission Is occasionally by satellite - it is 
impossible to send film by underwater cable-. - -Air freight 
is the norm because it is so much less expensive than 
satellite. -It cost about $2,000 for ten minutes' trans- 
atlantic transmission by satellite in 1974, all costs 
included, whereas air freight was about $45. The 
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British Post Office charged about $1,000 for its share 
of satellite communication,. and the United States end 
charged rather less, about $800. In addition there were 
payments for ground lines, speech circuits, terminal`, 
equipment., Trans-pacific satellite communication for the 
same period of time was about $3,500, in exposed form. 
Another reason why air-freight is the norm for trans-atlantic 
communication is that at seven or eight c'clock in the 
evening in: NewYork when most of the United States: film is 
available there, it is about one ctclock in the morning in 
Europe,. a time when film is least r*equired and when the 
use of slow transport does not matter. 
Cheaper ' satellite communication would- give the agencies 
greater flexibility. The Post Office claims'it'is 
expensive because traffic volume is unpredictable, and it 
calculates that the number of telephone calls displaced 
by film-passage justifies the . high : charges. The . agencies 
argue that much of this pote'ntial telephone traffic never 
happens anyway and that they are helping the Post Office 
utilize spare capacity. The:. problem of unpredictability 
of. demand: can be solved byIfixed times. ., 
Eurovision for 
instance now. has standing lines, and has. cut its:. costs 
through routinization. In. order for an agency to do this, 
it is necessaryto. have permanent arrangements with clients 
or partners who : have agreed to take. film, regular, ly and at 
certain times of the day. The ITU has recommended that 
PTT's make 40% discounts for arrangements of this kind. 
The EBU, which runs the Eurovision system, has started a 
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contractual arrangement whereby it takes _up 
lately-arrived 
film from the United States by satellite. It would make 
more economic sense if it were the other way around - 
U. S. stations receiving European film, since they would 
be able to use it 'more immediately on the day of reception - 
but this would require a degree of co-operation between the 
three American networks which does not exist. 
Transatlantic communications between New York, London and 
the continent of Europe are by far the most important in 
the agency news traffic system. New York is the most 
important single source, and Europe is the most important 
news market. London, suitably in-between the two continents 
of: America and Europe, is the main centre: for news-processing .{ 
Visnews employs about 450 personnel in London, or who are 
assigned from London, and of these 170 are . 
in the news 
division. The journalists are from many countries, but 
commonwealth and anglo-säxon predominate-. To the London- 
based staff should be added fifty or sixty others who are 
not controlled mainly from London. 
Both agencies are important sources of film for the tele- 
vision stations with which they are linked through owner- 
ship. Visnews estimates that the-BBC consumes two to 
three of'its news stories every night `on average, which 
is about the same or even slightly more than the stories 
of overseas (non-British) events filmed by BBC crews. 
CBS and Eurovision material may. account for between a 
quarter. and a third of the average BBC consumption of 
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foreign film. Actual proportions on any given day vary 
enormously. 
ITN, takes its foreign film. from CBS, UPITN, Eurovision 
and its. own. resöurces. ITN tends to have fewer news 
programmes than the BBC, and to have rather fewer news 
stories a night (since. BBC has. 2 channels) which may mean 
that ITN use. of UPITN is less in volume than the BBC's 
use . of 
Visnews. A. UPITN source however estimates that 
the percentage of ITNnews which originates with UPITN 
is sometimes as high. as 20%, though it varies considerably. 
The percentage of. foreign news originating from UPITN would 
of course be-much higher.., ' It would be expected that ITN's 
dependence on UPITN. for foreign film would be substantial, 
since ITN has only about 50% of the strength of the BBC's 
total overseas reporting resources. The BBC has to feed 
radio, as, well as two television channels. -' In sum, the. 
news-film agencies may ; account. for between forty and sixty 
percent of. all BBC and ITN foreign news and in. any case 
'their contribution is very substantial. 
We. have seen ; that imbalances, 
i. n the geographic makeup of 
news.. traffic on the general news agency ,. wires, 
is determined. 
 
in- part by the more extravagant imbalances in the distribution 
of media resources around the world.. In the case of the 
news-film. agencies, the same applies but more so, and 
changes in composition of news-film packages might-be expect-, 
ed: to follow on broader changes in the distribution of 
television station clients and revenue, and changes in the, 
taste for news. 
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Recent studies indicate very restricted interests on the 
part of some of the, European television stations. A 
comparative study conducted from the Leicester Mass 
Communications Research Centre found that in selected 
stations the news from Black Africa provided only one or 
two per cent of the total; news from central and Latin 
Amercia about, the same, and from Asia a little more, 
largely on account of the Vietnamese War. The United 
States on the other hand provided as many stories as those 
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three continents put together. 
Improvements in the facilities for exchange of television 
material between the major world-regions may have the effect 
of inducing higher consumption of news from currently 
under-represented regions, and in that way create a demand 
that will eventually make itself felt in the. agencies too. 
But improved facilities for international communication have 
so fartended to accentuate the unidirectionalityof news- 
flow. 
The possibility of such improvements have been explored in 
recent years for the Middle'East, Latin America and Asia. 
Eurovision extended to South America in early 1971 involving 
the Spanish television organization Servicio Iberamericano 
de Noticias (SIN) and the South American Organizacion de 
la Television Iberamericano based in Mexico City. Spain 
pays the costs of co-ordination and transmission, and 
Intelsat allows a reduction of. about 55% of the previous 
tariff for each reception station in the news flow. Eurer- 
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vision material is channelled via. Spanish television to South 
America, by satellite.. The charges-to South American 
stations; by thePTT. ts of that, , continent. are 
higher as a rule 
;. than. those, of., the United , 
States. and Europe, but in some 
cases block bookings have; been accepted on , a_ concessionary 
basis. Ground. station-charSes, in. Brazil, Colombia, Peru, 
Venezuela. were $450, for the, first ten minutes and $18 for 
every additional minute in-the early. 'seventies. Compar- 
ativerates. in other South American countries. were double 
or quadruple°these., figures.. a The stations or Argentina 
and Mexico. originally participated in the scheme but then 
withdrew. when their.. national PTT's refused to lower the 
ground rates..; 
Nevertheless,. the supply of European film to South America 
has greatly improved as a. result_ of, this development. 
News of European stations in the communist block is also 
,, transmitted, but this 
is newswhich has been selected by 
Eurovision members from the Intervi: sion offerings. (Inter- 
vision is the East European equivalent to Eurovision. ) An 
estimated1750, filmed news stories a, -year have passed from 
Europe to-South America, by., satellite, since, 1971- But the 
reverse ,; 
flow,, , from South. America to Europe, has never 
exceeded 30news items a year. Thus far the new develop- 
ment. has. tended . 
to. reinforce one of ., 
the traditional charader- 
istics of international news flow: , 
'its unidirectionality, 
even though improvements . 
in. volume are not unimportant. 
Immediate demand effect on. the_agencies might be to encourage 
further concentration of. resources in the developed western 
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world, rather than a more balanced distribution. The 
agencies want payment, whereas the Eurovision'film that 
has originated from member stations is offered free, after 
budget contributions. have been considered. Half of the 
Eurovision budget is supported by the stations of four 
European countries: ` the United Kingdom, France, Italy 
and West Germany. Since-Spain covers transmission, cost, 
South American stations are receiving Eurovision film at 
a very cheap rate,. at a cost equivalent to transmission to 
or from'the extremities of Europe within the-basic Eurovision 
area. 
A similar exchange arrangement between Eurovision and a 
major world region was established in 1974 with the 
beginning of the Arab States Broadcasting Union's involve-. 
ment. The ASBU had proposed in 1973 that the entire Arab 
region should be broken into three sub-regions, each of which 
would possess one satellite station, encouraging intra-regional 
exchanges and facilitating the daily supply of news from 
Europe. 
In Asia a regional exchange of television items by satellite 
began to seem feasible'by the late 'seventies-'', but for the 
most part landline or microwave were-the most accessible 
means of communication between Japan and Korea, Singapore 
and West Malaysia and Thailand,. Turkey and Iran and Pakistan. 
Satellite charges 'in this part of the world are very high, 
and the great diversity of policies and objectives held by 
different earth stations which is a global characteristic 
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"There were a number of points about which the 
developing nations were unanimous. These 
were: that the agency services were overloaded 
with items from and about Europe and North 
America; that inadequate coverage is given, 
to news emanating from countries of Asia, 
Africa and South America, where about 90%`, 
of the world's population live; that the 
agencies, when transmitting news stories 
from Europe and North America, often assume, 
quite erroneously, that broadcast newsmen 
in other parts of the world have, :.. similar 
knowledge of the relevant background as 
their colleagues in the countries originating 
the stories - therefore there is ,a real need 
for the provision of adequate background 
material; also. that the placing of experienced 
newsmen from Asia and Africa in agency newsrooms 
to help in the selection of news material for' 
transmission to their regions would ensure that { 
news stories unlikely , 
to. be of interest are 
not -transmitted. " 23 
We. have seen that one reason why there is said to be in-. 
sufficient film from the developing countries and between 
them is that the film offered by broadcast organizations 
in many of these countries is often found to be inadequate 
or unsuitable for the agencies for technical reasons. 
This means that coverage is left to the agencies? own resources! 
and they are cautious in their employment of these resources. 
No great hope for dramatic change in the present state of 
affairs was offered in the statement of Gerald Long, 
Managing Director of Reuters, to the 1973 IBI Nicosia Con- 
ference. 
"It is inevitable. that the flow of TV. 
programming is largely from the countries, 
of advanced technical development to'the 
developing ones.... " 24 
Long was talking of TV programming generally. Hisargument 
was that the one-way flow would be acceptable if the content 
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represented a boon'to the developing nations. But in 
practice. the content was largely, irrelevant both to ind- 
ustrial and developing societies. He favoured the devel- 
opment of. techniques which would offer choice, and in that 
way off-set the problem. of domination by the industrial 
countries. In particular he advocated cable technique., 
which Reuters itself had begun to exploit in North America 
and which increased choice, and made available any sort 
of textual material provided there was storage for it. 
Part. of the problem of. imbalance in international tele- 
vision news-film flow is therefore the general. character 
of all television news flow across the world, which is 
largely one-way and which is dominated by entertainment 
material designed: originally to suit the needs of North 
Americaand_Western Europe and Japan. This does nothing 
to stimulate. popular,. demand for material of closer regional: 
and cultural relevance.. 
Changes. in the geographic- make-up of story origins are 
likely to follow changes in, technology and in markets, 
as far as the agency news-film output is concerned. A 
more immediate kind of change that could be exploited to,: ' 
offset criticisms Of cultural bias is in the direction of 
greater feature content as opposed to spot-news. Spot- 
news is and, will. continue to be the'agencies' principal 
activity. But the production of feature material is a 
useful sideline . which. also, 
keeps. staff. employed` who might 
otherwise-be underused during slack. news periods in their 
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respective 
regions. A feature film can easily be put to 
one side if a major news story breaks. And it has a much 
longer storage time than spot-news. Visnews has actively 
pursued this policy recently with a series of cultural and 
semi-educational programmes mainly for children. 
Despite their obvious importance in the world flow of 
television news, the two major news-film agencies do not 
exude an aura of power and prosperity. Their offices 
are modest, their senior executives are accessible. 
Visnews and UPITN exist mainly as outlets for the services 
of their owners, but they themselves do not earn great 
profits. The practice is not very profitable anyway-. 
There are too many stations which can afford to pay only 
very little, and the costs of communication as well as 
production are inhibiting. For that reason CBS Newsfilm 
has reduced its international operations and rationalized 
the ones that remain. For Reuters and UPI, however, Visnews 
and UPITN are logical extensions of their interests in news 
and communication. Their involvement in the news-film 
agencies. may also help sell their basic news services in 
some parts of the world, perhaps through package deals. 
For the BBC and ITN the news-film agencies are extensions 
of their own news-gathering interests, and they are also 
distributors of BBC and ITN film. In this way Britian 
continues to play an important role inw rld news dissemin- 
ation, in, film as in basic news, but at the same time it 
reinforces western control of the news system outside of 
the communist countries. 
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4. And Other Spin-offs 
" The agencies utilize skills and facilities which have a 
general applicability in the media field. The knowledge 
which is tapped for general news services is useful'also 
for publishing in other forms, and in the practice of 
espionage. The communications infrastructure can be 
sub-leased when it is operating at something below maximum 
capacity. 
In the publishing field, a typical example is the book 
produced by Reuters in the late 'sixties ön Africa, 'Reuters' 
. contemp- Guide to the New Africans", 
ý5 
a 'data analysis of 
orary politicians and socio-political facts. Contributions 
were by the agency's own correspondents. But it was not 
considered to be. a very successful venture and has not been 
followed up. AP regularly produces an annual volume, "The 
World in 19.... "", which gives a photo-journalistic account 
of the year's major news events. In its first experimental 
year (1964), some 100,000 copies were sold. The book is 
a product of AP's special Books Department 
in New York,. and 
is sold primarily through newspaper clients who buy in bulk 
and resell or even give away to their readers. The news- 
papers can add their own localised inserts, or have their 
names printed on the front cover. 
Reuters signalled its intention in 1973 to adopt a tougher 
marketing approach in the application of existing informion 
and technology when it appointed a Marketing Manager of 
Reuters' News Division, who was responsible, amongst other 
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things, for the audio service, the sale of 'profiles' of 
newsworthy personages for media library use, and the Extel 
s 
teleprinter service. This last was an ill-fated attempt 
to market the new teleprinter of Extel Corporation (U. S. A. ) º 
in Europe. The executive appointed to the. new post was 
Michael Marsbridge, formerly marketing director of Illustrated 
Newspapers and former senior marketing executive of the 
} 
Thomson Organization. 
In the educational field, AP has tried to boost the sale 
of its simplest one-machine ticker service by offering it 
to schools as an educational device. In 1974 it put out 
a package which it called the "AP Newspaper Reading Skills 
Development Programme", a kit including 150 article cards, 
100 project cards, student log book, test pads, questionnaire 
forms and a teachers' manual. The project was developed 
jointly by AP Newsfeatures and Curriculum Concepts Inc., 
an educational consulting firm, and in conjunction also 
with. the American Newspaper Publishers Association Foundation, 
which provided consultation and technical assistance. The 
primary objectivies of the programme are "to improve. the 
reading comprehension skills of high school students of all 
ability levels, and to develop the newspaper reading habits 
among teenagers". This AP project therefore combined the 
virtues of educational philanthropy with shrewd long-term 
business interest. The activity file card of the kit, 
for example, "contains 100 projects and activities that 
enable students to become closely involved with their local 
daily newspaper through researching of issues, observation 
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of. trends and analyses of material found: in daily news- 
''papers". 
26 The kit was designed for : sale through the 
client-members of AP, '. who had the option. of purchasing it 
at a cost of 075 a unit, or giving it, away to local schools, 
or of selling them to their local schools,. at actual cost. 
APalso produces an annual sports. almanac, through the 
participation-of around 400 of its members who contribute 
material. 
UPI has gone into publication of major news stories or of 
documents related to them. For instance, it published 
an "impeachment report" in ; paperback,. in conjunction; with 
the New American Library Publishing Co., within 72 hours, 
of the final impeachment vote. by the. House Judiciary Committee 
in the; final stages of;. the. Watergate saga. UPI, and its 
associated enterprise,,. Newspaper Enterprise Association, 
offered the book to any of their respective subscribers 
who wished to offer it to.. theirreaders as a public service. 
Not all UPI's, spin-offs have been quite. so innocuous.. In 
the Summer of, 1963, Senator Fulbright and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee looked. into the "Activities of: Non- 
diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the 
United States" -, in other words, the public relations and 
lobbying activities that took place at Government level in 
America at the behest of foreign clients. The committee 
heard how INS before its takeover, by UPI turned over its. 
reporters to; commercial clients: who paid a fee. , 
Clients 
would indicate the questions they wanted reporters to pose 
{ 
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to certain sources. For additional fees, INS placed, 
clients' material on the news wire. Latin-American dictators 
were prominent amongst the. clients. But UPI was involved 
even more directly than this: 
"UPI for at least a generation, had had a Special 
Service Bureau which also made its reporters 
and photographers available to non-journalistic 
.s clients. It has now stopped this. There is 
no evidence that UPI ever put the client report 
on its news wire. ""27 
Earl Johnson, then editor of UPI, said later that UPI would 
let reporters and subject know when the inquiry was made 
for a private client, that it would undertake no tasks for 
foreign governments and that client material had never been 
put on the UPI wire and never would be. The public relations 
operation was transferred to an outside commercial organiz- 
ation after the hearings. UPI Special Service assignments,, 
it emerged, had been undertaken by Washington correspondents 
on behalf of corporations and publications, both domestic 
and foreign. Some UPI correspondents did not know of the 
Special Service bureau's existence until they read about 
the Fulbright hearings; neither did many senators. In 
state capitals, UPI Special Services had contracted to ask 
key state legislators their intentions on banking legislation, 
on behalf of a non-journalistic client with interests in 
banking laws. The bureau was found to have taken no 
responsibility for who the clients were, and reporters did 
not know who they were working for. Furthermore, two UPI 
editors were found to be beneficiaries of the sources whose 
material they put out as part of the UPI service. 
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Sales Director of the UPI Special Service Bureau'was"John 
Nagel, who had-been director of INS Special Services in 
1956. UPI had other contracts with public relations 
agencies taken over from INS, but Earl Johnson said that 
less than a tenth of one per cent . of 
UPI's money came from 
this activity28 
In'this kind of informational service, as in other forms 
of espionage, it is not the news service that is put at 
the disposal of. non-media. or media clients, but the news- 
reporting.:, This means, that some information is made 
available to certain clients and not others, on an absolutely 
exclusive basis, and this contravenes the general principle 
to which the major agencies have paid lip service for much 
of their history - that information should be distributed 
equally to all clients. 
Naturally we cannot know much of'the activities of 
intelligence personnel within or upon the structure of the 
western news agencies. In the case of the CIA,. 'it is 
difficult to believe that amongst the many other involvements 
of that agency after the war - in labour unions, ' cultural 
organizations, newspapers and magazines etc., the news 
agencies-should d have been entirely neglected. 
The history of CIA involvement in the press was the subject 
of an article by Stuart H. Loory in Columbia Journalism 
Review in 1974.29 Mr. Loory records how in answer to re- 
quests for information from the New York Times and Washington 
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Star - News in 1973, William E. Colby, CIA Director, re- 
vealed that the CIA had "some three dozen" American newsmen 
on its payroll at that time, including five who worked for 
"general-circulation news organizations". It was sub- 
sequently reported in the. Star-News that the CIA was going 
to fire those five men. The CIA received private queries 
from several news organizations about the involvement of 
their employees. Not all the a'ganizations received full 
assurance that. their journalists were uninvolved: 
"While Colby gave assurances to some organizations, 
he refused to even talk to representatives of. 
others. United Press International and CBS could 
not get beyond the CIA's press contact. " 
"Ronald E. Cohen, UPI's Washington news`; editor, 
also called Thuermer (the CIA's press contact), 
who refused to amplify the Johnston story. 
Cohen left pnone messages for Colby, who did 
not return the calls. 1130 
Cohen had no success. He wrote a memo to UPI in New 
York and let it go at that. 
Loory's article, is tantalizing, but relatively unfleshed. 
Talking specifically about CIA relations with'news agencies, 
he mentions the "unlimited amounts of money available to 
buy, as the agency did, the services of newsmen working for 
Reuters, Agence France-Presse, Tass, Hsinhua, (the Red 
Chinese news agency), and the staffs of dozens of news- 
papers spread around the world". He follows this up 
with a hypothetical example from_an unnamed source, quoting 
how the CIA might plant an untrue story with Reuters agency 
(feeding the story in through a European bureau, and using 
the services of a paid agent in the London HQ). The example 
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- is. not entirely. convincingtoanyone who knows the inner 
workings ofthe, news agencies, even though it is not:. 
remarkable that an intelligence; agency should want to use 
them. ' (see,, 
The tenor of. Loory! s allegations, was repeated in subsequent 
. 
evidence to the House 
. 
Intelligence; Committee in Washington. 
A committee report, 
31' 
which alleged that there were 11 CIA- 
:. agents posted abroad, using, the cover of American news 
organizations,. with the connivance, of, those organizations, 
also claimed that the' CIA had used the Reuter nets agency 
as. - cover , for its agents and 
to plant false ' reports. ' This 
- elicited aquick, r. esponse fromReuters general manager, 
GeraldLong,. who said he still awaited; proof.. that any 
Reuters service had been manipulated. It does appear odd 
`-: that-Reuters should, be singled out for CIA use to the 
exclusion : of the American. wire services, and this prompts 
the suspicion that : initial sources 
of information concerning 
ýi; thisallegation. were anxious to deflect attention away from 
American tofor"eign news organizations.. A Washington-Post 
story of 'January 1976 claimed that the : 
CIA's major efforts 
in this field were in payments to correspondentsVworking 
for foreign media, whose job was to, getpro-American 
stories'into-their. newspapers.. One particular instance 
". ' of such activity 'affects Reuters again, because., the same 
story alleged'that CIA. _money had been paid to the Latin 
American`news-agency, Latin, which Reuters helped establish 
and with which it still. maintains close business`: contact. 
also' been In, addition or aVs part - of such . activity, -. 
it has, 
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said that the CIA's attention to journalists concentrated on 
the stringer journalists, those who work for several 
media organizations and. have a self-employed status. The 
CIA has admitted its use of such correspondents. When 
George Bush, who took over the directorship of the CIA 
early in 1976, promised that the CIA would not. enter into 
any relationship with full-time or part-time-journalists 
accredited to U. S. news organizations, he left himself the 
option of recruiting both non-American and American 
reporters who worked: for-foreign news organizations. 
Moreover, the possibility of institutional arrangements with 
news organizations, executives, bureau managers, and 
administrative personnel, was left open. A further 
tightening of CIA regulations in November 1977 likewise 
failed to allay suspicions., These appeared-to-exclude CIA 
recruitment of all news personnel bar non-journalists 
recruited with the approval of their management, free- 
lancers and employees of foreign news organizations. But 
the door was left open for exceptions to the regulations 
in the event of specific approval. of the Director of Central 
Intelligence. 32. 
In the present study, no special. attempt. has been made to 
examine the. issue of espionage.. Several respondents 
volunteered the information that the buying of agency 
personnel by intelligence organizations "twas 
a problem'. 
The respondents happened to be UPI and AFP personnel, but 
it is unlikely that any special significance attaches to 
that. Use of agency personnel for realld-iXtyl work 
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seems'on the face of it unlikely. Agency work is actually 
quite constricting, very much-of an office job, involving 
team co-operation, _and; 
personal availability. Espionage 
work for. agency men would be more likely to be of. the 
'soft' information-gathering variety, which is in any 
case what journalism is all about. However, relatively 
few agency-men-have good (in. the sense . of. more 
than super- 
ficial) contacts at. high levels -: contacts,. that would elicit 
; something more than-routine-information. Agency men might 
, be used; to: 'plant'stories. But this might be better and 
. -more. convenientlyachievedfrom outside 
the agency. After 
all, governments and' other. news-sources misinform-as often 
as they inform. ThereLseems no special need to: get a 
journalist:. to make up the story, especially, because the risk 
of his being 'discredited: is, sogreat-. ", Having, co-helpers 
inside an agency might help. - but might also be'redundant. 
The most likely: use of: agency personnel in espionage is. 
this: to find out what has not. been sent. over the wires 
for public distribution. Such information is not necessarily 
sinister,, : simply: of insufficient newsworthiness,,, or lacking 
the suitable 'peg' for future use. This kind of access 
to information which. is organizationally routine; but 
publically. unavailable has. been known to 'interest, the CIA, 
and no doubt other intelligence agencies., Loory himself 
: quotes: two: examples where the CIA sought access to such 
routine. organizational information. 
A sharp contrast to the possibility of covert intelli- 
gence gathering as one form of agency diversification was 
the joint AP/NBC News operation established in February 
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1978 for national public opinion polling, for use in each 
organization's news output. For AP this represented a 
further application of its recently expanded computer 
technology. 
One other area. in addition to covert intelligence, which 
is not talked about too openly in agency circles is sub- 
leasing. : Reuters, UPI, AP to a lesser degree, AFP 
hardly at all, have increased the extent to which they 
handle the international communication's for other: media. 
Reuters? largest contract is for the handling of the New 
York Times News Service.. But both Reuters and UPI have 
extensive arrangements with individual newspapers. whereby 
correspondents for. these newspapers will use agency 
communications to file their stories home. The arrangements 
also apply to other, smaller'news. agencies. This was the 
case, as we have seen, of- the short-lived Asian News Agency, 
which filed through the Reuters' communications network. 
In'the domestic U. S.. market, AP and UPI'also handle the 
distribution of certain syndicated material. 
'The main advantage to the agencies is. that it helps them 
utilize spare capacity'on their leased wires. It is also 
a way of establishing more cordial relations with clients 
or other media, although, these relations are often initiated 
on an entirely local' level, byan individual news corr- 
spondent and an agency bureau chief. 
For the newspaper concerned this arrangement usually means 
9 
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either that communications are cheaper, or at least that 
they. are more convenient. They are likely to be cheaper 
where the agency has a full-time leased. wire, and the news- 
paper-has nothing.. It is-the advantage of convenience 
:: that matters when it is a. question of the agency office 
being a more convenient' and pleasant place from which to 
file stories. This happens in times of crisis when other 
.. communications may, not 
be available. . But it is. often part 
of-a--broader-relationship between, individual newsmen, which 
maysallowthe newspaper correspondent access to the agency 
wires as well,. so that he can keep wellinformed. 
:.,: The-disadvantages are that; in times of. emergency. or crisis 
the agency: may not have the communications". capacity or the 
staff to deal with the communications , of; other 
media. At 
times 'like this the agency's, interest, must come'first. 
The other main disadvantage is. that when a. newsman files 
through an agencylthe. agency, must come; to know about the 
coPY"`he. has written.. In-other words it. is_i. nadvisable 
to : send a scoop through an. agency network. Here again 
this*difficulty, can be solved in . practice, 
by. good relations 
at the local level. 
A telephone survey, conducted by the author, of. foreign 
editors of British national newspapers in the Summer of 
1974found that. editors of the more serious minority- 
circulation daily papers were much more. likely to use 
agency communications than the popular press.: , The 
main 
reason for; this is. that the minority papers print much more 
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foreign news, both absolutely and relatively, than popular 
papers, and they have many more-correspondents overseas. 
Popular papers tend to cover stories on a-'crisis' basis, 
and they are more likely to-be scoop-oriented and prepared 
to put a lot of money'into coverage for short periods. 
So rather than go through an agency they will normally 
prefer to use hotel telephone or telex. They will use the 
agencies where communications are really problematic - 
Beirut was mentioned twice - but the main purpose will be to 
save time, to avoid the delays of the public system, rather 
than to save money. A saving is sometimes made even where 
it may not be the primary purpose - from Cairo for instance, 
when the local correspondent will send only one-hundredth 
or less of the material it would be necessary for him to 
send to make it worthwhile for the paper to set up a direct 
telex line of its=own. The main agencies involved in sub- 
leasing, both 
. 
for minority and popular papers, -are 
Reuters 
and UPI (although UPI is not only used by papers. which 
happen to subscribe to its services). One '. paper rented a 
24-hour'transatlan'tic circuit from AP, which the American 
agency was not using at'all. `Minority papers: were more 
likely to mention the savings made:. one said that agency 
transmision cut foreign news communication costs by as much 
as 5O%. 
33 
PTT's in Europe (in line with ITU recommendations), do not 
generally permit sub-leasing. of circuits for profit. But 
third party use is permitted, 'with qualifications. A line 
between ' twocompanies'which have a straight business 
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.. of agency services for innovations such as CEEFAX or ORACLE 
in the U. K., though clearly these may represent a. growth 
market in the future.. On a smaller scale, news-gathering 
and communications resources of the agencies have . 
been 
exploited for publishing, espionage and sub-leasing of 
facilities. 
The more sophisticated the technical. developments-in the 
news-agency, business, the greater the agencies' overall 
significance within the media world. . -_ 
Only. the agencies 
are large enough to want to employ high-speed transmission, 
computerization, information storage and retrieval for'news, 
on this kind of scale. It puts them further. and further 
ahead of anything their media clients are likely to develop 
for themselves, and for that reason increases clients' 
relationship of dependency on the agencies, and exacerbates 
the traditional structural imbalances of agency market-_ 
orientations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 'Inter-Agency Relations, and the'`. 
National News Agencies 
There-'is an"important'sense in which the global agencies 
do not control the' distribution of their own product to 
newspapers and broadcasters, since between the global 
agency and any particular client often stands the national 
agency in. the role: of-local wholesaler. Inmany_countries 
of course the- global agencies . deliver direct, or within 
any particular country some do and'some do not.,. In a 
. substantialpröportion of all cases, however, and especially 
in'the Third World, 'delivery is-iridirect. Where dependence 
on ' the' glöbal agencies . is already. great, therefore, -the , 
---responsibility of news: choice by an individual media 
organization is-often further reduced by the . intervention ý> 
of: a third. party.. - 
The'- I ncidence of'indirect distribution has been discussed 
'in' Chapter One. Here the concern, is with the- national 
-news agency-more generally and its'typical relationship 
with' the global agency, for this relationship is fundamental 
in any understanding : of 'world news flow. ., " Since the 
relationship is in its'turn 
reflective of . 
the relations 
between the global agencies,. -some-attention is given here 
"' to'the`process whereby"the 'global agencies, helped spawn: 
many of the national news agencies, andto the reasons'why 
the global agencies were able to sustain their superordinate: 
position: 
-What-is a. national news agency? There is not always a clear 
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distinction between national, international, and, world-wide 
agencies. Much depends on the extent of any particular 
agency's news-gathering. operations, its selling operations, 
and the kind of news which is gathered. 
A national agency may be thought of as one which collects 
.. national news of 
its. own country, often takes, irternational 
news from other agencies,, and distributes national and 
international news to_the media and other; clients of the 
country in question. Some national ; agencies employ their 
own . 
foreign correspondents, and these complement the service 
taken by the national agency from. -other agencies.., Where 
this happens, there are two . outstanding characteristics 
to 
be recognized as true of most national agencies. . 
Firstly, 
the number of foreign correspondents employed by. the 
national agencies is generally very small, and they are 
often : posted in capitals which have. a . special- political, 
economic or cultural, relationship with. the country of the 
agency. Secondly, the news.. collectedby these. foreign 
correspondents is news of specific interest to.. the country 
of . 
the agency: for instance, news aböut. the; activities of 
a countryman's overseas business operations;, the. foreign 
travels 
_of a .: 
local dignitary;.; or news of emigrants from 
the agency's country to the country in which the. 'correspondent 
is posted.: Most national agencies do not, sell`their 
services abroad on : any sizable--: scale. They may have 
exchange arrangements with other national; agencies. 
Indeed, they will usually have exchange arrangements with 
the;: international or world-wide agencies; but., these are 
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unequal' exchanges --they serve merely to cut the cost of 
the international services. National agencies are very 
often, 
- but not always, government agencies. ' They may 
, "'be run by the Ministry of Information or`heavily subsidized 
from` government sources. Otherwise, they tend to be 
co-operatives owned`by the media of their country; or. 
perhaps' by both the government and 'the media. 
National agencies are very often virtual'monopolies in 
'their- respective ' `countries. ' The degree' to` which this is' 
-so so varies. `For example, it is particularly common for a 
rational'agency to have an actual monopoly on the collection 
and distribution'ofnational news. This is true for instance 
of the Press Association in the U. K.; nobody has'declared 
that the PA must be a monopoly -'but it developed that way: 
It is a monopoly in a restricted sense: namely, there is 
no other organization that performs the same function as 
the PA, or on the`same scale This function, -it must be 
stressed, is twofold, and--encompasse`s collection` and 
distribution on a national` scale. Other U. K. `'organizations 
claim to `coll'ect U. K. 5news on a national scale'(the BBC for- 
example), no other organization can claim to distribute 
national news, on-a' wholesaler basis, as widely'or 
extensively-asthe-PA. There are numerous smaller agencies 
which '-'specialize-in certain geographical areas, or certain 
kinds of news, but none would' qualify` as a 'national agency!. 
The PA's virtual monopoly situation can be explained by 
two factors. First of all, the PA was really designed as 
: 'monopoly by its owners, whowere the regional daily news- 
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. papers of 
the U. K. Secondly, it is often difficult to. 
make money as a news agency, and the PA, because it aims 
only to avoid making losses while serving its member, papers 
to. the best of its ability, can survive market conditions 
better than most possible alternatives. 
Frequently, smaller 
, 
and. more specialized agencies exist 
alongside. a national agency as we have seen. The distinction 
between any of these, and a national news agency varies, and 
is sometimes difficult to determine with absolute certainty, 
.,. 
So that, it may be said that a real degree of competition 
exists. There is 
, 
more. competition in France, for instance, 
than in the U. K. 
These then, are component: characteristics. of a. 'typical' 
national news agency. Some agencies are less elaborate; 
some more so.: Some, for: example, can hardly be said to 
have an elaborate domestic news-gathering function. This 
is. often because there. is little demand for such news 
because there are hardly. any media, or that, if there are, 
the media are metropolitan rather than national in out- 
look; or simply because. the infrastructure required for 
an efficient domestic news-gathering operation. is not 
available. -. When this happens, agencies exist primarily 
to redistribute international news collected from inter- 
r.,. national news agencies. 
national agency At the other end of,. the scale-there is, the 
which employs a_large number. of foreign correspondents 
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who do not-confine, themselves to reporting events of 
interest only to their own; country. but engage in general 
reporting; an agency which. aims not simply to sell news 
todomestic. news media, but also' to media, of other countries. 
In the introduction : these were described as 'international' 
as opposed; to '. global' or 'world-wide' agencies. Such 
.,, agencies include, as 
foremost, examples, DPA and Kyodo of 
West. Germany and Japan. respectively.,: Both of these 
agencies tend to'distribute their services internationally, 
, and,,: 
these, seryices contain;. a relatively-high proportion of 
;. general news.;;, However, they. have not been considered 
along'. with the other world-wide.. agencies. in this book, 
because'their. international sales are not .: 
quite ; as extensive 
(in the. case of Kyodo they. tend to be limited mainly to 
. 
the South East Asian region; and then on an exchange ' basis); 
and their -news-gathering still tends.. to be. concentrated on 
the_needsof:. the domestic market or on a particular world 
region. 
A study.. ofýinternational or. worldwide agencies must take 
into account the national news agencies. This: is because 
: national news agencies'are a source . of a good 
proportion 
of . 
the-global agencies' total overseas . 
revenue; - and 
because throughýthe. nationalagenciesthe global agency 
news. services . 
are distributed' to media which . otherwise 
-: would not or. might not receive. them. . The-national - 
agency is: in: a-sense a convenient revenue device, whereby 
.-.. ` revenue 
is. assured the global agencies-from-media which 
individuallymightbe unable to afford. global agency 
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services, but which collectively or through government 
help, can afford them. 
The development of global-national agency relations 
closely reflectsthe global political configuration at 
the time of their emergence. From their earliest days 
the activities of national and international agencies 
have been closely interconnected. Both emerged in response 
to much the same stimuli, and indeed, historically they are 
partof, the one-phenomenon. Factors of origin which they 
share include: the emergence of the large circulation 
newspaper, international trade and investment, 'the the electric 
telegraph, and the development of national governments 
which had some tie of accountability to their respective 
populations. Those agencies of countries which had over- 
seas territories-that were extensive enough to. permit 
direct communication between them and the national 
a 
capital of the imperial country, tended to be; international 
in scope, while those agencies of countries with few 
imperial possessions or none, remained national in scope. 
The most powerful agencies emerged from the most powerful 
imperial powers of the second'half. of the nineteenth 
century: Reuters in Britain, Havas in France, Wolff in 
Germany. Germany did not do, well in the race for colonies, 
ýand. of course Wolff was the weakest of the triumverate in 
terms of international relations, but both the country and 
its agency had considerable influence in Central Europe 
and the Austro-Hungarian empire. 
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Britain,. France and Germany. were thus the countries which 
benefitted. most in the period of European. territorial 
imperialism after 1870. -, But by. farthe most important 
imperial 
. 
power. was Britain, -. which collected 
territories 
in Africa, Southern Asia and the Far East which-amounted 
to four and three-quarter million square miles,, and an 
estimated 88, million people. By 1900 the.. British Empire 
.. , covered one-fifth of . 
the, land-area 
. of 
the globe. and included 
something-like. one quarterof. the world"population. 
It is in"-terms of this incentive and facility. that Reuters 
must be seen as`the dominant agency of its time. Havas 
may have been' wealthier, but its international scope was 
., rnever_this, 
extensive. . 
France. was. however the second 
;, _"imperial. "power, 
with. territories inAfrica"and, Indochina 
covering 3.5 million square. miles, and 26 million people. 
Coming a long way ,, 
behind was Germany,. with one-million 
" square miles and, 13: mi'llion 
people, mainly in Africa. ' 
The exclusive character, ofcartel-. agreements reached between 
the agencies; - were. by,,. no means typical 'of imperial trade 
generally. ,, 
Cohen, argues ; that colonies., never became 
.. 
exclusivemarkets,;, that the. major states never found it 
difficult , to, trade with the colonies of their rivals and 
:: that, conversely, colonies always bought, wherever cheapest, 
and sold. their raw-material and foodstuffs,, freely to the 
l. 
-,: highest bidder. 
:... Indeed what the. cartel. shows. above all is the great import- 
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ance each agency attached to news of the territories covered 
by the others. ' Then as now the greatest 'need was for news 
of other major powers of the world, 'rather than news of 
economically primitive dependencies. In only two countries, 
(the smaller imperial powers of the period - the United 
States and Japan), did trade with overseas dependencies 
ever account for more than half of the total=trade. In 
the case of the three most powerful imperial countries 
'such trade was surprisingly small as, a proportion of the 
total though accounted for a higher proportion of Britain's 
-trade than of the trade of its nearest rivals. 
In other ' words'; - the major: states traded with each other 
and non-colonial areas more than they did with colonies. 
The country which engaged in most trade of this kind was 
also the country-which sustained the most'globally extensive 
agency: Britain. Asimilar pattern emergesfrom figures 
of overseas investment. Britain invested about $12_billion 
between 1870 and 1913, and her total net foreign assets 
at the beginning of the First World War were about $19.5 
billion, or nearly 25% of the country's total wealth. 
France invested about $8.6 billion, or about'15% of the 
national wealth; Germany invested 6.7 or about 7.5% of ,ý 
the national wealth. Most of this investment was not to 
the colonies. 52% of Britain's fore±'gri long=term 
investments were outside'the empire, -mostly in the United 
States and South America. Of the 7.3% of long-term 
investment in the empire, however.,. most'of it was in areas 






Britain 1894-1903 21.27 30.42 
1904-1913 25.71 34.75 
France. -1894-1903 9.86 11.20. - 
1904-1913 10.58 . 12.61 
Germany 1894-1903 0.10 0.35 
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South Africa and India (31% of all foreign investment). 
But the largest single area of overseas investment was a 
country not particularly important in the Reuters network: 
Canada and Newfoundland, which accounted for 13.7% of all 
investment. 
Given the pattern. of overseas trade, and 
,, 
investment, Reuters t 
concentration on Empire is aLmatter for further explanation, 
since after all economic news was a very important aspect 
of the news business. The agency appears to have enter- 
tained a bias in favour of empire that was not justified 
by the facts of trade and-investment. America and South 
America were given surprisingly little attention`, even 
while Britain's competitive position within the United 
States fell substantially in the period 1870-1913.3 
Reuters agreed. that South America should be Havas. territory, 
and Havas rather than, Reuters maintained coverage of that 
continent. Reuters did have the most important link of 
all European agencies with the North American agencies, 
situated as it was between the two'continents, and it 
negotiated with American agencies on behalf. of the triumverate 
While the AP was charged a cash price for the European 
service in addition to exchange of services, Reuters made 
virtually no attempt to establish itself as independent 
agency there in sales terms. 
III 
What was the cause of Reuters' preference for empire? 
Perhaps there is a clue in the fact that empire. investments 
were more. stable than those in, say, America, because they 
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were government investments rather than commercial. 
4 
But 
perhaps'it was that news of North America or South America 
was welcome so long as it was news and-was delivered through 
a trusted business associate. In other words, it did not 
matter too much that some other organization had'collected 
it. After all, news of much the most culturally and 
economically important. parts of the world,, in the eyes of 
British interest was left very much to the-agencies of 
Germany, France and America. News of the empire, however, 
would get 'no public- coverage unless from Reuters. It was 
-a . Particularly 
accessible market-because of communications 
. 
and-cultural links; and it was a monopoly market. 
'The: overseas long-term investments of France and-Germany 
'were even less-imperial thane those of,,. 
(8.9/ for 
France "x12.5% for Germany), ' but - unlike' Britain which used 
Europe-for-only'-5.8% of its investments, these countries 
invested lieävily there /a in- the case of France, 53.2% 
for Germany); 'they invested between-30-34% of their overall 
long-term' investments up to 1914 outside both Europe and 
the colonies,,.. split. fairly evenly between North-and South 
America. ' The-concentration of investment in`Eur'opemay 
help: -explain'why both Wolff"and'Havas confined their 
'major expansionary efforts to that continent while Reuters 
soon gave up an independent European-position. French 
investment in Europe was as high as 70% of all long-term 
investments in-1900, and declined after that date only' 
, because of investment in South America and the French 
Empire. 
- German investments were considerably lower. 
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than French mainly because interest rates, were"higher in 
Germany than in either France or the U. K.;; and in line 
with Germany's comparative rate of long-. term investments, 
Wolff's operations overseas or through the rest of Europe 
were similarly retarded. 
The foreign activities of the French and German agencies 
therefore appear to be in line with the. distribution of 
long-term investments by their respective countries. The 
right of Havas to the South American market, however, 
appears in retrospect. a generous concession: by Reuters, 
since Britain had a greater and earlier. investment there 
than the French. And while Reuters expansion seems to 
have favoured imperial, rather than simple trade or invest- 
ment interests, British investments were also noticeably 
overseas, away from the, continent. of. Europe in:, a way which 
the investments of the European countries were not. It 
can be assumed that the, laying of a global; communications 
network. was an advantage in the gathering and transmission 
of news from both imperial. and non-imperial overseas 
territories. 
The activity of the agencies is. not-noticeably related to- 
the, incidence of migration from these countries in this 
period,, 'of, which half was' to the. United States and much 
of the rest to Canada, Argentina,, -Brazil, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa. 
Britain's share of world. trade already began to fall in 
the pre-World War One era. Moreover, her share of world 
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manufacturing production fell-even more sharply. In 1870 
its share of the world's production was more than two-thirds 
the combined shares of the United States, Germany and France, 
but by 1913 this ratio had fallen to less than"one quarter, 
and manufacturing output in the United States, alone was 
more than two-and-a-half times the United-Kingdom's., 
Germany was perceived by Britain-to be a greater. threat than 
'the-United States, however,: partly because America's exports 
'tended tobe complementary to rather than competitive 
with ` the, UnitedKingdom's, and tended'to concentrate only 
onc. ertain-areas, such as-Canada and South America. The 
climate' ' of'competitiveanxiety at this point-in Britain was 
not one'therefore'that would have encouraged Reuters to. 
`-take particular notice of' the American" threat. ' . In fact, 
U. S. tariff barriers affected' British exports to. the American 
market' far mor& than did increased U: S.; competition on 
neutral markets 
The United-States did-not enter the race for, territories 
until the early-twentieth century; and then concentrated 
its attention mostly on the Pacific. This was the-time 
when the"American agencies were also beginning to expand 
their overseas news-gathering: and distribution; networks, 
but their expansion possibly-had more to do with the upturn 
of' U: S. ''foreign investment at this time, which by, 1913 
reached , 
$2.5 billion. Of these, some 40%. were in Mexico 
(cultivated' by'AP from before, World War One), -30% in 
Canada (also a market for American agencies from early 
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days) and much of the remainder in Europe. 
Control of major-news markets by the European triumverate 
of course began to decline after the First World War. 
The German agency continued after the war,. but its overseas 
markets and its privileged place in, the cartel agreements 
were largely destroyed. In the inter-war period, Reuters 
and Havas lost out to the American agencies in South America 
and in'Asia, and to a limited extent in Europe. The rise 
of the American agencies and the relative. decline_in the 
fortune of the European agencies in their role, as distrib- 
utors of news for the world certainly seems to'cor. respond 
with relevant changes in the. American economy and its 
economic involvement with the world. During the First 
World War, "the United States ceased tobe an international 
debtor, and by. 1922 had become a net creditor for about.. 
$1,200million, apart from large sums owed it by major 





the. other hand, British foreign investment had been reduced 
by 25% in comparison with pre-war figures, and French by 
55%. By 1930, U. S.: investments abroad (apart , from war 
'debts) were four and a half, times those of the British. 
6 
Although North`American expansion was , not. 
initially per- 
ceived as threatening, itbecame: so, after the First World 
War, since by this-time two. fieldsin; which America was 
especially competitive -. machinery and motor vehicles - 
were amongst the few expanding. export markets. 
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Because"of Britain's declining position after the War, the 
'imperial market for investment became proportionately more 
important than. it-had been before theWar, reaching 59% by - 
1930. Of non-imperial investment, Latin America accounted 
for well over half, while the United States took only 
5.5% (a slump from 20% in 1913)"7 Europe's share rose. 
This'investment-position helps to explain'Reutersº increasing 
anxiety: not only. was it facing invasion by'the U. S. 
agencies, ' but'in areas which were becoming more important 




While'South'America became a more important area of British 
economic concern, foreign agency 'propaganda' was' an 
increasing cause of frustration as was the traditional 
dominance' there of Havas. ' And as U. S. agencies expanded in 
South America, 
. 
British holdings there still outweighed 
American, even until the Second World War. 
ange _ News-Flow as ? News-Exch 
The concept 'imperialism' denotes an imbalance of power 
relationship between nations. The first agencies emerged 
in the countries of nineteenth century imperialism,, andr 
their relationship with agencies of other countries was 
and: is-to some extentstill. a reflection of the imperial 
balance of power. 
`It should, be understood, however, that this imbalance was 
not often`unidirectional. The agencies did not everywhere 
impose their own news-gathering and distribution machinery. 
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Rather, they established relations with local. independent 
agencies. The essential characteristic.. of this.. relation- 
ship, was the principle of news-exchane, which it. embodied, 
although the exchange was rarely equal. 
The flow of international news therefore involved and 
still involves a multiplicity of distinct organizations 
and lack of editorial control. Despite this fact, the` 
weaker members of the network could not act with sufficient 
unanimity to. put countervailing , pressure onthe stronger 
.. members and thus achieve a_lasting equilibrium of-influence. 
The great possibility - creation of a truly international 
news organization, acting as a single; bodywith no concessions 
to particular national interests, or pressures - was never 
realised. 
Instead, co-operation between agencies has tended to reflect 
both teconomic necessity',.. often at the cost. of editorial 
control over the use to which news is put and the quality 
of the news which is received, and the state of diplomatic 
relations between the nations of the agencies which are 
partners to the agreement. 
Early Exchanges Between the Global Agencies 
News-exchanges began very soon after the initial emergence 
of the agencies. The first agreement was, in 1856, between. 
Reuters and Havas, and was confined,, significantly, to news 
of trade and of stocks. The agreement_was widened to 
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. include Wolff 
by. 1859,. and inssubsequent years incorporated 
larger. geographical areas and broader topics. Havas_ 
furnished news of France, Spain, Italy and the Levant; 
_Wolff's part of 
the agreement was news of Germany, Russia, 
Scandinavia and the Slavonic countries; Reuter provided 
.., news. of the. British Empire. 
The, primary. purpose of the, agreements; was to reduce the 
cost of foreign. news-gathering, at the same time as pro- 
tecting markets. The partners to the post 1870 agreements 
..,, were 
to, sell their news services only in what by common 
, consent were 
their own spheres of. influence. Outside 
_,, 
these spheres they would sell only. to the- other partners 
and tono-one else. These-early. agreements did not 
usually forbid the collection of'news in each'other's 
... 
territories, only, the sale of news. But in practice most 
ofthe"news-gathering in any area was left. to the agency 
-whose particular. sphere of influence it was, '-andwhich 
would probably enjoy privileged access to major political, 
military. and:. economic sources. So"in St. Petersburg, 
for instance, where before 1859 Reuters and Havashad 
maintained their own correspondents, Wolff now collected 
-Russian news which became part of the-news package it, ; -, 
exchanged for the services of its partner agencies. 
, 
The 1859 agreement did allow the agencies. to retain 
-clients they had gained before-that date in'rival terri- 
tories, As'it happened, Reuters-had a-considerable 
clientele. in Germany, and even"after: 1859 it expanded its 
5o8" 
news-gathering operations in Hamburg, Frankfurt, Hanover 
. and 
Berlin. This expansion was not favoured by Bismarck, 
who persuaded the King of Prussia to, raise the necessary 
capital to back Wolff's Continental Telegraph Company with 
State support. Bismarck's hostility-illustrates-both the 
political advantages that Governments both then and now r 
perceived in the idea of a single national agency suscept- 
$ 
"i! 
to State pressure, and the fragile character; of.. the ible 
agency agreements. 
In this periodof the early, 1860's therefore, 'harmony: 
reigned between Reuters and Havas, who together maintained 
a joint office in Brussels (and which later spouted sub- 
branches in Antwerp, Ghent''and Bruges), while there was 
considerable friction between Wolff and Reuters. '` Wolff 
expressed this in. the most significant . way, =when., in the 
i'. 
mid-sixties', the newly laid Atlantic cable required-some 
form of agency co-operation to meet the"expenses: of getting 
American news. While Reuters negotiated with AP of New 
.. 
York, Wolff initially signed a deal with the Western AP of 
Illinois. 
Inside German territory, state-controlofcommunications 
discriminated against Reuters. telegrams, which were labelled 
'private' and therefore of relatively low priority, whereas 
the telegrams of Wolff and, its allied agency, they semi- 
official 'Korrespondenz-Bureau'-of-Vienna, were given more 
immediate clearance.. Since., Wolff's agency was-the agency 
ofPrussia Reuter. s: did well. in those areas-which'. resisted 
Prussia's drive for unification, of which Hamburg was one. 
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Here it-signed an exchange agreement with the local agency 
of Bremen. It had a lead over Wolff in the provision of 
overseas-prices from America, the West Indies and the Far 
East. To increase this lead still further it expanded 
,.,,.,,,... 
into what before had been exclusively' Wolffs foreign 
territory, by establishing contact with the earliest of 
the Scandinavian territories, Ritzaus of Copenhagen. 
The advantages of oligopölistic alliance were clearly more. 
attractive than-the dubious, risks-of international competition 
But this alliance, consolidated in the agreements between 
all three agencies in 1870, formalized the inferior position 
, of the German `news- agency- as a , source of international news. 
Wolff's acceptance of this 'status was bought by ' Reuters t 
agreement to free , the, German market forWolff's monopoly 
control - clearly a highly desirable objective both 
commercially., -and politically. 
The agreement recognized Austria, the Scandinavian countries 
and-Russia as territories suitable for Wolff's' exploitation. 
But in return, ' the Germany agency would-pay a considerable 
sum to ` Havas-andReuters annually. -'Reuters agreed to 
-close. its. Cerman. `and Austrian offices, with the 'exception V 
of Hamburg which had been the most prosperous ofVthe V 
overseas'markets : and where it` remained until 1900: 
Navas' right to the markets ofFranc"e, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal was confirmed, as was Reuters' right tö'England, 
Holland and. their dependencies. = 
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The apparent harmony established between the three agencies 
by, the 1870 agreement was in fact immediately disrupted by 
the consequences of the Franco-Prussian war. Unnerved 
by the possibilities for Wolff which the`Prussian victories 
opened, Havas sought to strengthen its ties with-Reuters. 
There was even talk of Reuters' buying up a considerable 
share of Havas, but. this plan was'dropped with the 
rapid recovery of France, and of Havas. Instead the 
agencies agreed to a 'joint purse' arrangement under which 
all profits from all sources would be shared. 
This was perhaps the nearest thing to a truly international 
agency ever conceived,, and it failed.. Reuters broke. the 
spirit of the agreement when it embarked on an ambitious 
telegram operation. between South 
, and, 
North America, the 
West Indies. and, Europe. It should have been a booming 
success, but totally incompetent management turned it into 
a fiasco after only one year. When Reuters presented 
Havas with a bill for the costs, the French agency was 
naturally displeased. 
Changing diplomatic interests of Bri fain and France 
further removed the chances of a.. lasting'partnership of 
the kind envisaged in the 'joint, purse' agreement. 
Disraelis'agressive. near east policy in the mid-seventies, 
onwards for instance brought, about renewed'struggle for 
. the markets 
of Turkey. and, Egypt, where before the agencies 
had acted on a joint basis., As British influence was 
established in Egypt, Reuters became its leading internal 
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agency. Eventually, Havas withdrew entirely from Egypt 
(in 1900) in return fora financial compensation from 
Reuters and the promise that,. dispatches would still be 
headed 'Reuter-Havas'. This was but one aspect of the 
imperial scramble for Africa which further intensified 
the identification of agencies with the policies. of 
national governments. 
Conflict between Reuters and Havas was partly solved through 
the device of extending the 1870 agreements, which by 1876 
recognized Australia, the, West Indies. and the Far East as 
territories normally reserved, for distribution by Reuters, 
while- Reuters. gave up all claim to the South American 
market,. and Indochina, which were to be recognised as 
Havas territory. 
But. precisely because, Wolff was not the most active 
_, participant 
in the scramble for overseas territories, 
Reuters was inclined to move closer now to the German than 
to the ; French.; agency. In 1887 Wolff and Reuters signed 
an. 'offensive-defensive' alliance providing for-joint action. 
in case the renewal of"the 1870. agreements, scheduled for 
1890, could not be, accomplished.. In the same year as the 
,. alliance, 
Francesco Crispi,, the Italian Premier, discussed 
with. Bismarck-how. the. agencies of the Triple Alliance Powers 
- Stefani-. in Rome, Wolff; in,. Berlin, and the Korrespondenz- 
Bureau of Vienna: -, could combine to crush the dominant 
position of Havas, in, Europe. 
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Although Reuters' first reaction was to avoid such a 
polarization, for fear that the conflict would cut it off 
from its primary source'of continental news, it evidently 
considered enmity with Wolff a more serious possibility. 
The success of the'pact depended ön the joint operation 
by Wolff. and Reuter of bureaux in Rome and in Paris, since 
neither could expect any co-`operation'from Havas. Stefani 
in Rome had initially been'an ally of Havas, 'but now sided 
with the Germans. 
Except in the very early days, 'when Reuter himself had 
worked with Wolff in the Paris , office' of Hävas, there had 
been no experience of such close co-operation between the 
German and British. -agencies. ' The joint offices were not 
successful. Crispi didnot'permit Stefani co-operation 
in the end, for fear of retaliation from Francophil interests 
in Italy; while in Paris the alliance agencies'could not 
hope to compete for- with Havas on its own ground. 
The pact failed, and' the'1870 . agreementt' 's were renewed after 
all by the original triumverate in 1890: The renewal 
merely confirmed each agency in the' 'territories' it had 
already acquired. Havas made'a bid for the right to 
distribute news in Russia, reflecting the. acc'ord emerging 
'between-Russia and France, , in '. 
exchange for its Italian 
market, which in the light of the offensive=defensive 
pact no longer seemedýsucha-friendly place. Since 1876 
Havas had arranged with the Russian authorities 'to receive 
dispatches directly from St. Petersburg, rather than through 
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Wolff, and-consequently it received its Russian dispatches 
several hours in`advänce Of 'those going via Berlin. 
But'; its : bid for the' - Russian market was not recognized; the 
alliances between, the agencies were not quite as fickle as 
those-`6f their'home governments; and markets once gained 
were, not readily relinquished. Onle'consequence of this 
stateýof affairs'as we have'seen, was the promotion of State 
backing in Russia for a. single national' ' agency to counter 
the 'dependency: ön Wolff for. foreign news, and this, 'in turn 
laid the foundations for.., what, was later to become TASS. 
The 1890 agreement was `further `renewed , in 1900. '` The 
'essential", character of"the triumverate survived therefore 
far `most of the 'second half 'of- th'e'nineteenth century, and 
continued'up to-the First World War 
. 
in'its original form, -- 
with consequences'`, that'lasted at least until the-Second' 
World War and in some respects until today. ' 
The 'Sat'ellite Agencies 
The smaller European agencies allied themselves to members 
of the triumverät, e. They had no choice if they were to 
survive as credible news organizations, since there was 
nowhere else they could go for a comparable supply of 
foreign news if they were unable to collect it for them- 
selves. 
The triumverate both nourished and contained these smaller 
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agencies. The typical pattern of. news exchange. was 
already established before the 1870 agreement. . Havas 
had a relationship with the Italian agency Stefani, based 
in Turin. Under the agreement between them,.. Stefani 
gave Havas the world monopoly on its Italian news, and 
undertook to transmit it directly to Paris and,, if Havas 
so required, to Germany, Switzerland and. England as well. 
It agreed to maintain correspondents. in Rome, Naples and 
other major Italian cities.. It would-also transmit Havas 
news to subscribers of the French.; agency,; in. the Levant. 
In return the Stefani agency received the Italian monopoly 
on all Havas news, which meant that Stefani was sole 
possessor in Italy of La world, news service. Alliance 
with the triumveratetherefore. automatically conferred 
a monopoly status on a smaller. agency within its domestic 
market, an extremely attractive political and commercial. 
proposition.. 
Wolff's most important ally was. the Korrespondenz-Bureau, 
of Vienna, founded in 1859, although this agency did sign 
separate agreements of news provision with, the other 
agencies in 1869 and later, to offset the consequences of 
internal disputes within the triumverate. The-Viennese 
agency acted as point of transmission , 
between, the Baltic 
States and Middle Europe, one of the most febrile areas 
of the world for much of the period leading up to the First 
World War.. It maintained offices-in the. countries that 




providing business information to banks and commercial 
houses, moving only gradually into general news.. It also 
operated in southern Sweden, where the larger papers were 
its subscribers. 
After 1870, the Scandinavian agencies co-operated more 
with Wolff, whose territory this had then become. By 
this time two new agencies had appeared: Norsk Telegrambyra 
" (NTB) in 1867 for Norway, and Svenska Telegrambyra (STr) 
the same year for Sweden. The Swedish agency. started 
primarily as a branch office for 
 
the. distribution of news 
received via Ritzhaus from Wolff, later receiving some 
State support before passing into the hands of. the Swedish 
press in the 1890's. The Norwegian agency was taken over 
by the Norwegian press, through the device of a joint stock 
company 
Reuters andHavas operated joint bureaus in Holland and 
Bel gium. The main initiative came from Reuters, which 
bought up a 
. 
local agency in Amsterdam, ' founded by one 
Alexander Dalamar. Dalamar'sbrother Herman'took charge 
of the Reuter-Havas office in Brussels. A Swiss agency 
founded in 1895 Maintained similarly intimate relations 
with Reuters and'Havas. These two agencies, together 
helped establish the Ottoman Telegraph Agency for news 
of Turkey in, 1911. 
-, Reuters was no less active outside Europe. Before World 
War One it-formed the Eastern News,, Agency in India, on 
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the basis of two previous domestic agencies, and this was 
India's principal"agency. until. Indian independence. In 
Japan, Kokus&i, founded in 1914,, was at first little more 
than a foreign branch of Reuters. After the. failure of, 
an indigenous venture by British newspapers in South-Africa, 
Reuters established the South, African News Agency, in which 
it . held 
a. controlling. interest untilthe, inter-war period. 
While Australian newspapers were able to. support independent 
agencies, they. stilldepended on Reuters for their supply 
of internationalnews.. " 
National agencies often emerged as, the result of local- 
initiative,, in some cases almost"as early as the triumverate 
agencies themselves-. But since one of the most important 
functions, of, a_national. agency was collection of international 
news, it was inevitable that they quickly became linked-in 
with-the_ existing. arrangements_; of the-triumverate. The 
resulting relationship of inequality was sometimes expressed 
in, the part-acquisition of the agency . 
by`the, largerone, 
. as. we see 
happened. in the case, of Reuters and some of its 
satellites. At other . 
times,: Reuters took 
. 
the initiative 
and -founded its own-agency. This happened. wherever, the 
,: 
local agency was too strong to want to enter into. a deal 
with the triumverate. Since the. triumverate agency 
needed . an : office 
in any case, to collect and if possible 
distribute news, it was, an, ea'sy alternative to set up a.. 
local 'front' agency, and. in that way to. secure a foothold 
on the local market. This was quickly.. achieved'wherever 
__. 
there was competition. between scarcely-established local 
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agencies, 'which was the case in Holland until 1934 when 
ANPwasestablished, and in Japan which did not have a 
single strong national agency until Domei was. formed in 
1936. 
More commonly the relations hip remained indirect: as a 
condition of the news exchange, and ' the domestic monopoly 
position it bestowed, the national agency was usually for- 
-biddento sell its service to other agencies outside the 
cartel. After 1907, ? other agenciest invariably meant UP 
in practice, and between the wars AP and theGerman'ýTrans- 
ocean agency. UP tended in consequence to deal with some 
of the smaller domestic rivals of the triumverate agencies., 
such as Central News 'in the United 'Kingdom, or-Extel,. or 
Fournier-in Paris. 
It cannot be said that the large agencies participated in 
the foundation of the majority of smaller agencies at. that 
time. Yet inasfar as the large agencies didat least 
half the job of the smaller agencies - namely, they 
collected and provided international hews-'the large 
agencies were very deeply implicated in the character of 
the smaller agency services from the' start of their 
operations. The smaller agencies could not usually have 
called on a fractionof the resources they-would'need if 
they were to provide for themselves what they 'could buy 
from the European triumverate. Even if they could have 
found the resources, say from state coffers, they'would 
still have''beenat a severedisadvantage"in news-reporting 
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comparison : with with the` larger' agencies. The political- 
economic character of the period would have demanded as a 
matter of. the utmost priority an excellent service of news 
from `-the'-Parliaments,, Governments and Bourses of Britain, 
France and'Germäny, and. 'similär news from the territories 
'. "those countries controlled or greatly influenced. It 
would Piave been impossible to comp'ete-'ineaningfully on the 
domestic ground of even. one of these three.. Wolff and. 
Havas enjoyed- privileged relationships with their own 
respective governments. Wolff and Reuter, as we have, seen, 
: found it impossible -to 'compete successfully against Havas 
'" ö`maintain a joint t Paris office. So what in 1887-1890 t 
chance would; a, smaller agency have had? Reuters was less 
close to the British , Government perhaps' but it had what 
was', 
., 
al. considered, a'respectable relationship and 
status. which.. no other agency - especiallyä foreign. agency - 
could conceivably-have won. In British territories-it 
might have been easierto'displace the position of. Reuters, 
but only with at least' an equivalent service of British 
economic and political news, which a. smaller agency would 
'have: been unable"tö obtain. Even, Up', of America oould not 
dis la th r. , .. p ce Reuters;; orýtheother. partnes of the triumverate. 
This agency . got 'as' far as it 'did only because" of the 
spectacular-,, 'h o me market it served. 
Reuters was rather more sophisticated in its relationship 
with satellite: agencies than either Havas or. Wolff. 
ative in starting Wliereäs Reuters sometimes took the"initi 
up new agencies or buying up 'existing' ones, süch'strategies 
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seem not to have occurred to its 
., 
partners. One reason 
for Reuters' acumen in this very crucial marketing operation 
was. the character of its, oWn relationship at home with. the 
Press Association, national agency of, Great Britain. 
Reuters managed to have its cake. and eat it: not to be 
encumbered with the problems of domestic news-gathering and 
provincial distribution,. yet to derive a considerable share 
of its total revenue both from the London. press and, the PA 
acting on, behalf of the provincial. press. 
Like the AP of New York and CP in. Canada,. the PA emerged 
as an act of protest by newspaper editors. against; the 
quality of news service provided by the telegraph companies. 
The service was expensive, it did. not observe the require- 
ments of its clients, and actually weakened: their competitive 
position by selling to coffeehouses and, hotels as well. - 
an_early version of the 'continuous-use . versus: 
daily-publicauai' 
conflict that is still bemoaned by many editors-in the face 
of news competition of radio and tel*evision.,. 
Fortunately for the. provincial press, the Government too 
suffered from the irregularity. and inconsistency; of 
telegraph company services; and. when the-.; PA exploited its 
considerable political influence in a campaign for the 
nationalization of the telegraph companies, it had a 
receptive welcome. 
..,. .: 
Almost as soon. as nationalization.. df the telegraph companies 
was achieved. and the PA was awake to its new power',. it 
521. 
approached Reuters for"an exchange arrangement. - The PA 
would be exclusive purchaser of Reuters news, but Reuters 
retained the right to- supply its"news"directly to sub- 
scribers within a fifteen mile radius of Charing Cross. 
It was a period of rising costs but the PA succeeded in 
establishing an initial basis of subscription that did 
not exceed the charges of the old telegraph companies 
er newspaper. In turn, p the PA was obliged not to accept 
overseas news from any other source than Reuters, with 
the exception of occasional items from private informants. 
Reuters was never closely involved in the business of 
direct domestic news-gathering. The PA was its most 
important national news source, while in London it 
maintained some independent coverage. This distance 
from the home market may have been inspired partly by 
Baron Reuter's feeling of national difference. It was 
all right for a foreigner to be involved in foreign news, 
but problematic for one. to have such influence over 
domestic news operations. He did not lose by this 
strategy. Much of the trouble that afflicted Wolff and 
Havas passed him by; yet he retained the wealthiest 
clients in the country. One single client, the PA, 
perhaps paying less than the provincial newspapers would 
have done separately, saved him a lote of expense; and 
protected the provincial market from the interest of foreign 
agencies, as-well as containing the expansion of small 
domestic agencies like Extel and Central News to the London 
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area. 
Global Agency Promotion of New Satellites 
This close involvement of global with national agencies 
has continued throughout their subsequent history. Actual 
global agency involvement in the setting-up of national 
agencies has been a characteristic of post-colonial times 
as much as it was of colonial days. There is usually no 
question of an ownership interest; rather the 'involvement 
is considered in terms of mutual assistance between news 
organizations of the developed countries with their counter- 
parts of the underdeveloped world. The, two agencies most 
active in this context are Reuters and AFP. 
AFP was heavily involved in both an. advisory and. a material 
capacity in the French African territories when these 
became independent. The national agency which emerged in 
these circumstances was usually the old branch office of 
the AFP, and was often staffed initially by the same 
journalists that had staffed. the AFP bureau. The relation- 
ship was expressed also in terms of the special use made 
by the national agency of the. AFP news files,. though that 
dependence is less considerable now that both Reuters and 
AFP in Africa have made inroads into each other's ex-colonial 
territories. Even so, the revenue is usually greater for 
the established agency than for the non-established. That 
is to say, a French African country will probably use AFP 
as the primary foreign news source and pay it a higher sub- 
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scription, and use Reuter, as a secondary, source,. paying 
smaller, subscripti_ons. - 
(Mutatis mutandis in ex-English 
territories. -). _: 
Reuters has advised the. governments of 
many countries , 
inAfrica and. the; Middle East about the 
-. setting: up, of national news agencies, : often giving technical 
assistance, and lending out personnel forgiven periods of 
time. It has also: played, a major, role. in the establishment 
, of.; the Latin American co-operative. agency, Latin, which is 
a major news: source,. for Reuters and which takes its 
-: international news mainly+fr, om Reuters., Similar relation- 
ships. between Reuters, AFP and. national, news. agencies have 
occurred; inttheir. respective Far Eastern and South East, - 
Asian areas of influence.. -, A very recent-, example of aid 
is'-, the-assistance given. by. Reuters in,, the establishment of 
;: the. Caribbean:: News . 
Agency (CANA) in, 1975, which, started 
with 18 subscribers, of which nine., were radio-stations,.. 
three were TV stations"and the, remainder. were newspapers. 
CANAhoped to be' independent, of Reuters after a year of. 
operations, and its UNESCO; inspired constitution embodies 
guarantees of non-interference from governments and other 
vested interests. of the area. 
A.. seeming. paradox of this 'kind of advisory relationship 
is the fact.: that many:. of . 
the agencies in. question are 
gQvernment-owned, and in. some respects subscribe to. 
'different norms of news-gathering, and news-distribution 
than. those=professed by the`international: agency.. 
But anew national agency is a new client, and as'such': it 
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contributes to the continuedsurvival-of the global agencies. 
A new national-agency-may also mean the introduction of 
improvements of national news-gathering machinery. Where 
there are few newspapers or other `media, ' or where the 
existing"media are also the media of the capital city 
serving only the urban population, 'a national news agency 
may represent the beginning of a"geographically much more 
widespread coverage. This is sometimes best done by the 
government, because if there are no provincial: media and 
there is little provincial, literacy, it-is probably the 
government which has most to gain from=some coverage. It 
would be foolish to rule out the possibility. that in the 
long run the very existence of 'a: good technical facility 
for news-gathering might generate-the needs and pressures 
that also stimulate the growth. of, non-government media. 
In short, as the. global agencies themselves argue, some 
news is better than no news: `helping a'"government-owned 
agency may be the only means'-of generating-a regular news 
supply-from some-countries. 
Governments must alsobe'well-informed to'govern well. 
They need to be well-informed'about international news, 
and about their own country. 'The-''international, 'agencies 
are helping them--do just that; when they - give aid:. to national 
agencies., After -all, much of : the:: activity , of 
the global 
agencies is about news ofgovernmentsand diplomats and 
these are some-of their-most avid consumers. .. 
So the 
global agencies can simply be said to be helping countries 
participate in the process,,: of'inter-dependence that character- 
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izesthe modern world. From a certain point of view it 
may be"said'thatthey are also helping maintain certain 
kinds of"government, and that is also true. On the other 
hand they do not help exclusively the same kind of govern- 
ment. The instances` include one-party"as`well as multi- 
party states. They rarely, if. ever, include communist. 
agencies, but those agencies have help from elsewhere. 
General Character of the Global-National'` Relationship 
The relationship between global and national news agencies 
is one of enduring significance for them both. National 
agencies are invariably, regarded as. important sources of 
news by the global agencies; if they are not so, regarded 
then that state of affairs is associated with a sense of 
grievance by-global agency journalists, as well as a sense 
of professional (and cultural) triumph--'a national agency 
which is not an.. important source for a global agency, the 
implication is,. has no right to be a national agency. 
Wherever there is a national agency, it is-common for the 
office of the global agency in the country to subscribe 
to it, but, in some cases the national, agency service may 
not be received in the.: country itself. Most"East. European 
national news-,. agencies , for. example, are not received by 
the global agencies at, the points of origin, but are 
picked up. in. Vienna, 
which is the central reporting centre 
for. East Europe. for the world agencies: At the height of 
the Cold War it was difficult to get. correspondents into 
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East Europe at all, and so there was not always an office 
locally. to'receive local news services;, but it also 
suited the East European gevernments to have their services 
picked up outside. their own territories it removed the 
apparent need, in their eyes, for correspondents actually 
to put foot in the countries they covered. And since 
East Europe does not rank high in. the news priorities of 
the global agencies, it is common for these countries to 
be literally considered as a 'block' to be viewed and 
covered from one central point. 
Where national agency services are received by the global 
-agencies outside the countries concerned, it-may also be 
because it is cheaper for the global'agencies to maintain 
a. team of service monitors, and-'perhaps translators, at 
a point which is. central in their own network. ' This is 
possible if the outgoing signals of the national (or inter- 
national) are sufficiently strong, -as they are 
in the case of TASS, NCNA, 'the East European agencies, the 
North Vietnamese agency. To maintain an editing team 
in the capital of origin can sometimes be slower, especially 
where communications are inferior or where agency dispatches 
must pass through a censor's'öffice, 'thän-"global agency 
transmission to 'the nearest regional centre 'or to head 
office. For reasons such as. these, the service of the 
Middle East New Agency (MENA) is"often monitored not in 
Cairo, where it originates, but in' Beirut; the North 
Vietnamese agency is monitored in Hong Kong' Tokyo. 
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There are cases where national, agencies do exist but whose 
services are not taken by the global agencies.. UPI for 
instance no longer subscribes to the national agencies of 
French North Africa, which are not considered sufficiently 
newsworthy or trustworthy as sources, and which do not always 
pay the global agencies for. the services they receive from 
them as. part of the exchange agreements. Of. course most 
countries in Africa have special relationships with either 
Reuters or. AFP, which tend. to weaken the possibility of 
alternative or additional links with the American agencies. 
In some cases national. agency services are not taken because 
they are allied with global agency operations, and therefore 
considered to be direct competitors. Reuters and UPI both 
do without AFP's domestic French service, for example, but 
do have arrangements with smaller French agencies. Reuters 
does not subscribe to a domestic service of the U. S. agencies, 
. and 
in Germany, DPA's domestic service no longer goes to 
the offices of Reuters, AP and AFP. Needless to say, it 
would usually be possible for a global agency office to get 
access to domestic services through its own clients if the 
need arose. 
What can a global-agency expect from a national agency? 
This varies considerably. The most comprehensive national 
agency services are those of the western developed nations, 
which include the PA of Britain, Germany's DPA,, and Italy's 
ANSA. The relative adequacy of these agencies, in the eyes 
of the global agency journalists, reflects the high develop- 
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ment of print and broadcast media in such countries. This 
implies, therefore, that the best national agencies exist 
in countries where there are. sufficient alternatives to 
these agencies. 
Where necessary, a global agency can do without a very 
good national agency because the other media will act as 
adequate news sources, and this happens in the case of 
Reuters in the United States, Germany and France. In 
other countries, however, the main reason for doing without 
the local national agency is usually that it is thought 
to be so bad, not because there is any alternative. Yet 
even where this happens a global agency does not generally 
have the local resources to provide an adequate alternative 
for itself. 
Local governments may prefer to use broadcast media as 
national news outlets, and this may mean that the'broad- 
cast media will act as primary news sources for the global 
agencies. The usefulness 'Of broadcast media in practice 
is often diminished unless used "in conjunction with a 
national agency. A national agency provides an 'immediate 
written record of an announcement or an event, whereas a 
broadcast station has to be monitored by the global agency, 
which must try to tape key passages' if these can be identi- 
fiediin advance. Radio may be more important than other 
media for aýgovernment which is communicating directly to 
its own people, many of whom may not be exposed to any 
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sources. But the chances are strong that the agency will 
be first source. It would be foolish to rely on the local 
broadcast network, or the national newspaper media which 
rarely have more extensive resources than national agencies, 
unless there were good commercial reasons for doing -so, 
or unless the national agency was not considered competent 
in its task. 
In, the light of, standards of journalism as defined by 
professionals. in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
national. agencies do often fail to meet these standards of 
competence. But this does not necessarily make them use- 
less as sources. If the national agency is a government 
agency for example, and its news distribution is government 
controlled, it is still very often of value to the global 
agencies as a reliable source of government. policy and 
statements, and has the advantage often of being used as 
E 
initial source by the government over other media. This 
istrue of many countries, whether the agency is controlled 
or not, since it is easier for the government to talk to 
one medium rather than to all media, especially on certain 
routine kinds of,, announcement. 
National-agencies may be important to global agencies not 
only for news. In some countries they may employ a good 
proportion of all trained journalists, who can feed news 
to westerners in a style and at a speed which resembles 
what westerners regard as journalism. Precisely for that 
reason they may ,. 
be, of more. immediate or personal use to 
531. 
.. global agencies, as. stringers,. or at 
leastas news-contacts, 
than as representative's of a national", agency. This is 
often , , the. 
case- where the agency is both quite strong and 
is also tied to the political machine, so that'agency 
journalistsenjoyhigh. status as civil servants or party 
members., - Their job, means that they are quite well-informed, 
whilst at' the, same time 'it also indicates they have a good dea: 
. of contact. with 
other'journalists,. including foreigners. 
In some.; countries, especially. the less developed nations, 
journalism is not, seen asthe distinct profession it is' 
-regarded as in: 
the United States-or in the' United Kingdom, 
but more as a -way of being , 
for a certain 'sector; of the elite, 
;. where: the frontiers of journalism with, literature, art and 
politics are-, not. -clearly defined. In such a'case, the 
national agency journalist, especially at. the senior level, 
might also be a potential'dissident -: his artistic aspirations 
his close understanding but'not his direct involvement with 
'the' political elite (many members of which may be personally 
known-to him), and his' : exposure. to western developments 
and. -ideas, all' contributing, to this. possibility. - 
One-further non-news-function which can make a-national 
agencyattractive: as partner.. for a global agency is its 
. significance 
as a location for.: local expertise in commun- 
ications technology. 
--.. Second- 
in importance to their role as news sources however, 
the-national agencies are important t6 the global agencies 
as. clients or. 'subscribers to. global news services. In 
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some cases, where domestic news-gathering operations are 
primitive or non-existent, the national agency exists for 
no other purpose than to receive and distribute'to local 
media or government offices, the edited versions of global 
agency services'. Sometimes the global agencies have no 
choice but to, accept this arrangement, which occurs in 
countries where news is rigidly controlled, and'the national 
agency doubles as distributor-and censor. '. ' It also occurs 
in countries-where the local media are undeveloped and 
cannot afford to. take the global agencies- Isingly or where 
there is severe shortage of foreign exchange reserves. 
Often they do -not- want the services of global agencies even 
if they could afford them, because they do-not want to 
handle that volume of wordage, nor to employ a man to watch 
the teleprinter for' eighteen or , 
twenty-four`hours or what- 
ever, and prefer a national' agency which. will distil the 
news for them. Even in the developed nati: on5 there is a 
tendency for national news agencies to, distribute global 
agency services for provincial or non-metropolitan newspapers 
- this being a valuable market in bulk, but which it would 
be difficult for a global agency' to cultivate by itself. 
The national agency may also undertake the- translation, if 
needed, into local languages, 'and. if: the revenue possibilities 
of a country are'not particularly high then a global agency 
may prefer not to take responsibility for such: a task. 
It. goes . withoutsaying 
that the global' agencies are of 
considerable importance to the'national agencies. The 
national agencies invariably distribute world news as well 
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as domestic news, and their main source of world news is 
one. or more of the global news agencies. This applies 
to the., strongest national agencies just as much as to the 
! weaker. DPA and Kyodo, for instance, '-maintain sizeable 
overseas reporting staffs, but'these are not exhaustive 
enough to substitute for the world agencies. (Kyodo takes 
_-most of 
the world., agencies, while DPA now depends mainly 
on UPZ) This'isbecause the primary function of these 
agencies is-reporting for their home markets', and their. 
overseas markets are relatively. ýsmall - the. international 
news they cover is deliberately viewed through national 
eyes. Secondly, they do not cover the world as comprehen- 
ively as do the globalagencies. t: 
They tend to concentrate 
on the western developed nations,: and much less on other 
parts- of` the;. world (though Kyodo does cover south east Asia 
quite extensively, given Japanese cultural and economic 
interests'in-that part of the world). And where they do 
maintain a presence, they only keep a bare'minimum of 
full-time: ` staff . 
National: agencies could use alternative sources to, the 
global agencies, and in practice-they-supplement their 
basic diet: by monitoring foreign radio stations, for 
instance. ` In this"case of course, there isstill an 
indirect dependence on the global agencies because the 
= foreign radio stations will also take their. news from the 
-- global' 
agencies. Foreign` radio-is an original news source 
-only forýnews of the country of the radio station in 
question, as a rule, and no national agency 'would be able 
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to, or would want to, monitor all the radio stations of the 
major. powers when it could subscribe instead to a global 
agency service. However, some. ofthe major broadcasters 
like the BBC sell digests. of monitored'foreigri radio 
stations. Another supplemental. source is amongst other 
national news agency services. But these share the same 
disadvantages as radio: they are. good'news sources only 
for news of the countries they individually: represent, some- 
times not even very good for that,. and their reporting 
strength in no way. compares with that of the global agencies, 
and is often hampered by. lack of skill or government control. 
Resistance and alternatives 
"On the whole, the major powers. have not shown 
themselves ready. -or-. willing, to"face up: to the 
consequences of the two-way (information exchange) 
system. 
We find evidence of this... in_the functioning 
of the five international news agencies belonging 
to the developed nations. 
They flood developing countries'with information, 
and'it. is editorialized information about the' 
industrially advanced world while little. news 
about the developing countries finds place in 
the media of these nations.. 
Even this scanty news is given out in a manner 
that projects a distorted picture of these 
countries to the world. ' 
(Inder. Kumar. Gurjal, Indian Information and 
Broadcasting Minister, 1974. )8 
The power of the large agencies does not: rest on the total 
compliance of the smaller agencies. Resistance to this 
power 'has been a common. theme-in the history of ; 
their 
relationship. This : resistance has rarely succeeded in 
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establishing a viable alternative, and success seems closely 
related to political power., The most striking examples of 
success. are the American agencies, and the. two leading 
agencies of the communist or socialist world. AP challenged 
the dominance of the European triumverate because its comp- 
etitive. edge on the home market was threatened by the inde- 
pendent foreign operations of its chief rival, UP. The. 
prominence of, these agencies. on the world scene was truly 
established only-after World War Two,. in'thewake of. America's 
role in the political and economic reconstruction in the 
west and containment of communism beyond the Russian andChinese 
blocs. 
The other notable examples of. agencies which have achieved 
some substantial. measure of. independence: from. the: flow of 
information' provided them by the global; agencies are those 
of West., Cermany and Japan, . 
DPA and Kyodo. respectively. 
, 
These-are. theagencies of the two .. 
principal; losers of the 
Second. World War, countries which before that. war had main- 
.,, 
tainednews agencies which. had also struggled-for their on 
sphere of influence,, and which since the war have been amongst 
the, --economic , giants. 
AP Leaves the Cartel 
The story of AP's . 
disaffection from the triumverate is 
vividly, though at times misleadingly, described in Kent 
Cooper's book "Barriers Down". AP joined the European 
cartel because it was an extremely convenient mode of 
foreign news collection,, leaving the agency with resources 
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for its primary objective, capture of the domestic market, 
while giving it an initial advantage in the competition' with 
its domestic rivals. 
These advantages were not permanent. The United States 
rapidly developed its own cable networks across the globe, 
and communications seemed more feasible; the domestic compet- 
ition, UP, having to rely solely on its own foreign news. 
collection, could argue that it was truly independent 
editorially whereas AP was not. For this very reason AP 
had to engage in its own reporting of overseas events, but 
was unable to recoup foreign news-gathering costs'by foreign 
sales. 
AP's main complaints'against the cartel, then, were that 
it kept it out of foreign markets; '' that- the European. 
agencies could present American news disparagingly if they 
wished even though their clients had no access to-alternative 
sources; andin'any case they did not report enough American 
news, while they could present news of their ' own` countries 
favourably. 
AP's unhappiness was both commercial and diplomatic. It 
began. to recognize that in a free trade situation: it would 
do very well overseas, 
_and 
one way to achieve this situation 
was to stress how the cartel system worked against the 
diplomatic interests of the United States and the interests 
of other countries dependent on the cartel. 
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AP's role in the breaking-down of the oligopolistic system 
occurred first of. allnearer'to home than Europe - in South 
America. Its interest was excited by Up's success in. 
obtaining the'Argentinian'paper'La Nacion as client, even 
'though this paper had first of all approached AP whose 
chief, Melville Stone, soon to be replaced by'Kent Cooper, 
had not reacted. UP's initial success was partly due to 
distrust of`some'South American newspapers-'of the'reporting 
ofi. the opening of the 'European war by the Frýhch agency 
Hauas. Since Havas and Reuter had the advantage' of access 
to. -. transatlantic`communications in the control-'of the Allies, 
the. German agency could-not-distribute its own version. 
When La Nacion again approached AP after the war, ' AP decided 
to- app roach Havas', and iiegotiate., for. limited`entry 'onto the 
French agency's traditional South American'market'. Havas 
agreed', ' on condition that it'received compensation for any 
financial loss, and in return'fpr''the. use of APIsown 
service.. Havas was banking on being able to maintain 
sales, while AP would be taken as a 'second' agency, and 
banking 'on being -able-to undercut -AP 
rates if necessary, 
with' the backing ': of the French-government . In the mean- 
time; access'to AP's service allowed Havas to compare the 
respective performance of the two agencies. AP'accepted 
these conditions because it'did not want'a clean break from 
the cartel: 'it still needed the"cartel's supply'of news 
of other parts of the world (especially those European 
countries of the cartel agencies), and did not want to 
. provoke. a 
battle with Reuters at this stage, since Reuters 
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was bound to intervene if. Havas was-too deeply disturbed. 
At_the. time of this treaty, 
. 
AP: also took over the news' 
service for South America which before had been run by the 
American Cable Co., at that time co-operating with the 
State Department to enlarge cable traffic with South 
America. 
While in favour of breaking with the cartel, AP, like UP, 
had no objection to signing up deals with other agencies. 
In the. Far East it won an exchange. arrangement with the 
Japanese agency, Rengo, in defiance of Rengo's earlier 
agreement with Reuters. UP had already signed up a number 
of opposition agencies in the world and AP possibly feared 
losing out on the available supply. Reuters tried to 
dissuade AP from leaving the cartel by threatening to sign 
up. an alternative agreement with-UP, thus reversing the 
tables between theAmerican agencies. UP briefly considered 
the idea and thenturned. it down. 
The free market situation was formally achieved; in 1933 
with Reuters' reluctant but powerless consent; in Europe 
as we have seen, neither American agency could. make much 
headway in the domestic markets of the. major European 
. agencies. 
On a globalscale, AP was a long way behind 
UP as news distributor. The, real consequences of the 
pre-war victory were not, to, be evident until. after the war. 
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Shifting Centres of Resistance 
Leading centres of resistance to the global agencies before 
the Second World War were primarily those agencies of 
countries which had pretensions to major political status 
in the world. The overseas activities of the German agency 
Wolff, or Continental, had been restricted by the Allies 
after Cermany's'first defeat. But. the Nazis created 
their own' international"news machinery: Transocean, which 
disseminated by radio, and DMB, which was a forced merger 
of previously existing agencies, notably Continental and TU. 
These affected Reuters and Havas in two ways: they distrib- 
uted free of charge or at extremely low rates for propaganda 
purposes, ' and with the aid of State funds, and by depriving 
the-o-ld European agencies of subscriptions to their services 
weakened them financially. Much the same was true'of the 
Italian agency under Mussolini. In the Far East, the new 
Japanese agency Domei further encroached on already 
overcrowded markets to the discomfort of Reuters in particular. 
Even in friendlier regions, Australia, Canada' and South 
Africa, there were growing signs of media dissatisfaction 
with news services that seemed to reflect the interests 
of'the British Empire rather than strict journalistic norms 
of impartiality. CP resisted attempts to oblige it"to 
distribute Reuters in Canada;. South African newspapers 
took over SAPA which became an independent agency. 
The efforts of the Fascist agencies. were'doomed-to eventual 
failure of course, because of-their defeat'inwar. Else- 
where there was no serious attempt actually to do without 
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the global agencies altogether, except of course in the 
case of TASS, but even TASS continued subscribing. to 
services of. the western agencies. Then as now the most 
usual form of controlling the influence of the western 
agencies was to attempt to control the national agency 
(which if it did not exist. was set up for the purpose), 
which distributed global services locally, or simply to 
change allegiance by showing preference for one global 
agency over another. 
After the Second World War the centres of resistance 
changed more to the Third World: Africa, Asia and South 
America, but with no notable success except for the New 
China News Agency,, which has the resources : to collect its 
own foreign news ( but still takes western agency services). 
Unlike TASS, the New China News Agency has not collected 
. quite 
as loyal a string of client agencies as the Russian 
agency collected in Eastern Europe after the war. Its 
service is very likely to be only one of several subscriptions 
to communist agencies by those national agencies depending 
mainly on communist sources of news,.. but in its own country 
NCNA is every bit as powerful as TASS. 
In Asia, the post-war Japanese agency ILyödo has approached 
near sufficiency in its own gathering of world news, but 
does not have an appreciable. overseas clientele. India's 
national agency did begin to build up a moderate overseas 
reporting strength while still part-owner of. Reuters, but 




novel arrangement designed to establish-an-independent. 
news agency for the, Asian. region began in 1971 with the 
Asian News Agency. This was the creation of a number of 
talented Asian. journalists, with a background of American 
experience. The principal journalist backer was Adrian 
Zecker,. an ex-Time. Magazine writer, who co-founded the 
Asia Magazine in 1961 with Norman Soong,. ex-AP, who had 
worked for. the photographic and-feature agency, PAN-ASIAN 
News Service. , ': The Asia 
magazine was distributed as a Sunday 
supplement,. for: English-language newspapers throughout Asia. 
There-were-plans to use--profits from this venture for the 
establishment of. 'a news agency. " But Asia Magazine was 
-not very profitable. :: Zecker left, followed by a number 
-of . others, 
to form -Pacific Publications in 1969. ` The 
basic- idea behind, this . group was to set upa complete 
Asian communications-package, which would include specialist 
magazines,. a. newspaper and a news service. -" ' The specialist 
magazines, including Orientations, Insight, Chic ranged 
from cultural- artefact coverage for collectors, through 
political and economic analysis-for businessmen to the 
women's fashion market. The news service was actually 
..: 
launched before the newspaper,... in order to set up-'a news- 
gathering: apparatus that"wöuld eventually feed; into the 
paper. 
" It: started as-a-wire service-that would specialize in 
interpretive coverage of spot news-developments, using 
Reuters for communications. Six months later a weekly 
: newspaper, the Asian, was established, and this too was 
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included as a Sunday supplement in many Asian English- 
language papers.. The Asian took much of the news from. 
ANS, but this of. course detracted from the value of ANS 
for potential clients of the news service. 
Although both the news service and agency frequently 
covered material of high: quality, and of specific 
relevance to Asian interests, in aSway which Anglo-American 
journalism could, not achieve for an eastern market, the 
. news service could not survive. . 'It 
regressed. from a 
wire service to a mailed service and by 1973 ceased to 
exist. . There were 
many problems:. lack. of executive 
expertise, insufficient security capital, insufficient 
clients willing to pay economic. prices fora service which 
they saw, as very supplementary to that of, the major agencies, 
and difficulties : in. maintaining uniformity of style and 
editorial. approach among-the many full-timers and stringers 
in different Asian capitals. ' 
The experience of the Asian News Agency is a depressing one 
for those who seek a viable, non-government alternative to 
dominance of the big. agencies, because the ANS-sought to. 
by-pass direct competition' by. focusing on regional news, 
and on background and interpretation. rather , 
than. on spot 
news. Direct competition would have required an impossible 
capital outlay, with. correspondents, in all'the major capitals 
of the world, and still no great hope of financial success. 
The novelty of: the, ? Lan News Agency was its. commercial 
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backing: other attempts'to establish viable alternatives 
to the global agencies have been'backed by national agencies 
with strong. or direct government connections, and their 
motives have naturally been at least mildly political in 
character.: ' These attempts, like. the GNA (Ghana News 
Agency), have started as regional news agencies in the 
first instance, but usually with the implied possibility 
ýof, their. one day becoming a realistic alternative as source 
of international news to the global agencies'. Their news- 
coverage in practice rarely gets beyond being regional in, 
character, with the supplementary aid of reports from per- 
haps'a full-timer or stringer in one or two of the major 
: worldý. capitals. 
The Middle East News-Agency, for example, which was founded 
as co-operative agency in 1956, but passed to government 
control in . stepped 
up its foreign coverage in the 
mid-sixties, and maintained bureaux in Beirut, Khartoum, 
Jiddah, Gazah, Benghazie, Mogadiscio, Dakar, Belgrade, 
Colombo, Karachi, Singapore and London. ' The plans for 
extensive-coverage outside the Middle East however proved 
-''impossible and - quickly' 
collapsed.; Within'the. Middle East 
region and in Africa, Egypt. (reflecting the image of power- 
ful'non-alignment established by Nasser), has nevertheless 
acquired a reputation as important news , source. 
through MENA 
änd'through itsbroadcasts. -It is a very important source 
of news developments in the Middle East for. the global 
agencies, which tend to pick-up its service in Beirut. 
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The. other major bid for independence in African news was 
the Ghana News Agency (GNA), founded in 1957, following 
MENA. as one of the earliest of the post-independence wave 
of news agencies, which still maintains offices in London, 
Lagos, New York, Togo, and Nairobi.; ' These offices are 
. usually 
located in embassy buildings. Under Nkrumah, a 
plan to convert the agency. into a Pan-African News Agency 
was implemented, and the London staff was increased to 14. 
At this time the agency was run as an independent public 
corporation . 
(but subsidized by. the Ministry of Information). 
With the death of Nkrumah this vision was, laid aside, also 
in the realization that other African countries were less 
willing to accept the agency as an authoritive source on 
non-Ghana affairs.. The London bureau was reduced from 14 
to 3 staff. It is still the most. important source of news 
for Reuters on matters to-do with Ghana,. and. Reuters'. 
'correspondent in Ghana is-in fact. a journalist of the. nation- 
al agency. 
South . America is perhaps more dependent: on foreign agencies 
than any other of the major world regions, precisely because 
there are few strong national agencies on the continent, 
and because the media, though prolific, `are for the most 
part fairly poor. -:, -There is very little-, SouthAmerican 
representation among the foreign press. corps'of other 
countries. Yet there. have been fewer . attempts.. here to 
establish alternatives. to dependence-on the larger agencies 
for news of-the continent as a whole and. news: o. f: the rest 
of the world. The most important venture in this respect 
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; _. is Latin-,, founded in 1969, with the `aid and advice of Reuters, 
This is a, co-operative that initially included 13 newspapers 
, of various South American countries; - most of the papers 
had a conservative-reputation. The agency collects its 
own South'American news, with the-help of its member news- 
papers`, and also distributes world news of Reuters. Reuters 
. 
in turn has the°use of Latin for its South American. news. 
Accörding to a 'report by John Nichols in1975v Latin employs 
20. full-time reporters-, ' most of them agedaround'30, earning 
only-- 60-70% of the pay of AP and UPI' correspondents. But 
most of them have worked for the global agencies, or have 
received training-supervision from Reuter's Patrick Crosse 
and his successor, Jose Maria Orlando, anUruguayan newsman 
sand a"former, AP correspondent in Cuba. ` The agency has 130 
print,, -broadcast and institutional ' subscribers. ' By 1972, 
Latin copy. represented a minimum of 26% of total wire service 
copy in. 6-newspapers studied by, Nichols, ° and this was an 
increase of over 400% on-1970-: In that period the agency 
appears tohave shifted away from interpretive and cultural 
news reporting and, 'surprisingly, from economic reporting, 
but appears tobe, covering much more sports news (accounting 
-- for about 33%. of'total 1973 output)'., In-the course of 
' Latin's life, the use of AP in the , papers studied by Nichols 
declined by 33/, although, this'decline appeared to be 
levelling off. About! 90% of all"prominently displayed 
ý%' -news stories in this study which ; combined 'agency byelines 
included Latin as a consulting source. 
Aý'UNESCO meeting in Quito, Ecuador; in 1975, 'recommended 
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that the government of each Latin American country should 
establish its own national news service,. which would in 
turn supply its news to a larger 'Latin American news 
service', also financed by these governments, for 
hemisphere-wide distribution. While. South American 
communications experts. may perceive in the Reuter-assisted 
Latin agency a certain conservative bias perhaps arising 
from the character of its newspaper members,, the possibility 
of achieving a stable inter-government consensus: on the 
running of a continental agency seems. remote indeed. 
The Quito recommendation was also reflected in the spirit 
of the proposal accepted, by the New Delhi meeting of non- 
aligned nations in 1976for., a Third World news agency or 
exchange arrangement.. One. of the. backers of.; this proposal, 
Yugoslavia, had announced earlier that year, that its agency 
"Tanjug would become an agency for third world countries. 
Tanjug is better placed to do this . 
than many_agenciesof 
the socialist countries, inasfar: as Yugoslavia has maintained 
more open . relations_with 
the western powers in the last 
decade or so, and Tanjug is known to. have depended rather 
more on western news sources in the past than. on; TASS. 
It is: probable that its own proposal, whether.; singly or as 
part of. a Third World news pool, will take_the. form mainly 
of co-operative relations with othernews agencies rather 
than a. substantial increase in, personnel actually reporting 
news from Third. World., countries. 
Indeed, apart from attempts. to set up new agencies to compete 
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with the established world agencies, either at a regional 
or. a global level, 'the most important supplement to the, 
global agencies as news source that. has so far been gener- 
ated, has been the regional. news-exchange agreement. 
. 
This generally consists of formal or informal agreements 
between national agencies to provide one another with 
edited services of, their own news. . The services, are 
exchanged free of charge, 'andin most-cases are-transmitted 
by. radio. At a regional, levelthes, e. arrangements. sometimes 
give. evidence-of. a certain degree, of deliberation, and have 
often been the consequence of - UNESCO. conferences. But in 
practice. they' differ hardly at all, apart from their regional 
emphasis, from; ordinary exchange agreements between 
national:. agencies-of., different regions. Thus, for instance, 
larger agencies of Asia: subscribe not.. only. to the global 
agencies but also , 
to, someof . 
the leading national agencies 
of the western and socialist blocs, including, quite often' 
the East German 'agency ADN. Actfial. consumption of these 
sources and. their use'in the output of national agencies, 
is generally"a.; small percentage of. the total. of. foreign 
news originating. from the world' agencies.. 
One of: the strongest of the regional . al-liances of news 
agencies is the European Alliance,. sometimes known as 
, 
'group, 39'. This. originated in. 1939. out of an agreement 
between the agencies of Finland,. Sweden,,, Norway,. Denmark, 
Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria,, in an effort 
to set up. an alternativesource. of news to the agencies. of 
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the major powers. After the war it expanded to include 
Spain, Portugal, France, England, the German Republic, Italy, 
Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, and in 1970 . 
included some 
of the Warsaw Treaty countries, namely Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Poland,. the Soviet Union and Hungary. 
The significance of the group does not rest primarily on 
news exchanges. Such information is only infrequently of 
help to other member agencies, who can obtain their normal 
diet of European news from the global agencies. The alliance 
is helpful sometimes when a member wants special coverage 
of an event in the countryof another member, but there 
is little consistency in the speed"with which arequest of 
this kind will be met=or the quality of coverage,: -since each 
member agency is generally fully employed on coverage of 
its own country for domestic subscribers. 
More significant is the agreement between i, to 
co-operate in technical developments' involving communications, 
and in protecting their joint interest in the"free flow of 
information between their countries. '' 
Exchange of news between national. news agencies of a region 
does not 'necessarily improve the flow of'news"in that region, 
as some participants of, the UNESCO conference on Asian media 
in 196.0 pointed out': 
"Slow` communication within the region places national 
agencies at a disadvantage compared with world 
agencies, because news collected-by the latter can 
be made available earlier to the countries in the 
region through the. use of long-range wireless trans- 
mission from well-equipped stations outside the 
region. t1 10 
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These exchanges are useful for receiving full reports of_, 
speeches by national leaders and that kind of formal 
verbatim report which would not normally be carried by the 
global agencies. In other respects it is possible that 
the kind of private or at least non-government alternative, 
in the field of interpretive background, or feature material, 
has more to offer. TheAsian, News Agency was such. an 
example. A continuing alternative is the range of 
services put out by: the Press Trust of Asia, -an organization 
supported from-funds of leading Asian newspapers and the 
Ford Foundation. The: PFAls, Depth News service provides 
newsand features on-the subject of development in Asia, 
as a training device for Asian journalists. 
National Agencies: The Third Force 
The. 'develöpmentof national news agencies must be seen as 
'a'progressive'trend. Although-the use towhich'they are 
: put, and- their' links with governments, have repressive 
' cönsequences, -'the national-news-agencies generally serve to 
(i) improve"the quality of domestic' news-gathering, 
'(ii) provide cheap foreigný. and'domestic news for newspapers 
andothermediaVwhomight' otherwise-be unable to`subscribe 
lly tö one or möre'of the'globalagencies, or to individüa 
employ the necessary labour to'edit,, collate and translate 
these services, and (iii) to improve. the flow of outward 
communications 'to neighbouring countries'and"to the global 
agencies themselves. 
The UNESCO 196 4 survey listed 87 national agencies for 
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75 countries or territories. A 1969 survey by the 
Organization of International Journalists in Eastern 
Europe was very incomplete;. the compatibility of different 
sources on the news agencies (OIJ 1969, Unesco 1964, Unesco 
10 ' ":;. 
1953, Unesco 1950) is extremely poor, and even within the 
surveys the comparability of information in terms of the 
categories covered is very weak. The kind of information 
offered about the agencies varies from one agency to another; 
or information is delivered in different ways to what were 
presumably identical questions. Despite these difficulties 
certain trends can be observed. 
In 1950 there were only 76 agencies for 51 countries. The 
increase in the space of the period 1950-1962 occurred mostly 
in countries which before did not have'agencies. During 
that time of course many new - independent states: emerged? 
and the wave of independence has:, continued., subsequently - 
new agencies have appeared, '. for, instance,. in Malaysia and 
the Caribbe an. The 
. 
increase between 1950 ; and 
_1962 
is 
actually : larger-than thefigures indicate. because the 
1950 system of classification includes some agencies that 
would not have been included in-the 1962-., survey. These 
figures exclude in both cases the'global: agencies AFP, AP, 
UPI, Reuters or TASS. 
Of the agencies existing in 1962, 
.; 
11;, were founded before 
1915; 17 were founded before 19.40, ° and . the rest only after 




a. gencies therefore 
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were established-in the period following the Second World 
War 
The agencies founded in the pre-1915 period, ý"and'still 
existing in-the 1950 and . 1962 surveys, were mostly con- 
centrated in Europe-with a scattering around' the globe - 
one in Asia, one-in the Pacific, one in South America. 
In the inter-war period, '1915-1939, just under'half of the 
agencies then established were founded in Europe. The 
rest were established in Asia, (6), Africa and the Middle 
East': (3), the Pacific_(1), "North America (2), and South 
'America (1).. The dominant region for-news agencies after 
the Second World War was Africa and the Middle East, ' which 
produced 27 agencies or one 'third of all agencies founded 
between 1939 and. 1962, followed by Asia'with just under a 
third of the post-war total (23), and then`Europe (13) 
and South America (13). Many-of the South American agencies 
were founded in the immediate post-war period, -and were 
short-lived. « The' African "' agencies came mostly 'in the mid- 
'fifties to the early 'sixties, and have stayed.: 
The news. agency'phenomenon therefore was primarily European 
before the First' World War., ' There was a. gradual extension 
throughout'the inter-war period, but with Europe still the 
major region for new agencies, while thepost Second World 
War era saw a boom in the founding of agencies-in Africa 
and Asia. 
Of all agencies recorded in the`UNESCO "1964-figures, Africa 
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and the Middle East account for-about one third of the 
total; followed by Europe accounting, for another third; 
the rest mainly in Asia and scattered among the other world 
regions. 
Since the 1964 survey, expansion has been much more gradual 
and has occurred principally in Africa, Asia and the Middle 
East. 
The death-rate of agencies appears to have declined consider- 
ably up to the 1953 survey. In the pre-1915 period, over 
half the agencies then founded subsequently ceased operations; 
whereas only about one quarter of those founded: between the 
wars died before 1952, . and only : a. sixth 6f . those founded 
in the immediate post-war-period. 
Naturally, one would expect to find-fewer agencies dying 
the shorter the interval between the date-of their foundation 
and the date of survey.. But one would also. expect a 
higher death-rate at the: beginning ofthe period, as comp- 
etition gave way to a situation of monopoly markets- 
achieved in some instances through an amalgamation process. 
Wars accounted for several deaths, but often new agencies 
emerged on the basis of a, -previously established. 
infra- 
structure,. with. perhaps little change of facilities or 
personnel. Most of the East European agencies of the post- 
Second World War period had a lineal history., going back 
into the pre-war period when they were national or party 
; politicalagencies. These would not have been recorded 
v 
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as 'deaths',. since their continuity of name indicates 
reasonably uninterrupted survival, despite changes of control. 
Of all the agencies in 1962, nearly all, about seven out of. 
ae ryeight, were primarily domestic news agencies, with no 
substantial sales overseas and with few exchange arrangements 
other than those with the global agencies. The 'internation- 
al' agencies, with some overseas activities but nothing 
approaching aglobal level of operation, tended to be 
European, east or west, or the agencies of non-European 
developed nations, . such as. 
Kyodo of Japan. 
The numbers of domestic bureaux maintained by these agencies 
varies tremendously,, as one might expect... Jiji of. Japan 
claims 60 domestic bureaux, Kyodo about 50. PTI of. India 
has. about 50. At, least one third of. the. world's national 
agencies had four bureaux in their own countries or fewer. 
There does seem to be a strong tendency ; for. the 
agencies 
of the developed countries to command far greater domestic 
resources, other things being equal. Canada's two main 
domestic agencies for example employ about 200 full-timers 
between them for a population (in 1966) of, about. 20 million; 
whereas PTI if-India employs about the same number for a 
population of 483 million! -This 
impression does not improve 
very much if one allows a. further. 1100 
journalists for India's 
lesser agencies. In Japan, Jiji and Kyodo employ. about 
600 journalists for a population of 105 million;. - and. the 
PA in the United Kingdom has some 200 journalists for a 
-population of 55 million. 
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Countries with more than one main agency are not necessarily 
developed or very wealthy countries; they include, for 
instance, Turkey and Indonesia, as well as the United States 
and Japan. In some of the developing countries there may 
be one national agency controlled by the government and* 
another which operates on more commercial lines; or there 
may be several agencies, none of them truly national. Or 
in communist countries there may be a division of agency 
functions, with a different name for each function, as in 
Russia where there is one agency for spot news and'one 
agency for feature material. In Spain there are a number 
of different agencies, each covering its specific geograph- 
ical area, yet in practice governed by the 'same organization 
of which EFE is the international news branch. The presence 
of more than one agency in a country is therefore not 
necessarily a sign of greater competition or enterprise, nor 
of news freedom from government control, nor even of adequate 
news-gathering resources for domestic news. 
As a rule about one half of the daily wordage distributed 
by national agencies is foreign news. ' Of 29 agencies for 
whom this information was given in the UNESCO surveys, 21 
gave between 40-60% of their total wordage over to foreign 
news reports (mostly taken from the global agencies). Of 
the three communist countries included in this number, all 
used high percentages on foreign news, most of it from 
TASS; but the highest figures were those of African agencies, 
some of which devoted up to 75 or 80% of'their news content 
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on foreign news, reflecting the poor development of domestic 
news gathering. 
Wordage varies enormously 'in volume, from 15,000 a day for Antara, 
-of Indonesiaý i. n 1953, ' to- 250,000 for'Canadian Press in 1969. 
In"24_cases figures were available for. both 1953 and 1962, 
and-in 16 of-these casesthere. had been increases in absolute 
wordage in the space of a decade,. and-in 6 cases the wordage 
remained constant. The increases were sometimes! in the 
order of_, 100%. _ 
In_ 12 cases figures were also available 
for 1969, `. 'andof these 10 had increased`their'wordage 
since 1964. 
In terms of words transmitted, the existing agencies appear 
to be increasing`the volume of-information they carry. 
This sometimes. refle`cts. the greater complexity of; their 
operations: this is. true; of EFE for instance, which in, 
recent years has greatly expanded its international trans- 
missions: '- It seems that agencies of the developed countries 
carrymöre: words thänagencies of the less developed 
countries: the very high figures are invariably those of. 
agencies in developed countries, 
(e. g.:, 112,000 for U. K.!. s 
PA, 110,000. for South Africa's SAPA in 1962 etc. ). 
Where developing agencies have increased their wordage 
substantially. over time part. of this increase may well 
be due to increases in the volume of. words. they receive 
from , the. 
global agencies. For example global agency 
transmissions to South. America have increased by well 









PNS Philippines - 15, ', 000 10,000 
CTK Czechoslovakia 18,000 56,000 80,000 
DPA West Germany - 120,000 120,000 
ANSA Italy - 200,000 283', 000 
ANP, Netherlands 30,000, 40,000 66,000 
NT Norway 22,000 ::.. 22,000 26,000 
PAP Poland 36,000 
_6o, 
ooo 
EFE Spain 40,000 65,000... 
., 90,000 
Logos Spain 16,. 000 38,000 45,000 
TT Sweden 30,000. ". 35,000 40,000 
ATS Switzerland 40,000 40,000 53,000 
PA United Kingdom 30,000 90,000. 112,000 
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Shortly before this . 
manuscript was completed', "UNESCO updated 
its survey of the. world9s media (cf. reference'll in the 
notes), using information largely, gathered in' 1971-2. 
Altogether there was a slight, increase in'the total number 
of national news ägencies, so that by `1971 there were 
national agencies'. in'90 sovereign countries. There were 
still as many as 40 countries without national"agencies, 
and of `these"; 25 had' popul"ätönsý" greater `than a million. 
In 50 out of the 90 countries with national agencies, these 
agencies were directly: controlled by. the State, and in 
the other forty. they, were: mostly, corporate newspaper 
endeavours or. public cor orations established under State 
auspices. Examples of privately owned agencies include 
Informex, the leading Mexican agency, which goes to 40% of 
the county 's, -'dailies', 
': 50% of .... . y its radio stations and 10% 
of its television stations; `aridthe'. South Korean agency, 
Hapdong. Private otiänership of course does not. necessarily 
ensure. a greater . 
degree of independence in editorial matters 
than-exists under government control. ', The increase in 
agenci'es,. where it occurred, was mostly'in Third World regions. 
'age Africa,. which had 21 'national ncies in 1962, " had 27 ten 
years later'of which-22 were directly controlled by their 
respective governments. There were.. still13 African 
countries. with"rio agencies. .. In South. America,: 'Brazil, 
Argentina, Colombia, Chile',, Venezuela now had agencies 
mostly private and sometimes in competition with other 
private agencies. Only in Argentina did they have, a. complete 
monopoly-on incoming news, from the world agencies. _, In Asia 
20 out of 28 countries with agencies were cases of direct 
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government control.,. Only five Asian countries (Cyprus, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Singapore. and Thailand) did not have 
agencies. Amongst the smaller Third World agencies there 
were some signs of growth in terms of%personnel and in 
wordage distributed. But many of them were still very 
modest operations. The Colombian Ultra Prensa for example 
had an editorial, strength eight persons;. the agency of 
the People's Republic of. the Congo had a-total staff of 46; 
the agency, of Dahomey, a,. total staff of 26'.. Very many of 
these Third. World agencies still distribute by bulletin. 
One interesting feature of, growth in most parts of the 
world is an increase in. the number of other agencies which 
any given national agency , 
subscribes to, including not only 
exchange agreements, but subscriptions"to leading world 
agencies. Even, in Europe this seems to be widely true.. 
There are many instances in the Third World'of agencies which 
originally subscribed to only one world agency, which now 
subscribe to two or more. Although most agencies have a 
long list of exchange agreements however with othernational 
and regional agencies,. it is still as true as ever that 
four or'five, agencies dominate the scene. In some cases 
an increase. in subscriptions merely. confirms this pattern. 
. For many years for instance EFE depended- 
mainly on the 
. 
German agency DPA-for its news, but in the 'sixties, sub- 
ascription with 
American agencies , 
have: brought it more-into 
line with. the common tendency for the American, British 
and . 
French;, agencies, to dominate news supply in the non- 
communist-; world.,;. 
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National Agency News Consumption 
Studies of how national agency output incorporates foreign 
news material received from the global agencies indicate 
(i) the importance of the global agencies as sources of 
foreign news, and (ii) the importance of the national 
agencies in determining -whichnews is received by subscribing 
'media. 
The most systematic study of how national agencies use 
material from the foreign agencies and indeed the most 
exhaustive study of national news agencies is that of 
Weibull, Olsson and Lundquist (1971) in their report of 
12 
news-flow in Scandinavian countries. 
This study shows firstly that the responsibility of 
editing foreign news for the Scandinavian media through 
the news agencies was shared by a small number of 
comparatively young journalists: 9 to 10 in each case; 
of whom over half were under thirty; two thirds had had 
no previous journalistic experience, and hardly any had 
had overseas work experience of any kind. 
Between 86% and 91% of all incoming material was discardEd, 
and between 8% and 14/ was-t-otally revised. The most 
common-reasons for rejection of material were that material 
was of no interest to subscribers or that it had already 
been sufficiently covered by other agencies, or that tit 
was not really news'. The principles of rejection were 
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formulated by the editorial team as a whole rather than by 
one or two Igatekeeperst. 
These four Scandinavian agencies (RB in Denmark, STT in 
Sweden, NTB in Norway and FNB in Finland), did not subscribe 
to American agencies,, which distributed independently, but 
took the services of Reuters, AFP, DPA, TASS and of each 
other. Of the incoming material, Reuters accounted for 
46.3%; AFP 26.2%; DPA 17.1%; TASS 2.1%; Scandinavian 
agencies 4.0% and others 2.2%; while their own correspondents 
gathered 2.2%. But of the material which was actually used, 
between 57% and 68% was Reuters or AFP news, . 
while DPA 
accounted for between 1% and 8% and TASS between 0% and 2%. 
Material from other Scandinavian agencies accounted for 
between 9% and 17% of material used, ' thus indicating high 
demand for regional news coverage. In general, the larger 
the originating agency, the more the material from that 
agency was used by each Scandinavian agency. 
The wires of the incoming age. ncie. s tended to"concentrate 
on the principal world capitals, and in regional terms on 
North America and Western Europe. The Scandinavian 
agencies did not deviate very much from this pattern, "but 
they did tend to use less material on western Europe than 
-Reuters, AFP and DPA, more on eastern Europe,, more on 
America, more. on the Middle East, about the 'same on Asia 
and less on Africa. In some respects they accentuated 
the biases of the larger agencies, and in other cases 
compensated. In general however there was not much difference 
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either in'terms of news content, 'which in all cases was 
dominated by, 'hard news' political matters, wars, inter- 
-, national-relations, defence4'and economics - ör in terms 
of geographical origin. 
This study`complernents an earlier Scandinavian analysis 
" byStig Thoren 
3ýwho, 
looked both at theSwedish. news agency 
(TT) and the UPI` and `AP provision of 'news to Swedish news- 
papers. The-UPI bureau in Sweden received the largest 
number of words: - 250,970 for the week studied, followed 
by AP with 225,870.. received by the . The tot*alý wordage rnational 
agency from Reuters Sand AFP were 153,340 and 
104,420 respectively. Content was dominated'by news 
dealing with armed conflicts and defence, mostly about 
Vietnam (of-the large agencies, TASS devoted 34.5%. to this 
category, Reuters 24% of its `total wordage, AFP I6.9°, ä, - UPI 
21.9/ 'and AP 26%) .' 
The second lärgest'category transmitted by . 
the western' 
world-wide agencies was'newsof international relations, ' 
including news"of international organizations and foreign 
relations, ' 11. '5% 'in the `case of 'AFP, ' to 23 . 5% for AP. The 
newspapers received from. the'AP and"UPI bureaux in Sweden 
some 22.4%-änd 18.6% respectively of the news these agencies. 
received from abroad.. In other words, they cutdown 
`drastically on"their total files, but delivered '. a more 
substantial' portion-. of those files than the'news-agency 
TT delivered of the material it received from Reuters and 
AFP . in the ' 1971; study.; 
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Political consequences of news agency selection of news 
in Scandinavia have been explored in a further; study cf the 
Swedish agency TT.., Rosengren and Rikardsson found that 
the agency favoured anti-Arab news while it: disfavoured 
pro-Arab news in its output as compared with its input, 
in coverage of. the Middle East conflict in . 
the Fall of 1972. 
This finding was interpreted as a consequence not of 
deliberate partiality of reporting, but: in terms of. a bias 
in the generally. accepted criteria for news evaluation. 
That is, part of the. pro-Arab news that was underrepresented 
in the TT output in this study belongs to the type of content 
that is regularly underrepresented in the news selection 
process: cultural, educational, -scientific, technical. news 
etc. 
14 
Findings of the Scandinavian researchers contrast interest- 
singly with studies of a third world-agency and an agency 
of a socialist country. Snider (1968) studied the use of 
international news by the agency of-Afghanistan, Bakhtar 
15 
over a period. of four weeks. This agency,. which was 
controlled from the Ministry of Information and Culture, 
was the sole source of international. news for media and 
government channels of. Afghanistan.., The International 
News Department had a vice-president and four.. translators. 
The vice-president selected, the.. stories. that were to be 
translated and transmitted, so that control of incoming 
foreign news rested'in the hands. ofjust one, man. 
Two unusual features about. Bakhtar were the high percentage 
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of incoming material us"ed about one. third and. the 
prominence of DPA. ' Themost voluminous single source was 
Reuters, "followed by AP-and"then DPA '(there: were seven 
agencies' altogether, plus -monitored'bröadcasts) . But of 
the stories, - transmitted by Bakhtar, "roughly one quarter were 
DPA stories, öne quarter from monitored radio"broadcasts,, 
and 21% were Reuters. In terms of the amount of copy 
H' used out ' of 'the file 'of any" one agency, "DPA' also scored. 
highest, since 46.3% of, its 
in-second place Incoming 
the', -United States, the`U. K. 
äthird. -dealt withforeign 
and then sport and-"economic 
copy was. used followed by AP 
stories focused very much on 
and the U. S. S. R.; - more than 
relations; followed by politics 
news. Over. 50% of ''all stories 
were 'less : `than' '100 words in ' length. - ' Of `'the "outgoing wire, 
'50% of störies dealt with'foreign relations, war accounting 
: for 'a' further 13% and politics '11%. ' Very little space was 
given`-6o sport. ' Usel'of`stories from TASS and'Hsin Hua was 
'"-low, even though Hsin Hüä's'transmissions were clearest: 
'öne'reasön for this'tended'tobe the length of dispatches 
'from these agencies, since; Bakhtar"showed a'clear preference 
for short stories 
Twö reasons for the'impörtance of DPA"here may have been 
"the fact 'that AFP only started supplying the agency on a 
trial basis during the course of'the''study, and the fact 
that dependence on radio broadcasts disguised dependence 
on agency material to some extent, assuming that at least 
some of the material'of'the broadcasts` originated with the 
agencies. It may also be that a country in themnon-aligned 
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world might tend to seek, out the largest agency available 
with the fewest ex-imperial ties, or that German trade 
with Afghanistan was considered especially important. 
The high use rate of incoming material probably reflects 
the low wordage received from the agencies relative to the 
norm for transmission to western countries. 
A study of the agency of Yugoslavia,, Tanjug, showed this 
agency to be rather closer to the typical western pattern 
as exemplified by the national agencies in Scandinavia. 
Robinson 
16 
found that Tanjug discarded or weeded out 78.8% 
of all incoming foreign news material. This was not related 
to censorship restricitions',.. butto the usual blend of 
professional judgement, available communications capacity 
and market considerations. Of a daily total of 264,000 words 
received from abroad, some 60% originated from AP, USIS, 
-Reuters-and AFP. The Socialist agencies in the U. S. S. R. 
and easternEuropeýprovided only around 30%. Although 
material from the correspondents of the agency did not 
account for much of the total news received from overseas, 
it did figure large in the finished product. Of the copy 
used by Tanjug, 45% came from AP, Reuters, AFP and USIS, 
14.2% from Socialist and the Soviet, agencies, 8.3% from 
other agencies, 24%. from the agency's own correspondents 
and 8.5%. from monitored broadcasts. 
The 
, study. shows 
that Tanjug is unusual amongst the socialist 
agencies in the proportion of material it uses from the 
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CHAPTER NINE: Organizational Structure, 
Communications and Clients 
569. 
Media studies have addressed themselves to two central 
issues in their relatively short history: the question 
of the effects of media output on audience beliefs and 
behaviours; and the question of how media output is 
selected and arranged in the first place. Both kinds 
of study have undergone considerable sophistication. 
, 
From dependence on stimulus-response models,, effects 
studies have progressed to consideration. of the uses and 
gratifications to which individuals put different kinds 
of media material, and the influence of social and 
group identity. on that process. 
1 
Some of the early studies that were concerned with news 
selection considered this in. terms of . 
an identifiable 
filtering process, where'certain individuals were 
responsible for eliminating or channelling forward the 
information they. received. This 'gatekeeper' approach 
was based on the psychological model of Kurt Lewin.. 
devised for a' study of how the housewife channelled 
certain foods into the home and not others. 
2 
This kind of, approach, exemplified in David Manning 
White. s. study of a telegraph editor whose job it was to 
select news from the wire services for. inclusion in his 
newspaper, 
3 
was not without merit. White's 'Mr. Gatekeeper 
did manifest some prejudices which directly, influenced 
his choice. Itis of some significance, moreover, to 
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understand that usually very few people are involved in this 
kind of filtering process, and that these few may be likely 
to demonstrate certain similarities of social background 
and cultural evaluation. 
More recent thinking on the problem of news selection 
however, sees this aspectof the process as but one segment 
of an enormously more complicated reality. The issue of 
selection is seen to involve consideration of the structure, 
ownership and management of media organizations; the social 
backgrounds, career patterns, and attitudesof professional 
communicators; patterns of interaction between communicators 
and between communicators and other related occupational 
groups; general cultural values and so on. Especially 
in the field of news', attention is now more likely to be 
given to the active participation of professional communicator; 
'and non-professional informants outside the media industry, 
for whom the media have strategic importance in their pursuit 
of private goals. 
5 
Many attempts have been made to give 
diagrammatic form to this complexity; but while 'communi- 
cations models' have illustrative value and may help to 
indicate possibilities for, Productive research, it is 
difficult to see that they add. anything in the way of ex- 
planation. Inasfar as they add little to our substantive 
understanding of media operations in relation to particular 
outputs, particularly news stories, and the subtleties, of 
real-life political and social pressures, they are limited 
in their applicability. 
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: This. study , of the global news. agencies is essentially about 
, 
the news-selection process. , 
In the earlier chapters, the 
aim has been to-clarify the. relationship of the agencies 
to, one; another. in the light of certain dominant. political 
, -themes ofthe 
nineteenth and twentieth. centuries, to 
explore theways in which markets have been maintained and 
developed on-the basis.,, ofprivileged political background, 
and:, to see how market orientation has affected the distri- 
bution of, agency resources and. attention. 
It is. now. timeto take 
.a 
closer look at-the agencies from 
a. localized"point of. view, to examine the kind of organ- 
izational' arrangements, that,, they represent, the, actu. al 
character. of, management and news-gathering at the bureau 
level, the. influence, of, technology as facilitator'and 
constraint, -: and the consequences for news output and for 
the client. 
At. this level the'first. consideration is whether:. the nature 
of agency work exhibits sufficient regularities to allow 
for any kind of-general statement 
. 
about the, extentto. which 
news, flow is,. an, intended and. controlled activity. . 
Many 
personal biographies of journalists after all emphasize the 
: absence of routine in news-gathering,. and. see there a 
constant anticipation and. celebration of the unpredictable. 
The Organization of News 
Many studies of media organization discern important borganict 
features in the structuring. of activity. Tonstall (1971) 
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for instance describes newspapers-as 'non-routine' bureau- 
cracies; in his study, the activity of different specialist 
news-gathering groups differ according toýthe'goal of each 
group, and the dominant pattern oC the, groupts loyalties 
or commitments to employing organization, professional 
colleagues and source organizations.? Elliott (1972) 
comments on elements of conflict he observed between the 
'organic' organization of television production teams and 
8 
the 'mechanistic' organization of studio crews. 
In situations of extreme crisis and in areas-of relatively 
poor communication, agency news-gathering is as inspirational 
and unpredictable as any journalism can be" This is clear, 
for example, in the mention of agency journalist's who 
worked alongside' David Halberstam of the New York Times in 
the Congo and in. Saigon, recorded in Halberstam's first 
9 
account of the Vietnam War. 
But for the most part, agency work is characterized by tight 
scheduling, of activity. " This does not preclude organic 
organizational features: `considerable initiative may be 
displayed, for instance, in the logistical- planning of news 
coverage. Nor does it necessarily imply a'great degree of 
bureaucratization: in fact the number of levels of 
authority in the structure ofagencies is'relatively small, 
and at the news-gathering end authority is'a diffuse, 
ambiguous and perhaps irr. elevant. 'concern. _ 
Yetthe evidence 
of schedule is sometimes so strong that it tends to blanket 
an observer's awareness of the organic features of the 
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situation, -and its, weakly defined sense of bureaucracy. ' 
The essence"of agency schedule is a continuous deadline. 
In. 
"a, way . 
this is ,a figure, of : speech, ; but it : does denote 
one major difference-between agencies and, other media: 
newspaper journalists. may have a day to pursue and develop 
about a story;. weekly news-magazine journalists and. 
of course have much longer,. and this is evident, in the 
breadth, -; depth and quality of. their. writing; television 
and. broadcast, journalists, may have one or two hourly 
intervals between. broadcasts - their schedule begins to 
approach''the-schedule of, agency., journalists, except that 
broadcast journalists_. often, update their, material simply 
_: by " reference , 
to incoming , agency 
reports, whereas" of course 
the . agencies. have, to collect 
the new material fresh. 
A 'continuous', deadline is--in a, sense an absurdity. Events 
have. to happen,;, have. to be. recognized as. relatively complete 
news-itemsor. news-developments before, they, can be transmitted 
The definition of when a. news-event has sufficient meaning, 
either-on its own accord, or; by', reference to some: broader' I. 
- set: of : events,. is a söcial construction; on . 
the part of the 
agency journalist. And that construction must take into 
account the necessity for some degree of personal and 
organizational order. But in: terms of the'shortness of 
interval ; between. stories 
o'r. dispatches,, the agency journalist 
,.. as a general`. 
rule,, is"working to a much tighter schedule 
than. any. `other media journalist.. For one thing, an agency 
journalist.. is.: working for the, deadlines : of clients in many 
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different countries, in different time-zones, whereas other 
media journalists are working simply to the deadline of their 
own ; employing organization. Freelance journalists usually 
have the good sense-to work for newspapers within the 
same time zone. 
The character of agency schedule has some important 
consequences. ' One of the most evident is the emphasis on 
speed, 
-which 
is especially acute in'agency journalsim. 
Enormously expensivetechnological.. innovationsýare-intro- 
duced to save only a few minutes in transmission or pro- 
cessing time. The 'scoop', which has gone -out : of fashion 
in daily newspaper journalism becauseit -isso difficult 
and so rarely achieved, is still. an important-objective 
for an agency bureau. chief. . It is` not a scoop-in subject 
matter that concerns-him, but a time-scoop; to be a few 
minutes, sometimes=even mere seconds ahead of`"a rival agency. 
Various forms of'feedback from head-officeor regional 
head bureau nourish this competitiveness: weekly-and 
monthly records of the-agency's success in. this respect 
relative to'the competing-agencies; frequent messages 
warning of the developments. onrival-wires; queries from 
client media. 
Speed affects the logistics and style of coverage. It 
binds the agency journalist to- his office. -'Even in the 
battlefield he 'stays -close to a- phone, or to a plane, and 
does not- usually plan to-bei away from the _ 
office= for longer 
than a day. =- One reason for this of' course is that he must 
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ensure immediate transmission of. the news story. ' But the 
other reason is that his office may need. him to work on 
.. some other, perhaps. 
totally different development somewhere 
else. There are never too many staff. 
The-story'for an agency , 
is. usually what other.. media would 
consider_a development within, a larger story. Agency 
journalists do not wait to integrate, explain and package. 
They send now. Head Office may do any fundamental., 
integration and packaging that has not been done ; and is 
considered necessary for client necessary . 
for For similar 
reasons the agency journalist.; therefore does not spend much 
time on explanatory 'background'. or '. assessment' pieces, 
or 'in-depth', news. writing. That kind of: writing assumes 





Of course this , 
affects. what agency journalists` think 
of as being: news. ,.;.. 
The. pressure. of agency schedule, finally, has consequences 
for. the, internal_communications of agency, organizations. 
Not simply 
for the sophistication of communications technology 
but for, the absolute volume of-such, communication. Bureau 
chiefs are in frequent contact with their head offices. 
_-Stories 
transmitted from any given bureau arrive, at the 
desks of-head, office or. regional head office almost instant- 
aneously, and elicit,., if they are going. to elicit: anything, 
almost instantaneous feedback. The. output of. the agency 
, 
is. received on. one or more teleprinters in. each, 'bureau,. so 
that. the, ýorganizational image, the selection criteria it 
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employs, its constantly developing definition of'news vis- 
a-vis any given set of world circumstances, is constantly 
present, regardless of distance between bureau-and head 
office. Communication networks in, agency life, perhaps 
more clearly than any other single variable, account for 
the apparent uniformity of agency products and 
the degree 
of control and integration so evident in the news-processing 
cycle. 
Studies of other kinds of multi-national corporation have 
shown that distance is no necessary obstacle to-control by 
head office over far-flung divisions and branches", 
especially in the case of U. S. -based multi-nationals. 
10 
Nor is the extent of bureaucratization anecessary indication 
of the extent of actual organizational control of its members. 
Pugh and Hickson,, in their comparative study of organizational 
structures, have found that. centralization of decision-making 
upwards is an alternative mode: of control to a high 
'structuring. of activities'. of. employees, by setting pre- 
scribed tasks, rules and procedures-'to regulate behaviour. 
11 
But in the case of agency organization it is not so much 
'prescribed tasks, rules. and procedures' that are sources 
of control, but rather the continual statement and restate- 
ment of values and norms through the ` process' of-communic-lion 
on specific issues. ` It is'a constant process of predicting 
the reaction of organizational colleagues and adjusting 
strategy in the light of that prediction. This is the 
basic process that underlies the closely-integrated pro- 
fessional and organizational solidarity that is characteristic 
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of full-time agency journalists. It eliminates the need 
for highly'centralized decision-making. Although except- 
ional dilemmas are passed up tue 'hierarchy (from editorial 
to executive levels), no time-consuming decision-making 
machinery is suitable for agency work, 'for otherwise by 
the time a decision is taken the story will be dead. 
Centralization of-Editorial Control' 
Editorialcontrol, ofcourse operates all the way. down the 
line. It is. there at the level of the news sources to 
which. an agency journalist exposes himself: if he were 
not looking at the localdaily press or monitoring local 
broadcasts,, 
, 
whatelse might, he be doing with his time, 
what other sources, of information might he have tapped 
which are otherwise obliterated by the salience of local 
media organizations? The news-gatherer. then is the first 
organizational form of control: he selects certain items 
of, information and discards others, even before presenting 
a story to a senior journalist for transmission. The 
criteria of selection at this stage have to do with personal 
factors and values, 'as. well as with commitment to organ- 
izational and professional values which have to do with 
checking, approaching opposition sources, asking certain 
kinds of question and not others.. Of course even before 
this stage, control and selection factors are at work. 
What leads. certain sources or source organizations to provide 
certain kinds of information and not others? What kinds 
of factor determine when a souxce initiates a relationship 
with a journalist, and when is-. it-the other way round? 
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Simply the asking of these questions indicates that the 
issue is. much more complex than the old-fashioned 'gate- 
keeper' concept would suggest. 
But these considerations do not make it unimportant whether 
or not there are strict editorial controls within an 
organization, and the form which these take. For instance, 
whether or not the material which leaves a certain bureau 
generally arrives in the offices of clients intact, or not 
at all, or greatly changed, is important. An organization 
in which bureaux have high editorial independence is different 
from one which does not. Where there is high editorial 
independence of bureaux there is a high diversity of 
editorial sources within the organization. Where strict 
editorial 'control' 'from the centre is exercised, "in whatever 
form, then a different kind of information-output is involved, 
which raises questions about how clients should relate to 
agency material. There is some merit therefore in consider- 
ing editorial 'control as a process which occurs in the time 
interval between the writing of astory"and the delivery 
of that story to a client, and this is the focus of the 
present chapter. 
There are certain basic characteristics of agency editorial 
control which it'is relevant to identify-at this point: 
(i) Editorial control is above all a process of 
elimination. It is negative' control. Some 
stories. are delivered on one or more wires, 
some stories are not used. 
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(ü) Positive Editorial Control is notable for 
its relative; inconspicuousness.. It concerns 
such things as the deletion of certain parts 
of: a story-. in the interests of precision and 
length, or the'addition of some very basic 
explanatory groundwork (the` title of a'person 
mentioned in a story,. for. instance, if this 
has been omitted, or a. sentence of background 
, to cover the development of the story prior 
to the latest report). Stories developing 
in more than one, country at 
'a 
time, may be 
compiled; by. a central desk from individual 
items sent by different. bureaux. There may 
-be. spelling mistakes, stylistic 'errors' (that 
do not accord with the style guidelines generally 
printed for editorial use; by each agency), or 
expressions which do not suit the colloquial 
'usage of the'market for which the story is being 
? considered. But-most. editing has ,a straight- 
forward technical as well as marketing character, 
which does not query the basic substance of a 
story, . 
does. not. --seek alterations in its. basic 
structure and choice. of information. 
lves person super- ::.: (iii) Editorial 'Control: which invo 
vision rather. 'than copy-.. alteration is similarly 
low-key.. -There may be instances where major 
-revisions are-required,; and the editorial desk 
wilt -ring 
back , 
to the bureau `of origin maybe, 
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to demand further information, ' or to check 
the character and quality of sources of 
information. This kind of control is often 
forward-looking: aregional head bureau 
or head office may ask a bureau chief about 
predicted stories for the next week or month, 
and, "then recommend certain angles he should 
cover (and whichif, he is experienced he would 
probably cover: on his own 'socialized' initiative 
anyway). Control is often in the nature of 
feedback: what the-rival agencies are saying; 
reports in the London, Paris, and New York 
press that need to be checked out and'developed. 
The most extensive and protracted form of personal 
supervision occurs, as it would for any organization, 
in relation to the new members or the tincompletet 
member: entrants still on probation, locally- 
recruited journalists, locally-recruited bureau 
chiefs reporting: to ' larger regional bureaux, and 
'stringers'. 
(iv) At each editorial stage there are only very few 
people involved inthe task of surveillance of 
copy. The general'- pattern is that there is one 
copy-taster per editorial' desk, who is probably 
the only. person whowill see all the incoming 
copy directed to that desk. Anyassistant he 
_has will correct and revise copy: whichis given 
him by the copy-taster, ` and he may often be told 
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-. what to do. The number"of. assistants does 
not extend. much beyond three or four on even 
the most, important, desks dealing with the 
entire volume of world news. The flow of 
copy for so few people. issuch that they work 
at .a rapid pace 
in, any given shift:, the 
essential feature, is,. that, there is. really no 
time. for much more than , 
theelimination process, 
the simple kinds of change mentioned in (ii) 
above, and when the occasion, calls: for it, a 
more extensive and detailed-check-up on a 
story. 
The-, elimination. process 'is maintained at such a 
feverish-rate, that it:, is obvious that selection 
occurs: on,; the basis of 'a few.: simple variables, 
about . which 
there is a"kind of consensus between 
copy-tasters and . agency executives.: 
These have 
to: do:: with., (a). 'the cultural/economic/political 
relevanceof _a ; given story . 
to 
. one or more major 
world regions,.. (b) the dimension of... the story: 
the.. more. countries involved the better; the 
bigger; it is,. whatever it . 
is, . the= better 
whether it be an earthquake . or political 
demon- 
stration, (c) its content appropriateness: certain 
categories of news get high coverage by agencies, 
others do not. Politics, economics and sport 
rank high; education and science do not. For 
the agencies, therefore, 'news' tends to occur 
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towards the top levels of national, decision-making 
institutions, especially those whose decisions 
have fairly direct international implications; 
(d) its technical adequacy: in other words, 
provided the story passes on competence, in terms 
of language,, sources approached, impartiality 
of presentation, it is a candidate for selection 
on the basis of the other criteria. If it does 
not pass those other criteria it has no hope; if 
it does, a check back to bureau may be made-to 
salvage it. 
The dominance of the elimination function 
reflects both, the need tn cult down on the incoming 
copy, as well as the basic purpose of the out- 
going wire, which is to provide huge choice of 
usable material for clients in any given area. 
Soy while selection has to be made between some 
material and other material, it does not have 
to be so. rigorous that it becomes amajor 
problem, since it is. important'to provide 
much more copy than any'single client will 
want to use. The aim is both precision 
and bulk. 
583. - Agency Variations in Editorial-Control 
'Editorial centralization. 1 refers to the character and 
location of . 
those, persons"who have the right to receive 
copy from other bureaux with the intention of changing, 
altering, cutting, adding or, in. any other way. interfering 
with it, while that copy is, still en route to clients. 
With the partial exception of Reuters, the global agencies 
are also : domestic agencies, and 
their domestic. news 
funct. ions. are organizationally distinct. If we-regard 
the, Press Association as the domestic arm of Reuters for 
," 
the, present, argument, it can be said that the. PA and AFP 
exhibit the greatest degree of domestic editorial central- } 
ization. 
-.. , 
The PA does not 'regionalise'. its service. There are no 
desks in. London which serve. thespec, ific"needs of different 
U. K. regions. The same services are distributed across 
the nation from London;, there is no injection of regional 
material at a local level,. and the services : go straight 
to the offices of client media organizations. The agency, 
. acting on 
behalf of its: owners,, the provincial daily news- 
papers, considersthat. these. papers will "have covered 
their 
own regions adequately. The PA's own coverage in the 
regions. is based on a; full-time strength . 
of , about 
17 or 18 
correspondents out. of a total of.; about 300 editorial staff 
of whom the, . rest "are based in London- Wherever possible 
it has stringers on memb, er. newspapers.: Sometimes a news- 
room-will co-operate as_a body in providing the-PA with 
news. In a minority of cases the newspaper does not 
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co-operate as a matter of principle and forbids its staff 
to act in a stringer capacity for the agency. The PA does 
put out a 'specials' wire. This wire simply carries 
stories which are destined for specific clients. They may 
be ordered by the'clients, at additional cost to themselves 
for instance, they might want reports of speeches made 
by local M. P. 's - or the specials may be discretionary, 
sent by the PA whenever it thinks a particular client 
might benefit from a. story with a special regional interest. 
In the case of discretionary stories, '. the client would pay 
only if. he used whatever it was the PA offered. Total. 
wordage of special material of this kind put out by the 
PA runs to some 20,000 words a day. Any individual 
subscriber would. receive only a small fraction of this. 
In total therefore, the percentage of stories received by 
clients which have a specifically regional angle is a very 
-small fraction of the total 
material received from the PA. 
AFP'falls somewhere in between the PA'and the American 
agencies in the editorial centralization of-its, domestic 
organization. The main editorial function is centred 
in Paris, but outside Paris, as we have seen, there are a 
..,. .... number of principal bureaux and some subsidiary ones, which 
have much greater organizational significance than the 
provincial bureaux of the PA. For a few periods each day, 
Paris suspends its incoming and outgoing connections with 
% the regional bureaux to allow provincial bureaux to trans- 
mit to one another, and to newspaper clients, 'stories of 
primarily local or regional significance unlikely to appeal 
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on a-nationwide scale, and which do not therefore require 
handling in Paris. Even so, there are sometimes mis- 
understandings between provincial newspaper clients and 
the Paris central desk when clients feel that the general 
news service for the provinces does not adequately meet 
their requirements for regional news. ' 
AFP and the American agencies all tend to subscribe to 
the idea that there is something which is called 'national'- 
"news, and something which is called 'regional' or 'local' 
"news. This distinction is not altogether meaningful, since. 
the 'national' wires will often carry stories which appear 
to have a very local character, but to which editors 
attributesome'potential for national interest -`'very often 
a crime or human interest. story. But it can' beunderstood 
that news of central `government' and of'matters which in a 
fairly direct fashion affect-the nation as a whole, will 
be carried on the. Inationall or'trunkt wires. The 
regionalor'""state'wires often carry matters to do with 
local. government, local sports and the like,, which have an 
immediate relevance to the area in which they occur. Of 
course these matters might also be of significant'interest 
to other regions,: but' the division of wires has 'in the past 
tended to restrict the flow'of intra-regional news. 
The 'American agencies' produce ä'high. volume of state and 
local news'. In- the" past each main state bureau was- 
:, responsible for compiling a state wire that carried' nothing 
but local"news. Subscribers could take the state wire 
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entirely separately, or they could take ,a service 
which 
combined trunk with state wire news. Neighbouring states 
might take the state. wires of adjacent areas to. include 
some of. this news . 
on their own wire., But naturally, . 
this 
would involve much monitoring ; work, re-editing and 
re- 
punching. Both agencies have now computerized their 
news operations, so that inter-bureau communication is 
facilitated by the. elimination of much of the monitoring 
and re-punching operation that. was once necessary. State 
bureaux can file stories to selected destinations which. 
they consider mightbe interested in receiving them, and 
they can easily obtain abstracts of stories on-, other state 
wires which they can call in from the computer. . 
AP has 
several computer bureaux known as hub bureaux, whereas UPI's 
system is based on three computers-in one bureau. 'Trunk' 
wires are made up of the international material which has 
-been selected in New York as suitable for 
national dissemin- 
ation, and. of. the various stories, from different states which 
have been coded for national distribution. 
Traditionally there have been, three levels of bureauin 
the American system:. the head, bureau, the state bureau, 
and the smaller bureau. within any given state.. - The head 
bureau . exercised.. 
the most. important editorial control over 
the construction. of national wires, although of-course the 
material they used was the material . 
transmitted to them 
by the state wires,, (which were received in the head offices). 
These state wires included material sent by the smaller 
state bureaux. These bureaux commonly , waiteduntil, 
there 
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was available wire capacity: to carry their material. Although 
junior, . 
they had autonomy in deciding which material they 
wanted the rest of the. state to see, and indeed which 
stories they wanted seen at a national level. With computer- 
ization the state bureaux appear to have become more important 
in deciding which . stories. should 
be placed on,. the national 
or trunk wires, at. the 
expenseof the head offices, which 
are confined more., to a'monitoring and checking function, 
and. of the local bureaux. In,. the case of AP., it is not 
state bureaux as a whole that have become more important 
but selected state-bureaux. - the 'hub' bureaux. It is 
the 'hub': bureaux which decide on the destination codes 
stories sent them by less important or Ilinel suitable for 
bureaux. 'Their collective decisions about what is or, is 
not 'national' news. go towards the creation of a 'national? 
or .; 
t trunk'. wire. 
Internationally-there are also differences between the 
agencies in the. extent to whichthee1itorial functions are 
centralized.. This is; reflected'mainly. in the extent to 
which_each head öffice, exercises dominant control over its 
network global. system... 
In'their international operations the global agencies 
maintain a, three-level bureau system. At the top of 
course is head office. -in New York, London or Paris - 
and. then. there are regional centres. 
whose functions cover 
many countries, perhaps. more than one continent, . and 
beneath 
these are 'smaller bureaux. which simply cover one country 
or. lessand which tend to file. copy, -not. direct to head office 
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but to a regional bureau... There are two considerations 
in assessing the relative importance of these bureaux in 
an agency network, and they have to do with the distribution 
function and the news-gathering function. 
In terms of news distribution, New York is an exceptionally 
important centre in the case of AP. There are few 'middle- 
level' bureaux which intervene between New York and individual 
countries and the clients within individual coutries. 
Traditionally, the London bureau has ranked second 'in the 
hierarchy of AP's bureaux, and that bureau has inserted 
material of primarily regional interest on the wires coming 
from New York for Europe. But in recent years the time 
allotted for this insertion function has declined considerably 
and at the moment is of no great importance. Therefore 
New York sends out one European wire for the whole continent, 
including the United Kingdom. As we have seen, AP main- 
tains its on translating staffs in many European countries 
for direct distribution to clients there. In the process 
of translation, which requires. the news-flow to stop in the 
office of the local bureau, it is possible to insert extra 
items of interest to that country. (The extent to which 
this happens is not great. ) For one reason relatively little 
material of solely European interest is included on the 
wire's passage through London, - and what material there is 
will tend to be of a broad European character, and of 
little truly localized interest. . It is of course possible 
. 
for neighbouring bureaux to telex items of special interest 
to other countries, but this tends not to happen very often 
*cf. note 3, p. 957 
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because this is a non-routine procedure, it is time-consuming, 
and simply adds to the burden of translation work that must 
be done. It would happen. only in the. case'of something 
extremely important. 
The decision as to which news items-should be selected for 
Europeanclients therefore takes place, in,.. the case of AP, 
in New York. These decisions are. taken. by. the same desk 
(manned at any one time by no more than three or four 
p, eople), which has responsibility for sending news to Africa 
, and to.. Asia. and. South. Eas, 
t Asia. It and the Middle. East 
is of course, impossible, for such a small team to differentiate 
precisely between the world regions in the news they select 
for distribution, to them. . 
It is very much; the same service 
that goes to all the. regions. What. distinctions that are 
made betweenthe world regions. are very : broad in character: 
certain items may be-selected. because they have a broad Asian 
relevance, for, instance, but not a great deal of attention 
is going to be paid to news items which have specific 
relevance, say, to Malaysia, or Bangladesh. And when very 
specific choices are made, it is very often with an aware- 
ness of the presence ofa well-paying client. 
South America has a rather privileged position within the 
AP global distribution network, since it'has, a separate 
desk in New York (Prensa. Asociada Desk). This desk is. 
responsible for the distribution, in Spanish,, 
of. a service 
of international and U. S. news, which includes news of 
South America. But here again, the basic selection is 
made in New York, not in South America. If the South 
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American continent is privileged it is because it has a 
desk to itself, whereas the other world regions share one 
desk in common. But much of the work for South America 
is simply translation into Spanish. (News of South 
America which is to be retransmitted back to South American 
countries usually arrives in Spanish. ) The service for 
Brazil until the mid-'seventies was translated into 
Portuguese in Brazil. The American agencies are exception- 
ally well-entrenched in the South American market, and some- 
times serve as domestic agencies. Greater effort in the 
provision ofa regionalized service is evident in the case 
of AP's distribution here. 
The first main editorial stage in the formation of AP's 
World Service report, is the individual bureau acting in 
the light of accepted routines and prescriptions. But the 
major compilation processoccürsin New York, and this 
involves the putting together of some copy and the elimin- 
ation of other copy, and to a limited extent the choice 
of certain copy for major world regions and not others. 
The process is not totally' centralized'because, as we have 
seen, the translation function occurs in the bureau of the 
country into whose language the service is to be translated 
(with the exception of Spanish-speaking Latin American 
countries which are served a Spanish service translated in 
New'York. ) At this level, there is also considerable 
elimination of stories, and-to a very limited extent, the 
addition of 'new` 'ones .' The ' 
effort of translation. cannot 
keep up with the volume"ofnews. transmitted on the world 
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service without the risk of losing competitiveness in 
speed., In the process of, selection at this level, it is 
inevitable that stories. considered. to be of relatively 
little direct importance to the country in question will 
be dropped. 
AFP's news distribution appears even more centralized than 
AP', s,; because both: the m, ajor. compilation and the translation 
fünctions are located in Paris, with the exception of a 
Portuguese-language service which is based. in Brazil, and 
an Arabic language service which is. translated for AFP in 
Cairo,. by the Egyptian news agency MENA... A regional centre 
; _established 
in Hong-Kong in 1972 acts mainly as communications 
. centre rather 
than for editorial surveillance. All bureaux 
.. within 
the region file to Hong. Kong, whence copy. is moved 
'to Paris, and to Manilla for regional distribution by radio. 
There is some ' minor, insertion of specifically regional 
material in Hong Kong, that; might not interest Paris. It 
maybe that the importance of: Hong Kong will increase over 
time,. but: "in'. 1973 there was no consensus over whether local 
. 
editorial. control. had increased or not. as a result of the 
change. :` 
In Paris, -the; 'desk . central' receives. all 
incoming messages, 
domestic as. well asý_international, and then farms these. 
dispatches out ID. other, desks which specialize in certain 
: geographical. and other , areas. 
The overseas desks are 
arranged, largely according to language, though there may 
be different services within each language, grouping. Under 
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this arrangement, one incoming dispatch is likely to go to 
several desks. An incoming story of considerable inter- 
national importance would go to each of the language, desks 
at the same time as being transmitted on the domestic wires. 
Reuters operated in a fashion similar to AFP in the beginning 
of the post-war period, but itseditoriallsystem has 
changed greatly in the space of the past decade. Until 
1968 there was one Central Desk which received all incoming 
copy, which was delivered by clerks who ran between this 
desk and the pool of teleprinters nearby. Just behind 
the teleprinter pool was a -sports desk, and then along 
one side of the newsroom were various regional desks: 
European, Mid-East, South East Asian and Japanese, African, 
South African, North American, South American, and a desk 
for Australia manned by the Australian Associated Press. 
When Reuters cut down its South American activities in 
'1958, the North and South American desks came together to 
form a Western Hemisphere desk. The breakdown was other- 
wise essentially by continent. South Africa had a place 
of its own because there had been a South African desk from 
early on in the agency's history (it was the first 'regional' 
desk). The Central Desk functioned both to serve the 
regional desks, and to provide a direct service for the 
British press market. The Central Desk transmitted copy 
to the regional desks by teleprinter: each regional desk, 
staffed at any one time by a sub-editor and a teleprinter 
operator, would have a bank of teleprinters - as many as 
six in the case of the European desk. These teleprinters 
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would, carry the basic service compiled by the Central 
Desk, but they would also carry some of the incoming copy 
from regions covered by the specific regional. desk in 
question. These were called the '1. eak' teleprinters. 
A, total staff of 28 to. 30, manned the Central Desk which 
was the. largest and the most important of.: the desks., ' The 
regional desks were, mannedby total staffs of up to eight 
people.. Because total staffs had to operate . l6; to 24 
hour shifts, the actual 
number of, people on; any desk at 
time was much less , 
than t any given i he total. At any-, . 
given time, '-sitting . 
on the Central Desk would', be a copy- 
taster, 
. 
the. editor: of the day,. and a , filing editor.,, -In 
front of these gentlemen was a sub desk.. Sometimes the 
copy-, taster might filehis_own stories,. if these were very 
important, or even dictate them-to the operators, who were 
just behind him. 
Each of the regional desks would tend to work for a different 
schedule or. deadline, depending on. the.. common press dead-. - 
line, times'in their. respective regions. The Central Desk 
might give help,, advice, or, recommendations. For instance, 
it might initiate a round-up on stories of similar sub- 
stance but involving more. than. one region, Most of the 
translation. work was done at the receiving end,.. by national 
news agencies... A. long-established French-language desk 
did exist in'Paris-for France and French Africa. Trans- 
-lationinto Spanish for 
South America was done on location 
in.. BuenosAires. 
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The whole history of Reuters therefore up until the mid- 
'sixties was one of growing complexity in the centralized 
handling of news material. From being basically one 
single service of world news before the Second World War, 
with some special attention to South Africa and Australia, 
there was a proliferation of regional desks in Head Office. 
Complexity within centralization'. 
In the mid-'sixties, the role of the Central Desk was further 
accentuated when it was renamed the World Desk. Its role 
vis-a-vis the regional desk became more powerful. Before 
1966 each regional desk'hadsifted for itself through the 
incoming Reuters material to compile a regional service. 
After 1966 the World Desk did the basic sifting for all the 
regional desks, whereas before it had performed this function 
only for areas with no special regional representation, and 
handed out to the regional desks the copy which it considered 
suitable for each desk. The chain was not altogether 
hierarchic since the regional desks could still monitor the 
incoming regional copy direct on their own teleprinters. 
But the only copy they now changed was regional copy. The 
basic choice was'that of the Central Desk. 
The re-organization generated some bad feeling. Regional 
desk staff felt inferior to the 'elite' journalists selected 
for World Desk functions; those who were'not selected but 
had senior experience felt downgraded. 
Increasing the status of the World Desk was part of a pro- 
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gramme of production rationalization which culminated in 
1968 with the introduction-of computerized operations: 
Automatic Data. Exchange,, or'ADX. ' This was a 'multi- 
addressing addressing system whereby. dispatches. could be sent, 
simultaneously, to appropriately coded addresses. thrrough'. 
the world. It eliminated the need'for repunching of the 
same material for different destinations, and made possible 
the direct flow of news from source to client without 
intervention in-London. In-: practice, London still did 
,. exercise, intervention, except; 
on stories of . very: 
'great 
importance, like an American-election, when'the'New York 
bureau would be given : the, go-ahead for direct coding of 
stories for, immediate worldwide distribution. But usually, 
. -. 
incoming-copy was coded to London, where it was viewed by 
a copy-taster, who,: without needing to remove the dispatch 
from the: computer, -could indicate 
whether it: was. suitable 
for direct transmission to. given destinations. If not, 
it could. be taken out%of_-the computer and altered and, if 
the alterations., were heavy, be'repunched into the. computer. 
:; Introduction: of video 
display units-from the. mid-tseventies 
permitted. alteration-of copy without the need for removing 
it from the computer. 
The computer transmitted copy-to the same broad.! destinations' 
that were once' covered by the regional. desks . -° But these 
desks were now technologically redundant. Regionalization 
of news distribution : was- now largely in. the- hands'- of the 
., World Desk copy. -taster and sometimes, at. the discretion of 
theWorld Desk, of the bureau originating a story. The 
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role of the 'regional' desks was now shifted largely from 
news-distribution to news-gathering, and they moved out of 
London to Singapore for South East Asia, New York for 
North America, Beirut for the Middle East. The French- 
language desk was brought back to London from Paris, 
possibly to bring the selection of French wire copy more 
in line with the general output of the World Desk. Now 
translation functions began in Bonn for German, Beirut for 
.. 
Arabic, Lisbon for Portuguese. effect, the introduction In 
of. computer for Reuters has led to greater editorial 
centralization in the compilation of'a basic Reuters service 
and in news-distribution, but has at the same time brought 
about a moderately decentralized system of news-gathering, 
and has also in certain respects allowed the retention of 
editorial control. by regional centres over purelyregional 
copy. Such copy rarely exceeds 30% of the total. 
UPI introduced a similar: computer operation to Reuters' 
: ADX in 1971. Installed in London,: Itcovered Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa. The use to which it was put by 
UPI was somewhat different from Reuters' exploitation of 
the innovation. The burden of coding dispatches was placed 
squarely on the bureau level. An individual bureau was 
therefore responsible for determining to which parts of the 
world it considered a story should be sent. This was a 
radical change in traditional agency editorial practice. 
The change was preceded by a nine-month training or simulation 
programme. Correspondents had to be taught to write copy 
in a way that would be immediately acceptable to clients. 
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The training period, in other words, was designed to help 
correspondents-internalize the_practicesof sub-editors. 
; They were being asked to make 
the same' decisions that 
before-sub-editors at Head'. Office would have made: for 
instance,. they-now had to-decide-what priority they should 
give a story-- whether it should beurgent or ordinary.. 
To write.. too: much, or to send-a story. to too many places, 
might threaten to-overload the'system. ' In fact; one mode 
of. control still exercised by the regional centres is to 
let bureaux know, when the', system. is near Ito full-capacity. 
But this is technological"rather than editorial control. 
The implication of=this innovation for the present 
discussion is the decentralization of editorial control 
which`) it involves . It 'has eliminated a 'number 
of people 
who before were involved in the process of editorial 
choice (or elimination), , -but without diminishing the 
significance or importance"of the choice. factor. -. Once 
a-'story is-filed under the-new'system : there is no way of 
-changing 
it-before it reaches the client. -It can be 
monitored`,: but'the: correspondent': cannot be asked-to make 
any alterations-until after the initial damage has-been done. 
The correspondent =still writes one story for different 
client areas. But itýis possible for him:. to code the 
opening . paragraphs 
fora wider 'market area than' the closing 
paragraphs. Oneimportant`consequence of the system is , 
that it may'have introduced greater divisions of authority 
at the bureau level. Before, itwas-not too important 
who filed a story provided he had 'a reasonable command of 
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the language and an acceptable' level of journalistic` skill. 
But after the introduction of the computer it became vital 
that the transmitter not only had a good knowledge of 
codes but that he was also an excellent writer'and 
journalist. There was now, no automatic editorial control 
outside the bureau. So, certain. people were debarred from 
transmitting stories: on their own authority. The people 
who wereauthorized, to file tended to be. the, Amer. ican 
bureau chiefs and chief reporters.. In some instances 
reporters with, poor linguistic qualifications-(in English) 
were dismissed. To counteract this trend, the reduction 
of editorial work in the London bureau meant that some 
senior-journalists were. freed for location news-gathering. 
Direct transmission:. from-originating bureau to. client 
within the UPI system is not. -the complete picture. 
What 
tends to happen is that within, a:; major world region served 
bya computer centre, stories. ar. e'transmitted and received 
directly without editorial intervention. - Stories from 
one major region to another arereceivednot. directly by 
clients. but through the computer centre. of'the region of 
destination.. Editorial control will be very rapid at 
this point, as a rule, but will not necessarily be auto- 
matic. Finally', no stories. from: the United; States are 
transmitted directly-or automatically overseas without 
editorial, intervention., .. This is'because outgoing stories 
often need simplification in order-to facilitate the trans- 
lation process, wherever this: is_necessary, and because few 
-U. S. agency correspondents are considered. sufficiently 
,. 
*cf. note 3, p. 957 
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qualified to decidewhich`stories'are suitable for non-U. S. 
consumption. Incoming overseas material destined for the 
Unit ed`Statesmarket is also'processed`editorially, although 
ratherrmorequickly'than outgoing material, "since there is 
no language or cultural problem: the stories will have 
'been written by Americans usually, with'"the'American market 
high "in 'their thoughts. 
One' interesting feature of the new kind of "computerized 
operation "i's" its ý flexibility and 'mobility., UPI demon- 
strated'thisfirst of all when it transferred"its'London 
. operations' 
for Europe, the Middle East and Africa' to 
'Brussels. ""='' The argument at thetime was that Brussels 
was going to be"the political centre of Europe and, in 
American eyes, 'the"news centre; that Brussels was at 
least. as good a communications centre as Londonthat 
the Belgian Government was prepared to make certain"tax 
concessions-in order to encourage new investments; and 
that labour problems"were notnearly so' acute in Brussels. 
On-'some of these points the agency was to be disappointed. 
Expected tax concessions did not materialize, and" the` 
communications, though good,. were not noticeably better. 
Labour"problems did begin to catch up on the British rate- 
after 
.a 
few'years, although UPI was able to introduce 
athoroughly` modernizedand; well-equipped office'in its 
new location which it would have had trouble getting 
accepted by'British`trades unions. ` Brussels did not 
become quite"the news centre that UPI may have hoped for: 
and in any case, there is a limited appetite for EEC news 
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no matter how 'significant it may be objectively. 
The second overseas-. computer centre in the UPInetwork 
was established-in Hong Kong at the end of-1971. As the 
European change had followed. an expansion of the use of 
multiple, channels and a switch to. leased lines, the 
introduction of a computer in Asia followed the: development 
of cable communications as opposed to radio for distribution 
purposes.. Regional executive agency sources claimed in 
1973 that direct. coding by correspondents to individual 
countries had increased; in fact, to' reduce computer 
overload they were encouraged to be increasingly: selective. 
About 80% of . stories,: it was. claimed, were directly coded. 
The computer has. also greatly. facilitated inter-bureau 
communication in the area,, whereas such messages in the 
past had to be. handled physically via Tokyo. and, Manila. 
In the: Hong Kong, bureau (as in Brussels) there is usually 
only: one respondent who is responsible for monitoring 
incoming reports and redirecting them if necessary; 
sometimes there. are two. In pre-computer days there 
would have been eight persons on this desk. -_ 
The structure of news-gathering. operations in all the 
agencies is considerably more decentralized than: news- 
distribution. Given that the incessant flow of communic- 
ations between individual bureaux and the head office or 
regional offices is an important factor in determining 
a reasonably standardized approach and product,. along with 
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.. similar national 
background, education and training, the 
actual. logistics of news-gathering, and. to some. extent 
the real selection of stories,. is the responsibility of 
.. the: local. 
bureau chief., The problems of news-gathering 
from the, point; of view, _of. 
bureau chief is the subject 
of the next chapter, and all it needs here is toýsay 
that this is an essential link point between, the market 
and cultural factors that determine the organizational 
character of the agencies, and the practical processes 
of information-gathering in any given locality. This 
is the point. at which the raw material is collected and 
.,,,. organized 
in. preparation. for later processing. 
Not- all. bureaux are equal;, however. . As we, have seen 
some. of the agencies maintain regional centres.. In 
AP!, s, structure, the London bureau is the most important 
-of- all overseas bureaux. 
In the event. of a. news-crisis, 
for. example in the Middle East, it is the London bureau- 
which-will. take responsibility for the logistical 
problems. of getting correspondents-in. the European-Mid 
East. - African; area to the-. spot, and ensuring. a. rapid 
flow of copy into the bureau on its way to New York. 
There are two bureaux of this. importance in the UPI 
structure: Brussels and Hong Kong;  Singapore, Beirut 
and New; York in the. Reuters', network; and perhaps the 
Hong Kong bureau for AFP,. 
It is a matter. of degree.. Some bureaux-do notfile 
directly to their Head, Office, in Paris, or London, or 
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New York, but either to a major regional centre, or simply 
to the bureau in a neighbouring ' country. For instance, 
the-Malaysian bureau in UPI's South East Asian structure 
reports to Singapore. It-tends to happen that the 
bureaux which receive the communications ! 6f others in 
this way are more important than the ones which do the 
transmitting. This is not so true of developed'areas 
of the world, which are extensively covered by the agency's 
leased cable networks. Stories from Moscow'-Tor-instance 
pass . 
through Scandinavia, Germany or Belgium on their way 
to London or Paris, but the Moscow bureau is no less import- 
ant than the bureaux through which communications pass. 
Nor is any attempt made to edit the material which passes" 
through: this goes direct to Head Office. In-other 
cases, however, it is more than simply 'a matter-`of passage. 
Stories are stopped or at least monitored at the point of 
passage, and the bureau chief at this point wi-11'often 
have the right to query the point of origin on certain 
facts or suggest new modes of approach. This-happens 
very often where the smaller bureau'is headedýby a locally- 
recruited journalist, -or a junior staffer. It'happens 
particularly when there is no full-time representation 
at all, but a trusted stringer or stringers. In the 
nature of things, coverage left to local recruits, juniors 
or-stringers is generally coverage of ; countries which are 
not considered of very major news importance by the agencies. 
For the same reasons that make such countries poor in 
newsworthiness, the communication facilities between 
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them and Head Office are generally poor, another reason 
which makes it advisable for them to file through a 
nearby senior, bureau. In some'cases, however, and espec- 
. iall. y in Africa inter-country communication is-very 
bad, and it is easier for the stringer or local"corr- 
espondentto file, his stories directto Head Office 
'(London or Paris, `. in the case of Africa, no matter which 
agency -it is); but'there will . 
be some supervision of 
news-gathering by the bureau 
chief. of the nearest sizeable 
bureau. The bureau chiefs of Nairobi, 'for example, have 
responsibility of this kind for several, countries of East 
Africa; *a similar 'situation ' is found in South' America 
where the_ smaller' countries' liaise with bureaux 'in the 
larger-'ones; in the-Middle'East where Beirut and Cairo 
bureaux sometimes lead for others in the same region. 
In Europe some of the East European bureaux-are really 
subordinate politically to'Vienna; and-in Scandinavia, 
Stockholm' tends to be the 'senior bureau.,. ' The , politics 
of inter-bureau superordination-subordination'is'a 
flexible 
and mobile'phenomenon'in people: terms. But the fact 
- remains'thýat some' 
countries are consistently given low 
' coverage facilities; -and these are 'therefore especially 
vulnerable to being considered subordinate to bureaux 
in neighbouring countries which are considered of greater 
newsworthiness. 
The overall`'pattern of news-gathering and news distribution 
is in the process of change with the introduction of new 
technology. But'the use to which similar' technology is 
604. 
put and the way, this use varies between the agencies is 
a further; indication of the relative centralization of 
editorial operations. UPI's employment of a computer 
system as we have; seen appeared to lend considerable 
autonomy to individual bureaux for transmission-of news 
direct to clients within themajor geographical areas; 
whereas Reuters' similar technology, while-it allows 
for-the possibility of such direct transmission, is not 
actually 
. 
employed for that purpose to, the same: extent: 
news material is; monitored prior to transmi-, sion in-London, 
even though the computer system greatly facilitates the 
transmission process. This excludes, in the case of 
Reuters, material inserted in the Singapore bureau for 
local South East Asian consumption,.: and. for practical 
purposes, news of'special interest to the Arab world 
inserted and translated in Beirut. The controlled 
flexibility of . 
the Reuters system is likely tobe similar 
to that introduced by AP in its computerization. of. foreign 
news distribution from late 1975; in. the case of AP- 
infact, computerization seems to -abe ýaccompanied, by', 
greater centralization in New York. AFP': s computerization 
in the near future will be similar in use to, Reuters and 
AP'. 
The most likely future change. will be. towards the establish- 
ment of regional high-capacity. Information and Storage 
Retrieval computers, permitting; clients to exercise choice 
over the news they receive, as already happens in the 
U. S. for many , 
clients. , While this facility,, will take 
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many years to extend around -the world', it may serve to 
eliminate some of. the factors; observed during the course 
of this study. 
2. Communications 
Chapter One described how communications systems in the- 
agency network benefitted the clients in the developed 
world rather more than those of the developing world. 
The United States and Western Europe are interconnected 
with full-speed leased line circuits with tremendous 
capacity for both transmission of news and news distribution. 
Where there is high communications capacity there is a 
natural tendency to expand to meet the capacity, and many 
testified to that tendency who bemoaned its consequences 
for the traditional economy of agency messages. The 
recent expansion of 'sub-leasing' communications facilities 
is an attempt to ensure full utilization of existing 
networks. 
In the rest of the world, and between the developed and 
developing world, the situation is changing. Inclusion 
of South European countries and some Middle Eastern 
countries into the agencies' main leased wire circuits has 
taken place in the early 'seventies, although in some 
instances, as from Israel for example, outgoing trans- 
mission is normally. at half-speed, thus indicating-the 
limit on total communications desired from such countries. 
The other, mmajor locus. of 'development has been South East Th 
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Asia where a number of bureaux in-the. 'Reuters and UPI 
circuits are on full-speed or half-speed links with 
regional centres. Elsewhere outward communication is 
by private telex, or through local national or commercial 
PTT's, and these means of communication are progressively 
more expensive and less efficient, from the agency's 
point of view, than leased circuit communications. 
Distribution of services on the other hand, outside the 
leased wire circuits, is normally by: satellite or ordinary 
radio. Satellite is normal for communications from North 
to South America and has helped increase average wordage 
of transmissions considerably. Some of the agencies use 
satellite for communication to certain South East Asian 
and Asian destinations, but otherwise ordinary radio, 
which is far less efficient and reliable, is the norm. 
There is obviously a relationship between communication 
costs and the volume of agency. transmissions. To say 
anything more definitive than that however would tend 
towards an unproductive chicken-and-egg argument. Those 
countries with efficient linking communication systems 
tend to be those which already enjoy established or 
fast-developing links in terms of culture, trade and 
investment, and are therefore more likely to have a much 
greater volume of news about themselves to-exchange than 
countries without such links. On the other. hand one can 
argue that while that is initially true, communication 
networks do not necessarily catch up fast enough with new 
/ 
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relationships and new needs. An often quoted example is 
the dependence of African countries on communication 
,, -systems that run 




African, country to another. There is, also the 
possibility that simple capacity 'creates' the need, and 
., 
that therefore refusal . to provide , 
the capacity indicates 
insensitivity 
, 
to, the requirements of minority groups, or 
simply to new possibilities. As, we have, seen, where the 
agencies;,: expand, capacity. they tend; towards maximum 
,; utilization of that. capacity. 
Might it not be.: the case that expansion of capacity between 
countries which now have only relatively low capacity 
-might: be. 
'the necessary inspiration for stimulating an 
information or, news flow, that does not at present exist, 
. ,.. abut which. 
if it did: exist would lead . 
to better international 
relations? . This; consideration is very relevant to those 
'.. countries which, would. like to. see some alternative to the 
-:. presentrange. of global news, agencies, 
but whose active 
involvement. in, promoting an alternative is inhibited by 
the. present. differences in cost. that operate to the advantage 
of. the. existing, agencies.. 
There- is,, evidence to support the argument, that the 
. relationship i. 
between. news flow. and. communication cost was 
p in, the past and still is important. At the root , ~: im ortani 
issue is. 'the fact, that only a ,: 
few countries were of. the. 
responsible for developing the major communications 
systems and. that use of these systems favoured those 
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situated in the countries that had introduced them. So 
for example after 1919, the U. K. owned and controlled 51% 
of the world's submarine cables, and the United States 
owned 26.5%. The rest were variously. Owned by France, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy and Japan, in that order. 
In terms of landlines, the United States was understandably 
more powerful, given the importance o, flandlines in 
internal U. S. ' communications: " accounting for--'40% of the 
world's total at that'time, with another 36% concentrated 
in Europe, and a mere 12% control ' in- Asia, 6% in South 
America, 3% in Africa and 2.5% in Oceania. Telephone 
communications were similarly divided. 
12 
There was an overall tendency for' communication charge rates 
to decline in'real terms during this period, - and7the 
tendency has continued for much of the post-war period as 
well. Cheapening of communication rates was . greatly 
facilitated not simply by expansion, 'but by-new technologies: 
radio' teletype, and multi-address radio-systems were the 
most influential in`theperiod before-World War, Two, and 
the telephonic'cable after it. ý Within the space of 15 
years, between 1923 and 1938, -Reuters for exampleswitched 
from sending most of its news by cable to sending some 90% 
of it by radio. This had dramatic consequences for the 
total wordage broadcast around=the world, which: after the 
introduction of wireless for the general news service, 
climbed from113,000 a month in 1938to 6', 200,000. in 1951" 
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in. Europe: the main-advantages of cable were that it 
allowed for two-way communication, and for; greater tailor- 
,..: 
ing; of services for different, groups of client. A particular 
problem with radio . was that. radio frequencies had become 
overcrowded":. there was a limit tothe.. channels available. 
. In the peaceful conditions,. of the post-war period, there 
was less fear about-the security of landlines. The British 
Commonwealth Press Rate for cable, communications. also 
encouraged, the use of cable further afield. This was 
intended, to compensate for the cable. traffic lost to Cable 
and Wireless as a result of Reuters' heavier investment 
after 1938 in., beamcast. radio. for multi-address news 
distribution. .. 
First introduced in 1941, it operated 
between all territories within the, commonwealth, irrespect- 
ive of , 
the, nationality, of'the correspondent: filing a 
message, or the ownership, of the newspaper to which the 
message was ultimately directed. ''As a result. 'a lower 
;.; ,, 
rate has. helped. to. make possible a. much largerflow. of 
news over the vast-area covered. 
15. 
Between 1938 and 
1949 the-volume of. press: traffic from Canada to'all 
Commonwealth countries, increased bY, 75%, and to, -Canada 
from allCommonwealth countries by250%. 
The-Commonwealth Press Rate stood at 'uneconomical' 
one penny (old pence) a word for many years, rising to 
new pence with decimalization, and stood at 3. new 
pence a. wordin 1974. 
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Introduction of telephonic cable in the early 'sixties, 
permitted extended multiplexing arrangements, ` greatly 
increased efficiency, greater capacity (e. g. avoice 
grade line equals about 24 telegraph cables in capacity), 
and reliability by comparison with radio. Radio was 
least efficient for long distances, on'the other hand, 
leased wire circuits were not worth the investment unless 
traffic was very heavy: so provision of telephonic 
cable for the developing and undeveloped parts of the 
world remained poor for many years-to come. 
While communication rates on the whole became relatively 
cheaper and more efficient, certain remarkable imbalances 
remained. (See Tables 11 and 12. ) This problem greatly 
exercised Williams in his description of the situation in 
the early 1950's. He found that rates often bore little 
relation to costs, and that costs-were often lower in one 
'direction (from developed countries)-than in the'other 
direction (to developed countries). Cable rates to and 
from Middle Eastern countries not only 'vary enormously 
from country to country and according to which direction 
they are sent, but'are frequently so`high as, to, preclude 
anything like a full and regular service of background 
news 
16 Some examples of such imbalances are-evident 
in perusal of-Table 13. 
Table 13 shows the extent to whichratesdiffered according 
to whether one was filing to or from London; the great 
differences in rates, according to destination, which were 
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TABLE THIRTEEN 
COMMUNICATION RATES 19 5217 
Cable 
Ordinary Rates per Word: 
from London to London 
New York 2.04 US cents 5.54 US cents 
Paris 1.75 2.91 
Moscow 3.50 8.75 
Iran 3.50 10.50 
Sudan . 
4.37 6.27 
Lebanon 3.50 9.91 
Egypt 2.91 3.79 
Israel 1.17 1.17 
Jordan 1.17 1.17 ...... 
Urgent Urgent 
Belgian Congo 4.96 14.58: 44.19 
Afghanistan 5.54 16.33, 21.29.: 42.70 
. 
Brazil 7.00 21.00 14.00 64.17 
Peru . 7.00 
14,. 00 63.73 
from to London to Paris 
Singapore 1.14 19.14 
Johannesburg 1.14 13.14 
Montreal 1.14 9.14 
To London 
via Paris 
Tunis 4.67 0,12 3.03. 
Algiers 4.67 0.12 3.03 
Rabat 8.17 3.21 6.12 
Saigon 9.05 3.79 6.71 
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not simply an expression of distance; and the differences 
according to cultural affiliations. There were also 
problems with radio communication: for instance a 'minimum 
period' often operated, perhaps of 15 minutes, which had 
to be paid for even if the. period actually used was only 
a minute. 
Leased line circuits have become much more common, in 
agency networks since Williams' time; yet there are. still 
great inconsistencies and imbalance. There'are no pref- 
erential rates for the press in leased circuit networks, 
as there are in ordinary cable . 
communications. ' Rental 
charges vary according to (i) 'distance, (ii) mode (whether 
cable/radio/satellite), and (iii), quality (e. g.. voice-grade 
or telegraph). 
The London Post Office divides the world up into two 
major zones: Europe and the rest; each of these is 
divided. into three sub-zones, _and costs are 
fixed accordingly 
for voice grade and telegraph circuits. In the Autumn 
of 1973, a 50 baud intracontinental (European) telegraph 
circuit would have cost between £1,320and £2,400 a year; 
a voice-grade circuit would have started at 9.5,272. A 
50 baud telgraph circuit to the Mediterranean would have 
been £7,500; but 911,250 to Asia or the Americas and 
915,000 to Australasia; a 200 baud circuit would have 
cost from 915,000 to 930,000 and a voice-grade circuit 
from £24,000 to £60,000 according to the. zone...; In, that 
year Reuters leased. from the Post Office some 5 private 
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'telegraph channels, 9 radio-broadcast facilities and 7 
voice-grade (dataspeed) channels. Broadcast channels 
are rented: by, the time for which they are required: a. 
two' hour 'daily broadcast in 1973 ' cost almost Z4,000 a 
year , and. 
an` eleven -hour daily broadcast cost over E16,000 
a year. 
Leased wire circuit, charges are in fact shared between 
the agents of the transmitting countries and the agents 
of the, receiving countries. 'Sometimes these shares are 
far from being equal. The cost of renting terminal 
equipment and services can also. vary greatly depending 
on location.. ',. The European countries are trying to 
standardize. their, rates,. basing them on the public 
charges;, for. telephone lines, but there. is much greater 
` diversity for inter-continental communications, for. `which 
the ITU has made no recommendations and even- if it had 
would notb. e. -as effective as in Europe, where the ITU 
has the most status: 
Charging procedures for leased lines can vary greatly 
between countries. South Africa for instance has a 
standard charge regardless of destination (8,400 Gold 
Francs monthly for a 50 baud telegraph line in 1974; 
between 22,000 and 27,000 for a. voice-gradeline, 
depending on quälity). 
8 
Other countries vary their 
charge-according to destination, usually on a zone basis 
similar to that of the U. K. Post. Office. A 50 baud line 
from Tokyo-to either Beirut or to a , more northerly European 
616. 
TABLE FOURTEEN 
EUROPEAN LEASED WIRE COST: SEPTEMBER 197319 
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LONDON Manchester 368 2.9 Amsterdam. ' 1 ' 10.9 
PARIS Arles 601 3.5 Milan 618 13.1 
BRUSSELS Arlon 160 4.6 Cologne 185 29.2 
MILAN Rome 498 6.0 Frankfurt '498 19.1 
COLOGNE, Munich 446 6.2 Amsterdam 216 20.3 
COPENHAGEN Esjberg 262 3.6 Hamburg- 278 19.5 
AMSTERDAM Maastricht 168 2. '5 Dusseldorf 176 24.8 
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;,. destination, London or Paris forexample, is the same 
(9,200 Gold Francs monthly in 1974), although voice-grade 
is; less-expensive for: Beirut; (23,000 monthly as'compared 
with 31,500 monthly). Voice-grade circuits are generally 
, threeto 
four times as expensive. as full-speed 50 baud- 
lines (normal teleprinter. speed). -The relative 'shares, 
-.; that"each 
terminal charges for any givenline can vary 
enorm. ously, -:. Thus on.. the London-Vienna circuit, London's 
share, for a. 50. baud- line. was, 863 Gold Francs monthly in 
June' 1974, and'Vienna'sshare was 1,656 Gold Francs. 
Lisbon. charged . 
two 
. 
and a . 
half 
. 
times as- much as London; 
Paris, charged one . 
and .a 'half times as much; Rio de 
. -. Janeiro charged seven times as much.. . New York. charged 
:; around one hundred-Gold Francs. less.. These'differences 
were also reflected'. in voice-grade charges. 
The- International Press-Telecommunications Council, a 
pressure group representing communications users, including 
thd. global and national news agencies, `. has argued that 
there, is; scant evidence. to. suggest that rentals bear any 
relation"to. the cost. of. providing a. circuit plus a 
reasonable return upon investment, This was illustrated' 
_by reference"to a series 
". of-national. and international 
European. circuits (cf. Table Fourteen). 
Leased wire rates in'Europe are 'generally' much more 
expensive than: for equivalent distances in North America: 
eight-or nine times higher. However major increases in 
leased line costs for the agencies in 1978 , may, precipitate 
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a joint AP-UPI shift to domestic distribution by'satellite. 
In telex communication, which is in any case generally 
slower and less reliable than leased circuit, there are 
also important variations. Countries off the major 
routes are far more expensive to communicate with. From 
London, the number of seconds time bought by one new pensiy 
varies from 8.57 for adjacent European-countries to only 
4 on direct lines to North-Africa and Eastern Europe. 
It is cheaper to telex the. Canary Islands than Bulgaria; 
twice as cheap-to telex Monaco than`Morocco. 'Operator 
calls vary from 0.21 new pence for three minutes (e. g0 to 
France) to 2.55 new pence for India. From Indonesia it 
is as cheap to telex to Europe as it is to the PhiLlipines, 
or to Hong Kong. Communication from the Hague to 
Tunisia costs 2.75 D fl. for three. minutes, but 10.00 D fl. 
for communication with Nigeria. (1974. charges) 
The structure of. communication charges in the-world is 
one of the most important factors operatingýto-maintain 
the existing global agencies in their positionof strength. 
But it is not impossible'thatýover time and:. with the 
development of-regional-satellite networks, : this, will be- 
come less important. 
. 
3. Technology and the Client Relationship 
The kind of communication network` which an agency develops 
has consequences: both for the relationship between the 
agency's bureaux and'its central offices, and for'the 
. 
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relationship between the°agency. and its clients, whether 
or not, these. are served : directly or 'through the local 
bureaux. 
Advances in , communications often seemed to strengthen the. 
role"of the agency, vis-a-vis. the client in the matter of 
editorial diversity. By increasing the sophistication 
of ". means; whereby. news was-brought, tothe individual news- 
paper. in a fashion : easy for: the paper to " handle ,. the less 
Incentive; did the. newspaper have to spell out its own 
editorial. choices, asopposed'to the'choices already implicit 
in the agency's; provision. 
. -_. -=This'possibility"first. 
became a major issue perhaps in 
North America after -the widespread application ofý. tele-., 
'typesetting (. TTS). , TTS transmits type by; tape_and auto- 
matically: activates linecasting machines,., It was-fir st' 
. 'introduced 
in 1928,.: but not until the 1950_', s;. did,. it become 
.:,.. 
very; common; in the, United 'States. By February-; 1952. there 
were 800 newspapers. linked,; to TTS. circuits. It. was the 
smaller papers which adopted these most quickly:. 76Y6., of 




circuits , had circulations 
ofunder -50; 000.20 The smallest papers were those most 
willing to. feed. TTS, tape, directly into: their linecasting 
machines,, the papers for-whom- independent-national-coverage 
was. not especially important. However, of-nearly 1,000 
newspapers`-receiving TTS agency services in 1954, only 54% 
were actually setting wire news with TTS tape. 
21 
TTS 
was -basically: a domestic mode of communication; the agencies 
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could not feed international clients in, this way. " Not 
until the 'seventies did the U. S. agencies extendTTS 
wires to Canada. National agencies in Europe have adopted 
some form of TTS systems, most notably, as in the case of 
the. Press Association, for numeratetable-likenews: - 
sports results or financial- prices for example. 
The seminal content analysis study. by Cutlip22 in the 
early 1950's was in fact inspired by concern for the effect 
ofTTS wires on editorial choice. Cutlip's choice. of 
newspapers in Wisconsin was based on the, choice made a few 
years earlier by Van Horn_in. a'similar-. study. 
23 
In the 
meantime there had been a shift over to TTS wire in 
Wisca. nsin, and control over the state -wire moved from 
Chicago to Milwaukee. Rather limited evidence-suggested 
-that where a paperwent. over'completely"to use of TTS, 
the amount of, wire news was! -apt 
to increase-, at-the expense 
of local news. Cutli. p mentioned a comparable study from 
ýthe. Indiana University Depar. tment'of'Journalism comparing 
wire news use before and after. TTS, which found that TTS: - 
carried a fewer number of items; : the newspapersýtook a 
larger number of, it: ems from. TTS wire;,. TTS carried a fewer 
number of paragraphs' , less volume; ;` newspapers using TTS 
in 1953 gave more space '(volume) to . 
AP: news items; more 
AP copy was'used by more; newspapers. 'Despite certain 
changes perceived by Cutlip as a result of. the shift to 
TTS (e. g. gains in news , of 
foreign relations and-government, 
drops in economic labour. news), the general; balance of 
content still followed thepattern on the trunk wires. 
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These studies helped raise the issue: . how far did the 
global agency. `servi"ces influence the choices made at the 
local'; level? Papers taking TTS (the majority) had the 
option -either 
of'editing'this material in the-normal way, 
inwhich case. the. advantages of: TTS were'reduced or simply 
feeding in tape as it. was needed - in which case there was 
. 
still choice over stories, < but not in the manner 'of present- 
ation. 
Some : studies suggest heavy . agency influence . over 'the 
client 
:... decision-making-processbut 
others suggest there is 
'greater' variety at this level than "has sometimes, been' 
thought. Inhis study of 16 telegraph editors of-a 
newspaper sample,: Leiber found- that '. the press association 
has- become' the. recommender` of news , 
tö the wire, editor and 
thus'ýthe real selector of telegraph news. The wire editor 
-evaluated 'the''news according 
to what the. AP sent' him' . 
2i 
Studies of die 'such editor', - 'Mr. Gates' ,: in two 
periods, 1949 
and: 19661-largely supported this view.: The attention 
Mr. -Gates gave to the 
various categories of; news: closely 
reflected the gaceallocated to the categories on-the. wire 
`" 'services he- received. The consonance. -was not so great 
in' the' second. study. - when he received: only, 
one news service, 
in contrast to, the earlier period when°he had received 
three' services`. 
25. 
The selection'of wire service' news at any given moment'. of 
time maybe influenced by 'budget' statementsannouncing 
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the news which is due to be sent in the near future. In 
a study. of telegraph editors, Liebes reported that 25% 
of his respondents admitted that wire service budgets of 
what they considered the outstanding stories to' come were 
decisive factors in their decision-making. 
26 
There are other factors of course-which enter. into selection 
other than the priorities established_by wire services, 
such as editorial policy, marketing considerations and 
personal gatekeeper values.; In the field of foreign news, 
however, it. is reasonable to. suppose.. that these other factors 
are. not as important as they are for domestic news. The 
managing editors of 613 evening daily:. papersas'reported 
in a survey by Bowers, 
27 
considered publisher. intervention 
into the use and display of news; copy; . 
to- be most,: frequent 
in the field of local news, and least frequent. in the field 
of foreign news. 
It is understandable that. a paper without. its.. own resources 
for national or international news reporting. should rely 
heavily on an agency for such news. ; But_what'about state 
or local news? A study of. newspaper consumption of 
agency state news by 23 newspapers ; in Minnesota found that 
the 'average newspaper' used slightly morei. than one third 
of all state news. furnished it bye the AP. TTS- State wire. 
Only 7% of the state wire items sent were not used by any 
of the 23 newspapers. 'There were no consistent differences 
in usage according. to size of newspaper. e. This. ' evidence 
shows. relatively high overall usage'of-state wire; items 
623. 
. provided 
by AP. but of course there. is no indication of the 
extent to which this usage . was. complemented 
by newspaers' 
own resources. Stories that got, espe, cially low, usage 
included out-of-state stories,. and stories that were. 
filed late, in the day. Items receiving. high usage 
tended to be filed early on in the day, had Minnesota 
datelines, and tended to be either 'spot. news' or. human 
interest stories. Newspapers which used TTS'tape were 
more., likely to use stories in their entirety than newspapers 
which, used the AP services without the tape. But three 
quarters of the stories used by the total sample were not 
cut atall. : Thus,, the 
difference between TTS and non-TTS 
newspapers, appears relatively insignificant by comparison 
with, the overall tendency for newspapers not to. change 
: agency, stories even 
for news of their own state. 
28 
At least one study has addressed itself specifically to.. the 
question of the standardization effect of agency. news. 
-Stempel 




six, Michigan dailies linked only to a , 
UPI TTS, wire. All 
were evening dai: li s with less. than 13,000 circulation. 
Three factorswere considered: placement of story, length 
of. story and origin of story., During the week 
these six 
-papers used 
764 wire stories., - Only. 8 of these stories 
-were. used 
by all six papers. One, paper. used slightly 
more-than half, the total; three-used less than aquar. ter. 
For all six papers, there ; was only 31% agreement on the use 
of articles. Papers also. differed in the content 
balance 
of stories_they, chose: on the initial wire, for instance 
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there weretwonation al stories for every state story, but 
the ratios for individual papers ranged from 1.5 to 1 to 
almost 5 to 1. Editors also differed greatly on the 
number and proportion of shorts or fillers. "Agreement 
on short stories was considerably less than that for other 
stories, but even discounting these there was still only 
34% agreement on regular stories. 
29 
'There is considerable evidence both ways: the wire 
services are influential on. local editor choice.; but that 
-newspapers can-still exercise a great. deal 'of choice within- 
the material that they are provided. ' 'Evenwhere there 
is influence this is far from being one-way influence: ' the 
agencies respond to-what they'perceive to be their clients' 
or members' interests, especially if-those clientslare 
within important markets (as U. S. papers are), ' or are 
especially wealthy clients'inany market. 
Recent technological changes in this''field appear to be 
in the. direction'of increasing the possibility""of-autonomous 
decision-making at 'the' client editorial level. While 
mainly confined to the United States at'the moment, these 
are changes likely to be exported to'Europe-. and' eventually 
much--further afield, and which will overtake the original 
TTS system in prevalence... . 
We have: -already. seev how the 
introduction of computerized systems. greatly- facilitates:. 
inter-regional news exchange, `and"allows for-the possibility 
of much, greater specification of news to. individual news- 
paper requirements, even though this possibility is not 
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exploited as. far as it. could be. Following closely on 
-this innovation is 
the generalized , 
use of dataspeed systems. 
AP. first introduced dataspeed for its stock quotation 
service for . 
12 subscribers in July1959. Subsequent use 
was mostly confined to. transmission, of numerical data of 
this kind, and for the occasional news report... '"; 'In May 
1974 for instance, it.: sent out,, -. word for word, 'Watergate 
transcripts totalling : some '. 36,000 words in this fashion. 
Both AP. and UPI had, around. 150-160 high speed clients each 
at this time. 
Late in 1973, AP announced it:. would. transmit, its news 
service at 1,050, words per minute to a. few, test papers, 
:: 'which were the. Detroit News, Washington Star-News and the 
Baltimore-Sun, This new development was a. response to 
the earlier. datelines of many newspapers and the consequent 
need for rapid transmission ofmaterial. by. a certain time. 
--The step., was, taken in . 
the knowledge that as -telephone 
companies changed to'digitaltransmission in many big 
city areas, ''high,, speed. transmission would, become more 
economically feasible. Datastream could , be applied to 
. the-, bulk 
of. AP's output: 'A', wire, regional.. B circuit 
-and business news and sports , circuits.. ; 
In. 1974 AP: Datastream, became available: across the United 
States, delivering news at 16 times the normal rate. 
Twenty papers,. intwe"lve, states, subscribed . 
to, the. new 
.. 
system. within the-- first: five; dayst,. The new system 
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eliminated the news jams that had, beenunavoidable on the 
'traditional printer-tape 66 speed wires; and-provided 
plenty of surplus capacity. 
UPI's first commercial delivery of its high-speed wire 
service, Datanews, was to the Sarasota-(Florida) 
Herald-Tribune and Journal. Datanews uses a single 
high-speed data circuit to deliver a-complete news report, 
including general, sports, -financial and regional news. 
The system began-as UPI completed its regional Information 
Storage and Retrieval system (AP's parallel system was 
introduced a couple of years before). 
Dataspeedsystems permit a much' faster delivery; they 
therefore allow more time for editing; and if. `linked in, 
as they are, with information storage and retrieval 
systems, the idea of editing as a matter of dialling for 
those stories whichan editor picks-up from a 'daily or 
hourly abstract has become a reality. Since there is 
greatly increased wire capacity it. mayýmean that the 
wire services will cut down on-their leased, -wires, 
` go 
more-for limited time-rentalsand thus save in that way, 
or that they will onjure up new ways `in which that 
capacity can` be'exploited. ý The Dataspeed systems 
provide 'a technological convenience far greater than 
that-of traditionalTTS-delivery, but without the charge 
that they encouragestandardization, of.. news. selection across 
newspapers. Onthe contrary, there is more, space for more 
news; "' abstracts of news ' items can be -presented, in a clear 
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shorthanded way" which greatly facilitates' the selection 
process and leaves plenty, of time for. this-process to be 
considered. On the other "hand, the stories eventually 
selected, as on, the TTS - delivery systems, are likely to 
remain'inthe same form as they are written or presented 
by the agencies, 'the main editing function being a. process 
of elimination of-unwanted paragraphs. It is unclear yet 
as'to what extent Dataspeed delivery' and other computerized 
aids will lead to a greater. 'survival', 'rate'of original 
bureau copy, or' even stimulate. the'collection of more news 
in more areas. 
Relationship between Agency and Client Resources 
The papers most likely to be able to exercise independence 
of judgement in using agency services under present 
circumstances, are those which have the greatest reporting 
resources. As we have seen however, these are precisely 
the papers that tend to subscribe to the, most agency 
services. An economically healthy paper in a big city 
with a large circulation therefore tends to. invest more 
than others in all news-gathering areas. But having more 
agency resources, such a paper will be in a position to 
choose items from rival agencies, and to compare and 
assess respective performance. It will also be able to 
use agency material as 'background' (even if the agency 
reports were the first to . come. 
to its notice) for reports 
by its own staff. Where a newspaper has staff of its own 
it"wi. il. obviously prefer-to give more space to their material 
rather than to external sources. But the distribution of 
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their correspondents by, newspapers . tends. to exaggerate 
rather than compensate for the imbalances of news-awareness 
-characteristic of the. industry,, as a, whole; -. which means 
that the agencies are still the most-, important sources 
of news for vast areas, of, the less. develop-ed-world.; 
An excellent example is the British national-newspaper 
press, 'which has a reputation. among the. agencies. for 
crediting them with responsibility for news-collection 
-least of all newspaperclient s, A survey was.. conducted 
of British national media organizations in June 1974 by 
the author. questionnaires were-sent to all the. daily 
newspapers: the Financial, -Times, 
the. Times, the Daily 
Telegraph, Guardian,. "Daily Express,, Daily Mail, Daily 
Mirror and the Sun, as well as the BBC and. ITN,, and two 
Sunday papers, the Sunday Times and the Observer. All 
these organizations responded., The' respondent in each 
case was a foreign editor or. equivalent. 
The daily media organizations accounted for 128 full-time 
residential foreign correspondents between them, and in 
addition another 27 staff normally resident in the, United 
Kingdom were stationed abroad at the time of survey 
(thus indicating the extent of use of 'fire-fighter' 
correspondents). The media also retained the services 
of up to 301, stringers. 
Over 40% (40.9%) of the full-time resident, foreign 
correspondents were stationed in Western Europe, and a 
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further 28%'(28.3%) in". North America. Almost 70% of the 
total number of correspondents were therefore based in 
precisely those two'areas. of: the world most generously 
covered'by- the global news agencies. (cf: Table Fifteen) 
To: some extent this balance may have been offset"by the 
dirstribution of stringers. Only' 29% (28`. 9%) were based 
in Western Europe and 9% (8.9%)' in North'America (total. 
for the two areas: 37.8%). 
In , coverage of the rest of the world, the'Middle`East 
and Far East got relatively generous attention; ' while 
Africa and South'America between them ` accounted- for a mere 
5.5% of all full-time correspondents (but`21 6% of all. 
stringers). The higher representation of'stringers in 
those more remote-areas is an'indication i. n favour of the 
argument that'sheer'cost is a major' factor in news-selection 
practices quite apart from°cultural proximity and many of 
the other -variables that researchei'shavý considered. 
West Europe is obviously cheaper to cover than the Far East 
where communications-are much more expensive;, many 
of the" cities areas expensive to live in; and travel 
around the Far East and between the Far East and Europe 
is extremely expensive by 'comparison with Europe. The 
inhibitions created by cost mayhemselve's help create 
cultural differences that eventually 'reinforce the con- 
sequences of cost. 
Stringers outnumber full-time correspondents in all major 
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areas except North America. Even in Western Europe there 
are about half as many stringers again as there, are 
correspondents; perhaps because within Europe there is 
high concentration of foreign correspondents in, certain 
areas and dependence on stringers for coverage of. smaller 
or more remote European countries. Coverage of the U. S. S. R. 
and Eastern Europe is minimal, accounting for 3-0 of full- 
time correspondents and 3.6% of stringers. 
In general, the popular press is even more restricted in 
its foreign news coverage than the. 'elite': press, The 
'elite' press (Financial Times, Times, 
, 
Telegraph, Guardian) 
accounted for 73 of the 128 full-time correspondents whose 
location abroad was indicated. at the time of 'survey. The 
popular press, (Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, 
Sun, Evening News and Evening, Standard) accounted for only 
less, than half, that number, 32 correEpondents. The differ- 
ence.. in the number of retained stringers was less striking: 
167 for the 'elite' press, . and, 
126 for the popular press. 
The elite 
. press 
also accounted-for more. of the 'fire- 
fighters' - having 14 temporary assignments abroad as 
, 
opposed. to only 8 in the. case. of the popular_press. 
It is clear from Table Sixteen that in all but one area 
. of 
the world the popular press was less well represented 
in foreign correspondents resident abroad, than; the elite 
press. The exceptional area is. Australasia and Oceania, 
where the'popular. -press claims two correspondents against 
the elite's one. In terms of stringers, the popular 
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TABLE FIFTEEN 
DISTRIBUTIOY OF BRITISH` NATIONAL DAILY MEDIA FOREIGN 




Abroad Stringers a 
W. 
_ 
Europe 52 87 
E. -, Europe-, & USSR 
N. America 36, 27, 
S. America 3. 25 
Africa 4, 40 
Middle East 12 28 
Far East 11 51 
Australasia 
& Oceania 32 
127b 301 ' 
aOne 
respondent did not distinguish between 
retainer-and non- retainer. 
bOne 
correspondent was not located 
Source: Author's Questionnaire Survey 1974. 
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TABLE. SIXTEEN 
DISTRIBUTION OF CORRESPONDENTS AND STRINGERS OF, BRITISH 
NATIONAL 'ELITE' AND. 'POPULARPRESS, SUMMER 1974. 
'ELITE' 'POPULAR' 
Foreign Foreign 
Correspond Retained- Corr. e'spond Retained 
-ents Stringers . -ents 
Stringersa 
Western Europe 33 47 13. 37 
Eastern Europe 37 0 4 
North America 18 10 14 16 
South America 2 16. 0. 9 
Africa .2 24; 1 14 
Middle East 6 19 ,2" 
8 
Far East 8 32, 0 18 
Australasia 
& Oceania 1 10 2 20 
73 165 32 126 
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press is better represented in only two areas: Australasia 
and Oceania, and North America. But most of the stringers 
were actually-accounted for by only'one paper. 
A higher percentage (84%)-of the popular press correspond- 
ents are based in western Europe and'North America than. 
the percentage of elite press, correspondents based in these 
`two areas (69.9%), and a ", similar difference is observable 
forýstringers, although the percentages arenot=sohigh. 
The representation of the BBC and ITN abroad was -. compared 
with'that'of two elite Sunday newspapers, the Sunday Times 
'and'Observer. The results are indicated'in Table Seventeen 
'Sfiforeign'cörrespondents are considered as a resource which 
can beýcompüted at a national or at a world level, then 
it 'is'clear that the overall distribution of this ''resource 
does nothing to correct-, the West European and North American 
leaning of the western global agencies. 
The-national media of a : few countries have 'foreign correspond- 
ents in-'most large capitals ' of the world=- these countries 
'. 'ä re mainly the United States, -West Germany, "and the United 
Kingdom: ``Some countries have a very sizeable represent- 
ation in a few major capitals, and very low representation 
in some others. ''' Japan tends to fall into this category, 
having 'more'foreign correspondents--in Washington than any 
other coüntry, but very few in Africa or Latin America. 
-'Some countries have low-level representation in only one 
or two major capitals, and sonie have no foreign correspond- 
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ents at all. 
Information about the foreign correspondentsin eight 
countries was gathered from embassy sources in 1972-73. 
The countries. were Belgium, -Finland, Greece,, Hong Kong, 
India, Israel, Kenya and Spain.. In seven of these countries 
the United States had more correspondents. than any other 
country. Counting the number of. times a country ranked 
first or second in its representation in each of these 
eight countries, the United States came first with 10 first 
or second places, followed by West Germany. wi. th_7 and the 
United. Kingdom with five. After the'top. three or four 
countries represented, the number of correspondents per 
country tends to dwindle to,, one or two. ,; 
Of 97 foreign 
correspondents resident in, India, for example, three 
quarters (72) came from the United States, =the United 
Kingdom, U. S. S. R., Japan, West-Germany and. Prance. 
Countries with the greatest number of correspondents abroad 
also tend, to attract the most foreign correspondents: 
there were more foreign correspondents in the United States 
, 
in 1974 than in any other country:, 1,172, of whom. a third 
were from the. U. K., West Germany and Japan.. 
The. United States,., the country. with the., most foreign 
correspondents abroad (about 500 Americans and 700 foreign 
nationals working for U. S. media, 1969), distributes about 
half ofthese, inEurope. Of the total computed for 1969, 
-, 1,462,791 were stationed, in Europe. 
(mostly London, Paris, 
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TABLE SEVENTEEN 
;...., DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS 
OFTHE BBC AND ITN, AND OF TWO SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS, 
SUMMER 1974. 
BBC SUNDAY TIMES 
ITN OBSERVER 
Foreign Retained Foreign Retained 
Corr. Stringers Corr. Stringers. 
Western Europe 6 3 3 9 
Eastern Europe 2 0 l 1 
North America 4 1 4 1 
South America 1 0 0 1 
Africa 1 0 0 4 
Middle East 4 1 1 2 
Far East 3 1 2 6 
Australasia 
& Oceania 1 0 0 0 
22 6 . 11 24, 
'Source: Author 's Questionnaire Survey 1974. 
636. 
Rome, Bonn, Berlin and Frankfurt), 332 in Asia and Austral- 
asia, 169 in Latin America and Canada, 76 in the Middle 
'East, and 92 in Africa. These figures include part-time 
29 
staff. A study of the distribution of New York'Times 
full-time correspondents demonstrates roughly'the same 
pattern. Of 41 full-time correspondents employed by that 
paper in late 1966,17 were in Europe, 10 in Asia, 9 in 
the. Americas and 5 in Africa and the Middle East. 
3 
Japanese correspondents are very heavily concentrated in 
the United States and Western Europe. The Japanese Press 
Directory for 1972 lists a total of 333 correspondents of 
whom 112 were based in the United States, 107 n'Europe 
(of these, 22 were based in Russia and Eastern Europe), 
89 in Asia and the Pacific area, 13'inAfrica and the Middle 
East, and 12 in South America and Canada. 
Not only is there an imbalance of distribution over the 
different major regions of the world, but therealso 
an imbalance within these major regions. Krüglak (1955) 
studied 286 correspondents working full-time for the 
American information media in Western Europe. Almost 
half ofthese were agency correspondents. ' He-found that 
the U. K. had the largest concentration of. correspondents 
for the media with 108 correspondents based there; France 
was second with 63, followed by Italy with 36 and Germany 
with 27. These four countries accounted for 82/"of all' 
the American media correspondents in, Western Eürope. 
31 
Tunstall recorded a concentrationof', British European- 
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based correspondents in Paris. 
32 
Concentration of. foreign correspondents in certain world 
regions and certain parts of these-regions, is exacerbated 
by the fact that onlya few media organizations account 
>: for-`a-disproportionate number of correspondents. In the 
-United Kingdom, Reuters accounts for about three quarters 
., of 
the total, and of the daily-news media in the U. K., 
four organizations account for two thirds of the correspond- 
ents. In the United States most foreign"correspondents 
are accounted-for by the. two-major'agencies, the three 
". leading TV networks and-a-handful of newspapers. Of the 
newspapers the New York Times accounts for between a'third 
and: a'halfof all press correspondents. ' Finally these 
-respondents are not' necessarily` very' representative of 
{ their own populations. The, studies that exist of foreign 
correspondents of the United States and-the United Kingdom 
: tend to show that foreign'correspondents of these two 
.: countries enjoy higher standing-than other journalists in 
their'`own news-organizations and, 'amongst -their journalist, 
colleagues, and tend -to have -had. a 
higher formal-education 
and-to -have come from metropolitan areas. 
33 
_!, The-incidence of 
foreign correspondence as a-whole does 
: little to add to the-coverage Of the global-agencies in 
-- 1. 
terms of -its . distribution around the 
world: .. foreign 
cörrespondence is concentrated in the, -area's' where the 
agencies concentrate their own resources, ' and in much of 
the.;. restof-the world the agencies. are almost the sole 
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sources of news for clients throughout the world. Agency 
clients. who enjoy their own coverage resources are the ones 
who tend, to pay the-most for agency services and to take 
the most services that are available. The agencies*in. 
general operate a sliding scale according to circulation 
so that the larger circulation papers pay much more than 
the smaller circulation-papers. But there are also 
differences across countries. The details are not. avail- 
able, indeed are closely. guarded,,, but it does-. seem that 
those countries-which receive the least diverse agency 
services are at least paying less for these than clients 
in more- favourably situated parts of the world. The fact 
that the American agencies concentrate mostly on their 
"i 
home market, and at times have been said to regard 
foreign revenue as 'jam', -probably works to-the favour 
of their overseas clients who pay less than they might 
if at least both American agencies operated tough profit- 
oriented policies abroad. As it is they are not cheap, 
-. and only the stronger media. can afford to take them 
directly. There does-seem to be a tendency for the 
agencies to charge more for. clients on. their home market 
- this is where they have. -extreme natural advantages over 
their competitors, especially where they'are also-national 
agencies. In Paris in, 1974, for instance, the-360,000 
circulation paper Le Monde-was. charged 42,000 French 
francs for the AFP service, (national andinternational) 
and 4,200 for UPI, 6,790 for'AP, and . 
7,8110 for Reuters 
which generally charges more. than the American agencies, 
having a less profitable-home-market than they. An 
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:. average 260,000 ci. rculatiön paper in the United States 
that year would have paid something in the region of 
$200,000 for one of the American. wire services, nine or 
ten times asmuch. as the world-service of an American agency 
cost Le Monde. A100,000 circul'ation. Norwegian. daily the 
same year paid approximately £9,200 for the, AP, less than 
a tenth'of the larger U. S. paper, and obtained an. edited 
version of Reuters and AFPthrough the, Norwegian national 
agency for L38,500. A larger. Norwegian paper with a 
circulation of around 200,000 paid almost £17,000 for the 
AP service, nearly, twice as much as the agency charged its 
smaller competitor. Between them these two Norwegian 
papers had 12 full-time foreign correspondents of whom 
10 were based in'Western Europe and North America. 
Summary 
This chapter has examined some of the organizational 
constraints on news-selection procedures. and their 
consequences. The nature of a news agency's 'scheduling' 
of activity in response to global market demands wasshown 
to influence its conception of news; but agencies differed 
in theextent-to which they centralized the editorial 
P 
operations in both news-gathering and news-distribution, 
and this in turn was influenced by news technologies. 
Two very important external factors that influence the 
editorial selection' process are communications'and the 
agency's own clients or members. The nature of communic- 
ations networks affects the. degree to which clients are 
encouraged to exercise autonomous editorial choice; but 
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CHAPTER TEN: Agency Journalism at the Bureau Level 
. 
1. The Bureau Chief: Responsibility and Background 
The global agency organization is an arrangement of. 
relatively discreet units, each of which is in two-way 
communication with'the nucleus, the head office. These 
units, the bureaux, may have their own satellites, smaller 
. 
*bureaux or stringer outposts, and maintain a lower volume 
of communication with each other, but the attraction of 
communications to a. centre of the whole system is generally 
stronger than the attraction of bureaux to one another. 
The bureaux system is essential to the way in which the 
global agencies actually operate. 'Despite the speed 
of modern communications, -and the preparedness 
Of indiv- 
idual newspapers or broadcast media to resort to the 
'roving correspondent' or the 'firefighter' instead of 
maintaining residential correspondents, the agencies have 
by and large retained a pattern of local representation, 
and indeed have expanded to most parts of-the world. 
Their insistence on local representation, is a reflection 
of the nature of the task: relatively continuous 
surveillance of the nation from primarily`a metropolitan 
vantage-point, on behalf of an international clientele; 
distribution of news to each nation, with some filtering 
in of news which is of specifically local interest. The 
agencies have business relations with most-of the countries 
they cover: they need a representative in each country 
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not simply- to gather news, but also to sell news"; they 
need continu'ous_ýpresence, or the nearest to this they 
can afford, because unlike the firefighter of 'a newspaper 
`they'cannot rely onsöme other source to tell' them when 
a` crisis has occurred; 'S' an agency has to-tell other 
people when'a crisis. is about to occur; and' it` is 
. as well 
that it should have representation inside a country at a 
5point of. crisis, since sudden closure of customs-posts 
and, airports might' otherwise restrictcoverage'by. fire- 
fighters altogether. 
There. ß. s . some compromise of' 'course. A great ' 
many, nations 
are covered only by-stringers for the agencies, with a 
more general surveillance from'a regional centre. 
Stringers are . especially vulnerable' 
at'times'of crisis, 
more so . 
if they are local nationals; ' but' the stringer 
is commonly relied 6n'for non-crisis, routine, coverage.:. 
As 'soon as events inside a country look like: becoming 
what to the global agency's pa staff ' appears''a matter of 
international concerii, °'or "a national matter of such 
"" 
, 
magnitude that it must`' automatically be of. international 
concern, a`full-time" agency-staffer is generally sent in 
to take main responsibility. 
There are some 'rovers' and'firefighters'. in the agencies.. 
Like their newspaper counterparts they sometimes' enjoy 
arelatively high prestige, but-not the'-, same of 
autonomy'. A 'roving correspondent' ' is nöt'. the ' same thing 
as a 'firefighter': a. 'firefighter' is a correspondent 
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who travels to the country where the latest crisis is 
happening, to take immediate, responsibility,,, for,. coverage ; 
a'rover' on the other hand; is one. who has. some broad 
region. "to cover, but may wander, from country,, to,, country 
more . or. less at his own discretion. within the 
region, 
without any obvious or, significant base. = Two, kinds of 
coverage are implied: ,,,.,, the .... 
the 'firefighter' for' spot news 
in a time of crisis; the'rover,: although he may cover 
crises as well, for 'in-formed'. coverage'ofa background 
or featurish character. 
Anyone in an agency, virtually, can be a firefighter. 
Once a crisis flares in any particular country, reinforce- 
ment from, other bureaux are normally directed to the spot, 
often with a, great deal of ingenuity and canniness on the 
part of. the regional bureau chief or news. editor who is 
-organizing the logistics of the operation. ', ' 'There is no 
identification in the, agencies of, jone or two people'who 
should spend., most, of their, time . 




is more probable. because there'äre, so many 
countries in, which a; newspaper has no local representation: 
therefore it makes, sense: to allocate. certain individuals 
to this role. But agencies, have men inmost areas: the 
problem is the number of men they need at a'given time. 
There is. nothing especially prestigious about being a 
firefighter. There are however certain individuals who 
are recognized as .. 
', roving, correspondents', : although their 
numbers are small. - perhaps about aý dozen' for all. the 
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agencies combined. They are generally senior journalists, 
with a great-deal. of experience behind tham. Being a 
roving' correspondent is in a way a confirmation of organ- 
izational status, 'but by nomeans a widely distributed 
reward. ' It does not imply'a'great deal of autonomy: 
' roving correspondents report'to the local bureau 'chief 
of the country they are in, ' or the nearest bureau chief. 
They do not generally spend long periods away from the 
office, or from reach of the office. But they are often 
employed to write feature and commentaryýpieces". There 
is no trend towards increasing the numb-er of such corr- 
espondents. -Precisely because a degree of extra prestige 
is attached to this role, there i. s'the danger of upsetting 
local bureau chiefs; and by allowing certain individuals 
to'developc. an expertise and freedom which is not. typical 
in agency work there is the danger of undermining the 
organizational authority on which the system rests. -There 
is also a , financial disincentive: by creating 'stars', 
the agencies would . 
be' developing correspondents they could 
not. hope to afford;. other media would step, in with offers 
of-highe r salaries, and a great deal of training and expense 
would have been wasted. 
The bureau, then, is the core organizational form of agency 
operation, thepointýat which local coverage is organized 
and. managed, and at which the agency's-services can'bel, 
. 
promoted. '' The bureau chief is. a crucial status link 
between the or executive and local correspondents. 
He takes legal responsibility in any given country for what 
a 
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goes out: over the wires about that country,., and, for 
general employment and business matters, although, 
occasionally a 'bureau manager'is especially appointed 
to take care of these and so free the. bureau chief for 
more news-gathering work. The bureau"chief, finds local 
journalist 'staff and 
, 
stringers; he does much of, the 
, 
coverage of important news stories, liaises with'local' 
clients and is responsible for collecting revenues from 
them. His role is absolutely: indispensable, and although 
he, may work on a, team basis with his. colleagues in . 
the 
matter of news-gathering,. he is. first:. among equals; and 
represents a useful vantage point for the analysis of 
actual agency : operations. 
Methodology 
Eighty-eight bureaux-and head offices1were visited in the' 
course of the research; the principal source of inform- 
ation about bureau operations in each'case was the bureau 
chief (although certain information was verified at head 
office) and at head office 'a wide range of personnel were 
contacted. These bureaux were located in twenty-three 
countries, and an attempt was made to visit the bureaux, 
-of each of the four major agencies in. these countries, 
although this was not always possible. Ina few cases 
there were revisits. The interviewing was done mainly 
by the author, but his colleague Jeremy Tunstall conducted 
eight interviews in four countries on behalf of this project 
and Dr. Michael Palmer, who also worked briefly on the 
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project, conducted two interviews with bureau chiefs in 
Brussels,. in addition to many interviews in Paris,. Other 
sources of information approached, included leading foreign 
correspondents in the countries visited, local news agency 
personnel, local newspaper editors, and embassy, information 
officers.. 
The initial`. intention was to follow up the interview 
material with`a. general questionnaire survey., The pilot 
study, . "however, 
met with. considerable opposition or. extreme 
caution fromeach. of the agencies, and it was clearly 
impossible. toýproceed in the hope of a complete , questionnaire 
survey: -, %This. phase did illustrate very clearly the degree 
of centralization of the agencies, since in many; cases 
bureaux, chiefs did feel. obliged to check with head office 
for-permission--,, to complete the: questionnaire,. which was 
refused. Others received. warnings from head office not 
to'complete these questionnaires. Approaches to the 
agencies to. discuss the range, of permitted questions' 
were 
.; not ,; 
productive ,= and would-not have. allowed the 
,, 
disclosure. ofthe. kind of. evidence sought. The principal 
reason for the reluctance of head offices to give permission 
wasfear of giving awayinformation: that might hurt their, 
competitive status,, and simple reluctance to`disclose 
commercial or trade asopposed to''. professional' details. 
It 
. 
is, however fundamental. to this thesis that'commercial 
.. 




A number of questionnaires were'returned completed, however, 
before head offices could clamp down, and these fifteen 
questionnaires provide very detailed observations about 
the character of bureau operations in nine countries, 
including some very large countries, and which apply to 
several hundred agency personnel. Since only a few of 
these particular countries were visited for interview 
purposes, they increase the total number of countries 
about which detailed information is available to twenty- 
eight. " This material' therefore is extremely valuable. 
Further information about bureaüxýwhich were not personally 
contacted was available from dispersed sources; 'information 
about the bureaux of one of the. agencies in three countries 
was available from the datacollected'in an earlier study 
in which the author'participated. 
1 'From' all these 
sources, in addition to published evidence, 'it is'possible 
to define the major features of agency news-gathering. 
In what follows, the questionnaire evidence is used as a 
starting point, then bäcked-up with evidence gathered In 
interviews and from other sources. The fifteen completed 
questionnaires included 3 from Reuters' respondents, 
3 from UPI, 4 from AFP, and 5 from AP. The'European 
agencies therefore accounted for'7''and the American 
agencies for 8. `This number of cöiirse i-s - too small for 
fine distinctions. ' The' countries they represented 
included two medium-sized West European''countries, two 
mid-Eastern countries, two Asian-countries and three South 
American countries. The respondents were bureau chiefs 
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in all but two cases;, in one instance a night editor 
answered the questionnaire, and in another the respondent 
wasa stringer - the only representative of the agency in 
his country. 
There were over fifty interviews with UPI personnel, of 
whom 23 were bureau chiefs, and the rest were mainly 
editorial executives in New York,; London and Washington. 
Others were bureau correspondents. The total number 
includes two reinterviews of bureau chiefs who changed 
their location in the course of the study. There were 
fifty-seven interviews with Reuters journalists, of which 
twenty-five were with bureau chiefs. Twelve of the total 
number of interviews were reinterviews, 'often with personnel 
who had changed their location or function in the course 
of the study. AFP interviews numbered 43, of which '12 
were reinterviews. Eighteen interviews were with bureau 
chiefs. At least 40 interviews were held with AP personnel, 
of which 6 were reinterviews, and a total of 20 were with 
bureau chiefs. A further: eighty or more-interviews were 
held with newspaper foreign correspondents, national news 
agency personnel and embassy staff. 
Further light on agency work is provided in the question- 
naire responses of 10 correspondents in the United States 
and West Germany from the late 'sixties, in the course 
of an earlier study which was not specifically-concerned 
with news agencies, but which. looked at foreign correspond- 




Geographical Scope of Coverage 
The geographical area covered. by any one bureau can vary 
tremendously., The range amongst the questionnaire 
respondents was between one country or territory and 
sixteen.. -Only, 
three.. 
respondents in fact. had responsibility 
for coverage of only one country. One of these was respons- 
ible for one very large country in South America; in the 
other two cases the, countries were relatively. small, and 
these bureaux, although they filed direct to their head 
offices, were in some senses subordinate to larger bureaux 
in, the same world region. 
These vast differences` in the scope of bureau. responsibility 
were also"observed. inthe. course of interview. Whereas 
most European countries' , 
attract their own bureau coverage, 
this is, not quite 'so common in the less developed world. 
Bureau chiefs in Nairobi, Kenya, for. example, tend to be 
responsible. for six or more countries in the East African 
region. Of course they' do have stringers as assistants 
in these countries, who, -. because of the`character of 
communications in Africa, file . direct, to head office,. but 
these. stringers. are in other. respects. junior to the Nairobi 
office which can direct coverage and if necessary take over. 
Table Nineteen indicates some other instances of. multi- 
national. responsibility, although these' instances are not 





Bureau Location Range of Coverage 
Cairo, Egypt Egypt- 
Libya 
Sudan 













Bangkok, Thailand Thailand 
Burma 
Cambodia 
New Delhi, India. India 
Bangladesh 
Ceylon 
Mexico City, Mexico Mexico 
Central American Republics 
1 
With variations these instances apply fairly 
closely to all four agencies;, stringers are 
usually maintained in the 'subordinate" 
countries, and in one or two cases there, are . full-time but locally recruited correspondents, 
reporting to the major bureaux. 
I 
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multi-nation responsibility for direct: coverage;, there 
..,. are 
otherbureaux. which have, multi-nation. responsibility, 
but in the sense of. maintaining a. general; surveillance 
over other. bureaux. in,. a large world region. , 
This is 
true for instance of the UPI bureauin. Buenos Aires, 
which has a general supervisory responsibility for the 
whole of. South America, or. of. the Reuters Singapore 
bureau which,, has a similar role vis-a-vis: South, East Asia. 
Bureau Size 
The size of : agency. bureaux also shows great variation, in 
terms of the number of , full-time" staffeach. employs. 
estionnaires", the range Among the . bureaux coredby "qu 
wa'sbetwe"en one and 14 
but this included one bureau 
which: claimed. ultimate, employment responsibility for a 
number. of'"other.. bureaux in its region... 'Eight of. the 
questionnaire ; 
'respondents. said'their bureaux"employed 
.. 
between. 16 -and. 15 full-time 'staff. 
Not all. full-time staff are . journalists, however. 
Journalists were defined as.. itstaff who spend all, or nearly 
all, of their time directly engaged. in news-gathering or 
news-proc, essing". Among the questionnaire bureaux 
there were between 1 and 98 such journalists; in ten 
cases the number of journalists ranged between three and 
fifteen. 
The fifteen bureaux covered by. the questionnaire. accounted 
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for 194 full-time journalists between them out of a total 
of 364 full-time staff. In other words, 53% of-these 
agency-staff were directly'engaged in the news process; 
the others-were ancillary staff, including messengers 
and technicians. 
Most of these agency journalists were generalists, with 
no specific function other than the' gathering or processing 
of news. Of the 194 full-time journalists, only 39 or 20% 
were specialists, that is, journalists whö. spentat least 
half of their working time covering only certain kinds-of 
news. Of the 39 specialists, 24 were accounted for by 
the one regional bureau in the sample,, answering for all 
the bureaux within its area of responsibility. The others 
were. accounted for by six bureaux. Thirty-four of the 
39 specialists in fact were 
lying in a technique rather 
all of them employed by the 
European agencies having no 
The remaining five speciali 
ism was sport and three who 
photographers, their speciality 
than a news-field therefore, 
two American agencies (the 
general news photo service). 
sts included two, whose special- 
covered mainly political affairs. 
In addition to their full-time reporting staff, the 
fifteen bureaux recruited the help of at least 187 stringers 
(because one bureau refused to give a precise number, the 
total figure is imprecise). The number of stringers per 
bureau ranged from 2 to 35. This did not include cases. 
. where special arrangements 
had'been made for journalists 
of local news agencies to report for a global agency 
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bureau. Sixty-six of the 187 stringers, or 35%, were 
not paid a retainer, but were paid in terms of lineage 
used. The majority of"the stringers therefore, had a 
more secure relationship with the agency than would be 
implied by an. arrangement based on lineage or-results 
alone. On the other hand this is the kind of stringer 
more likely to be a reporter for. some other news medium. 
In emergency an agency can usually find other sources 
very quickly. 
Most of the full-time staff were resident in the country 
in which the bureau offices were based, and not in the 
surrounding countries or territories for which the bureaux 
wererespondible. Of the'364 full-time staff reported 
by the questionnaire respondents, only 30 or 8.2% were 
resident outside the country in which the bureau was based. 
Of these, twenty-one were full-time journalists, or 10.8% 
of all journalists. Only one of these was a 'specialist' 
a -photographer. 
These findings'indicate iherefore a high degree of central- 
of agency operations' based' on the bureau office. 
The fact that one bureau may be respönsible"for several 
dountries is''not compensated for'by any strong' tendency 
to locate full-time' correspondents in the surrounding 
territories on a residential basis, 
'even 
though physical 
communications between these 'countries are very often 
poor. There 'is "a 
tendency- to, compensate for'' the lack of 
full-time' correspondents by the recruitment of` stringers 
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in those areas. A higher percentage (30%) of all stringers 
was reported as resident outside the country of the bureau's 
location than the percentage of all-full-time staff or 
journalists. But the significant point Is that more 
stringers are recruited in what, in the agency's eyes, 
is the country of main importance, than for the surrounding 
countries where there are fewer full-time correspondents 
and usually none at all. 
The larger bureaux. as we have seen are those situated in 
the major capitals of the developed world or which are 
well-situated to. serve as regional centres. The most 
highly staffed of one American agency's bureaux were 
London (40), Paris. (26), Rio de Janeiro (21), Tokyo (16), 
Beirut (15), Saigon (. 14), Rome (13), and Buenos Aires (13). 
Nationalities 
The questionnaire respondents were asked to indicate the 
nationalities of their staffs. Among the journalists 
there were many more locally-recruited staff than 'foreign' 
staff. The 'foreign', staff tended . 
to, be nationals of 
the agency home countries.. There were three and a half 
times as many locals (145) as there, wer, e non-local 
journalists (40).. This total (145 + 40 185) is smaller 
than the total reported earlier (194), because. -some bureau 
, chiefs 
did not answer for all their correspondents.. 
Twenty-six of the non-locals were American (the American 
agencies were over-represented in terms of staff in this 
part of the survey), .5 were 
British, 5 were French, 2 
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were Spanish,, 1 was Italian and `1 was"Uruguayan. The 
. Latin non-locals were"all employed -in 
South American 
bureaux.. ': 
However, despitethe high. number of local journalists 
employed, it is clear that the agencies prefer- control 
1 to rest in the'hands of nationals of their countries or 
nationals of : the Anglo-Saxon world. Of the 14'-bureau 
chiefs who gave details of 
nationality and birth-place on 
the questionnaire, 13 were American, . Br tish or French, 
and the other was aWest European. 
This is-very clear in, the interview evidence also. 
Twenty-one UPI overseas, bureaux were visited in the course 
öf"the research (naturally the North American bureaux 
were headed by Americans) . -' 0f; the 21 bureaux the bureau 
chief was American in 12'cases, English or Australian in 6. 
The other three were locally recruited. Of-these, one was 
actually a stringer, ýeditor of a pro-Greek English-language 
paper on Cyprus; one wasa Mainlander Chinese on Taiwan; 
one was an-Indian in'Kuala Lumpur: All three bureaux 
were - small, '.. tending 
to report to- larger büreaux: in the, 
same region'(for instance, Hong Kong or: Singapore). 
'Certainly, 'theAmerican and Angle-Saxon bureau chiefs were 
outnumbered by local editorial and news-gathering'staff, 
but bureau-chiefs tend to be the chief correspondents 
°1 and loci of control. Photographers are commonly recruited 
' locally - in Italy, for-example, all four of UPI's photo- 
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graphers were local. Additional information about a 
further-10 bureaux in the UPI network. was gathered from 
embassy sources; of these, two were headed by American 
bureau chiefs, one by a Frenchman, another by an Australian. 
The remaining six were locals (3 in South America, 2in 
Europe, and 1 in Asia), but in each case the bureau tended 
tobe a 'subsidiary'. Over two-thirds of all 30 UPI 
bureaux for which information was obtained in addition to 
the questionnaire. evidence were American, British, French 
or Australian.. 
A UPI respondent (European news executive) discussing 
the European situation, reported that in the region of 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa, all bureau chiefs 
were American except in four cases, -and of these. four 
cases. one was Australian, 
-one 
was Egyptian and. two were 
'British. He also claimed, that there was a general 
tendency at this time-(1974),. towards. appointing more 
Americans. -as bureau chiefs, 
'and., that this reflected the 
importance, of the American market.. An: Asi. an news 
executive 
. 
respondent;. commenting on; the. Asian. situation 
in 1973;.. _-reported that in--8 out of 11. countries the 
principal bureaux were headed by either . 
English, or 
Americans, but that Americans accounted for only 14 out 
of, a ., 
total full-time.: journalist. staff of 74. 
Of the. five locally-recruited bureau chiefs in the UPI 
network for which information was-available , four had been 
long-, time employees of the agency. The Egyptian bureau 
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chief had worked. for the agency since 1945; the Cypriot 
and Dutch bureau chiefs. had worked for the agency at least 
10 years, the Taiwanese. bureau chief. for . 
18 years. The 
fifth was a young journalist in, Kuala` Lumpur who at that 
time was under the-relatively close supervision of the 
American, bureauchief in. Singapore.: This. evidence 
suggests therefore that local , recruits who. are appointed 
to the position of bureau. chief tend to, -be extremely 
'. trusted. ' men,, who once appointed are left in their bureau 
-rather. than, regularly transferred as happens. in the case 
of Americans. Few American' bureau chiefs have been. in 
one-place for more-than 10; years, and 'usually for much 
less. There was a tendency in the. case. -of UPI.: to use 
English or Australians for coverage of Africa. and the 
Middle. East. 
The evidence for. UPI is-very similar. to that of the other 
: agencies.. Twenty, -of-AP's overseas bureaux were visited, 
and of these 15, were headedýby. an American bureau chief. 
; 0f the. others one ; had a-. South 
American bureau chief,, and 
the others-were locals of their. country of coverage - 
:,. in two. cases,: very, 
long-established agency journalists, 
and in two cases heading very small 'subordinate' bureaux. 
Evidence about a further nine bureaux was collected: 
four, of, these- had American bureau chiefs, two . had British. 
Of 29. overseas bureaux for which data was collected 21, 
were`, headed by Americans or British. 
Twenty-two Reuters bureaux outside the ; United- Kingdom 
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were visited. Of these 16 had British bureau chiefs; 
in the other cases there was. an Australian, a Chinese, -. - 
a Lebanese, a Thai and two Filipinos. Data for another 
7 bureaux showed that in four cases the bureau chief-was 
British, and the others were local or non-commonwealth. 
So in 21 out of 29 cases the-bureau 'chief was British 
or white Commonwealth. - 
Of 17 overseas AFP bureaux visited, 12 were headed by 
French bureau chiefs, and-5'by locals. Dataýof 8 
. 
other 
-bureaux were-obtained, of which all were headed by French 
bureau chiefs. French control existed therefore in 20 
out of 25 cases. 
In aggregate' then,. totalling both interview and question- 
naire evidence (but not allowing for a few cases in which 
bureau. chiefs provided both. interview and questionnaire 
evidence) data for 145 agency bureaux was collected. Of 
these bureaux 97 or almost 67% were-headed by Americans, 
British or French bureau-chiefs;.: 'a further. 9%. were 
headed by White Commonwealth or West European, journalists; 
and 35 or 24% were headed by locally recruited journalists 
or other nationals. 
Stringers are more likely to be locals,: than -bureau chiefs 
and -full-time agency journalists... -Of all' . 'the 
stringers 
reported in the questionnaire, evidence. from fifteen 
bureaux only 8-were American,. British or French, while the 
remaining 157 were reported as locals. -The percentage 
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percentage of full-time journalists (78.4%). Non- 
journalist 'Support,?. 
. Staff 
are, * mostly locals:. of 108 
support; staff. reported, 106. were, locals. 
The strength of local representation in the bureaux of 
global agency, offices. is perceived as a. significant one, 
and many, respondents in the interviews commented. on this. 
Although most agency, journalists: are locally. recruited such 
, 
journalists do not as a rule filter, into the international 
'. circulation'. process whereby, , 
journalists are transferred' 
.., 
from one, bureau, to another;. unless : they, happen to be locals 
', of the United States, Britain or., France. 
The reason. why, there are "not. more-locally-recruited 
bureau. chiefs is justified on a number. -of counts.; It is 
said that' they, would occupy : posts. which the. agencies need 
to, hold. open for their own. nationals, in, order for them 
to-have. a. line of. promotion for those ; who' work in their 
-, domestic networks 
or on-the'desks at head office. But 
the. usual : reasons' given have: to do with coverage -rather 
than organizational exigency. '. Most important for the 
American- agencies, it is felt,: -, i's the . need : to -have local 
news . coverage: 
in"any given country-guided by-an. American, 
because. only an American'is, likelyto-have an authentic 
feel for the requirements : of the American-market. There 
is also the technical -proble: m -that--. the locally-recruited 
nationals are often not up. to the high standard that is 
generally required . to . feed news- into .a system which 
depends 
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on-an English-speaking market for much, 'if not most, of 
-its revenue. This is the reason why locally-recruited 
journalists in non-English speaking-countries are. -often 
not allowed to file directly into UPI's computer controlled 
distribution network. A locally-recruited journalist is 
also more susceptible to pressures from. his government 
or other local interests, since his property and family 
are immediately to hand; while to touch or put too much 
pressure on a foreign journalist, especially one who 
comes from one of the major political powers, can create 
something akin to a diplomatic 'incident' and in any 
case looks bad.. Either for this reason or as a matter 
of inclination there is the possibility that., despite 
screening, a local journalist may be markedly biased, 
and this possibility'is considered greater for one who 
belongs to the country he'covers than one-who does not. 
The possibility of bias makes it all the more surprising 
to find that-in three out of. the four cases on Taiwan, the 
local bureau chief was a mainlander Chinese - although 
one can-also argue'that only a mainlander on Taiwan would 
have had easy access to. Taiwan government sources. The 
use of Greeks in Cyprus raises similar doubts about the 
access lb the Turkish community; or the employment of 
Indians in Malaysia rather than Chinese or Malays. In 
each of these three cases of course the bureaux'do not 
operate-withthe same autonomy as. bureaux headed by 
nationals of the ägency. countries. . 
Local journalists may very occasionally be appointed as 
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10 of the 14 had worked in journalism prior to joining 
the agency that now employed them and of these 6 had 
worked for-newspapers-and 4 for other agencies. Of those 
who had worked on newspapers before, their'newspapers 
were either provincial or regional papers of'their own 
country or foreign-language newspapers in-other countries 
- this experience obviously being a relevant qualification 
for agency work. 
Respondents had joined their-agency between the ages of 
18 and 37, but in 13 of the 14 cases the'range-ofrecruit- 
ment age was between-18-and 26. They were all'American 
or West European in nationality; nine of them came from 
provincial towns or cities of their home countries. In 
three cases there had been a father who"was' a journalist, - 
and six others came from a'middle or`upper middle class 
background, only two coming from a working class background. 
Two others had had fathers in the services. 
Ages ranged between 26 and 54. 'Itis clearthatit is 
possible for an agency correspondent' to be appointed 
bureau chief of a. medium-sized foreign bureau. in his early 
thirties. Ten were graduates; nine were married, three 
divorced and two single. They had worked at their present 
post-for between 1 and 20 years; but 10 had been at their 
present bureau for 4 years or less - in. 
6 cases, -for 12 
years or less. Twelve had been bureau chiefs from the 
moment of their arrival at the bureau, indicating therefore 
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better as a rule than their European counterparts. -. They 
have usually had some prior experience of journalism 
before moving totheir'agency. Bureau chiefs are moved 
around from post to post at quite frequent intervals, and 
they are rarely recruited from the bureau for which they 
have responsibility. 
2. News-Gathering and News-Selection 
We come now to the question of how news is actually 
gathered. and selected for transmission at the bureau level. 
This involves (i) the organization of the task 
(ii) relations with news sources 
and (iii) criteria of news selection. 
(i) Organization of the-Task 
Agency journalism is, perhaps surprisingly, very much an 
office-bound job. This is truest for the bureau chiefs, 
who, in addition to correspondence must'concern themselves. 
usually, with management and client relations. 
All but one of the questionnaire respondents spent 60% 
or more of their time in the office, and 8 of them spent 
between 75% and 90% of their time there. In the 1968 
survey, 8 out of the 10 respondents spent more than 50% 
or their time in the office, and in four cases it was 
75% or more. 
The single most important kind of activity in which 
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respondents engaged, in terms of the proportion of their 
total time consumed, 'was news-gathering and news-processing. 
In 11 cases this accounted for between 50% and 85% of all 
working time, among the questionnaire respondents. The 
other major time-consuming activity for. this sample was 
bureau administration, which ranked highest in 8 cases, 
and this was followed by dealing with technical communicat- 
ions problems and activity connected, with, sales and 
client liaison. In sum, news-gathering. or processing, 
and bureau administration, accounted for between"60% and 
100% of the respondents' working time. 
Within the general work category 'news-gathering and 
news-processing', the . single: most important component. 
was the, writing up of news stories: . 10 respondents 
claimed to spend 11 hours,. or more a week in writing news 
stories. The next most time-consuming. component was 
reading the local press in. the search. for new stories and 
in the process of'keeping well informed generally.. 8 of 
the 14 respondents who answered this. question. spent more 
time on this , than, anything else under the work category 
in question.. Third most important activity tended to 
be the editing or filing of copy. -Other-'activities were 
fairly'equivalent in importance', exceptý, för'planning future 
coverage' which-got, the lowest overall score. 
Respondents were given a 
. 
rather different set of activities 
to rank in the 1968 study, but. here 'writing and sending 
stories' consumed the most time. - nine of the ten spent 
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TABLE TWENTY 
NEWS GATHERING OR PROCESSING COMPONENTS 
IN TERMS OF RELATIVE TIME CONSUMED- 
(High score = high consumption) 
Activity Score' 
Writing news stories 50 
Reading press 39 
Editing-Filing copy 34 
News-gathering by 'phone 27 
Monitoring radio/TV, 
local agencies 27 
Writing features 24 
Press conferences 24 
Sociable occasions with 
news sources 22 
Face-to-Face interviewing 20 
Planning future coverage 13 
'Other 9 
Respondents were given a multi-choice.. question to 
indicate approximate'number'of hours spent, on each 
activity.. Each . 
time. category was numbered, high 
numbers for long time periods; the numbers formed 
the basis 'for the score. 
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10 hours or more a week on this 'activity. Next most 
important activity. for this. sample was telephoning sources, 
which consumed between. 5-9, hours a week in nine cases and 
more than ten hours inthe_tenth. Taken altogether it 
is. clear-that the writing. process. was a dominant activity 
for all respondents. 
Respondents were asked about the extent of their-travel, 
both within the country in which their bureau was located, 
and outside it, in the space of a six-month"perio d in the 
second half of 1973- . 
Most of them had spent some time 
outside the city, ', inside the country in''which'they were 
based. 8 'had travelled for between 15 and 25-days in 
this way; two had done no such travel. Altogether the 
' 15 had marked up 203 days of"trävel inside their country 
of coverage in the six months' A similar: period, 21.3 
days, was spent on travel outside the country in which 
the bureau was based, but within the region for which the 
bureau was responsible. - Six respondents had done no 
such travel, but. in. 
4 or these cases the bureau' only 
covered one country in-any case'. The. rests put in 
between 7 and 45 days' travel in. this way. Significantly 
perhaps the most. travel was in the Middle East'and Indian 
sub-continent regions. Only three respondents had 
travelled outside their area of responsibility, and in 
one case this was 
for- home, leave in the United States. 
1968 respondents: also: reported. a" fair amount of travel a 
year, from between 12 .. 
days to 3 months. 
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These data do suggest, however, a certain metropolitan 
bias in coverage. If there were areas anywhere near 
as important in agency terms as the capital city of the 
country in which the bureau was located, this would 
presumably be`reflected in a"higher'degree of'travel 
outside the city, in the provinces. 
(ii) News Sources 
The single most important news source for agency corr-. 
espondentsappears to be the press media of the country 
or. countries covered by their respective bureaux. In 
other words,. 'news' is determined to a large extent by. 
what other journalists have already defined as being 
'news', and the global agencies are partly, at least, in 
the business of relaying national journalistic definitions 
of_news, on an international level. 
Respondents were asked to identify by rank order the most 
important initial source of news. The highest score 
(63) went to press media of the country or countries" 
covered; 10 out of the 15 respondents or,, two-thirds 
recognized the local press media as source of at least 
31% and usually more of all stories. 
The second most important news source was information 
which the agency, had solicited from individuals or 
. organizations 
(score 42), followed by local radio or 
television media (32), unsolicited information (21) and 
} 
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competing: news. agencLe s (3),. 'Stringers' were added to 
the categories. provided in ,a number, of cases, 
and scored 21. 
Taken together, then, local_. press. and broadcast sources are 
extremely important. It,; is significant however that., these 
respondents believe solicited information is'. more product- 
ive than unsolicited information, and if true contradicts' 
, to some. extent. the impression, of passivity given by the 
high dependence on local media. . . 
This impression is 
confirmed by the 1968 data. . 9. of the respondents then 
claimed they made more telephone calls to sources in a 
day than they typically received;, but half felt that 
sources helped journalists. more than journalists helped 
sources; the others thought it was about equal. 
The, 1968. survey respondents tendedto think that the 
;, variety of important 
sources was good; they did not see 
-their jobs. depending. 
on the maintenance of ;, 
good relations 
with': dominant sources "therefor. e. " 
; There was disagreement 
as to : whether individuals were more; ' important than organ- 
izations or. not,. but. most tended, to go through public 
relations. officers . 
first 
. of all . 
in their approach to a 
source. . Although there; was not usually. a dominant source 
individual or . organization, 
there does appear to be a 
dominant type of source 'in many cities; in, 6 cases civil 
servants accounted-. for. 
60% or more-of all, sources in these 
developed western, countries. This finding is very likely: 
to be replicated inmost areas. of the.. world. Very little 
payment to sources for help provided was reported. 
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Comparatively few questionnaire respondents have been at 
the receiving end of serious source sanctions - retali Lons 
that is for activity which sources disapproved of. Four 
correspondents had never experienced ' any of a list of 
sanctions presented to them during their experience in 
their present bureau. 2 had been expelled and 6 had 
been threatened with expulsion at least once. 3. had had 
experience of being refused all access to official sources 
and more than once. Only one had been imprisoned. 3 
had been forbidden to file any 'stories out of the country 
and 4 had experienced selective restrictions'onfiling, 
even when other media were free to file as they chose. 
8 had experienced informal 'warnings'-a few times or often, 
and three had actually been subject to- physical: intimidation 
by sources. Altogether therefore the 15 respondents put 
up'30 allegations of sanctions, experienced at least once 
and sometimes quite often. However the respondents were 
'asked about their experience in the present bureaux, and 
in 'some cases this experience was , of only'a few years' 
duration. The findings would have been more remarkable 
had the respondents been asked about the sum total of 
sanction experience. Sanctions experienced. by respondents 
in the 1968-study were rare, -usually mild, amounting to 
insistence that 'a correction appear_in print or a letter 
of protest or correction sent. to a journalist'ssenior. 
This `low profile on sanctions reflected : the. relatively 
open and secure journalist-source relations of the 
countries covered'in that survey. 
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3. i'News Selection and Processing-_ 
Respondents were divided in their feelings about the 
extent to which they were autonomous agents in the news- 
selection process. They were asked whether news-selection 
was always, often, infrequently or very rarely determined 
by factors outside their control. 8 thought news-selection 
was pretty much determined by outside factors, often or 
always, while the-other 7 felt that they were usually in 
control. There was no consistency in the answers of 
respondents of the same agencies; but the four'European 
bureaux all felt that news-selection was basically 
something that they. controlled. 
In comparison with journalists of local media in the country 
or countries they covered these respondents mostly felt 
they were freer to report whatever they considered news- 
worthy (9 out of 14), while 5 felt they had the same 
degree of freedom. However, in comparison with other 
(non-agency). foreign correspondents, only 4 out of 14, 
felt they had more freedom.; while 7 thought they had the 
same amount of freedom and 2 said they had less. 
Interview data supported very strongly the impression 
that agency journalists felt freer in reporting whatever 
they wanted to report than local journalists, ' especially 
where there existed a strong degree of 
government control 
over domestic media. , There are a number of possible 
explanations for this consensus: 
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1. A government's concern for internal- securitymay. 
lead it to exercise more caution in. relation to 
the'flow of information to its own public than 
the flow of information to overseas-countries. 
2. Harassment of foreign journalists is more likely 
to create an unfavourable impression abroad than 
harassment of domestic journalists (particularly 
if 'abroad' means; large powerful countries. which 
have an ideology of 'freedom of the press', and 
on which the smaller country in question is 
dependent in some way). Foreign. journalists 
will report their own experiences, especially 
if they have nothing else toreport other than. 
harassment. Harassment of foreign journalists 
can take on the effect of a 'diplomatic incident": 
3. The kind of information which. the government may 
wish to control need not necessarily be of great 
interest anyway to the foreign press: the, foreign 
press may be-Interested in the. general, character 
of restrictions on, say, internal. political 
opposition, without being concerned with the,. 
instrumental' details of how this restriction is 
achieved, in practice, the kind of, details which 
the, government might find embarrassing or. dangerous 
to itself. 
4. The agencies are themselves careful to avoid what 
they consider to be needless provocation of the. 
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authorities. 
5. The sanctions. which a government feels it can 
apply. against, foreign nationals are generally 
less. severe than those which can be applied 
againstitsown-domestic journalists. 
6. Governments need. the agencies to present the 
government point of view internationally, and 
need the-services of the agencies to keep 
informed of international affairs. 
7. In some-countries, the revenue to the local PTT 
from communication costs incurred by the agencies 
may be sufficiently great to discourage harassment 
of foreign correspondents. 
8. Governments may be anxious to learn how their 
activities are viewed by the foreign press - 
if they are repressive governments the foreign 
press may be one of the few forms of genuine 
feed-backavailable. 
It should perhaps be said that this finding of relatively 
high-correspondent autonomy may be a finite cultural 
phenomenon, reflecting the tolerance many third world 
countries have shown in the past to western media. There 
is some feeling that such tolerance is drawing rapidly to 
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exhaustion. Martin Woollacott, the Guardian's Far Eastern 
correspondent, argued this case in response to developments 
in India, Bangladesh and Vietnam in 1975 (though restrict- 
ions were lifted in India in September 1976): 
1'The great era of the Anglo-American foreign 
correspondent, a person as privileged in some 
ways as a diplomat, travelling around combining 
the roles of adventurer, entertainer, reporter 
and moralist, is-coming to an end. ' But it is 
to be hoped that the rising tide of censorship 
and other restrictions will in time recede for, 
in spite of all the excesses and. stupidities of 
the western press in Asia and Africa, there is, 
nothing else to take its place. " 2 
On balance in this study, therefore, agency journalists 
experienced a relatively high degree of autonomy in news- 
reporting.. But this did not altogether extend to their 
view of the news process as 'a whole. When asked which 
level within agency operations they considered to be the 
most influential over the news-flow, only 6 said it was 
the local bureau chief, while 4 thought it was the desk 
at head office, and 3 thought it was a mixture of both. 
In two other cases, the desk of a 'regional bureau. was 
considered the most influential. 
There is a tendency therefore to see power as balanced 
between the bureau chief on the spot and the news- 
processors on editorial desks at either head office or 
the regional level. 
The 15 questionnaire respondents' bureaux put out, between 
500 and. 8,000 words a day, in the week prior to their 
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completing the questionnaire. In 11 cases the output 
varied between 1,000 and 8,000 words a. day -, a very wide 
range. 
" 
The percentage of the total daily wordage which 
is 'spot' news, as opposed to 'soft' news of a featurish 
or background nature, is very high, - 75%. or more in all 
but two cases. The percentage of news which was inter- 
. 
national, that is,. news, directly concerning two or more 
countries, varied: in ,7 
cases it was 60% or. more of 
news output, and in 7 cases. less than 50%. These' 
percentages_of course are estimates based on the'previous 
weeks' experience. Content analysis. indicates. that 
the international stories predominate. Respondents 
were asked to rank varying kinds of news within both 
national and international news categories. There was 
aclear 'tendency to regard non-violent'political news as 
themost; prominent category, in terms of the amount of 
wire space it consumed, in both national and international 
news categories. 
Who did these respondents think they were writing for? 
9 consideredthattheirbureaux were primarily in the 
business of. reporting. news of world-wide interest, whereas 
6 thought their news was of interest mainly to a specific 
geographical region (e. g. the_Middle East). Local clients 
within the area of coverage were in most cases considered 
of little. or, no., importance. 
It is. clear from the interview evidence that the agencies 
take-the competition seriously, and that in many ways 
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this inter-agency competition influences the news-flow, 
often in'the direction of greater conformity, but not 
always. In illustration of the latter, Reuters' response 
to the competition on the world-market was to try for 
greater regionalization and this in turn prompted the 
American agencies to define their task in a way which 
gave low priority to the need for regionälization. The 
questionnaire respondents'were asked to say which other 
agencies they considered to be their most important comp- 
etition for clients in their area of coverage and for 
clients around the world generally. 
In 6 cases AP was mentioned as the most important comp- 
etition for clients in the local area of coverage, twice 
as often as Reuters was mentioned, three times more often 
than AFP and UPI. DPA was mentioned'only once. AFP 
was mentioned as the second most important competition 
in 7 cases, probably reflecting its good position on the 
South American market. This was better than the second 
place mentions of AP (5), 'UP'(3) and Reuters (3). 
Reuters was mentioned as the least imp6rtant'in'5 cases, 
UPI in 4, AFP once. Reuters' poor ranking here may 
reflect the heavy representation of South'American bureaux 
in this small sample. 
Mentioned as the most important competition' for clients 
around the world generally, AP again received most. mentions 
' (10) , many 
more 'than Reuters (3) ,, UPI 
(2) 'and AFP (2). 
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Reuters got the most mentions as second most important 
(6), AFP (5) and UPI (3), and also as the least important 
(5), followed by AFP (4) and UPI (3). AP's lead in both 
kinds of competitive position is better than it at first 
seems, since there were more AP respondents than any 
other agency: they were not able to mention themselves. 
Respondents experienced agency news-work as relatively 
unpredictable.., They were, asked what percentage of 
stories in the previous week had required`. prior preparation, 
either a day in, advance of; their occurrence or more than 
a. day. Participant-observation in other news media, 
including TV news-studios and newspapers; had shown that 
quite a high percentage of stories were predicted and 
In-'some way prepared for in advance. In the-case of the 
agencies it was clear that most stories required no advance 
preparation. Eight respondents said that 50% or more of 
the-stories of the previous week had required no advance 
preparation (in two cases, between 80 andý100%). In no 
case did stories which required preparation within a day 
of. the news event's occurrence account for more than 509o, 
and very little preparation'of more than a day's duration 
was reported. Aggregate percentage figures are shown 
in. Table Twenty-one.: This question does not cover the 
anticipation of stories before they happen, not all of 
which need. any advance preparation. If'almost 40% of 
all stories require some 
kind of advance-preparation, the 
stories which are simply'anticipated and can somehow be 
taken account of, however-automatically, before they happens 
682. 
is presumably much higher. 
In an attempt to elicit some of the news-values at work 
in agency. news selection, a number of 'dummy' stories 
were prepared. Twelve stories were devised altogether, 
representing six pairs, each pair addressed to a : specific 
hypothesis. In the original questionnaire-the stories 
were not presented as pairs, in order to avoid recognition 
of the underlying hypothesis by the respondent. The 
respondent was asked to give a score to each story. A 
high score indicated strong likelihood that the respondent 
would report and file the story. Each story was scored 
both for 
.a peak 
period and for a non-peak period in news 
transmission, on the assumption that there would be a 
difference between stories that had 'a poor chance of 
being reported under any circumstances and stories which 
would probably be transmitted on a . 
day when there was not 
much happening. 
TABLE TWENTY-ONE 
PERCENTAGE'OF NEWS STORIES 
REQUIRING ADVANCE PREPARATION 
Stories requiring preparation 
within a day of event's occurrence 24% 
Stories. requiring more than 
a day's preparation 17% 




For stories of approximately'equal magnitude: in other 
respects, thosewhich'are concerned'with the capital 
city'or major metropolis ' aremore likely to bereported 
and filed than ' those "concerned with the provinces. 
This hypothesis followed from the observation'in the 
course of interview that bureaux were generally located 
in capital cities, and that a capital city location was 
usually considered sufficient for nationwide coverage. 
Capital cities are usually the location for political 
and other sources which claim nationwide responsibilities 
and powers, and 
this is the kind of news which overseas 
media are likely to-consider important. The problem 
with this kind of concentration is 
that it'can over- 
emphasize 'official' news sources, and this can be 
especially problematic 
where there are serious differences 
of interest between urban and rural populations. 
STORIES: i. City authorities of capital city announce 
extensive redevelopment scheme, first of 
its kind"in the country. 
ii.. Provincial authorities of remote province 
announce a major new industrial drive. 
... 
This hypothesis. was clearly confirmed. In all but one 
case, story. ii about. the industrial, drive., in a remote 
provincial zone was ranked below the story . about. 
the 
capital city redevelopment.. If the individual score 
of, 5.; out. 'of. l0, is. regarded 
as a dividing line between 
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probably not being reported, and probably being reported, 
with 5 or over indicating a reasonable reporting possibility, 
then the city development story was a. possi'bility in nine 
cases for peak periods, and ; in 12 cases , 
in non-peak periods. 
The provincial story was a possibility-in only three cases 
for peak periods, and five cases for non-peak, periods., 
Hypothesis 2: 
'Serious' stories about, politics, economics and soon will 
get higher priority than 'entertainment' type stories, 
such as crime, and human interest. This hypothesis took 
into account the observation-that despite the importance 
of market factors in agency operations, the agencies are 
far from being 'entertainment' media; in other words, 
the kind of market demand made on their, services is still 
overwhelmingly for news of those major events of signific- 
ance in international relations. 
STORIES: iii. Annual financial statement of large 
corporation in nation's major 'industry, 
shows serious losses. 
iv. Knownlocal_criminal gang rob 
nationally; owned bank of a million 
pounds. 
This hypothesis'is not confirmed: both stories are likely 
to ' be' reported, but the''crime story -is 'rather `more likely 
to be-reported than the financial story*- In9 cases 
the crime story got`better peak-'scores than the financial 
story; and the financial : story got better peak scores 
in only two-cases, theother"cases being-even. --The' 
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financial story did better during non-peak periods, when 
it received higher scores in 6 cases, whereas the crime 
story. did best in only 5 and. the other cases they scored 
evenly. . These 
stories were high possibilities for 
. reporting and: 
filing. The financial story was a report- 
ing. possibility. in'll cases for a peak period, 12 for a 
non-peak period; while the crime story was'a possibility 
in 14 case's for both peak and non-peak periods. ` 
Hypothesis 3: 
A story which concerns more than one country is more 
likely to be reported and filed than a story which concerns 
only one country, other things being equal. This is a 
further test of the, relative importance of 'international' 
to 'national' news in the agency selection process, and 
it was predicted that international stories would get more 
coverage, since the agencies have a wider market for 
international'than national stories, and because, having 
distinct' national identities of their own they would be 
more likely. to search out the stories that related the 
countries they covered to the countries of their home 
base, '. which: is-where their largest markets generally are. 
STORIES: - V. Leading-opposition spokesman-makes major 
speech' attacking president/prime minister 
for current government economic policy. 
vi.. Leading opposition spokesman makes major 
-. speech attacking president/prime minister 
for current government foreign policy 
concerning, neighbouring: country. 
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This'hypothesis was clearly supported. In 11 cases, the 
foreign-policy story got higher .. 
combined-peak and non-peak 
period. scores, and, in three cases the stories tied. As 
a possibility for reporting and filing, the foreign-policy 
story was a clear possibility , in13 
cases for:, both peak 
and non-peak periods, while the one-country story was 
a reporting possibility in nine cases during peak periods 
and, a non-peak period possibility in 12 cases. 
Hypothesis 4: 
Stories-with an established: marketinterest will receive 
more attention than stories which have an-occasional and 
ambiguous market intere-st. This was based. on: the. observ- 
ation that certain. kinds of, story got, -routine. -coverage 
treatment almost regardless of their apparent' importance 
- especially. evident in. the field of sport, whereas other 
kinds. of story of perhaps - more, dramatic social importance 
were sometimes dismissed, possibly because. they:. seemed to 
be 'soft' stories on issues not defined: by: the. agencies 
as of automatic interest. 
STORIES: vii. National team wins placein final.. 
round of international football cup. 
viii. Team of medical scientists at leading 
university claim major. new'findings 
in field-of. radiology with important 
: implications for cancer cure. 
The-hypothesis was confirmed. The sports story received 
higherýcombined. scores in nine cases and tied with the 
science story in-two cases. Thescience story got higher 
} 
687. 
scores in , four cases and nearly-tied in several others. 
But the differences were not remarkable. The sports 
story was a clear reporting possibility in 15 cases, and 
the science story was a clear possibility in 12 cases, 
during peak periods. Therefore although the clear market 
requirement for sports news gave this story an edge on 
the science story it seems unlikely that major new advances 
in science would go ignored in the agency services. 
Hypothesis-5: 
Violent stories . are- more 
likely to be 
, 
covered' than non- 
violent stories, other things being equal. This 
hypothesis is similar to Hypothesis 2 in the sense that 
it also is looking at the responsiveness of the agencies 
in meeting press reqüirementsfor`-'dramatic' coverage. 
The stories selected for comparison here may'also serve 
-to test another 
hypothesis, namely that political conflict 
is likely to_havehigher priority than industrial conflict. 
STORIES: ix. Senior executive of large foreign-owned 
company kidnapped by guerillas. 
x. Total' strike at'major plant of foreign 
owned company. 
This hypothesis was very clearly supported. The kid- 
napping story was given higher combined peak and non-peak 
period scores in all cases, and the difference was con- 
siderable. 'In all. butone case the kidnapping story was 
considered exceptionally newsworthy, whereas the strike 
story was a 'possibility in only three cases for a peak 
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;. period and 7 cases for a non-peak period. The indication 
is that labour stories, especially non-violent labour. stories, 
receive very low priority indeed in the agency selection 
-process, -and this. is. also confirmed in; the content analysis 
findings. 
Hypothesis 6: 
Stories originating from 'reputable' local media sources 
have greater likelihood of selection, other things being 
equal, than those originating from local media sources 
of doubtful or ambiguous reputation. An established 
national newspaper in other words is likely tobe taken 
more seriously than a sectional interest paper. -, -, This. 
is of course a reflection. of normal journalistic; practice; 
the danger is that'good stories from_doubtful. sources 
might-be lost if'there is not available manpower to-follow 
them up, while bad,, stories or.. unimportant stories: might 
get more attention than. they otherwise deserve, simply 
because they are easy to come by. 
STORIES: xi. Prestige daily reports corruption 
charges against Minister of Agriculture. 
xii. Student magazine at nation's. most 
prestigious university reports 
allegations of serious misconduct 
by top police official. 
This hypothesis is easily confirmed. The more prestigious 
source won. on combined peak and.: non=peak period . scores 
in 
nine cases , andtied. 
in. five. As a possibility for report- 
ing and filing it received clearance in eight cases as a 
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peak period story, and 11 as a non-peak period story. 
The. less prestigious source was a clear story possibility 
in only 3 cases in a peak period, and 6 in a non-peak 
period.. 
"'The'se : stories can be compared in different ways of course. 




in the collective opinion of. the 15 respondents 
is the kidnapping story,, which includes several dramatic 
ingredients: violent . subversive 
political action involving 
a, possibly well-known international company. This story 
won 13Y of all. score points for apeak period. Next 
most important is the sports story with 11.5% of all score 
points - the kind of, story which an agency reporter would 
file. almost. without thinking. Next most important with 
identical peak scores are the opposition speech on a 
government's foreign policy, andthe bank robbery story. 
The .. corruption story, originatingin, a-presige paper, is 
fifth most important. These five stories, out of a total 
of twelve, account for, 55.6/ of-all score 'points- in a 
:. peak period. 
Several. "`scores for non-peak periods, were appreciably higher 
than those: for peak periods. Story i. for instance had a 
60%, greater likelihood of. being chosen in a non-peak period 
than in`a peak period. This is especially important as 
a consideration for those stories with relatively low 
chances of selection in. peak periods. Where the peak 


















expect, between peak and non-peak periods - this kind of 
story tends to go-out whatever . the circumstances. 
The: scores sometimes fluctuated widely between respondents. 
Story i., for instance, receiveda 0/3 rating for peak 
and non-peak periods respectively by a European bureau, 
and a high rating 8/10 by a South American bureau. 
reflect the differences between countries: This may 
since news values are. inpart determined by the local 
environment. A city development. scheme may be old news 
in a European country, but-. perhaps more newsworthy in a 
developing country. Other stories, such as-the 
kidnapping story, were consistently marked high. ' There 
appears tö. be greater consensus about certain kinds of 
story than others. 
In addition to the story-pairs, respondents were offered 
four more stories and asked simply whether they would or 
would not report them. These stories . were. 
devised in 
the light of interview suggestions that there were certain 
kinds of story which were treated with a great deal of 
conservative caution by many agency reporters, not just 
for self-protection, but. to preserve, access and good 
relations, with_sources for times of greater importance. 
STORIES:. i. Monarch/prime minister arrives drunk 
at annual. celebration function and 
is incapable of, delivering, his speech. 
ii., Wide-scale torture of, political dissidents 
by army and police- talked about in 
opposition circles, and confirmed from 
meetings with victims. 
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iii. Detailed leak of closely-guarded 
secret deal to buy new missiles 
from major power. 
iv. Outbreak of factionalism in ruling 
-party threatens position of chief 
executive. 
There was. only one 'would not report' and three no answers, 
indicating therefore either great fearlessness or simple 
unwillingness to commit 'would not report' answers to 
print. Alternatively. the outcome may have been different 
with a different sample of countries. As it is, the 
assurances that respondents would report these stories 
were several times. accompanied by qualifications to the 
effect that the stories would have to be impeccably 
sourced; one major problem in news-gathering of course 
is that it is often difficult to find an impeccable 
source for a story that few people want to admit to, and 
-especially difficult if an ', impeccable' source` needs. to 
be someone of high official status. ' There is also the 
question of when a respondent chooses to quote his own 
observations as an impeccable source'. 
Summary 
The bureau-'then is the most important level of agency 
operations: 'the point at which-day-to day'news-gathering 
is organized and at which local liaison with clients is 
maintained. Individual bureaux can 'cover from one to 
sixteen or-more' countries or territories; they vary 
tremendously in the numbers'of full-time staff, journalists 
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and stringers they employ; few of these are specialists 
and most are resident in the country in which the bureau 
office is based, even where that office covers several 
countries. Most staff are locally recruited, but the 
-bureau chiefs and senior. correspondents: are generally 
nationals of the agency's own home country. Agency 
news-gatheringis mainly an office job for many bureau 
chiefs at least, and the single most important activity 
is writing and transmitting stories. While there is 
some travel, it appears that coverage is mainly metropolitan. 
The single most important news source in agency journalism 
is the range of local or national-media of the country 
or countries covered. A number of factors emerge as 
important in the determination of news selection, including 
for instance the rural or urban character of a story and 
the reputability of the originating source. Whether or 
not 
.a 
story emerges during a peak or a non peak-period 
of office activity is also very influential. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: - Source Control'and Agency Coverage 
News selection is not simply determined by the activity 
of newsmen, but is the product of a relationship between 
newsmen and 
news-sources. Sources can be more or less 
accessible. Agency news, it is clear, focuses very much 
on news of political and economic elites and elite organ- . 
izations, and these w.. iel. d considerable resources which 
can be used to control the flow of news about themselves 
or about affairs in which they have interests, and to 
sanction those who threaten to undermine such control. 
This is especially true of governments, and it is the 
control of political sources with which this chapter is 
most concerned. 
Government control. over news flow takes two basic forms, 
positive and negative. Negative control is achieved through 
formal censorship, and formal censorship occurs either 
before or after publication. In the case of pre-publication 
censorship, thereis, little,, chance. that anything unfavour- 
able_to: the government's interest can appear in'the media, 
since media material-is vetted by government-appointed 
agents in advance of public. appearance. If censorship. 
occurs after publication,, greater discretion is; allowed. 
the publishers. Where. this happens, media publishers 
areexpected. to define: for themselves, perhaps in the light 
of. established 'guidelines for the press', what it is they 
can. or: cannot print. They may make an error, or. ignore 
theguidelines, -. but,. either. way, they do so at the risk of 
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penalty. Formal censorship can be-considered in the 
light of other, variables: for instance it can either be 
specific, in which case the area of application is limited 
in a relatively unambiguous fashion, or it can be com- 
prehensive, where blanket control exists over almost 
every area'or topic. 
Positive censorship is a more subtle-phenomenon, and 
implies a more active and developing kind of relationship 
between sources and the media than exists under formal 
government regulations. It is a form of manipulation 
whereby the appearance of media freedom is maintained, 
*hile in practice the government employs a variety of 
mechanisms to ensure it receives favourable coverage. 
These mechanisms range from intimidation to heavy-handed 
public relations. activity.. 
1.. Source Control Through the National Media 
News control by-, positive or-negative': censorship affects 
the-local or national media of any given country first 
of all. We have` seenthat . agency journalistsin general 
feel freer to report'whateverlthey. consider newsworthy 
than journalists of the media of the countries they cover 
wherever ` there `isý substantial government controlover the 
media. The measure of control exercised, over`the local 
media is 'therefore not necessarily equivalent to, the 
measure of control exercised over-the foreign media: - 
it may well be greater, -, an`d occasionally less. -, One would 
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nevertheless predict a positive correlation between the 
two kinds-of control: although agency correspondents may 
be freer to report-than local journalists, the very restrict- 
ions imposed on the local media will also be restrictions 
on agency journalists, since their most important sources 
of news, as we have seen, are: the local`media. " Control 
of local media by governments therefore must be considered 
as forms of control on all coverage, whether local or 
foreign, -and-this section'will, examine modes of local media 
control as examined in the. course of interviews with. agency 
respondents. 
Overall, local media generally have at their disposal more 
resources for the coverage of 'the country than does the 
foreign press, or a single agency bureau. ': Precisely 
because. the-local media are-local, they are`, closer to the 
country and the people than the foreign. press; corps in 
terms of language, family and business: ties, cultural 
. 
assumptions. The grassroots access of the-local media 
is probably superior to anything the agency bureaux can 
achieve. The agency bureaux achieve`this kind-, of access 
through employing local media:. journalists as stringers. 
If the local press is relatively unfettered in ' its coverage 
of domestic affairs, it becomes a steady? source. ofstories: 
the agency will use domestic stories from, this`source which 
it would never have gathered for itself or from any. other 
source if these stories were not presented to it: in this 
-way. Naturally, 
the agency may make. checks to ensure 
the accuracy of the stories it uses, or to add an. inter- 
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national angle. But the spade-work will have been the 
work of. the local media. Even where. the local media are 
not sources of specific stories, they are sources of 
general. experience, an indicator of the. general situation, 
which. an agency journalist may use to develop. an impression 
for himself of some of, the answers to the more speculative 
of political problems:., how, secure the government is, how 
will it, fare in the forthcoming elections, what factions 
exist within the cabinet on a certain issue,: etc. 
Illustratyn-cfihe. importance of local media was provided 
in interviews held with agency correspondents in the 
Philippines shortly after the , 
introduction; of Martial Law 
in 1973. The agencies are the primary sources of news 
about the Philippines for, the outside world: there were 
no other full-time foreign correspondents based there at 
the time of interview.. Martial Law had. been. _accompanied 
by the initial closure of all newspapers and was followed 
by a period of close government control over the media, 
those newspapers being allowed to appear which were owned 
by interests close., to the. government. Correspondents felt 
. 
that this made coverage more difficult; before, they had 
had. the benefit of. whatwas considered the freest media 
system in Asia, but now it-was apparent-that-there were 
simply.. -fewer stories 'about, '. Knowledge of what was 
happening in. the southern-island of. Mindanao, for example, 
:. scene-of ,a Muslimsecession.. st movement, was limited not 
only by military, restrictions"on access,: to Mindanao, but 
also because Manila TV stations; were less: enterprising 
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in sending down film crews'to cover the situation, for 
fear of government disapproval and'reprisal. 
The purpose of government' control over the local media 
i's of course to silence the voice of opposition, and to 
enhance its own. Sometimes the policy is selective: 
certain opposition voices are eliminated whilst 'the 
rest remain free to express their, ' presumably less 
2 threatening, opinions publically. Such silencing of 
opposition, ` which often extends beyond the'literal meaning 
" pof the law, as in South Africa's anti-communist legislation, 
can make'the agency correspondent's, lifemore difficult. 
The legitimate organs of opposition expression-are closed 
to him. ` He 'can no longer look to them to represent an 
existing and perhaps widely-held. point of view. If he 
wishes to pursue the matter himself he' may have to go 
slightly''underground'. He is obliged to hunt alittle 
more than he might have done. Assuming he is successful, 
he will still have problems about sourcing the information, 
without provoking official reaction. For the agency 
correspondentthe'problems are greater than for the news- 
paper correspondent who generally has lessto'protect 
(i. e. 'no 'clients' in the country; - us no extensive 
material assets). Where the repressed opposition voices 
do indeed represent a significant, and perhaps powerful 
movement, as it is' arguable' they did in Turkey in 1971 
(enough to provoke widespread military rule), then the 
problem is very important from the viewpoint of those. 
interested in'accurate', comprehensive political 'information 
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on an international scale. 
A government which denies legitimacy to-a point of_view, 
or to a means of expression, may also succeedin forcing 
a foreign correspondent to-adopt lillegitimate. l. means 
in his search for information. It may also push those 
. voices 
it has declared illegitimate into greater depend- 
encyon the foreign press corps for expression, as appears 
to have happened in Moscow in the late 'sixties and sub- 
sequently. If these voices are in fact unrepresentative 
of significant power, groups in the country, and if the 
foreign press corps is also restricted in its. access to 
established sources, then asituation may, arise of. over- 
dependence on unreliable sources of information. If the 
voices are representative. of significant power groupings, 
or it is possible that they are, then the correspondent 
'is obliged, by the definition of his task,, to.. risk possible 
involvement in illegitimate activity. He may not meet 
the obligation however if. the risk entailed is, too great, 
and in this case there will certainly be a net reduction 
in the quality of coverage of the. opposition voice in 
question. Alternatively, restricted access maylead to 
more attention being given to; a certain group than it 
might otherwise have received, either provoking the 
government to further restrictive measures or exposing 
. 
its threats as harmless. In oneway, or another-then, a 
government. 's, actionto deny legitimacy to. certain voices 
through the local media, can endanger. an agency correspondent 
and through one of several possible effects, reduce the 
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validity of an agency's output concerning that country. 
Singapore Case Study 
There. are'many reasons for thinking that the quality of 
the local news media does by and large determine the 
quality and quantity of news about current events in the 
country which is released to the outside world. 
Singapore 1973, is an example of a country where domestic 
news received little attention in the coverage of the 
agencies or of the foreign press generally. Several 
agency. respondents from South East Asian bureaux in inter- 
view explained the Singapore situation partly in terms of 
agency preference for stories of international as opposed 
to strictly internal significance. Government control 
over the media in Singapore was largely informal, but 
rigorous to the point that it was difficult for a visitor 
to the country to gain any coherent sense of what the 
government in Singapore was doing from reading the daily 
press. Papers thought by the government to be even mildly 
critical were sanctioned., Others which were not critical 
were kept in check by. telephoned advice to editors con- 
cerning what they should avoid and what they should draw 
attention to. 
When the. Singapore Herald started in 1970 it provided what 
was considered by many agency journalists tobe the only 
important, source of competition to the leading Singapore 
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, newspaper, 
the Strait Times, and the only source of 
criticism of government activity.. The government began 
to make life more difficult for the Herald. One means 
employed was the withdrawal of advertising by government 
agencies. When the Herald ran into financial difficulty, 
. 
the government exerted its influence to discourage would- 
be lenders from putting up the necessary capital Plans 
by groups of the paper's supporters, to turn the paper into 
a public company were finally thwarted when the government 
refused permission for this to happen. The paper- 
eventually closed down. 
Although the local press was advised as to what it should 
or should not publish, agency respondents claimed that they 
themselves did not receive such advice, or did so only 
occasionally. This bears out the general rule that where 
there are press restrictions on. local journalists, the'. 
foreign correspondents enjoy at least marginally more 
freedom. Though there were restrictions on what they 
felt they could safely report from -Singapore, agency 
respondents claimed that anything 'really newsworthy' got 
through. 
The inherent danger to accepting this state of affairs is 
of course that eventually the. 'really newsworthy' events 
are redefined to mean 'the most interesting of the things 
that we we allowed to report'. One respondent in 
Singapore admitted for example how difficult`it was for 
the foreign press to break through 'the veil`of secrecy' 
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which surrounded government policy and. behaviour. There 
may be stories about which the journalist feels certain, 
but for which it is impossible for him to obtain satisfactory 
authoritative sources. And if he can source his story 
satisfactorily it can happen that the source will 
authoritatively deny it once the story is released, so 
that the consequences for the reporter may discourage him 
from taking further'risks. 
Government control of the local media can be both informal 
and effective. The kind of informal control which operated 
in Singapore would have no doubt become formal if it had 
seemed not to work. That it did work is related to the 
one-party system in Singapore, the conservative character 
of the media proprietors who remained in business and whose 
primary motive was commercial, and the weakness of 
opposition elements., 
Informal Local Media Controls 
The variety of informal government and other source 
controls over domestic media is immense; some of those 
encountered in the course of research are here described, 
but these are hardly exhaustive. Bribery is a common 
enough mode of control, particularly where the basic 
wages in journalism are very low in comparison with other 
middle class and professional occupations. In Manila 
before the period of Martial Law in 1973, newspaper 
journalists would expect-to earn more from pay-offs from 
news 'sources' than they would from their own papers. 
704. 
These news sources might include government ministers or 
businessmen. Other factors that help explain the adoption 
of bribery as a mode of control where it occurs are the 
existence of only, a low state of professionalization of 
journalism, so that standard patterns of. training, 
recruiting and operation are non-existent; and where social 
values permit-the offer and acceptance of money or gifts 
as a mode of achieving power, or of acquiescing to it, as 
acceptable. 
A government may choose to control the domestic media in 
a more fundamental way than through intimidation, censor- 
ship or bribery. Indirectly it can buy the. good will of 
the media through the control of resources and facilities 
on which they depend.. Advertising is one such source, 
and the importance of government advertising will vary 
with the availability and volume of other sources of 
advertising and the. extent. to which revenue can be raised 
from circulation and other means. *Other resources and 
facilities over which many governments have control are 
publishing licenses, newsprint allowances and communications 
subsidies. Fearing the loss ofsuch benefits, the press 
or media in general may tread more. carefully in their 
treatment of the ' government that they would do otherwise. 
After, the New York Times had made its: decision to publish 
in serial form the 'Pentagon Papers',, an agency bureau 
chief in Paris conducted an impromptu survey of several 
leading Parisian publishers to discover what they would 
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have done ' in, a, similar' situation. None said they would 
. 
be prepared tö print:, such'highly classified documents if 
a. similarsituation arose in France. The most common 
reason ; given waspthat the` government had too many ways 
of hurting the financial interests of their papers. 
An important method of government control' over both 
domestic and foreign media which has already been dis- 
cussed at length. is the establishment or manipulation. 
of a national news agency. The national-news agency may 
be the sole source of national (in the sense of nation- 
wide) news: a foreign agency which can cover the capital 
-city for itself will often be happy to depend on the national 
agency for non-capital news mostof the time -` of course, 
usually. quoting the national. agency, as source. If the 
subscription to the service of national agency seems'less 
than the. cost of maintaining a network'of stringers, the 
national agency might be preferred to the stringer; network 
if a choice between the two has to be, made in a , situation_ 
of scarce resources. 
A, relationship appears to exist between the perceived 
adequacy of a local agency and. the maintenance of stringer 
networks. 
. 
An agency bureau chief in Tel Aviv reported 
that the limited service of the Israeli national. news. agency 
(which at the time covered, only police, courts, and airport 
arrivals) necessitated the employment of a large stringer 
network. The Israeli agency is co-operatively owned by 
Israeli newspapers, which were worried that if the agency 
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expanded its coverage, there would be fewer jobs for 
journalists on newspapers. The relationship. is again. 
demonstrated in Malaysia where one of. the world-wide 
agencies chose not to subscribe, to., the Malaysian news 
agency, Bernama, because the, local agency correspondent 
calculated that he could get more reliable coverage for 
less money by depending on his network of stringers rather 
than on Bernama. 
Controlled Press as. A. encv Source 
Control of the press by the government, in whole or in 
part, does not necessarily mean that the press becomes a 
less reliable source in'practice. Much depends on the 
kind of government, the kind of press which existed before 
press control, and on the definition of 'reliability'. 
In the Philippines, the introduction of Martial Law and 
of 'press guidelines' issued by the government, made the 
Manila press in some ways more informative than they had 
been previously. Before the introduction of Martial Law 
. 
the press in the Philippines was renowned for being one 
of the freest in South East Asia: on the other hand it 
was also virulently anti-government, in the interests of 
big business groups which controlled the media, and often 
accused by both friends and enemies of the government of 
sensationalism. Under Martial Law, the fettered. press 
possibly became a better source of news about government 
policy and action than it had. previously been: it is 
conceivable, if unlikely, that this was more in the interests 
of the masses of the people, at that point in Philippine 
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history, than a press run by business groups which might 
have had a lot to. lose from changes which the government 
was attempting to introduce. 
A government controlled press is unlikely to carry 
criticism-of the government. Yet under certain circum- 
stances-the accurate presentation of one side of a picture, 
even if favourable to that side, invites its own criticism, 
or contains it by implication, almost as well and perhaps 
better than an approach which fails to give an accurate 
presentation of any side to a controversy. This is no 
justification of press censorship; but a recognition that 
where the press is part of'the'process of power struggle 
the existence of an ideology of free press is not always 
adequate protection for the reader. 
In the 'context of international news flow therefore, it 
is. worth observing that the existence of government control 
over domestic media does not mean that the absence of such 
control would provide more or better information of itself., 
However, since it is unlikely that foreign journalists 
will, be refused access tothe. kinds of information which 
pro-government newspapers print, the existence of govern- 
ment-control should never be adistinct advantage to them, 
unless they are led by the government's opportunity to 
present its case through the national press, to ask 
questions'o. r to consider issues and frameworks which before 
had escaped their notice. 
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To know how press control can affect the 'quality' of 
the national media as sources it is necessary , 
to. define 
the ingredients of 'quality'. National media have four 
major uses for agency and other foreign correspondents: 
when (i) the media are valid - the information. 
printed or conveyed by them is generally 
'true', refers to events that have actually 
happened, -and statements that have been made, 
without any deliberate engineered intent to. 
distort or confuse; 
(ii) they are reliable - they keep to the same 
standards of news-coverage over time, and 
over all categories of news; 
(iii) the media are a forum for one ofa number 
of viewpoints which may or may not be 
accurate, but are considered newsworthy 
by virtue of the fact that they exist 
and are attributable to recognizeable 
persons or organizations considered to 
have influence of power; 
(iv) the media, singly or as a group, represent 
the voices and interests of different classes, 
sectors and other divisions of the country, 
with no important exception. 
Where government or other source control tends to reduce 
the scope of any of these four functions then some'decline 
in national media quality as agency sources maybe said 
to have occurred; but where controls simply detract from 
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the usefulness of one function but enhance that of another, 
an overall assessment may be difficult. 
It is not simply national governments that control national 
media. Political parties,; foreign governments, business 
interests, religious organizations and private individuals 
all. contribute to the shape and colour, of the national 
media in many parts of the world. Their respective 
motives, resources and significance have to be assessed 
by the agency correspondents. The press in pre-civil-war 
Beirut for,, example, was notorious . for harbouring media outlets ,. _.: _.:. 
which were. in, fact subsidized ifnot controlled surreptit- 
iously by different political interest groups. Says one 
respondent: 
"It takes skill to identify the valuable from the 
worthless. Many of the-papers are subsidized by 
Arab governments or movements,. though it is difficult 
to find official information to this effect, and 
sometimes stories are deliberately'planted. One 
carried a story recently which. claimed that the Iraqui 
Prime Minister had been assassinated. In fact the 
man had been in hospital for two days for the treat- 
ment of a natural complaint.. 
Beirut was. a centre for espionage . as. well as a meeting point 
for. Arab politicians and businessmen, and was the home of 
many exiled politicians, especially from Syria.. Access 
to information here was generous by comparison with neigh- 
: bouring countries and some of. this information was of 
potentially. great significance, as when, for example, it. 
reflected upon the contemporary state of Israeli-Palestinian 
or Arab relations. 
It is important therefore for agency 
reporters to study.. the; local media well, and to gain some 
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idea of the relative merits of each publication in terms 
of the factors which have been used above to' define 'quality' 
of media for newsmen. 
A press which is largely controlled by government, party- 
political or business interests, is not necessarily a less 
valid or reliable source of news or of general information 
about how institutions work and events occur in any given 
country, than a press which is run solely on commercial 
principles. In the western world, and in particular, in 
Great Britain and North America, there is a tendency to 
equate mass circulation newspapers of comparatively neutral 
politics with the western ethic of journalism which places 
great value on the concept and the possibility of-object- 
ivity and impartiality. It is assumed'that'the search 
for mass markets leads to a toning down of any pre-existing 
tendencies to support one. political'or interest group or 
another. Though some bias will be retained, this is. 
watered. down sufficiently to be acceptable to opponents 
of the view upheld. This equation, insofar'as it can be 
supported, may tend to work best only where'parliamentary 
democracy is institutionalized, where a-large degree of 
autonomy is conceded to non-political organizations, and 
where the: principle itself is adjustedto'suit the require- 
ments of consensus-bound-polities. ':: In other countries, 
where'a presidential or`similar authority can control the 
media without accountability to a`democratic body of any 
substance, commercially-run media may be less. informative 
than those run byorganizations with moral or other non- 
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profit goals. Also, in countries where the potentiality 
of mass circulations is limited by geographical, linguistic, 
racial and other national characteristics, there may not 
be the , samepressure towards non-partisanship as occurred 
to some extent (often exaggerated) in Great Britain and 
North America.. That there is some connection is indicated 
by the transition at. the time of the 'Northcliffe Revolution', 
which was primarily a;; revolution in. märketing. Before 
this, the press was largely controlled by political 
parties.. 
Commercialism, then, is not in itself a guarantee of 
better 
. 
'quality' than. " any. other media principle. 
Commercially-run media, for instance,, may be more than 
anxious to co-operate with national governments in order 
to protect their investments, whereas papers with other 
objectives may offer more resistance. The commercial 
paper. may retain a high degree of. professionalism' in 
., 
its.. -journalism, and the other papers may display much bias 
and selectivity. However, professionalism is as good as 
the-phenomenon to which it is applied. A commercial 
paper . may.. simply 
ignore certain issues or events, and yet 
, 
be considered ', professional' in a technical sense in its 
.. coverage of 
the events which the government does not find 
threatening. A non-profit paper., on the' other hand, with 
. -an. axe 
to grind, may be very biased, and in this sense 
unprofessional, but it may be much more informative at 
least in. identifying what . thereal issues or the most 
significant issues are. and the possible viewpoints that 
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may be taken on these issues. 
2. Access and Source Control 
The question of access is central to the very concept 
'journalism' in western society, which assumes a 'public 
right to know', and whose practice in western countries 
depends on the ability-to gain access to sources of inform- 
ation and to obtain meaningful responses to questions put 
to such sources. 
The term 'access' refers to two aspects of the source- 
agency relationship: the ease or difficulty with which a 
journalist makes contact with a source; ' and the readiness 
of a source to initiate contact with a journalist. Where 
the source initiates contact there'is, on the'surface, 
very good access. 
A distinction needs to bemade, however, between access to 
a source and access to information. ' Ease of, access to a 
source in the physical sense does not ensure ease of access 
to information. Many journalists tend to assume that the 
second follows the first. ' There is a corruption of the 
western philosophy of journalism which assumes that these 
two things are identical; that it is sufficient to approach 
those sources which by common consent (as expressed in the 
concrete institutionalization of social power 'differences) 
should be the most authoritive, with scant regard for. the 
fact that such sources are often under great political 
pressure to be as uninformative or even as misleading as 
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they. can possibly be. This corruption of an occupational 
ideology is also bound up with the phenomenon of news 
personalization, which removes responsibility for accuracy 
from the journalist and places it on the source. News- 
personalization. isthoughtto attract greater audience 
attention; it also routinizes the journalistic, task, since 
it identifies: news issues with news sources, and implies 
. 
that all informationcan be gathered through a rudimentary 
set of. face-to-face contacts. The norm of 'impartiality' 
can be. upheld, in this fashion on the basis that persons. 
representing opposing view-points or interests have been 
included in the set of. face-to-face contacts. chosen, no 
matter ; how insubstantial. the, expression of these. viewpoints 
may be. 
In"practice, therefore, journalism: and agency journalism 
included, is, 
-as much, 
'about;,.. reporting people's opinions 
about the facts as about-the. facts themselves, -... Opinion 
is not. necessarily distinct from-fact, of course: as a 
social-phenomenon an opinion is a fact .. and may 
have concrete 
: social consequences. 
News personalization, -understood 
in.. the. i. sense described 
here, is not therefore wrong, so 
much as: half. _a task.: Agency journalists do a: lot of 
opinion reporting - for instance, the . 
'reaction'... ýstory is 
standard procedure;. '_whenan event occurs . 
in one country 
that-has consequences for others; agency. journalists in 
those other countries will ring prominent news. sources to 
quiz them on their reactions to the latest developments. 
This kind of reporting is, a form of news personalization. 
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Agency journalists do not engage in'much reporting of an 
'investigative', even of*a deep background kind. AP 
does have an investigative team in Washington, enterprise 
reporters and specialists for domestic US- affairs, and 
produces a certain amount of background foreign' coverage: 
this would not represent more than 10% of its-entire 
output, and this is far more than the"other agencies attempt. 
Reuters senior executives have-actively denied that reporting 
of this kind can be a normal function for agency'organiz- 
ations. 
The agency' journalist therefore spends'. much of'his: time 
in the kind of mechanistic activity implied. by. news 
personalization: the search for peöple.. rather than for 
information as such. The, information is not all that 
important so long as the.. right-source, is tapped, and an 
'authoritive' quotation supplied. 'In`this way`the agency 
correspondent becomes a messenger, his role to'convey 
the newsýof-events and statements. of' spokesmen for 
established power groups in any given-country, on whom 
he alsocbpends, often enough, for much of his information 
about those who are without power.; ` This is not to deny 
that this is the-role'perhaps. imposed'on'him by the needs 
of -those clients with most market leverage, - or that the 
character of international relations is especially bound 
: up wi. th'managed impressions rather. than. substantive 
exchanges.: 
Precisely because the agency defines its'taskin such a 
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way as'-to exclude, in day-to-day reporting, analytical' 
explan: at on., or even in-depth historical and descriptive 
examinations, it is inclined to personalize news. The 
, agency journalist' becomes" more dependent as a result on 
establi'she'd sources and his ability to gain access to them. 
It is the authority'of these sources which makes them 
important for the agency journalist. ' The fact that 
precisely.: because they are authoritive they may be the 
most' dubious sources, if not deceitful., that they may use 
the channels of access simply as means' of'news-management, 
cannot 'influence the agency journalist too much because 
these . are--sources he . cannot 
afford'to` alienate, `and` their 
'kind of news-is what he is in business to gather, regard- 
less of its. -meaningfulness and 
s to whomo 
Access as Censorship 
Restrictions on access to sources, if only through the 
forced mediation o. f, public. relations departments, is a 
form of censorship. Bythe creation of obstacles between 
himself and the journalist, the source makes access a 
privilege which he can grant provided certain conditions 
are'met. The journalist holds certain bargaining points 
as well, : of'course most notably his access to other 
alternative sources of information; the source-journalist 
relationship is a reciprocal one, not always of equal 
strength for eachpar, ty, but usually requiring some compromise. 
But because agency correspondents are essentially foreign 
correspondents and because coverage of a country from the 
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point of view of international news requirements tends to* 
be concentrated on governments, the reciprocal relationship 
between agency and government is heavily. weighted. in favour 
of the government. This does not. prevent the. agencies 
from getting across the essential ingredients, of an 
exhaustive coverage, but they are. obliged_to do so in a 
very low-key manner,, and to behave with great., caution in 
the short-term. 
Compromise can begin in, gaining access to a country. This 
is especially true of western media, in. general . when mining 
access to communist countries: the price paid, for access 
is. considerable observance of the restrictions, imposed on 
coverage, and this ±s a sacrifice in terms of professional 
ideology as well. A dramatic non-agency example of, this 
is the compromise of Japanese media journalists in gaining 
access to China, when in 1968 Japanese media agreed not 
to pursue a hostile China policy, nor to obstruct the 
return of 'normality' of relations between the, iwo countries. 
Observance of these principles appeared to modify Japanese 
press coverage of Chinese events in subsequent years, 
especially in connection with the Lin Pao`affair. and the 
question of Japan's position with regard to: the China- 
Taiwan relationship, in a direction more in line with the 
official Chinese viewpoint. 
But when an agency sets up 'bureau in a country awhere 
there is' little' likelihood of being able to file anything 
out. 'whicü does not suit the government, 'it, does'at'least 
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retain editorial autonomy in the final treatment of the 
dispatch, and can. combine material. from the country with 
reports from alternative sources. This is less-of a 
compromise therefore than actually signing away the right 
to editorial autonomy on-certain issues, which it appears. 
the'Japanese media did do. " 
Just as extremely difficult access represents a major 
problem in international news coverage, so too does 
'excessive'. access: excessive access is also a'potential 
mode of control, control'through confusion or distraction. 
Certain sources bombard journalists with information. 
Agencies, concerned as they are to cover all the basic 
events of the day, may be'trapped into spending too much 
time on events that. have. beencreated for them. The 
danger arises from over-dependence on government sources, 
the very sources which have the most reason and. the most 
resources for an elaborate. press relations machinery. If 
the : government is-' seen as . too important a source, -then 
whatever ; emanates from that source tends to carry. a certain 
significance regardless of its content. 
In recognition of. this. problem, "an agency, Senate corrcEpondent 
in Washington reported; that his agency no'longertried to 
cover all committee hearings, of which there were"on 
average twelve'a'day. -Adequate coverage of. -them all. 
would, _in any case, produce too much material: for-the wires 
to carry:. 
"The criteria of selection have more to do with 
newsiness than with the significance of the 
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story for the nation in itself. 11 2 
The sheer number of formal events places a limitation 
on the agencies. A Washington bureau chief reported that: 
'Anyone who can is encouraged to dig. But 
in places like Congress where there may be: 
_ forty or fifty on-going committees at any 
time it is difficult. The higher the. 
number of formal events there are to be 
covered, the less time there is for digging. "3 
This respondent's bureau had not changed size., in personnel 
terms, for at least ten years (at the time of interview in 
1972), despite the growth of federal government' functions 
in that time. There have been technical innovations which 
may have reduced the need for some editorial staff, but on 
balance it. seems that editorial coverage has remained 
fairly constant in strength. 
With limited resources, the agendes are often unable to 
exploit increased accessibility. A respondent in Tokyo, 
referring to restrictions on access imposed-by the press 
clubs on foreign correspondents who wish to attend regular 
ministerial conferences, says 
"Even if tomorrow all entry restrictions were 
lifted, none of the agencies would-have the 
manpower to staff each of the main ministries. 
The result in news coverage terms would be . 
exactly the same. "4 
On its home, territory, :. a global agency often-enjoys 
privileged access to.: sources, -and this. places the other 
agencies at a disadvantage. -::, Correspondents who. have had 
experience of both the-United States and. Britain. or France, 
almost invariably repor.. iithat they.. find the United States 
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new reporting environment; as one respondent said of an 
aspect of Washington reporting: 
. 
"It can take half a day getting in and oüt 'öf 
the Pentagon, let alone talking to. anybody,, 
there. "5 
This respondent. estimated that it took two years or more 
for a trained journalist to feel at ease in the American ,, 
capital, although, a 'lazy' journalist would find it easy 
to survive on information-fed to him by. important news 
sources, , 
often disguised as 
Privilegedaccess enjoyed by one agency can extend overseas, 
usually the result of close diplomatic ties between the- 
country of the agency's headquarters and the country of 
coverage. It is frequently alleged for instance that 
AFP enjoys privileged access to indigenous elites of 
French-speaking Africa and in parts of Indochina; similar 
status is often attributed to the U. S. agencies in the 
Philippines. and in certain South American countries; to 
Reuters in English-speaking African countries and the Malay 
peninsula. Where members of the local elite are custom- 
arily educated in the agency's base-country or by nationals 
of that country, there is -frequently. a natural. inclination 
to favour the agency in question with prior access to 
information. The openness attributed to U. S. sources by 
respondents, of the European agencies is partially extended 
to includeU. S. sources outside the United States itself. ' 
In_Vietnam, where the general conduct of the U. S. sources 
attracted considerable press criticism, the European 
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agencies-did not complain, of unfair treatment in comparison 
with the . 
treatment of the U. S. agencies, though they did 
perceive-differences., An AFP respondent in Saigon claimed 
... 
that his agency-enjoyed the same official access-to U. S. 
sources as-the U. S. agencies,. ýimplying that the U. S. 
... agencies 
did, better, in informal-contacts and briefings. 
Though he felt that coverage by. the U. S. agencies was 
superior . to ; that of, AFP ; as far, as the military; situation 
-went, -the-advantage: was with AFP in coverage of the political 
! -situation. -- . Inpoliticalcircles AFPcould exploit the 
historic links. that-existed between'France and South 
Vietnam,: 'and. the'fact that AFP was much better established 
in. Saigon than the other agencies. before U. S. involvement' 
in the -war.:: An, 
AP respondent confirmed this view when 
he-observed that'AFP had been_superior, to AP and UPI in 
coverage of- South Vietnamese politics; -because of the 
traditional French influence in; the country, some of the 
local elite thought of themselves, as French first and 
Vietnamese afterwards. But a Reuters respondent took. an 
unequivocal view of United States superiority in access 
to U. S. sources: 
! 'U. S. newsmen here, have an advantage -as far. as 
access to U. S. sources is concerned. If a 
U. S. officer wants, to talk,, hewill release to 
AP and UPI; he probably hasn't even heard of 
Reuters, ii( 
He went on to say however, that the situation was probably 
the reverse in coverage of South Vietnamese sources, and 
added that fluent. French was essential in order to cultivate 
either North or South Vietnamese contacts. 
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Where there is hostility between the agency's base country 
and the . country of coverage, 
the agency often receives 
poorer treatment than those whose base countries maintain 
relatively friendly relations. The extreme manifestation 
of such discrimination of course is expulsion. `' This 
happened to Reuters and AFP, for example, -after the Suez 
affair of 1956, when both bureaux were compelled to close. 
And in Peking, 1967, the Reuters correspondent-Anthony Grey 
was imprisoned in retaliation for the prior arrest and 
imprisonment 
, of a 
New China News Agencycorrespondent in 
Hong Kong byýthe British authorities. The U. S. "agencies 
were not represented-in Peking at that time; `- the only 
other western agency present was'AFP. ` In practice there 
is a"great deal of perceived identification of the world- 
wide agencies with the interests of their base countries 
by sources and clients of other countries, -and'this can 
create serious difficulties in news-gathering, for the 
agencies in times of crisis. 
Privileged access for the global agency-on its home ground 
is sometimes matched by privileged access fors-'local: media 
journalists... We have seen that where there is an apprec- 
iable measure of restriction of journalistic activity, the 
agency journalists tend to feel freer than the local 
journalists; but where there is little formal restric- 
tion, ' the reverse may be the case. One possible case, 
in point is Japan, where. the organization of domestic 
journalists into press clubs often discriminates against 
the foreign media. 
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"Major, channels are.; 'still blocked. All 
back-grounders-given by vice ministers in 
the bureaucracy who are the key men in the 
everyday workings of the government are 
closed. ,, -: All ministerial. press conferences 
other than those given by the Premier and 
the Foreign Minister are, closed to the foreign 
press. For these the foreign correspondent 
has to-rely on secondhand sources, and these are 
not often accurate. In joint U. S. -Japanese 
talks held in Japan,, the-, Japanese side often' 
does not permit access to the foreign press, 
so there'is no way- at first. hand of comparing 
what the two sides are saying. "7 
This. -kind of situation has. to be tackled through the 
collective activity of the foreign press, which in Japan 
häs achieved several new openings in recent years, including 
access to the Premier's . 
press'clubpress' conferences, and 
. the 
thrice daily briefings given by the Chief, Cabinet 
Secretary. The Foreign Correspondents' Club in"Tokyo 
however has not (1973) become officially involved in this 
campaignfor better access, because ofpolitical"'divisions. 
amongst' its member media-representatives, who include TASS 
and New York-Times reporters. Instead, -a subsidiary' 
. =organization: 
has been: established' by some members of 'the 
FCC in order to campaign, on .a voluntary 
basis for `improved 
. 
access. But the. agencies have not been prominent in this 
---campaign: Reuters refused to become associated with the 
attempt to improve foreign press , access tothe press clubs 
on the grounds that the clubs made news-management by the 
government easier', and that'- they tended to' reduce the 
number of-occasions- when it.: was possible to attribute 
'information directly to its source. - Itwould'prefer to 
see the.. abolition of the system altogether. 
The Japanese example represents one particular. mode of 
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accommodation between. the media and. political` systems. 
It is a. mode of control which suits both parties. The 
formalization of the relationship protects journalists 
from each other and gives them security of access; for 
the source it provides assurance of 'responsible' reporting 
and an instrument whereby. intimacy can; safely be traded 
for press support. Similar to it in some respects is the 
Lobby system in the United Kingdom whereby privileged access 
is permitted the top media journalists. -Foreign media 
are not given access to the Lobby. Other groups of 
correspondents have their own parallel clubs which, though 
not so exclusive as the Lobby system, function; to a greater 
or lesser extent as a mode of mutual source-journalist 
control. 
The mode of accommodation between the media and political 
systems in any given country will affect . 
the. degree of 
access which foreign journalists will enjoy;,,, it will 
affect the overall balance of domestic coverage, -and to 
the extent that foreign correspondents of, all shades are 
heavily dependent on domestic media, it will:. affect the 
news of that country which enters into the international 
news-flow system. 
The mode of media-political accommodation which is adopted 
tends to be a reflection. of; the political. system itself. 
Where opposition parties have legitimacy for instance,. the 
media are likely to be more critical, more investigative 
in their own right, than where there is no legitimate 
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; opposition. .., An agency correspondent: reported that in 
. 
Malaysia, access . was. 
easier to achieve than in Singapore: 
in Malaysia, at the-time of. interview, vigorous opposition 
politics existed, whereas the same was not true for 
Singapore. ' This was reflected in the degree of openness 
about; domestic politics. and issues in. the respective 
domestic media of. both, countries... But it is not . simply 
the factor. of. pluralism that. explains the greater openness 
of Malaysia in -this respect.. In 
Singapore the dominant 
party . had. clear' control over the administrative bureaucracy: 
it was not as. easy., to tap middle-ranking. sources there for 
instance as in' a country, where , 
the dominant; party did not 
enjoy' such. control. (It was said of South Vietnam that 
regardless of official anti-press attitudes at the top, 
it was always possibleto tap good sources at lower levels 
-of the bureaucracy. ) 
'Access is heavily influenced by culture. Although the 
influence'of. cultural factors may be traced back to 
specific characteristics of the political and economic 
-. structure, foreign correspondents will.,. often. ascribe 
their impressions of , 
the different degrees. of access in 
different countries to national character, or similar loosely 
conceived phenomena. 
One very important cultural factor is thestatus'of 
journalism'in any-given society., -In many. countries, 
especially Third World countries - countries which-are 
heavily dependenton the great powers for economic aid 
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and investment --the foreign correspondent (particularly 
if he is from one of the world's elite media, 'known and 
recognized everywhere), appears to enjoy higher status 
than the domestic correspondent. The local elite may 
be hostile to the domestic media for its allegedly 
'sensationalist' role, or its capacity for subversion, and 
may be correspondingly anxious to woo the foreign. correspond- 
ent away from this undesirable influence=by granting him 
privileged access; but in any case the foreign media 
journalist of an elite, internationally. recognized'and 
renowned medium, will often be a correspondent whom. the 
local elite is anxious to impress, if they consider a good 
impression something' which it is still possible to give. 
The extra status ascribed to him may"also be associated 
with his spending power, if it: is sufficient to put him 
on a par with the local elite, or at least distinguish 
him from the definitely non-elite. Where the local elite 
is very closed socially, and maintains 'ascriptive' family 
or class-based norms even in public politics, foreign 
correspondents may still experience difficulty in access, 
as is the case for instance in several Middle. Eastern 
countries. In such circumstances source relationships 
may be established on the most idiosyncratic of bases. 
Even though he may enjoy greater access to the elite than 
the domestic correspondent in. certain countries, the 
status of the domestic journalist will concern his foreign 
colleague, ' precisely because the latter.. is_dependent on 
the. former for a great deal of information. Agency 
bureaux generally have working for them stringers whose 
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principal employer is a. leading newspaper or other medium 
of the, country in which they, are based. 
If the local media have arrived at 'understandings' with 
the local elites, then the value of information which 
stringers on such media can supply to the agencies is 
limited. In the United States, for, instance, the agencies 
are heavily . 
dependent-on the local media,. and on. stringers 
employed by the local media, for news; stories, in,. many areas. 
But,. as Janowitz has . pointed out, 
the community. press in 
the United. States, 'is often tied up with the interests of 
the local elite, and in, any case generally functions to 
support the, local., power structure rather than maintain a 
critical stance against it. 
8 
A French respondent who made a similar observation of the 
dependence of AFP on local media stringers for news of 
certain smaller towns, and some. not so small, argued 
that-the local ÄFP stringer was usually known to his 
paper's editor and owner, and were he to 19 o"beyond the 
accommodation already achieved between the paper and 
local interests he might well be subject to reprisals. 
9 
In large communities where-. there are sufficiently well- 
developed interest groups which can handle cönflict, the 
media may be less supportive of the local power structure. 
However, the thesis that pluralism ensures a balanced 
expression'of interests does not hold any more absolutely 
for the press than it does for democratic politics. There 
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are always interests which do not-have the resources or 
the appropriate consciousness for organized opposition. 
But it is probably true to say that the weakness of the 
community press is offset to some extent by the larger 
regional papers. 
Where there is concentration of power resources into a 
centralized political system, it is probable that. access 
will be limited to fewer sources than in a more dispersed 
system of power; that it will be subjected to.. greater 
supervision because of the centrally directed information 
policies, and may also be hampered because of the unavail- 
ability of the required, information or the difficulty of 
obtaining the appropriate permission. 
3. Source Control: Censorship, Accommodation and Reprisal 
From the point of view of a journalist's personal 
security there are certain advantages about formal 
censorship when this takes the form of a complete vetting 
of.. journalistic copy before it is. published. Under such 
a system it is difficult for a journalist to transgress 
the law, since he is prevented from doing so. He may 
instead, if he chooses, exercise his talent by so phrasing 
his copy. that messages are passed by censors. which would 
not have been passed if expressed less obliquely. 'Where 
censorship is partial,, where only certain copy but not all 
copy, must be vetted, or where censorship occurs after 
publication, there is, generally greater ambiguity. In 
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the'case of partial censorship, it'is often the journalist 
who must distinguish ; between copy he-needs to show to the 
censors-: aridthat which may pass straight ` into print.. In 
the`case'ofpost-publication censorship-hebecomes respons- 
ible even"-for' copy, which °he did' not believe" to be illegal 
at the, time. of-`writing it. In such cases it is probably 
'preferable to`havepress'laws which leave-little room for 
-more than one interpretation'of what is-or is not forbidden. 
'Post-publication' censorship falls within the realm. of 
source reprisal and will -be examined-later 'in this section. 
Complete pre-publication censorship is, in'fact, rather 
iunusual, since even where- all' copy is, vetted " by the censors 
-there is often room for negotiation between censor and 
journalist over 'the ' meaning' öf the 'relevant ' legislation 
and in the censor's commitment to firm application of the 
legislation. 
Negotiations" with the Censor: Middle East Case Study 
Many instances of negotiation between censors and agency 
journalists were quoted in the course of the study. They 
are evidence of a kind, of accommodation which is arrived 
at between the authorities and the foreign press corps in 
many countries, one in which the agencies are fully partic- 
ipant . 
In Cairo, at the time of the interview in late 1971, one 
respondent noted that some degree of negotiation with 
the censors was then possible. He felt this was'the 
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result. of personal contacts he had established with NENA, 
the national news agency in Egypt, which handles the 
routine censoring except. in cases where special consider- 
ation is required. Another respondent provided an instance 
of successful negotiation when he persuaded the censor 
to. drop the. insistence that there be a change , of; 
wording 
from 'Egypt' to. 'Arab' or 'occupied' with reference to the 
lost territories. This respondent was not, successful 
however, in obtaining permission to use the names. of the 
guerillas arrested for the assassination of the Jordanian 
Foreign Minister in Cairo that year, until MENA had used 
them. In his opinion it was not advisable to insist too 
, much in such circumstances for. fear. that dispatches might 
be. forbidden altogether.. Occasionally, the importance 
, 
of a story would. be. worth contravening the regulation: 
when Nasser died. he telephoned straight through to New 
York before the official announcement was made, and 
although he was cut off after the first few words, he was 
able in make sufficient sense. Several respondents 
observed that the censors were particularly unwilling to 
allow sourced-information which had not been officially 
announced. 
Egypt is an instance where formal censorship, at least 
at the time of study, was accompanied by great informal 
censorship of the kinds already examined. Most respond- 
ents commented on the slackening of censorship that had 
occurred under Sadat's 'liberalization' policies, compared 
with how it had been under Nasser. One claimed that only 
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two stories of his had been cut within the previous six 
months, and-one of these concerned the trials of men 
implicated in an attempted coup the year before. Informal 
or indirect censorship still remained: for instance, 
access to ministries was difficult in comparison with many 
other countries in the region, and ministers tended not 
to provide additional information over and above prepared 
statements. Official contacts were rarely of good value 
even when established, according to another, and although 
with experience it was possible to get better access, it 
remained difficult to source the information that was 
"obtained. ' And at the time the censors were even hostile 
to the use of the phrase 'official' or 'government' 
sources. 
The local media were not good sources of information because 
of course they too were under censorship, and were in any 
case all government controlled. Hardly-any editorials 
appeared which were not supportive of government'policy. 
Some respondents found access to Egyptian journalists 
difficult as well, some of whom had been implicated in 
the attempted coup of the, previous year, ' and may have 
been warned against mixing with foreign correspondents on 
the 'cocktail circuit'. But when access of this kind 
was-established it could be particularly productive - 
younger journalists especially, usually highly educated, 
were often very outspoken in 
private. Noting that formal 
censorship had slackened, it was observed that access to 
information had. not improved as. a'result, partly-due to 
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the size and inefficiency of the bureaucracy: this was 
a difficult apparatus to dismantle because it was a 
critical source of jobs for the already under-employed, 
and with its preferment system of promotion, moved slowly. 
Censorship greatly interfered with the speed of communication: 
censors needed to see all the copy, and in order for them 
to do so they forbade the direct telexing of messages, 
even though the agencies had telex equipment; outward 
communication instead had to be by radio, via NENA. This 
factor, in addition to the combined restrictions of formal 
and informal censorship, clearly seemed to outweigh any 
advantage in the degree of flexibility in negotiation with 
censors, and reduced the value of residency in Cairo in 
favour of Beirut. Beirut bureaux generally had'higher 
status in the agency networks than the Egyptian bureaux. 
-Beirut, in the. period before the civil war, was better 
served by communications, was an excellent centre of Arab 
news and more comfortable to live in. 
The character of Israeli censorship at this time made more 
explicit provision for negotiations: censorship was 
designed to cover any topic which might be detrimental 
to. national security. Issues generally regarded as 
automatically falling under censorship at the time of 
interview in. late 1971 were immigration, oil, committee 
of defence hearings, and any cabinet meetings declared to 
have fallen under the categories of information that were 
subject to censorship. These categories were distributed 
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by theauthorities: to all foreign correspondents, and a 
dispatch concerning, " äny of them had to be submitted to 
the censors.. : -,. 
Foreign 
. correspondentsýin, 
Israel receiveda list of subject 
areas liable to censorship control. A dispatch concerning 
. any, of_ 
these, areas had to . 
be submitted to the. censors. 
The agencies,; had, an. understanding withthe. authorities 
whereby they filed directly to their usual filing destin- 
ation,. butalso telexed copy which was subject to'censorship 
to. the censor's office,. and-. would submit the whole'day's 
output. to the office on. the-following day. Potentially, 
they were free tofile out, anything; in practice, a 
transgression was. punished -,. an offending agency might be 
required to file in everything to the censor's office for 
clearanceýin: advance of filing out of the country. Such 
a , punishment, might.. last a, week or two. It would make it 
very difficult for the offending agency to get out any 
given story as: quickly as-the other agencies. 
On strictly . military, 
matters there was little argument 
about censorship. ` But where censorship seemed to be a 
cover for fundamentally political issues then, the press 
would- complain, through the Foreign Press= 
: Association or. individually. 
One case which fell under dispute concerned a ban on reports 
of oil imports. to Israel from Arab. cöuntries. The author- 
ities feared that publication of such reports might push 
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those Arab countries not supplying oil to Israel into 
taking action against those that did, 'or on'the'imports 
themselves. The press successfully won permission-to 
publish. One'argument used was that the ban was directed 
primarily against the possibility of Egyptian reprisal on 
oil imports from other Arab countries. ' But since Egyptian 
intelligence must surely be informed of'such`imports it 
was ridiculous to continue with-the ban. 
Negotiating strength is influenced by the general 
character of the foreign press corpsf at any given time.. 
In the view of one respondent the attitude`takenby the 
foreign press corps towards censorship in Israel had 
toughened considerably over time. 'Before'1967 in his 
opinion, there was a very 'tame' foreign press corps in 
Israel,. which included only one non-Jew (a New York Times 
reporter). The army and the government'found it easy to 
get away with censorship. . 
But after . 
1967 and-the Six 
Day War,. which put Israel firmly back into-the list of 
top world news stories for the. next few years, the press 
corps was much better trained,, more'aggressive aid"less 
sympathetic to Israel. As-a. result, censorship was 
virtually impossible without 'Gentlemen's Agreements'. 
Nevertheless, a certain amount`ofbad feeling remained: 
as illustrated by the agency. r. espondent.. who. recalled how 
on occasions the censors had refused him permission to file 
copy concerning censored topics-which had already, bden 
filed by. other agencies. In another incident he was 
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forbidden to use material: which had actually, appeared in 
the. Hebrew press, although in this case he refused 
co-operation. 
., 
Agency respondents felt that visiting newsmen had an 
advantage over them. Newspapermen flying in from the 
United States, in, the: opinion of one agency respondent, 
could ignore censorship with much less cost to their 
employers,, than the agencies could afford. This was 
- especially the case with the 
NewYork. Times, he felt, 
=, because thecensors"stood in awe 
of, a paper which was so 
widely-read by the Jewish community in New York, and one 
which had considerable politicalinfluence. onWashington. 
In the Autumn of 1969'a CBS reporter illustrated the 
readiness of-visiting newsmen to violate agreements which 
residential-agency correspondents had accepted: he 
reported the news, of an Israeli commando raid into Egypt 
while the Israelis were still inside Egyptian territory, 
and in his news report described the event as an 'Israeli 
invasion of Egypt'. This-made life difficult for agency 
journalists who, had been given a prior briefing and had 
agreed not, to report the. event until. after the commandos 
had returned to Israeli territory safely: They were now 
inundated with calls from their respective head offices 
for further. information. The CBS reporter was, expelled - 
he ; probably. did not consider this 
an important price to 
pay for the scoop obtained. Had his news organization 
been forbidden representation in Israel instead of just 
himself personally this would not have been too serious 
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either. CBS could easily have slipped another journalist 
in under a different title, or used the services of some 
other journalists already in Israel. But for an agency 
to be banned is more serious. Certainly, such an agency 
could continue''its news-coverage in'a clandestine fashion, 
though the frequent contacts that would have to be made 
with the authorities in routine'news-reporting might make 
a cover difficult to maintain. An agency's elaborate 
communications equipment might be difficult to hide as well;, 
the cost of doing without 'them would be `a loss in speed of 
transmission and hence a loss in 'Competitiveness,. or 
increased costs if the-'agency decided to use someone else's 
communication facilities. 
Negotiation with the Censor: Hanoi-Case Study 
Negotiation with the censor occurs even in countries 
often thought to exercise rigid information control. 
Several examples were quoted by an agency respondent who 
had covered North Vietnam from Hanoi during the final 
stages of the Vietnam war before U. S. 'military withdrawal. 
The most general tactic is to argue with the authorities 
that disclosure of certain information which the correspond- 
ent wants to file will actually further their cause. 
During the correspondent's residence in Hanoi there was 
extensive bombing by U. S. planes. An obvious story for 
him to cover was the extent of bomb damage. But he was 
not allowed to specify direct targets: he was told such 
specification might forestall the need for the Americans 
to send in a plane to confirm a target-hit, and thus deprive 
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the communists: of-a_chanceto shoot it-down. Official 
bomb. casualties were often underestimated. When Haiphong 
was first bombed, official. figures said that two hundred 
had been killed, whereas the correspondent's estimate 
was closer to three thousand. He argued with the Ministry 
of Information to be allowed to use his estimate, pointing 
out that-this way the bombing might have a greater impact 
on western 'sympathizers. "; ' Four or five -days later he was 
allowed to use the figure of three thousand, provided that 
hei-credited it simply to 'observers'. 
It'is precisely the agency's value to'a. source ascommun- 
ication `channel, the fact' that it is generally not. seen 
to, be-: identified with the source's own press or, public 
relations machinery; that-can give-the' agency. correspondent 
leverage with which to seek greater freedom from the 
sourcessýcontrol over information flow. 
'The'respondent in Hanoi occasionally wrote stories for the 
fo 
Los Angeles Times and Time magazine. He. insisted that 
he-be allowed to write. them. in the: style of a U. S. journalist 
for'the: U S. market, that they should not be-propaganda. 
He pointed out that.: their credibility overseas rested on 
the-degree to which they-could be seen to be free from source 
control. ". ' And as 
.a 
result`of. his insistence,. he claimed, 
these"stories were not? interfered with. 
On`one occasion-he"wrote a. story which. concerned the ten 
year sentence of imprisonment imposed on a young underground 
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jazz musician. The style of the article, was slightly 
critical. When he was refused permission to file this 
story, he threatened to close up his bureau in. Hanoi, and 
was in the process of actually leaving the country when 
the Press Department interviewed him and agreed that he' 
could send the story provided that he. supplied several 
paragraphs which explained the official position on this 
case - which was that anything which threatened to weaken 
the morale of youth in. North Vietnam's period of turmoil 
should be suppressed. He-accepted this provision. 
A story which failed to get permission concerned the 
publication of a book detailing the co-operation, between 
the Pathet Lao and Vietminh forces during. the first war 
with the French. Had he been given; permission to comment 
on . 
the book in a,. dispatch, this permission might have been 
interpreted abroad as official confirmation by the North 
Vietnamese government of the existence of co-operation between 
North Vietnamese, ' and Pathet Lao forces in . 
the present war. 
This instance does illustrate one of the functions of censor- 
ship, where. censorship is carefully applied:,, it tends - to 'in- 
crease the significance of the copywhich is; permitted to pass. 
Negoti ton between censor and journalist is. usually 
expressed through the bartering; of interpretations of the 
established press regulations,, and interpretations of 
mutual convenience. But it is occasionally a simpler 
matter of a cash ; transfer. Or, if., the conditions allow 
, it, it may. be, a straightforward agreement between the two 
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not to undertake 'undue risks: in, Cambodia, in the latter 
stages of the Indochina war, it was said that the press 
agreed not to risk the_jobs -of. the censors,. while the 
censors agreedito let out the most important. stories. A 
censor might take it upon himself for instance to suggest 
when a story would, be more suitably , 
'pigeoned' (smuggled) 
out. 
This extreme kind of bartering requires certain kinds of 
political condition:, weak 
centralized control by the 
information authority-over its own personnel, poor 
-surveillance of foreign 
press correspondents and, perhaps, 
absenceý. of, widespread moral commitment to the existing 
order. . Inefficiency may be so widespread that bartering 
is. not- necessary. Of Cambodia It was 
also reported that 
the censors had no good understanding . 
of: English, and 
based their censorship of English: dispatches. on the' 
recognition of certain key words. This led to a. number 
of inconsistencies. 
The most, -effective censorship. systems. appear to operate 
". wherever: there is strong central 
government: control over, 
its. own press information machinery and over. the"local 
media and communications facilities, where. the-movements 
of:. the . foreign press corpse are. "kept under. police or 
intelligence surveillance, and wherethere is. widespread 
popular submission. to or support , 
of the. established balance 
of power. ', These conditions are.; sometimes met; temporarily 
in otherwise. 'unlikely countries -at 
times of acute political 
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crisis - in Manila, for example, when President Marcos 
introduced Martial Law in late 1972, and in Santiago in 
1973 when a coup d'etat. overthrew Allende's government. 
, 
In cases such as these there is sudden and tight control 
over the foreign and domestic press for the time it 
takes for the forces of revolution or counter-revolution 
to settle comfortably into power and for the resistance 
to be suppressed. 
There is a form of exhaustive pre-publication. censorship 
that does not permit of any negotiation between source 
censor and journalist: because it is not officially 
recognized. A respondent in Cyprus spoke of this secret 
censorship, at a time on the-island when there was no 
official censorship. He believed, as did other respond- 
ents, that the government could monitor outgoing copy by 
requiring the PTT to intercept messages. In this way the 
government exercised control without appearing to do so. 
Occasionally stories were received at head offices with 
significant alterations or ommissions which presumably 
were the result of such unofficial censorship. With 
the introduction of direct telex lines, the respondent 
`felt, it would be much less easy for the government to 
censor in this manner. -. Indeed, one of'the respondents 
on the island who had already. had telex installed believed 
that he was no longer. subjected to such-censorship. 
Evidence of-the same mode of censorship came. from a 
respondent in Bogota, Columbia, who reported that occasional 
'breakdowns' of the automatic dialling on the local telex 
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had occurred at moments of special political stress, which 
made it possible for the government to monitor the outgoing 
messages, : since. 
these then had to pass through . 
local 
communication channels in the ordinary way. 
Where there is open pre-publication censorship, there 
very; often is room for negotiation between journalist and 
censor; over. the interpretation of the rules to be followed. 
The items negotiated very often are of no great significance 
in themselves, but have importance . 
to: an agency insofar 
as it needs to fulfil the basic 'who, what, when, where 
and why. '. details of-a news event to satisfy its clients, 
as well'as to maintain competitiveness in speed of trans- 
mission against the other agencies and media. No journalist 
is likely. to bombard. censors with material which he does 
not expect them to pass: he is more likely to concentrate 
anon öüt of the country on other means of getting' inform 
in the required-time, and in his relations with the censors 
will seek to have as much information passed as possible 
within the framework of the censor's rules: 
In assessing. how much the censor will accept, -the agency 
journalist isanticipating'the degreefof government 
sensitivity on certain issues, "it's 'attitude to' what he 
wants tö. say-about'it, and any likely'reprisal. the 
government (or any other coercive source) islikely. to 
take if he. contravenes its regulations. In. effect, he 
generally makes some kind 
of compromise' based on his 
perception of the government's attitude, and his awareness 
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that the government might also need the agency. In this 
way, understandings are arrived at between authorities 
and journalists, even if nothing is ever actually said 
directly, and regardless of whether there is any pre- 
publication censorship, Post-publication censorship 
helps generate understanding because such censorship 
often requires personal elaboration to makeup for the 
vagueness of written guidelines, and is effective to the 
extent that it is accompanied by the threat of reprisals. 
A journalist will generally seek to assess the kind of 
story which will provoke a reprisal, and his behaviour 
will be based on his anticipation to the extent'that he 
worth risking. considers some reprisals not 
Reprisals 
Since ', understandings' are arrived at partly in anticip- 
ation of possible reprisals by sources against journalists, 
it would be appropriate to look at the kind of reprisals 
which agency respondents quoted as having occurred, and 
their response to such reprisals. 
A frequent 'reprisal'. is the official complaint made 
known to the, agency by a source. In a sense it is not 
a reprisal but rather the threat of a reprisal if in 
future. 
_theagency 
should engage in reporting similar to 
that which the source now finds objectionable. But it 
isa reprisal if it acts, as it often does, as a limit- 
ation on. the, journalist's activities in news-gathering 
and reporting. For it is an expression of the power of 
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the source- to make life difficult for the journalist 
and his agency., A source . complaint. 
which is not followed 
by a reprisal, 'in the . event of`a subsequent-and 
similar 
transgression'`leads to a-loss of credibility for the source. 
Knowing this, a wise source will follow up warnings with 
reprisals. The journalist, ` estimating that this will be 
.; 
the_view; taken. by the source,. will not casually ignore the 
significance of, a warning. 
,, Examples of; 
effective complaints: -., a Taiwanese 
correspondent 
who: refrained from mentioning the state of relations between 
mainland, Chinese -and 
local ; islanders, -in., response to 
'complaints'; a Beirut correspondent. who. had been 
cautioned by,, the Lebanese authorities over, a story he 
wrote about wild celebrations on the occasion : of Nasser's 
,,, 
death in Beirut, 
. 
in which many were killed and injured 
. he . would . 
not .,. report, this . kind of incident. in future, for 
. 
fear,: it:, might bringback-formal censorship. 
An ex-agency . 
respondent: recalled how'. he'had been in'China 
, during, the period of the-Communist takeover, ' but still 
behind Nationalist lines., He had made secret arrangements 
to-. visit Peking eon the. instructions his London office. 
On the way: he-called in on the bureau in Shanghai. The 
bureau chief there was horrified that the respondent was 
" going into Communist territory, since he feared the 
Nationalists would. find' out and in, punishment deprive'the 
agency of . its 
lucrative business in commercial news services, 
,. or, in some 
way threaten them. The bureau chief persuaded 
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the, London office to take the same view, and the trip to 
Peking was never made. This-is a clear example of how 
the anticipation of 'a reprisal can affect an agency's. 
coverage in the direction of submission to the local 
coercive power. 
The purpose of the complaint may notso much'reflect 
annoyance about any particular report, but may. be part 
of a government's policy to create anxiety among pressmen. 
An agency source. in Saigon quoted a government spokesman 
in. a dispatch as saying that negotiations. between the 
Vietcong and South Vietnamese. after the ce'asefire' would 
be held in Saigon. The government objected. on the basis 
that the statement had not been made. The respondent was 
able to. show that. the 'statement-had in fact been'made - 
and received an apology. ', His interpretationýof this 
incident was that it had followed-aprior government 
decision to be tough with'the press during' the period. in 
question. The government, in effect, was warning newsmen* 
to be careful to represent its position, -in, the negotiations 
accurately. In such: a way--can a government deliberately 
create. anxiety amongst newsmen by. upsetting'their notions 
of what is or is not acceptable, forcing them-to be part- 
icularly cautious by making--the impliCit-rules of the 
information game seem. arbirary and subject to sudden change. 
, 
Not all complaints` made by governments `are heeded. Whether 
they are or not. depends'to some extent. on'the-particular' 
.. bureau,. but mostly on 
the general journalistic consensus 
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concerning the'likelihood of. government, reprisals. This 
consensus will be influenced by the objective conditions 
of media suppression. . 
Respondents in Columbia and Mexico, 
for example, were comparatively light-hearted about 
government media regulations in the belief that effective 
reprisals would not be, taken. " 
. Some 'reprisals have, , already 
been. considered as distinct 
phenomena: censorship and access; control. These are 
sometimes inspired by a. spirit of retaliation against the 
press or certain sections of it. -But:: severe irritation 
with. particular newsmen is generally expressed. by expulsion. 
This sanction-: can. be more . serious for an agency than for 
a newspaper. 
An. agency executive who had once been. in.. charge. of a'London 
bureau and with responsibility also for the Middle East 
and Africa,, recalled how he had been asked. by. the South 
African-government to remove a correspondent whose reports 
. on 
the Sharpeville massacre had caused-it displeasure. 
The-respondent-sald. that he: had agreed. to have the 
correspondent in question. 
replaced, and commented:. 
"It is an unfortunate-; fact of life. The 
agencies must compromise. They have . 
to 
keep , their. -. bureau.; 
They have more to . 
lose than the newspaper which flies a man 
in- for, a' few. days and'who then goes home 
to write up his story. "11 
"The same- respondent added-that 
though agency reporters 
"-are-impartial when, reporting, news situations-such as the 
,; Sharpeville 
massacre, they:. may. not. be encouraged to 'dig'. 
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-behind the superficial phenomena in the: same way as they 
might beelsewhere where the risks were less. 
In fear presumably of more extensive retaliation, and in 
recognition of the likelihood that acorre'spondent who 
is considered 'persona non grata' by"the established 
sources may find it difficult to report what is considered 
to be the basic news of the day,. -the. agency in the above 
example decided to compromise, and thereby to maintain its 
capacity to"report at least some of the news,.. --The result 
of such compromise-is that certain kinds of information 
are not pursued. by the agencies in certain countries. 
But stories do break which are of-"considerable. importance 
in the agency's estimation, and which it will report even 
if subsequent reprisal seems inevitable. In, such 
-circiunstances the risk is taken-because there is_compet- 
ition from other media, and if an agency, as with any 
newspaper, is seen to be playing'-too, -safe, it may well 
lose ground' to its rivals. This is perhaps', especially 
the case with a news'agency, since'"there-are'relatively 
few organizations engaged in they-task of collecting news 
on a world-wide`scale, and since so many clients are 
dependent on it, any. hint that: it is making too many 
compromises, as 'shown '. by the.. output of-ý comPeting media, 
would be very damaging to the agency's reputation. Agency 
journalists are well schooled into consideration of the 
competition factor, 'though this is more evident 'in the case 
of-the U. S. agencies, which are competing inýa very big 
way on their domestic market, than with the-European 
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agencies, whose-domestic markets arerelatively secure. 
; Some discretion remains.. of course as to whena'story is 
considered important enough for risks to be taken,, and 
though-implicit. policies. may exist based on the customary 
practice in similar situations,. the individual agency. 
journalist-mayoccasionally take a , risk which his, colleagues 
would avoid. 
This would seem to be'the case in the following example 
where an agency respondent in a"Latin American country was 
'expelled for his coverage'of the kidnappingof a'European 
ambassador, ': on.. the grounds that he had made illegal contact 
,: witha-guerilla: group. 
The respondent had feared. that 
the-government was, about: to risk a shoot-out: with the 
_, guerillas,, "at'the probable expense of 
the, ambassador's 
life. The ambassador was. a known homosexual and had thus 
- lost. respect'in establishment circles. " 
The-respondent 
-hoped that publicity might; 
deter the government from a 
rash move.,. and went ahead with: his story. in the:: belief that 
he-personally would suffer;. reprisal_rather. than'the agency 
.,. as. -such... -He 
did'not allow: his assistant to write up-the 
story, =since this man. was, a foreign national, ' an-Argentinian* 
''Peronist, whose. politics were suspect to the regime. He 
. "arranged'that'hi: s assistant 
take refuge: in-a friendly 
embassy: for fear that a reprisal-against him would. be more 
: serious- than- against the respondent himself. - 
The seriousness with"which-an'expulsion"is treated by the 
foreign press corps will', depend on., local conditions. 
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Occasionally an expulsion, or series of expulsions, will 
set the. 'ground rules' for some time : to"come, as happened 
in Kenya according to one respondent there, who reported 
there had been no expulsions since a rash of them before 
1969, and that since then the press as a whole had learnt 
to avoid mention of certain sensitive areas, such as the 
existence of internal power struggles within the ruling 
political party of Kenya's one-party state, KANU. 
A correspondent will often know when'an expulsion order 
has to be taken seriously, or when it requires only 'mock 
deference'. One respondent in Bangkok simply left the 
country when the authorities presented him with the 
choice of promising 'good behaviour' or expulsion. When 
he returned two weeks latter 'the incident seemed. forgotten. 
The threat of violence in any situation ', can be a powerful 
deterrent. Intimidation against locally: rec]uited staff, 
for example, or the possibility of it is often afactor 
of some concern to an agency bureau chief. The foreigner 
is usually a more difficult subject for reprisal than a 
national,, since he is more. visible to the foreign press 
corps as awhole, and in a better position to exploit 
any diplomatic embarrassment that might follow from press 
-suppression. " Western '. agency staff tend to take-respons- 
ibility for any stories likely to cause:: domestic controv- 
ersy. In Egypt, the agencies-are (1972) obliged to 
employ locally-recruited staff, -except 
for-the bureau 
chiefs, because of the difficulty of obtaining sufficient 
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work. permits for more than one foreignerb One bureau 
chief in Cairo reported that his staff were all under some 
form-of government pressure or_influence, buthedid not 
know the extent to which this was so. As a result he 
personally write: up any story. of. possibly contro- would 
versialsignificance. He admitted that concern for the 
well-being of his staff tended to, dampen news-gathering 
-. 
initiative. 
An alternative to physical intimidation is commercial. 




Iri South America it typically takes the, form of hurting 
the, agencies' distribution to local clients in some way. 
Reprisals, and the possibility of reprisals, oblige the 
agencies to accommodate. with those sources, that have the 
power: to sanction, and such sources are. very often. the. 
established political, elites. .. 
The nature. of such 
accommodation is more, extreme the more forceful are the 
means and the-direction-, of media suppression, so that the 
-most,. obvious-forms of accommodation occur 
in one-party 
" states, dictatorships and the. pseudo democracies. 
Accommodation occurs in the democracies`as well, but here 
the, existence of opposition : parties, the legitimacy 
allowed non-governmental interest groups,. and the relative 
freedomof commercial enterprise, force many sources, 
. especially political sources, 
into less direct means of 
---press and 
media manipulation. In. such countries it is: 
the abundance of available information very often which 
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limits the agencies rather than its absence, in the sense 
that agency resources are consumed in the pursuit of 
relatively legitimate and routine kinds of information, 
rather than in the kind of digging and enterprise reporting 
which is supposedly the province of the popular-and'the 
elite press, though agencies do indulge in more such 
reporting now than they did. In such countries asthese 
the agencies depend very heavily on the local media, and 
their coverage reflects the quality of the local media. 
In all countries the agencies observe the press rules 
which have the strength of legislation behind them. In 
Great Britain, for instance, according to an AP-source, 
the Official Secrets Act is respected by the agencies. 
-Local libel laws a1re observed: these in fact may-be more 
limiting to an agency°than to a single foreign correspondent 
since the agency distributes in many countries and will 
therefore need to be careful that asingle story does not 
contravene the libel laws of any of the countries in 
which it distributes. In India, after the introduction 
of press censorship in 1975, °the agencies explicitly chose 
to stay on, thereby giving implicit' obeisance to the new 
controls, even though many newspaper correspondents were 
withdrawn on the grounds that no compromise with the new 
controls could be tolerated. " Like-'newspaper and other 
media correspondents,. agency journalists, also generally 
respect the 'ground rules' est'ablished in particular 
reporting situations between sources and press journalists. 
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In-'the-democratic"'countries, observance of legislation 
affecting' press coverage generally indicates ' the limit 
of: formal accommodation to sources. -This. does not mean 
-that informal accommodation, 
-does not occur in certain 
areas of news-gathering between news sources and journalists. 
For in such countries, sources have' become"especially 
adept in informal means of media manipulation. ' 
In many other. 'countries, quite apart from local press 
legislation, agencies reportýa certain degree of' 
accommodation: on certain 'sensitive issues', which 
follows : from` an' awareness of the kinds: of informal 
censorship and intimidation-which may occur if they do 
not compromise. This occurs at, various levels of openness. 
In Manila, '-one respondentreported'that in compliance 
'with general political pressure on the foreign press corps 
after Martial Law, and after the period-of complete censor- 
ship was over, he did not 'source his information indirectly 
- to"-'political sources' 
or 'observers', `for example. 
Since'it,:. was very difficult- to get permission to 'source 
-information directly to sources, 
unless it was either 
harmless or, positive for the government, ` this compliance 
represented a considerable degree"", of self-censorship. 
The Secretary for National Defenoe had said that it did 
not really matter. what the foreign press said so long as 
it sourced'all-its information directly. Occasionally 
as another respondent pointed out, -'it was- possible to 
-contravene-. the implicit. 
understanding and get away with it: 
a press.. trip had been arranged by the army to the southern 
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island of Mindanao where an 'unholy alliance' reigned between 
Moslems and Maoists who were. fighting against. the dominant 
Christian political establishment. At a military briefing 
there, two captured 'rebel' leaders were produced.. The 
briefing officers limited the amount of :, information which 
the journalists were to be allowed to attribute to these 
sources. One agency however went ahead to use indirect 
sourcing as well in an attempt to build up as full a 
picture as possible of the military situation on the 
island. No reprisal occurred, and the other agencies felt 
free to do the same. At this time, it. was still required 
of the. agencies that they submit their copy of any day to 
the Department of Press Information after it, had been 
, 
filed.. One respondent found this was a protection as well 
as a possible restraint,. since it affordedhim useful 
support if his copy had been changed in any way; by his head 
office after he had filed, it. 
Respondents interviewed in Taiwan reported several 
'sensitive. issues' which itwas. necessary to, treat with 
the utmost caution or to avoid altogether,. . _; 
These were: 
local political factionalism, instances of hostility in 
the relationship between mainland. Chinese, and indigenous 
Taiwanese, corruption'in, the administration, stories 
concerning the families of the,, -political-elite, stories 
critical of the government's anti-communist policy, and 
stories concerning the health of ; Chiang Kai-Chek. in his 
late years. -Similar issues in Thailand. were those to 
do with'the King, top government officials, the Buddhists, 
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the separatist movement in the South, cases of corruption 
not already taken up officially by the government's anti- 
corruption. agency (described by one respondent as 'a face- 
lift exercise), opium trade, Thai communists, U. S. involve- 
ment, the Thai military activities in relation to the 
country's neighbours, and foreign relations. A respondent 
made mention of a top American newspaper journalist who 
was made 'persona non grata' in retaliation against an 
article he wrote on the 'hypocricy' of Thai smiles. In 
fact, this respondent said, the 'smile' for Thais is an 
expression of many different moods, not simply of friend- 
liness or humour. 
Caution in coverage of Singapore's prime. minister Lee Kuan 
Yew, was reported by several respondents. Although access 
to the prime minister was considered good, the press, 
generally was careful not to quote his comments at press 
conferences before being given the go-ahead by the inform- 
. ation office. 
In this way, Lee was protected from reports 
of typically bombastic off-the-cuff remarks made by him 
during such conferences. Caution was also exercised in 
coverage of the island's-political and racial affairs. 
A respondent based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, reported 
that it was impossible to write storiesof"any criticism 
against the kingship, a titular role meant to symbolize 
Malay unity. Three people had' been arrested for making 
statements to the effect that the kingship was a waste 
of money, including the editor and deputy editor of a 
leading Malay paper. It was also impossible to write 
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anything''of negative implication about the. status of 
Malay as. a national language, or to question citizenship 
rights, or do anything that could be interpreted as an 
attempt to promote civil strife. Such interpretation, 
was left to the discretion of the police and attorney' 
general. Caution had to be exercised generally-over, 
coverage of the country's local political affairs. -. Over 
time however, it was possible to store up apt quotes from 
diverse sources representing the full spectrum of possible 
up-a good but ; irreproachable opinions in order to write 
interpretive article. 
One of the principal difficulties. of coverage in the 
Philippines as we have seen was'thesituationin the 
South. Since Martial Law, few residential respondents 
had been allowed. tovisit the area alone, unless through 
a military organized press trip. Reports gathered from 
local Filipinos who. had travelled there could not be used 
because of the. ban on indirect sourcing. 
A respondent in. Istanbul at the time of interview slate 
in 1971, while Turkey was still under Martial'Law,. reported 
that although he knew torture was a`widespread practice 
amongst the police andthe. army, against those' dissident 
army officers, civilians and students. who'had been held 
under detention. since March of that year, it was 'more 
than it was worth' for him to report cases of torture. 
This illustrates how good access,, which was also reported 
of top sources by an Istanbul, respondent, is not necessarily 
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accompaniedby. a sense of. freedom to report whatever 
there is to report. 
Accommodation occurs not only on outgoing copy but also 
in relation to incoming-files. .. 
A. respondent in Manila 
reported that although. incoming stories went direct to 
clients rather than through the agency bureau, the New 
York and Hong Kong bureaux had been warned to strike off 
any doubtful items, or to arrange-that they should be 
sent first to the bureau 
in Manila for manual inclusion 
on the local distribution network if 
necessary. 'Doubt- 
full 'stories were those which might have provoked 
governement'reprisal. A respondent in Malaysia reported 
that 'incoming stories had to be watched in case some were 
not suitable for local distribution. One such story 
concerned a report of, riots by. Javanese-in Indonesia 
against new school taxes. The wording had to be changed 
from 'Javanese' to'Indonesian' to avoid any implications 
of racialism. In many countries incoming reports are 
distributed locally by government-controlled national 
news agencies, in which case the removal of offending 
items is no problem. 
The Significanceof Accommodation 
The existence of the kind of accommodation which has been 
illustrated in the above paragraphs. needs to be viewed 
in a context of other factors: 
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1. In the first place, news of, events and of 
people which agency correspondents do not 
feel free to report may yet be reported 
by newspaper or other media correspondents 
who have less to fear from retaliation, and 
who may actually write up their'stories 
after they have left the country. concerned. 
2. Secondly, stories obtained by agency men which 
they do not. feel free. to use may : be passed on 
to other media correspondents who can use them. 
.A respondent 
' reported such a case.. in Saigon, 
when the story which he felt would be damaging 
to the agency was passed, on to anewspaper 
correspondentwho_was due to. be expelled. in 
the near future. 
3. There are some stories which may not easily 
be. reported as 'hot news but may be 
reported in gentler fashion and expressed 
more discreetly, en passant, in the occasional 
round-up pieces or feature articles, which 
an agency reporter, might write once in a month. 
4. It is always possible for the informed "° 
reader. to, 'read. between the lines'. 
This, last point is in fact a crucial factor in considering 
the merit of reporting-from countrieswhere there exists 
a certain amount of media suppression. ., 
The reader is 
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obliged to. some extent to educate himself into reading 
news reports of the; world,. to accept an active engagement 
with the material presented him : rather. than a , passive 
acceptance of it.,, And the. journalistic community, agency 
as well as other correspondents, need to train their readers 
into interpreting their own material, by being more open 
than they, are about their methods. of reportage, about the 
significance of,. the. style: they use: to report certain kinds 
of incidents, and the exact meaning of their methods of 
indirect-sourcing.,: This is perhaps. more. important than 
-editorializing, 
'which may: help., explain the. event, while 
still maintaining. in obscurity the methods,, rationale and 
values which enter; into., the assessment ; and: evaluation of 
reports of. that event from. a medium's own-reporters. The 
coverage of a: fairlystandard event-may in fact,, if read 
.. closely, say. a: 
lot about a country-which might not emerge 
-; in any direct way from other reports. Agency coverage 
of the two week session of the Indonesian People', s Congress 
for instance in. 1972ýwas able to illustrate,,, the supreme 
power of. President Suharto and his cabinet,. the main 
threats to that, power as evidenced by Suharto's on 
policies concerning internal economy,, foreign relations 
and-subversion,, the major internal problematic areas 
including corruption, and the hold of the military over 
the political machinery. All of this . was. reported 
legitimately enough through attendance at the session, and 
from local media. Any one of the items would have been 
difficult to deal with in isolation, and at any real depth. 
And whilst depth too was lacking in coverage of the items 
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brought up at this largely rubber-stamping political 
occasion, it was certainly possible for an educated reader 
to assimilate from these reports an up-dated and reasonable 
socio-economic outline of the character of Indonesian 
society.. 
Western reporting of Moscow and Peking is based very much 
on reading-between-the-lines thinking, and although this 
method has pursueda great number of false leads it has 
also often correctly identified major political, economic 
and social changes. This approach to reporting is not 
new to the newspaper-reading public since by custom 
Journalistshave been very open about reporting conditions 
in communist countries, and it has suited cold-war ideology 
and values to stress the difficulties of reporting from 
them. In other. parts of-the world the machinery-of 
reporting is not discussed so readily by journalists, nor 
the ways in which they overcome obstacles. -to obtaining 
information. It is necessary for the newspaper reader 
therefore to learn how to read between the lines of the 
reports that appear in his, own newspaper from foreign 
correspondents, just as some of those reports are them- 
selves exercises in reading between the lines. 
Summary 
This chapter has explored some of the most significant. 
ways in which news-sources can control the flow of 




CHAPTER TWELVE:. The News as it Comes 
1. Elimination and Specification 
Perhaps the most; characteristic feature of agency news 
flow is. the", high rate of elimination of news stories as 
they pass-through the system. The high fall-out. of 
news was demonstrated in an early content analysis study 
over five -days, reported _by Cutli. p in 1954.. He found 
that as much as, 98%. of all the news copy. received by AP's 
national. office. in: New York could be eliminated, by the 
time it had been filtered through the bureau, manager 
responsible for the trunk-wire, the. state wire manager, 
the newspaper editor and,. finally, the reader himself. 
Trunk wire editors received between 100,000 and 250,000 
words a day, and of these they selected about 283 news 
items or 57,000, words each news cycle. " When these 
arrived in the Wisconsin state bureau,. the 283items 
were reduced to 77 and added to another 45 items of 
`state_news.. to make7up the state, wire, of some 20,000 
words. Four. Wisconsin dailies selected and used some 
74, items from the state wire, or about 13,000 words. 
Of the total_. number. of stories, reprinted from. the state 
wire in any of. these newpapers, the average reader would 
look at only 15 stories totalling some 2,800 words at 
length .;, 
The most-important link in this chain is the central desk 
of the agency'-s; head. office, where the, most wordage is 
received, and at, which the 'trunk': wires are compiled. 
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In the distribution of foreign news this_is often the last 
internal editorial stage. 
The elimination process is accompanied by a heightening 
of content selectivity for specific market requirements, 
and this is especially refined in the services of the 
American agencies for their-domestic clients. At each 
stage of the downward flow, from trunk'to state to news- 
paper levels, certain categories of news increase as a 
percentage of the total and others decrease in importance. 
Within the total news 'hole', this is also-true of the 
foreign news category, ' which in Cutlip's 'study declined 
from 18.8% of the datelines at the trunk level to 9.4% 
in the state wire and 8% in the Wisconsin newspapers. 
More recently, Al Hesteralso'looked at the flow of AP 
-international news into Wisconsin over 14 days, -. 
2 
He 
studied both the 'A' and 'B' trunk wires; ' about one 
quarter'of the 'A' wire and slightly less'lof: --the-IBI 
wire was given over to international news. This was 
reduced to less than a fifth on the state wire. Remark- 
ably, the stat'e"wire editor did not use any- of the I BI 
trunk wire news,. which contained'more interpretive and 
background news than the 'A' wire. State wire editors 
tended to cut those stories which did not involve U. S. 
interests, considerably more than those stories in which 
there was a major U. S. angle, and reinforced. the. accentu- 
ation on thdý-trünk wires of-newsfrom developed countries, 
which accounted for about three quartersof all. -foreign 
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news carried. Wisconsin dailies used about 30.5% of the 
foreign items they received over,, the state wires, and this 
material represented only of their. news space. 
Most of the content-analysisstudies, of agency services 
have concentrated on the distribution process within the 
United States, and most of them are about : the American 
agencies, ýwith. AP attracting (or perhaps. permitting) the 
most attention., There are few studies which directly 
compare the output of-one agency with another. 
. 2. Content-Emphases: 1953 
The major exception to this was the IPI J study published 
in 1953.3 This study examined the flow of news into 
the United States, Western Europe and India: ý" 
(i) Agency News into the United States 
Four major agencies were examined, "J including 
Reuters and the now defunct INS. These agencies 
transmitted the. equivalent of 453 to 770 news- 
paper columns of foreign news over the period 
of study - four separate weeks in 1951-52. 
Between two thirds and three quarters of all 
stories were about a handful of countries: 
Korea and 'Internationaland' (e. g. the UN and 
NATO) in the lead, followed by the U. K., France, 
West Germany, Japan and Italy. Most of the 
copy was relatively , 
heavy, about twothirds of 
it concerning war, - politics, foreign: relations, 
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defence, and economics: while human interest, 
crime, disaster and sports accounted for 22%, 
and cultural, educational, scientific, -' technical, 
religious, judicial and legal subject matters' 
accounted for 12%of-the total. 
American newspapers. tended to concentrate on the 
same major geographical'areas as the agencies, ' 
but gave less: of. their. total foreign news 'hole' 
to the top seven` countries of the agency'files. ' 
About two thirds of their, coverage was concen- 
trated on foreign relations, war and". politics, 
in this and the other categories differing in 
emphasis from the agencies, 'but not greatly. 
In-fact the newspapers sampled actually gave 
more emphasis rather than less to the kinds of 
'official news' which were mainly characteristic 
of. the agency wires as well. 
The geographical emphasis of newspapers and the 
agencies seemed, to reflect readers' interest, 
with the major exception that readers wanted 
more news of Russia than appears to have been 
actually provided at this time. 
(ü) Agency News into Europe 
Five agencies transmitting news into Europe were 
studied, ' including AFP. ' These agencies transmitted 
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a total of some 135,000 foreign news words 
each day, ranging from, 12,000to 43,000 
depending-on the agency. But in most West 
European countries, the trunk wires were 
cut down at the level either of, the agency's 
local bureau, or through a national news 
agency, and the maximum percentage of the 
trunk wire which was retransmitted was 
51.5%.. Even for the same agency there was 
a tremendous range in the wordage transmitted 
from one bureau or national agency. to an- 
other: from 5,450 words a day,. in one instance, 
toalmost- 15,000'in another. 
Of all foreign news on these trunk, agency wires 
for Western Europe, news of the United States 
accounted for between 17.5% and 62.6% of the 
total, depending. on. the agency. This'percentage 
generally.. increased in the process of retrans 
mission from the level of national bureau or 
agency. Like. the services received in the 
United States, these agency services tended to 
focus heavily, 'on. politics, economics, foreign 
relations,, defence and war, which accounted for 
between-,. 63.5% and 77.8% of all foreign news on 
the trunk, wires, --and generally increased as a 
percentage, of the total. retransmitted, where the 
range was between 62% and 86%. 
766. 
Few countries fared anywhere-near as well as 
the United'States on these wires. News about 
Germany for instance accounted for between 1.9% 
and 6.6% of all foreign news on the trunk wires, 
but increased to between 4.9% and 11.5% in the 
process of retransmission. Three quarters or 
more of all German news fell into'the 'heavy' 
news categories of; politics, economics etc. 
Developing countries fared worst`of all, unless 
they, happened to be-'the' scene of major political 
struggle. India was represented very poorly: 
only between 0.1% to 1.2% of all news was about 
India on the trunk wires, although this some- 
times increased in the process of retransmission 
where the percentage range was between 0.3% and 
2'. 6/. 
News of other West European countries was also 
measured. Of all agency foreign news going to 
West Germany, that-concerned France, the U. K., 
Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, most was devoted to the U. K. and France, 
which accounted for between 29% = 43%, and 
31% 51% respectively; whereas Sweden's range 
was only 1% - 4%, and Belgium's 1% 
This news was rather less 'heavy' than in the 
other cases, 'the major categories of politics, 
international. relations etc. ' accounting for 
only 57% - 76%, perhaps indicating that news 
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requirements become increasingly differentiated 
with cultural and geographical proximity. 
(iii) Agency News into India 
Four agencies were considered: the. Press Trust 
of India, which ; took most. of.. 
its foreign news 
from Reuters; United Press of. India. which 
took its foreign, news-from AFP;., UPI, and 
another British agency, Near and; Far;. East 
News, now defunct. 
These agencies together transmitted some 32,000 
words a day of foreign news into India. About 
two thirds of all this news was news of the 
'West', and of this between a quarter and a 
third was. news of the United States, and the 
rest was'mainly news of Western Europe, with 
news of Britain predominating. As elsewhere, 
around three quarters of all coverage was 'heavy'. 
Indian papers tended to use proportionately less 
U. S. news than their agency sources, but around 
61% of all foreign news in the average Indian 
paper was. 'western, news. 
(iv) Summary of the IPI 1953 Study 
This-study demonstrated the heavily western 
character. of news coverage by the major, '. 
-agencies, %regardless of 
the area'of ý distribution. 
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But. even amongst the western countries some 
got much more attention than others, notably 
the United States. Foreign news other than 
'western news' tended to be news of. areas where 
the interests of western powers were intimately 
engaged', notably Korea. In all cases, the 
major content categories were news concerning 
politics,, economics, foreign relations, defence 
and war, which accounted for around two thirds 
to three quarters of total foreign'news in all 
cases. 
3.1953 - 1974 
There has been no duplication of the 1953 study. Most 
of the content analysis studies since that date have 
concentrated on the American market. But these studies 
do not indicate very radical changes in the relative, 
emphases of foreign news presentation for newspaper 
consumption. 
Cutlip's period of. study, 1952-3, just succeeds that of 
IPI. Cutlip did not give a detailed breakdown of 
foreign news, but he showed that 40% of the trunk wire 
was news of government, politics and foreign affairs, 
followed by economic news, which accounted for 18%. 
These categories therefore accounted for almost two 
thirds of the total. The next most important category 
after that was sport Whereas 'official news' 
declined as a percentage of the total on the state wire 
I 
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to about half, ., sport news . 
increased to 22%. As for other 
areas of coverage, -Cutlip concluded.. that there "is still 
a big. gap between wire content and the., interests and 
lives of newspaper, readers" .4 There was. only one item 
on music, for example, in the. five days studied,. although 
U. S. newspaper readers. spent 125 million dollars a year 
on classical music and concerts, more than three times 
the 40 million dollars, then spent on professional baseball. 
There was not a single line on hunting and fishing in the 
period-of study, although more than 16 million persons spent 
33 million dollars for fishing licenses in the United States 
. 
in 1952, and., 14 million spent 37 million dollars, for hunting 
licenses.. 
Adams. studied AP's. trunk , wire 
for a . month 'of weekdays in 
.,, 
the: period 1963=45, focusing specifically on differences 
between, foreign and domestic news, content. - Almost 38% 
ofthe -, total datelines 
(1,521) were, foreign. Foreign 
dateline stories were-. less specifically. sourced. than 
domestic, were more. likely.. tobe about '., serious' issues 
of. politics,. and, economics etc., and less likely, to be 
: written in. featurestyle, confirming the evidence in the 
IPI -and. -Cutlip. studies of, 
a relatively ; high degree of'' 
-'heaviness' in'foreign news coverage'. There was evidence 
that "the charge that foreign news stories tend to be`'too 
-much' concerned with straight,, unrelieved news'. treatment" 
was. correct. Domestic news was slightly more likely to. 
be.. '. sensational. ''. defined: broadly., to include, stories about 
controversy. of: any kind,, illness,. death, violence., 
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accidents, 'riots, strikes, crime, "and any other type of 
story "which would appeal. essentially to the emotions 
rather than to the intellect". Overall there were more 
sensational than non-sensatiönal stories, sensational, 
stories-accounting for 59.4% of foreign stories and 62.4% 
of domestic stories. Since the difference was not. 
significant there was no support for the charge of excess 
sensationalism in foreign news. 
Politics, war and economics accounted for 37% of domestic 
stories in Adams' study and 51% of foreign stories. 
Sports stories were ignored in his study so'that these 
percentages are on the high side, but nevertheless there 
is a remarkable constancy over time in the importance 
attached to these kinds of 'official' and 'serious' news 
on agency wires. Coverage tended'to be concentrated in 
certain countries as well as certain regions., The most 
heavily represented were-'the United Kingdom, Germany, the 
U. S. S. R. and the Vatican City, accounting for 33% of. the 
total. ' Among the worldregions Western Europe accounted 
for 45% of all foreign stories, followed by Asia (19.2%) 
and Latin America (9%). In the decade 1953-64,, therefore, 
no major changes in balance occurred'in U. S. agency wire 
content. 
The Hester study6 six years later analysed. the, foreign 
: news content-of AP wires in'a rather different way:. by 
looking at the proportion of news about : developed as 
opposed to developing countries; as anticipated, the. 
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developed countries.. go. t most "of the attention, and this 
-, attention remained fairly constant in their-favour in 
retransmission at. state level. News of the developed 
nations'wasdominated by news of'countries with which 
''the' United States had: direct relations, accounting for 
almost half the total.. in-, this. 'categoryon. the'. ', trunkwires, 
and increasing on the state wire: News from less developed 
nations was more 'dispersed, but items from Vietnam (the 
'Korea' 'of the sixties) predominated.. ', The major, content 
categories. were 'military `defence, foreign , 
relations, `and 
=., domesticrgovernment'politics, which accounted for over 
'half-they news about 'developed nations 'on the: -: trunk wires. 
and just 'under half. "at'. the state , wire level.. News of the 
developing nations was even more: dominated by this kind 
of news , 'which accounted'; for . 
as much : as' " 84% ' of. the 'total 
on the. 'A' wire, -and6 3.1%'of the ! B' wire, and 80.3% 
>of the state wire. This reflects, theIPI, study's indic- 
ation of greater. differentiation. 'in newsabout culturally 
or geographically proximate areas'(i. n this case, the 
"-'developed countries). '' 
=In contrast to' these studies which are concerned exclusively 
with=the AP'and with the Amer can'. market, there is one 
published study 'Of the material'. -provided: 
by the; agencies, 
mainly Reuters and. AFP, to the"' agencies7, 
covering 11' days in the spring of 1970, `very 'close in time 
to 'the' Hester study. This.. c6nfirmed; one finding of Adams' 
.. analysis in 196, -'the relative obscurity. or`, non-specificity 
of agency sourcing (in contrast to,., the- emphasis given to 
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the, ', importance of sourcing by agency journalists in interview) 
Almost 45% of Reuters items gave no acknowledgement of 
source, and in a further 9% of cases the source was un- 
identified. AFP was similar, while DPA''s sourcing was 
even more unspecific (66% of items unidentified. by source 
or source not acknowledged). 
Most of. the news items were accounted for by the major 
western cities and Moscow, Europe accounting for 30% of 
the incoming agency material, North America for a further 
12%. Western Europe and North America therefore accounted 
for over 40% of the whole, but this is rather less-than 
the kind of percentages quoted forwest Europe-in the 1953 
IPI study, indicating a-. relative decentralization of interest 
since that time, at least amongst the European agencies. 
About three quarters of the content was 'serious'. or 
'official' news relating to politics, war, international 
relations, 'defence and economics. 
Many of the content analysis studies have tried to 
analyse content at different stages of the news flow: 
comparing, for, instance, trunk wires with state wires. 
= One unusual study has sought to include the initial stage, 
looking-atinitial bureau transmission of news to the 
editorial desks. Although this again is about the. AP, 
it is one of%, the few studies which considers news of a 
"world region other than North America or. Europe, and, 
which includes systematic. interviewing of bureau personnel 
.. outside of 
the United States. 
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Hester traced the news-flow from South American bureaux 
to New York for 
,a 
three week period in 1971.8 Four 
bureaux in particular were studied, but transmission from 
10 bureaux were included in the content analysis. In 
the four main bureaux some 15 staff members were responsible 
for about 57% of the total South American wordage trans- 
mitted from all the bureaux to. New York during the study. 
In the three week, period of study some 1,636 items were 
transmitted to New York, representing about a third of a 
million words. Principal transmitting points were Buenos 
Aires, Santiago, Caracas and Mexico. 
The main content, categories transmitted were, sport, foreign 
relations, domestic. government-politics, crime-and criminal 
violence. Thesecategories. together acco'uznted. for almost 
73% of the, news out of Latin America (excluding Brazil and 
the Caribbean. countries. ). Sport alone accounted for nearly 
a quarter of all items. Approximately four out of five 
of all items transmitted to New York from the bureaux were 
written by non-U. S.. citizens., Most of the stories were 
about one nation; in only about 15% of all items were there 
international linkages, ' and in over half of these cases 
. 
Latin American nations received primary emphasis. 
A great deal was lost in the process of retransmission. 
During the period of, study foreign news made up almost 
40% of AP's trunk wire in-the United States, and 12% of 
the 'B' wire. Latin American news accounted for about 
10% of the 'A' wire's foreign news (some 24,000 words), 
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and 12% of the 'B' wire's (8,000 words). Only 7.8% of 
the stories originally transmitted found their way onto 
the 'A' wire after New York had made its selection, and 
of the remainder only 3.1% were used on the 'B' wire. 
Latin America ranked well after Europe on the 'A' wire, 
which made up 38.5% of the total of foreign news; and 
Asia (25.8%), but ranked about equal with the Middle East. 
On the 'B' wire, Western European dominance was even more 
pronounced, accounting for 42.4% of all foreign items, 
followed by non-U. S. North American (15.9%), and Asia 
(14.1%) and then South America. On both wires, South 
America did better than Africa, Eastern Europe and 'Other' 
areas. 
Not only volume was affected by New York editing, but also 
the balance of content. Nearly half of all the items 
retransmitted on the 'A' wire were in one category: 
crime-criminal violence, although this category accounted 
for only around 14% in the original transmissions, and 
nearly one in three items on the 'B' wire were in this 
category. 
But in transmissions of South American news to non-U. S. 
destinations there was greater similarity of content 
balance between outgoing and incoming items. 
There were other ways in which New York simplified South 
American coverage. Items were shortened from an average 
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of 228 words to 202 words on the, 'A' wire and 187 words 
on-the 'B' wire. The range. of datelines was also cut. 
More than half the Latin American wordage on the 'A' wire 
came from only two bureaux - Buenos Aires and Santiago, 
although these bureaux accounted for only 35% of wordage 
transmitted. On the 'B' wire,, Mexico and Chile accounted 
for half the wordage. New York also gave disproportionate 
space, to"stories within which the primary emphasis was on 
the United States. 
The general breakdown of AP's domestic wires does not 
differ remarkably in Hester. 's study from other studies, 
but he does shed considerable light on the news editing 
process and is., one of. the, first to be able . to compare 
original transmissions , with, outgoing 
wire content. But sion. 
it is clear., that. theNew York editors perceive differences 
between the requirements of their domestic market and the 
. requirements of 
foreign markets. 
4. Comparative Study of Global Agency Wires: 1974 
For the purposes of the present study a comparative analysis 
of agency wires. wasundertaken: - the analysis was mostly 
done by a research assistant (Ms. Hazel Grayson) under-- 
the author's supervision. A second assistant-(Mr. Denis 
Holt) undertook some further analysis of one UPI. wire,. in 
addition to separate analysis of material from the New. 
York-Times News Service, -the U. K. 's Press Association, and 
Economic Service wires. Reuters The author, is responsible. 
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for the study design, writing up, and inter- 
pretat±on of the findings. A methodological description 
by Hazel Grayson is included in Appendix 1. 
The main part of the analysis consisted of a three day 
comparison of AFP and UPI 'UK' wires, and a five day 
comparison of two Reuter and two AP wires - Reuters South 
European and South African, AP's European and African 
respectively. A number of other wires were considered 
singly and/or for briefer periods of time. 
The principal aim of content analysis was. to provide some 
description of wire content'to illustrate and elaborate 
some of the themes explored in interview and questionnaire. 
The very act of description however involves some'kind of 
systematic ordering of perceptions and concerns: - 
Previous research had indicated a great deal of-continuity 
over time in agency balance of content between world 
regions and content categories. The researchers antic- 
ipated that this analysis would confirm such continuity. 
However, other evidence had indicated important differences 
in organization and market position between the agencies, 
and in their stress on the regionalization of news services. 
The researchers therefore predicted that there would be 
important differences between the agencies, and that these 
differences would reveal themselves partly in their. 
regional emphasis. 
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-They also predicted that within each agency there would 
be important differences between wires destined for 
. 
different markets. 
Because the agencies served international markets. it was 
predicted that their-primary emphasis , 
would, be news of 
an 'international', character, concerning two or more 
countries, rather than 'national', concerning only one 
country, specifically. Such news would be more, readily 
recognized as general 'marketable'. material by"agency 
journalists, and would, be used more by. clients, -, since 
. national 
media look for the foreign news that is somehow 
relevant-to their on country. 
Because agency bureaux are normally based in., capital 
cities, and because they. concentrate on people and 
organizations normally located in capital cities, it was 
predicted that dateline analysis would show heavy over-, 
representation of capital cities. 
Length 
-An initial attempt was made `to determine the 'relative 
lengths of a selection. of agency wires: this proved a 
difficult task in the time available, for there were 
many obstacles to describing 'average' wire lengths for 
whole days without actually counting each word and account- 
ing for the tabular presentation of many'sports and 
'economi'c news'stories. The results must therefore be 
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treated with extreme caution as only a very rough indication 
(see Table 23). ' Six wires are involved altogether: 
Reuters' South African, South European and U. K. wires; 
AP's European, African and Paris wires; and the U. K. 
wires of UPI and AFP. These wire lengths ranged from 
24,000 to 62,000 words a day. The lowest figure, 'for AP's_ 
Paris wire, indicates the likely reduction in length after 
translation of the trunk wire into French for local con- 
sumption, less than half the original. The other wires 
were 'trunk' wires, some of which would be received in 
their entirety by'direct clients, others to be translated 
or edited by national news agencies or local bureaux. 
A count of dispatches and 'stories' provided a more 
convenient, definition of'length for any one agencyibut 
because dispatches varied in average-length between 
agencies this definition was of only limited value for 
comparative purposes. A dispatch represents the single 
'telegram' item as it arrives over the teleprinter, and 
is normally distinguished by. an introductory headline and 
code markings. Details of date, time and dateline (source 
-of origin) are usually also provided. A dispatch does 
-not necessarily coincide with a 'story': there may be 
several dispatches recounting developments in. some 
particular incident, speech or catastrophe, and these 
together make up the 'story'. 
A wire which is shorter than another. in terms of words 
may be longer in terms of dispatches. The AP European 
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wire carried more words onýApril 5th,, 1974 than the 
Reuters South European wire carried on March 8th,. and 
-yet the Reuters'-wo re carried 15% more dispatches (see 
Table, 23) ._'. ' The'. average `length o'f . a. Reuters dispatch. 
. 
therefore appearstobe shorter than an AP dispatch. 
The number of dispatches on awire, `how'ever, is. not,: a 
clear indication of the number of stories, it carries. 
This was evident in the main comparative data. .... 
In three 
weekdays of April, from the 22nd. to 24th inclusive, UPI 
consistently carried 'more dispätches than AFP. UPI 
carried between 255 and 372, disPatches, --AFR carried 
between 241 and 287. (There. ` seems , 
to be. a tendency towards 
greater length each'day during the . course of ,a week). 
UPI carried a total of 936 dispatches, AFP a total of-814. . 
UPI therefore carried almost'15% more-dispatches than AFP. 
, However, in terms of the number , -of, distinct stories carried. 
by the two. wires, AFP carried by, far. the. greater number, 
thus indicating greater subject variety, and, more compre- 
hensive. coverage. 
During the week UPI carried between. 64 and 104 stories, 
AFPbetween 124 and 150 a day, the. respectivetotals, for 
the three days being. 256 and 418., AFPtherefore carried 
63.3% more stories. than. _UPI. In, addition, UPI carried 
more corrections and repeated dispatches than AFP. 
These accounted for 694. of UPI's dispatches,, and 3% of 
AFP. 's total. 
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TABLE TWENTY-THREE 
EXAMPLES OF WORDAGE. 
1. Reuters Wires: Friday 8th March, 1974 
words dispatches 
South European 
(EUS) 49,489 409 
South African 




2. Associated Press: Friday 5th April, 1974 
European (EUR). 53,907 357 
African . 
(AF) 61,932 397 
Paris 24,638 194 
3. Agence France, Presse: Friday 3rd Ma y, 1974 
United Kingdom 32,368 272 
4. United Press International: Friday 3rd May, 1974 
United Kingdom 38,125 305 
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Reuters' South African, (SAF) and South European (EUS)-wires 
. were compared 
with, AP's European. (EUR), and African (AF) 
wires for five. days of. August 197.4. AP's AF wire tended 
to carry more dispatches . 
than Reuters': SAF, and considerably 
more stories. Reuters, ' SAF carried 422 stories during 
the week, and AP's'AF carried 699. (Stories were defined 
on a dail basis: the count began afresh. for the beginning 
of each day. ) In percentage terms, AP's AF carried more 
stories during. the week than Reuters'SAF. However, AP's 
AF carried only, 3% more dispatches than Reuters' SAF. 
AP's EUR tended to carry more stories than Reuters''EUS. 
During the whole 
. <. ... lperiod it carried ä total of 602 stories, 
and Reuters' EUS had 528. AP's EUR therefore'` carried 14% 
more stories than Reuters. But Reuters carried' considerably 
more dispatches than AP, about 18% more. 
The AP African wire therefore carried-more dispatches: and 
stories than the Reuters South African wire. The AP 
European wire had a less dramatic lead over the Reuters' 
South European wire, and Reuters carried more dispatches. 
The European services of Reuters and AP appear tobe, much 
longer in dispatches than the ` services for the U. K. put 
out by UPI and AFP, although AFP compared well on stories. 
UPI tends to be longer than AFP in words-and dispatches,. 
but puts out far fewer stories. Comparing the UPI-AFP 
findings with those of the two Reuters wires for August, 
it is evident that UPI carried a 'similar number of stories 
as'Reuters'- South African wire (256 for UPI, compared with 
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238 for'the first three days of the Reuters' SAF sample), 
but many fewer than those carried by Reuters' EUS or the 
AP African and European wires (292,395,353 respectively). 
AFP, however, carried more stories in the space of three 
days than any of these wires: 418. 
Reuters'-Pilot 
A number of short pilot studies on Reuters' wires preceded 
the main analysis, and highlighted some of the general 
characteristics of agency wire content. The pilot began 
with a complete examination of the Reuters East African 
file for a one-day period in September 1972, which found 
that of 85 dispatches transmitted, 18 were repeats, and only. 
23 holly original stories in effect were represented. Of the 
-dispatches most originated from Western Europe (37 or 44%), 
followed by Africa (13), South America (8), the U. S. S. R. 
and Eastern Europe (5), Asia and the Pacific (4). 
Political stories accounted for over half the total, with 
sports accounting. for most of the remainder (but the 
Munich Games were then in session, and this factor might 
also have increased West European representation. ) 
By contrast the North European file for the same day was 
considered. This was made up of 127 dispatches, repre- 
senting not more than 38 distinct stories,. counting the 
Munich Games as a single story. Excluding repeats and 
corrections, 50 dispatches originated from Western Europe, 
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accounting for 39Y ofthe-total, followed by the United 
States-(14), South America'(9), Asia and the Pacific (4), 
Africa and Middle East (3). -'The North*European file 
'therefore' carried more stories and dispatches than the 
EastAfrican,, and Western Europe accounted for rather a 
lower` percentage of the- 
'whole. -Every third story-on two=other wires was also counted 
for short periods. On the South American wire, Western 
Europe also appeared to dominate, followed by the United 
`States, Asia and the Pacific; the United Nations`, Africa 
and`the Middle East, South America, the U. S. S. R. and 
Eastern Europe. But on the South East Asian-file over 
a three day period in December 1972, it was found that 
'dispatche. s from the Asian and'Pacific regions predominated 
on each day, with heavy concentration on Australia and 
New Zealand ('although further regional. stories would have 
been inserted in Singapore).. Western Europe. ranked next, 
followed. by the United States. 
These short studies gave some confirmation to Reuters' 
claim to be giving greater attention to the regions to 
which the 'wires were directed: Africa ranked second 
most important dateline on the'East Africa wire, -Western 
`Europe was `first on the North Europe 'file, and 'Asia-Pacific 
first on the South East Asian wire. But`the regions of 
West'Europe and North 'America were still Of great signific- 
ance on all wires, ranking. second if they did not rank. 
first. 
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On all the files examined, political-governmental stories 
accounted for well over half, "or in one case just under 
half of the total number of stories carried. -. There was 
also an apparent tendency to concentrate on; issues which 
were of. international. (concerning two or more countries) 
rather than national significance. Between half and two 
thirds of all political stories on the wires examined were 
international rather than national. 
Three other Reuters wires were examined in detail for one 
day: Monday 11th March, 1974. These were. the Reuters 
South African (SAF), South European (EUS), and U. K. wires. 
The U. K. wire carried the most stories of these wires: 
: 122 in comparisonwith EUS 
(109) and SAF (82)1'. but had 
slightly fewer dispatches than the EUS wire.. Each wire 
carried an additional 18-40 corrections, or repeats: there 
were fewest on the U. K. wire (18 or 5% of the. total 
dispatches), and heaviest on the EUS wire(40, ^or, 10% of 
all dispatches). There were 36 on SAF or 10% of all 
dispatches. 
Content, of the EUS and SAF wires was finely balanced 
-between 'national' and 'international' news. - 
The U. K. 
wire was dominated by- 'international' news. (i. e. news 
directly concerning two or more countries), which accounted 
for 62% of all dispatches,.; while 'national'.. news accounted 
for 35% of dispatches and , -a 
'mixed' category of national 
and international stories (where it was hard to apportion 
785. 
a story. to one or other category), accounted for 3%. 
'Dispatches were broken-down according to their place of 
origin as indicated in the dateline. Western Europe 
dominated all wires, accounting for between 33% of all 
dispatches on the UK wire* and 50% on the EUS. wire. 
The smaller proportion of dispatches from Western Europe 
on the U. K. wire reflects the fact that the U. K. wire 
does not carry U. K. stories (since these are carried by 
the Press Association for U. K. clients), and this reduces 
the number of West European dispatches. 
In the breakdown by dateline, the. number-of dispatches 
from each dateline was, recorded, and also the number of 
stories or parts of stories which these dispatches repre- 
sented. Since some stories had several datelines, the. 
total number of stories based on the addition of dateline 
stories was higher than for the, general -total based on 
theme alone. This makes it difficult to give a regional 
breakdown of stories as opposed to a breakdown of dispatches: 
it is possible to add up the total number of stories or 
parts of stories for each dateline, and for each set of 
datelines in each region, and compare the totals of each 
set, but a certain amount of double-counting is involved, 
and the figure for story breakdowns are not as meaningful 
as dispatch breakdowns. In what follows, story totals 
computed. from the 'stories or parts of stories' aggregates 
will be shown in inverted commas (e. g. 'stories) - to 
distinguish them from the 'straight count of stories computed 
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TABLE TWENTY-FOUR 
NATIONAL-INTERNATIONAL STORY. CHARACTER 
i% of all dispatches) 
Reuters Wires - 11th March 1974 
UK EUS SAF 
. National 35 48 47 
International 62 48 45 
Mixed 3 4 _8 
100% 100% 100% 
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directly from differences in theme. -The latter are more 
reliable than the. former. All percentages'are rounded. 
In very general terms, however, the breakdown 
by story 
reflects the. breakdown by'dispatch. In this way, Western 
Europe also dominated in terms of 'stories' as well as in 
, terms of dispatches on 
these wires, accounting for 34% of 
all'stories or -parts of stories' on the U. K. wire and 
47% of allEUS 'stories'. 
After Western Europe, South America ranked second in terms 
ýof dispatches on 
two wires, but North America accounted 
for a higher percentage of 'stories' on all three wires. 
The South American prominence wasdue largely to an on- 
going cricket story from the West Indies. Africa followed 
North America. in dispatch terms on all wires, but led 
slightly in story percentages'. '- The other regions, in order 
of importance, were the Middle East, Asia, Australasia and 
Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
In this analysis, Africa refers to all countries of the 
African continent; North America to Canada and the United 
States; South America'to Mexico, the Central American 
Republics, the Caribbean and the Latin American continent; 
Asia includes the' Far East and China, South-East Asia,,, 
Indian sub-continent; the Middle East ' includes all non- 
African Arab countries, 'Israel and Turkey; _' 
Western Europe, 
includes the United Kingdom, Eire, Scandinavia and all 
other non-communist countries in Europe; _. 
East Europe 
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includes the U. S. S. R. and all countries in. the European 
Communist block. 
.. An attempt was made to determine how similar these wires 
were to one another, by assessing the percentage of 
dispatches on any of the wires which appeared also on 
the other two wires. A low percentage would indicate 
a high degree of. dissimilarity between two wires. (In 
later analysis, similarity was calculated for stories 
rather than dispatches. ) 
Of, all the U. K. wire dispatches, 73% appeared. on the EUS 
wire, and between 529/6-62% appeared on. the SAF wire. Of 
all the EUS dispatches,. between 72% and 73% appeared on 
the U. K. wire, and 68% appeared on'the SAF"wire. Of all 
SAF dispatches, between 53% and 62% appeared . on: 
the U. K. 
wire, and 73% appeared on ihe. EUS wire. 
The EUS and UK appeared quite similar to each other - since 
over 70% of the material of each appeared on the other's 
wire. The degree of similarity, between the SAF wire and 
the U. K. 'was less. Between 52Y and 62% of the material 
of the'U. K. and SAF wires appeared on each other's wire. 
SAF and EUS wire's were, quite similar - once. again over 70% 
of their separate, contents appeared on each other's wire. 
. 
Even. a degree of dissimilarity . approaching' 
25% however, 
is reasonably great,, and indicates a certain marketing of 
material. foreach region. 
Where more than one percentage figure is given, this 
serves to illustrate the range of variation between 
different days. 
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This one-day. study of the-Reuters wires indicated therefore 
that the South African wire received-rather less material 
than the wires of the U. K. and EUS regions. The content 
of the wires. seemed balanced between 'national' and 
'international! news categories, except for the UK wire 
.. 
which was dominated by 'international'- dispatches, possibly 
because of the absence on that wire ofdomestic UK stories. 
Such domestic UK stories were found to be quite important 
for the'SAF wire where they accounted for half of the 
; Western European content-.. West Europe was the main 
region oforigin for stories and dispatches on all wires, 
followed by North America. The ordering-of other-regions 
was not the same on all wires, but it was clear that 
Eastern Europe, the Far East, Australasia and Oceania, 
each accounted for only small percentages of the total 
output. 
The wires showed a moderate degree of dissimilarity. 
There were some indications of marketing-type decisions. 
For instance, hardly any dispatches about cricket in 
the West Indies for Southern Europe, "whereas these 
pushed up the South Amercian category considerably on 
the UK and SAF wires, reflecting greater cricket interest 
in these regions. 
Actual measures of similarity showed that approximately 
75% of the content on EUS wires was identical or highly 
similar; and likewise, the SAF and EUS wires. There was 
greater dissimilarity between the UK and the'SAF wires. 
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But even 25% dissimilarity seemed-to the researchers quite 
significant. 
There was not great evidence of regionalization, ýoutside 
of Western Europe, to the extent that might have been 
anticipated by some Reuters claims. African stories 
accounted for about 10% of dispatches and 14% of stories 
on the SAF: wire, which was fewer than on the UK wire, 
and about the same as on the EUS wire.. However, it. is 
probable that African content. isincreased forthe'wires 
to Black Africa, and maintained at, 'European', levels for 
White South Africa, as indicatedin'the-pilot study of 
the. East 
, 
African wire and :a . recent study 
of Reuters' West 
African wire. 
9 
The Goegraphical Origins of Agency Coverage; 
The UK wires of AFP and UPI were examined for three days 
of April 1974: Monday 22nd April to Wednesday 24th April. 
Throughout this period, UPI consistently carried more 
dispatches than AFP, and AFP consistently carried more 
stories than UPI: 
The major region on the UPI wires was Western Europe, both 
in dispatches and in 'stories'. Western Europe accounted 
for 28% of UPI dispatches (and 32% of total of UPI -'stories 
or parts of stories'), excluding, repeats and corrections. 
One'might have expected UPI1 being an American agency, to 
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have led with North America, but . since UPI has a-European 
centre, aid a complex'multi-addressing, system, it is evident 
that it concentrates on primary market needs. Western 
Europe was. also the major region for AFP, accounting for 
28% of all AFP dispatches (and 27% of AFP stories or 
-parts of stories'). ' 
North America was clearly', the most important area after 
Western Europe for UPI, `in terms of the-, less. reliable 
indication of 'stories', although the Middle East originated 
more dispatches. This, was a time of acute tension in, 
the Middle East when relatively. few stories. would have 
given rise to many dispatches, which is what happens when 
a significant story'is-developing, quickly (e. g. 36. dispatches 
from Tel Aviv account for only 2 different storylines). 
North America accounted-for 20% of-all UPI-., dispatches- 
(and 27% of all ' stor-ies') . , 
The Middle. East 
, 
accounted 
for 21% of all dispatches (but only 11% of all 'stories'). 
For AFP the second most important region after Western 
Europe was Asia for. dispatches, but Africa for, stories. 
Asia accounted for: 20%'of; dispatches , (20% of 'stories') , 
whereas. Africa accounted for 19% of dispatches (22% of 
'stories'). On"the UPI wires, Asia accounted for only 
20% of dispatches (6% of 'stories'), and Africa for. 12% 
of dispatches, (9% of 'stories'). ' For AFP`the. Middle 
East accounted=for, 12%-of dispätches. (11%. of 'stories'). 
A further indication of"the relative importance of Africa 
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on the two wires lies in the representation of Egypt. 
Whereas well over half of the African material on the UPI 
wire is from Egypt, on the AFP wire Egypt is not especially 
prominent. In other, words, 'much of UPI's 'African' 
coverage is really coverage of the Middle East conflict. 
Although the Third World appears relatively well represented 
on the AFP wire, this does not extend to South America 
where AFP has a fairly strong news-gathering presence. 
South America-. accounts for only 3% of all dispatches 
(3% of 'stories'). On the UPI wire, South America accounts 
for 3% of all dispatches (5% of 'stories'). 
In Eastern Europe, UPI appears to give more extensive 
coverage than AFP, but the percentages and the figures 
they represent are too small for any firm statement. UPI 
committed 10% of all dispatches to'Eastern Europe (9% of 
'stories'), whereas on the AFP wire, Eastern Europe took 
only 6% of dispatches (6% of''stories'). This was 
contrary to expectation and may have been because Senator 
Kennedy was visiting Eastern Europe at the time, an event 
which would possibly have inspired more coverage from an 
American than from a Europe agency. Negligible coverage 
of Australasia and Oceania characterized the wires of 
both agencies. 
This geographical breakdown suggests therefore that the 
two agencies are very different in their relative emphases 
on the different world regions, although both place Western 
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Europe at the head of the : agenda. This is. contributory 
evidence to. the thesis that the world agencies. are not 
identical in their news-coverage. +Indeed,, relatively 
speaking as we shall see further,, AFP is close-to being, 
an 'alternative' agency, in the sense that it gives great 
importance, to, African and Asian datelines.:; -: Its coverage 
of Western Europe is slightly less in, proportionate terms 
than UPI's, and. it is less interested in North America, 
which on AFP wires accounts for only . 
11% of dispatches 
(11% of 'stories. ') by comparison. with UPI's 20% . (and 27%) 
figure., 
A separate analysis of UPI's UK wire for-five days from 
May 1st to, May 5th 1974 inclusive, provides. independent 
confirmation of the major trends for this wire. The 
procedure for geographical breakdown here was somewhat 
different. -inasfar as-each story was identified with a 
major, dateline, unless this was clearly impossible in 
which case 
it was ignored. (34 stories were. not so 
identified- out of 489,., ) 
Western Europe was once again clearly the major, söurce'of 
stories on this. American agency. wire for a West'European 
clientele. The region accounted for. 36%ý. of:: all'stories, 
followed by.. North America (22%). The MiddleýEast was a 
clear., third with about 12%. The; U. S,. S. R. and, Eastern 
Europe, Africa and Asia, were allocated. about, equal 
proportions of space,, and each had between 25and32 stories. 
South America had 19, while Australasia: and Oceania accounted 
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for only 5. The general pattern therefore appears, to be 
very strong representation of three world regions in both 
. 
the periods 'studied, these accounting for between two thirds 
and three quarters of all output, while the remaining share 
is parcelled out with some variations to the other regions, 
but with South America and especially Australasia and 
Oceania getting very low percentages. 
Western Europe was also the dominant region of origin on 
the Reuters wires for each of the five days they were 
studied, accounting for 42% of all SAF dispatches (34% 
of all 'stories') and 3., 7%. of all EUS-dispatches (37% 
of all 'stories'). In other words, Western Europe 
accounts for over a third of all dispatches on both wires, 
a third of the 'stories' on the European wire, and just 
under a third of; all 'stories' on the African wire. 
Associated Press provides an interesting contrast to the 
other three agencies, inasfar as on its wires'itis not 
Western Europe which dominated but the United' States. 
Western Europe, at 17% of all AP's AF dispatches (16% 
of all '. stories'), was second to North America which 
accounted for 50% of all dispatches (47% of allý'stories'). 
On the European wire North America led. with. 40% of all 
dispatches (43% of all 'stories'). On the European wire, 
Western Europe accounted for 31%'o"f all dispatches (26% 
of all 'sto'ries', ). 
Whereas UPI leads with Western Europe, on, its wire', AP 
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leads with North America on itsEuropean, and African wires. 
This is due largely to thefact: that the service is put 
together in New; York basically with relatively slight 
regional: additions in London. However,, North America 
is slightly less prominent . on 
the, European than, on the 
African wire., Not only is. the percentage of North.,. 
American material lower on the European wire,, but the 
volume of, the European wire, 
, 
is less. This may. be due to 
., a tendency to, use slack. periods on the. African: wire as 
a dumping ground for stories with little relevance to 
regional demand, whereas on the European wire there are 
fewer: slack periods. . 
Much of the dumped : material, is 
likely to be. American. The European wirehas: to be 
translated into. otherlanguages, whereas the-African wire 
is received in . English. - Therefore. there 
is also -a 
tendencyto., keep; the-European wire°: slightly tighter in 
order, to make life easier-for, the, translators. 
The second most important 'region on the Reuters wires.. 
was.. North, Ameri, ca, just as. Western; Europe was second 
,,,,, most important on the AP. wires: North-. America. accounted 
for 19% in 
, 
dispatches, ' (21% of 'stories) , of 
the SAF wire, 
and 211%-of, -the dispatches 
(20%,: of" the. ' '. stories'),, on- the 
EUS wire. 
The : degree of, 'home, bias'', as indicated by the attention 
; an_ agency, . gives to its own. -region, is higher in. the<. case 
of AP than in the case of Reuters.. North America on the 
Doti r i. " 
AP wires accounts for higher percentages of total dispatches 
and 'stories' than Western Europe on the Reuter wires. 
North America on Reuters SAF wire accounts for higher 
percentages than Western Europe on the AP African wire, 
but on the Reuters EUS wire it accounts for lower percent- 
ages than Western Europe on the AP European wire. 'This' 
indicates that AP does feed more European news to Europe 
than to Africa, but with the result-that it sends more 
North American news to Africa than to Europe. The Reuters 
European wire carried more North American news than the 
African wire. 
On the Reuters wires the Middle-East ranks third'place 
after Western Europe, accounting for 11% of dispatches 
(10% of. 'stories') on`SAF, and 12% of dispatches (11% of 
'stories! ) on EUS After this the percentages became 
very small and any-general statement of comparative 
significance should be treated with caution. 
The Middle East is followed by Africa on Reuters' EUS 
wire, which takes 5% of dispatches (9% of 'stories'). 
This is about the same as'the space allocated to Africa 
on the South-African wire (5% of dispatches, 5%'of'stories'). 
Asia is slightly more important than Africa on 'the SAF wire 
(6% of dispatches, 8% of 'stories'), and comes next to the 
African region on the"EUS wire (8.1% of dispatches, . 
10% 
of 'stories'). On%the EUS wire, Asia has more prominence 
than Africa, on SAF they are about equal. EUS gives 
more space to Eastern Europe than SAF (on EUS - 7% of 
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dispatches, 7% of 'stories';, on SAP, - 5% of dispatches, 
3% of. 'stories').,, The African. wire gives more space 
to Australasia and Oceania (on SAF - 8% of'dispatches, 
12% of 'stories' ; on EUS - 1% of dispatches, 1916-of 
'stories')-.. 
_ 
The European, wire gives more space to South 
America than the African wire (on EUS - 
6% of dispatches, 
7% of 'stories'; on SAP. -, 5% of dispatches and 5% of' 
. 
'stories'). 
The. third-place ranking of the Middle East is in part to 
be explained by the coincidence of this, period with the 
aftermath. of the: Cypriot civil war and Turkish invasion; 
but observation of other . wires at 
different, periods 
indicates that the Middle. East has. been_a fairly. permanent 
crisis centre-in recent. years. ' Otherwise, the-Third 
World appears to be represented on the;; Reuters. wires"i. n 
a fairly even but low-profile fashion. The South African 
wire it seems does not carry much , news of the Black African 
countries, 'certainly, not as much as was anticipated after 
-looking. at. wires destined-for Black Africa. And it 
carries about the same amount of news about Africa as the 
European wire, but then 
. 
the,, African news on _the European 
wire is dominated , by South Africa.. Asia and Australasia 
in this instance receive more. attention on the SAFwire 
than on the European wire,. possibly, reflecting. commonwealth 
links. Eastern Europe and South America get more-. attention 
on;, the. European wire, probably because of geographical 
proximity. between Eastern and Southern : Europe,. and because 
Spain and Portugal have a greaterinterest, than-most countries 
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in South America. These observations therefore might 
indicate'a certain degree of selection of stories for 
wires on the basis of different market demands. - 
Whereas the Middle East ranks third on Reuters'wires, it 
is surprising that the Asian region takes third-place on 
AP's Africa wire, and competes for attention with the 
Middle East on the AP European wire.. Asia'accounts for- 
16% of dispatches (19% of 'stories') on the AP African 
wire, and 9.4% of dispatches (11%. of 'stories') on"the 
European. `The Middle East takes 10%'of dispatches (7% 
of 'stories') on the African, and 11/ of dispatches (7% 
of 'stories') on the'European wires. `This may reflect 
that in. the-aftermath of peak American involvement in the 
Indochina war''American interest and AP reporting strength 
still ran high there. 
No'other region gets. high attention on the AP wires. 
Eastern Europe is better represented-on the-Eüropean than 
on the African wires'(on EUR - 4% of dispatches, 4% of 
'stories'; on AF - 3% of dispatches, ' 3% of 'stories'). 
South America gets marginally more attention on the African 
than on the European wire`' (on AF - 3% of dispatches, 4% of 
'stories'); on EUR -'2% of dispatches and 3% of-'stories'). 
Africa is about the-same in both cases. (EIIR = 2% of 
dispatches, 4% of ''stories'; AF - 2% of dispatches and 
''4% of 'stories'. ) Australasia and Oceania hardly get any 
space (AF - 0.3% of dispatches and 1.09,16 of 'stories'; 
EUR - 0.6%` of dispatches, and l. l% of 'stories'). 
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Eastern Europe (9), and South America-, (5), the: Middle East 
(12), and many more on Asia (129).,. Therefore although AP 
carried 363 more stories on this wire than Reuters' SAF, 
314 of these were accounted for by AP's very much more 
extensive and arguably irrelevant (for Europe and Africa') 
coverage of North America. 
10 Much of the remaining 
superiority is accountedfor. by her coverage of. the Asian 
region. 
Comparing the European wires,, we find that Reuters. leads 
in Western Europe (45 more 'stori. es'), Eastern Europe (12), 
South America (22), Africa (27), the Middle East (15); 
AP leads in North America (213), Asia (18), and the agencies 
tie. in coverage of Australasia and Oceanid. Therefore, 
although AP European wire carried 110 more 'stories' than 
Reuters South European, this superioritywas. 
1more 
than 
accounted for by the extra number of 'stories' carried by 
AP from North America, and. in most of the other. regions,. 
Reuters had the lead. Many of the differences between 
the wires in Africa can be explained in. termsof AP's 
tendency to dump news there; and in Europe, by AP's 
concern -to make, lif. eeasier for translators. 
If we compare these'findings with those for UPI and AFP 
over an. earlier and shorter period, a. tseems that of the 
, 
two. Americanagencies, UPI is. more similar-to the European, 
agencies in its emphasis on Western Europe, (though a 
, 
few 
percentage points below. Reuters EUS wire). And like 
Reuters EUS, North America ranks second on UPI's UK wire, 
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though rather more important in proportionate terms on UPI 
than on Reuters. . 
Africa<and Eastern Europe'seem to do 
rather better_in, proportionate terms on UPI's"UK:. wire than 
on AP's EURwire. ': Asia is'muchbetter covered; by. AP,. 
In absolute terms of course AP and Reuters'tended_tocarry 
many more stories than UPI. - So for the'first three days 
of the five days for which their wires were analysed, AP's 
EUR carried 353'storiesagainst UPI'sthree'-day total of' 
256. In*other words, AP's EUR"carried 38% more 'stories' 
"in, an equivalent 
period. -Reuters' EUS'carried. 292 stories. 
in a three-day period, ' or , 
14% more than -UPI'. AFP's; three- 
. 
day total was 418, and therefore it. led AP by as much. as 
18.4% and AFP actually' beat Reuter? ' EUS. by 43% though 
'-'Reuters carried considerably more dispatches. - 
_-1-Datelines 
In the 'analysis of AFP and UPI wires it is evident that 
for several regions AFP has a'wider spread of datelines, 
that is to say, AFP's'stories appear to originate from 
a 
greater number of places than UPI's. 
11 In their" 
respective coverage of Africa, for instance, UPI has 
never more than six datelines during the three days, 
whereas AFP carries between twenty and twenty-one 
datelines. This of course confirms the differences of 
emphasis already noted in terms of stories. Even in 
the Middle East, an area which UPI did consider important 
and which ranked second most. important area in terms of 
dispatches and third most important in terms: of, 'stories', 
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the American agency provides five datelines a. day whereas 
AFP-has between seven and ten. 'And UPI's Middle East 
coverage. accounted fora: higher proportion of its 'stories' 
than AFP's (though UPI had fewer stories in absolute'terms). 
From the'Far East, UPI, transmitted dispatches from between 
, three and eight places a day (that, were represented on its 
UK wire)as against AFP's 9 to 12. However, UPI carried 
more . 
datelines, from Western Europe (15 to 28 a day, as 
against AFP'' s 18 , to 22), and, from North' America UPI provided 
stories from between 8 -and 14. places a day as against AFP's 
4 to 6. 
In the coverage of; the'-less developedpaarts of the world, 
therefore, AFP's coverage. tends to be greater in the 
absolute number'of stories carried and"in geographical' 
representativeness. For thedeveloped'world UPI has 
the edge. on AFP in this respect, although the agencies 
are about-equalin the number of 
countries 
which are 
represented. The agencies did not' differ greatly in 
their coverage of South America. How even was the spread 
of datelines? It was-notably uneven in the case of UPI's 
Africa coverage where Cairo accounted for about 50% ofall 
datelines fromthat region, whereas AFP''s Africa coverage 
shows far greater spread of datelines. UPI's Asian 
spread is relatively even, whereas on the AFP'wires Hong 
Kong and Tokyo tend to dominate. Middle Eastern coverage, 
was-uneven. Israel and -Syria took 50% 'of . 
UPI's datelines 
from=there; Israel accounted for between a third and-half 
of the-total - 
AFP file on the Middle East, though Syria was 
803. 
far less prominent than on UPI's wire. 
The' distribution of datelines on°the Reuters and AP wires 
reflected the distribution of stories and dispatches. 
The number of datelines on Reuters' SAF was considerably 
fewer than Reuters' EUS, about 20% less, almost exactly 
reflecting the percentage difference between the wires on 
'stories' (21%). The' number-of datelines'on the AP wires 
was greater in both cases than"the Reuters wires. AP's 
African wire carried 'a few more datelines than AP's 
European (3% less datelines on the European, but 11% 
fewer 'stories'). The AP wires were more similar on 
datelines therefore'than on 'stories'. 
West European `datelines account ifor 29%'öf, all datelines 
on Reuters African and 33% of datelines on Reuters European 
wires. This is- about twice'as many datelines; 'as from 
North America, in both cases. On'the European wire 
Africa accounts for about as'many' dateline s a`s 'North 
America, and therefore does rather-better' on- datelines 
than on stories and` dispatches'. In ' dateline'' terms, the 
Middle' East is less` prominent. on' both wires' than in terms 
of'stories and dispatches'. On the European wire the 
'Asian region does better in dateline ' terms' than does the 
Middle East`.... 
North America leads in datelines on the AP wires, accounting 
for between a third and half of the total. On the African. 
wire there`. are about twice as many'NorthAmerican datelines 
804. 
as there are Western European, and nearly three quarters- 
or 75% more on the European wire. Next most. important 
region'in dateline terms is Asia, on both wires, followed 
by. the Middle East. 
Was there a tendency for any one dateline to dominate each 
region? In. Africa, AP tended to let Cairo dominate - 
42'/0 
of all African. 'stories' on both wires for the five day 
period. Tokyo accounted for 17% of all 'stories' on 
Reuters wires from Asia; and 23% of all AP, 'stories' from 
Asia. 
Washington accounted for 34% of all Reuters North American 
datelines, and 26% of all AP North American datelines 
(encompassing Canada in both cases). 'Brazil accounted 
for 19% of all South Amercan datelines on. Reuters wires, 
and 21% of all AP's South American datelines - in this 
case Brazilian dominance was helped by the fact that both 
agencies maintain three major bureaux in Brazil. Cyprus, 
with two-, or three: datelines, accounted for 42% of all 
Reuters, Middle East stories, and 29% of all AP stories 
(Reuters coverage was very much dominated; by the Cyprus 
events during this period, whereas AP maintained a more 
regular coverage' of the Arab-Israeli situation than 
Reuters). London alone accounted for. 27% of, all West 
European datelines on Reuters wire; 26% of all. AP 
European datelines. 
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by the capital cities of the world. An analysis was 
conductedfor. two of the five days on which Reuters and 
AP wires were examined. 
While capital cities accounted for well over half of all 
Reuter datelines, they. accounted for under half of all 
AP datelines for the two days. On all wires, capital city 
datelines accounted for a higher percentage of dispatches 
and of 'stories' . 
than' their percentage of total datelines 
would indicate. '. For dispatches the percentages were 
especially high. On the Reuters wires, capital city 
datelines accounted for well over three quarters of all 
dispatches, more so on the European than.; on the African 
wire on the first day, but more so, on the African wire the 
second day. They accounted for. approximatelytwo-thirds 
of all 'stories'. AP capital-city datelines accounted 
for around two thirds: of all dispatches, and''rather less, 
for all 'stories'. 
The main reason why AP appears to be less dominated by 
capital cities is because of its comparatively exhaustive 
coverage of North America. North America can offer only 
two capitals, whereas Western Europe of course. offers_over 
a dozen. If the Reuters , 
and AP-European ý wires for 19th 
August are analyzed as above,. but excluding the United 
States, the results are as follows: 
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between 50-60% of the total each-day, and likewise on'AFP. 
Of all UPI's stories during the three days, 40% were 
political; 15% of all stories being economic. Sport 
accounted for 9%. Certain categories can reasonably 
be linked together to produce a violent-sensational 
category - intranation and internation violent political 
conflict, business and political crime, crime and legal, 
tragedy, disaster and accident. These categories together 
accounted for between 20% and 27% of each day's.. UPI file. 
Politics accounted for 36% of the entire: AFP file, economics 
20%. Sport accounted for 6%. The 'sensational categories' 
accounted for a distinctly lower range of daily percentages 
13% to 22% - than on the UPI wire. 
: Neither wire gave much attention to labour relations 
(UPI -0 to 2.8% AFP -0 to 2.0%), or to industry 
(UPI 
-0 to 1%; AFP - 1% to 2%). " Three categories could 
be placed together-to produce a''social' category - science 
and technology; social and welfare; educational,. religion 




and 8% of each day's UPI-file, and on AFP between 9% and 
11%, UPI gave about "8Y. to 11% of each day's file to i human 
interest'; AFP's human interest proportions were lower 
- 3% -and 9%.. 
In content therefore there is. a. striking similarity 
b. etween the agencies,. in the emphasis they give to politics 
811. 
and economics. AFP tends to. be a''heavier' agency. in the 
sense that itgives. less story. space to sensational or 
violent stories, less to sport and to. human interest, but 
giving more space to social and cultural . stories. In 
the separate five day. analysisof, UPI, politics. led with 
32% of all stories, followed-by-Sport (18%). ' Economics 
ranked fairly low in this week in fifth place" (8%). The 
'sensational'` categories figured'more prominently: than in 
the three day analysis, ' accounting for 33% of the total. 
The other' categories got similarly -low coverage. - 
The, content of'the -Reuters and AP wir es was also ' examined. 
On-Reuters' SAF`wire,. the; percentage of political stories, 
out of, the total of each day's coverage.. ranged-. between 
27% and'40%. "''Out of the week's total of 422 stories, 
146-or 35%'were political. - Economics (53 stories) was 
the'secbnd most important-category --although once'it. tied 
with sport and sport once overtook it'.: ` The economics 
r. ange-was 8% to 17% and totalled 13%, of-, stories during 
the week. 
. 
Sport (48 stories) ranged. between 10% and 13% 
and totalled 11%. ` The-"sensational' categories of 
political violence, crime,, tragedy and disaster, togdher 
accounted far about 24% of the weeks stories (102 stories). 
Labour relations-0 stories) accounted for barely 1% of 
the total,, and coverage of 'industry 
. 
(4 stories) was less 
than 19/6. Altogether therefore these industry-related, 
categories outside 'economics' received 3% of story. space. 
The 'social' categories (41stories)--science and tech- 
nology,. social welfare, education, race,. -religion and 
0 
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culture, got a total percentage of 10%. 
Reuters' EUS wire gave, between 33% and,, -39% of story space 
to politics each. day. Total number ; of. stories for the 
week was 528, and political stories numbered 195. Overall' 
political percentage was almost 37%, slightly higher than 
on SAF. Economics (60 stories) came second on three out. 
of five days; but büsiness. and political crime came second 
the other two days. Economics accounted for 12% of all 
stories; business and political crime for 10% of'the total. 
Sport (48 stories) was 9%. The 'sensational' categories 
(142 stories) took more space: on this wire - 27% of the 
total; 'social*' categories' (42 stories) took less - 
8%. 
Labour relations (5 stories)'. was less than 1% and likewise 
'industry (4 stories).. Human interest-stories on both 
wires accounted for about the same proportion of wire 
ýspace. in story terms: on SAF - 6% (23, stories); on 
EUS - 5% (27 stories).; 
AP's AF wire total number of stories-for the week was 699. 
Political stories ranged between 22% and 32% of each day's 
total, and accounted for 211. storie. s altogether or 30% of 
the week's total. Economic stories, were consistently 
second in importance, ranging between 16% and 21% of each 
day's total, and accounting for. 132stories altogether, 
19% of the week's total. The economics category was 
therefore: larger on this wire than on. eitherr Reuters wire. 
Human interest stories ranked comparatively high - at 
third place (for 4 days) these-accounting for 72 stories 
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or 10%-_of=the total. This category was followed by sport 
with 62 stories or 8%..; The 'sensational' '. categories. 
accounted for 139 stories, 20% of-the-total; -'social' 
.:, 
stories, -60 or 9%. Labour ; relations got , 
eleven 
_stories 
and 1-. 5ý6' of the total,. about thesame. as industry, 10 
stories or 1.5%. 
API's EUR wire was likewise dominated. by political and 
economic stories. Political. stories ranged from 23% to 
33% accounting for 176 stories out of a total of 602, or 
a percentage of 29%.;. Economic stories-were second in 
importance on-three days,. and the most important on one 
day, ranging between 8 and 23% of each day's total and for 
: 
88. stories altogether or 15% 
(less than on"AF). Human 
interest - came . next with 
63 -. stories ,, or 10%, then- sport 
,. with 
53-stories or 9%. " The-'sensational': categories 
together accounted for: 156. stories. or26% of, the. total; 
the 'social' categories for 50 stories or 8Y6., --Labour 
-. relations got 10 stories, or 2%, industry'rather less at 
. 1% of. the total. 
In proportionate terms therefore, AP wires carried 
slightly less political coverage and rather more economics 
in comparison with the Reuters wires.. The combined 
. 
politics-and economics categories accounted for. -48% of 
Reuters' EUS wire and 44% of AP's EUR; while., on-AP's AF 
they accounted'-for 49%, almost--he same as Reuters' SAF 
wire . where 
they had 48%-of-the total. -. ": Human interest 
stories ranked more highly on-AP wires--than on Reuters, 
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accounting for about a tenth of AP coverage, but about 
a twentieth of Reuters'. Sport was given a marginally 
less emphasis on AP wires: 8%-9%, compared with 9%-11% 
on Reuters'. The 'sensationai' categories took up about 
the same proportion of story space on all wires: 24%o and 24% 
27% on Reuters'-SAF and EUS respectively, 20% and 26% 
on AP's AF and EUR. The 'social' categories also accounted 
for similar proportions: 8-9% on AP and 8-10% on Reuters. 
Labour relations took up very little space on any wire, 
but was given slightly greater emphasis by AP which also - 
gäve'slightly greater emphasis to industry. 
Of course, the AP wires carried more stories in absolute 
terms than the Reuters wires. AP's AF, in comparison 
with Reuters' SAF, carried more political stories (65 more), 
more economic stories'(79 more), more human interest (49 
more), more non-economics but industry-related stories 
(21 more), more 'sensational' stories (37 more), more.. 
'so cial''stories (19 more), and more sport stories (14 more). 
At least some of these additional stories are likely to be 
accounted for. by AP's more extensive 'coverage of the United 
States. 
AP's EUR wires, in comparison with Reuters EUS wires, 
carried 28 more economics stories, 14 more 'sensational' 
stories, 8 more 'social' stories, 11. more non-economics' 
industry-related stories, 36 more human interest stories. 
However, Reuters EUS carried more political stories: 19 
more, and 5 less sports stories. 
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Nearly 70% of. AP'sAF superiority over Reuters' SAF is 
in the categories: of politics, economics and human interest, 
If we compare these findings with what we`know, about UPI 
and AFP politics dominated by an approximately similar 
percentage on all; wires. Economics was generally second 
in - importance,, but Reuters gave the, lowest percentages of 
story space to, economics,, perhaps fearful-of competing on 
her general news wires with her, specialist economic wires, 
which. are rather more remunerative. The European agencies 
were similar` in, no_t giving nearly as much, attention to 
human-. interest-as the American = agencies. -'Sensational' 
stories of violent politics,, crime-and natural-disaster 
accounted for a fifth to a quarter of all stories on all 
wires, , although 
this general category, was; less , 
prominent 
on AFP's-, U. K.., wire. than. the other:. wires. AFP. also 
gave. less- attention to :., sport than";. other-wire's. -i There 
was relatively little-coverage;, of,, any other: single 
category of news. 
Wire Similarity and Diversity. 
A greater degree of apparent diversity was discovered than 
had been anticipated. The UPI and AFP wires were far 
from identical. On, the first'. day only 27'stories were. 
carried on both wires, and these constituted. only 21.7% 
of all AFP stories and only 42.1% of all UPI stories. 
On the third day, "34 stories were carried on both wires; ' 
and these constituted 32.6% of all UPI stories and only. 
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22.6% of all AFP"stories. Had UPI been compared directly 
with AP and Reuters,, it is likely from what we know of UPI., 
that it would have been more similar to the larger agencies 
than AFP. 
Higher degrees of similarity were discovered between the 
.. 
'Reuters and AP wires. For instance, on the 20th August, 
60 stories were carried on both Reuters SAF and Reuters 
EUS wires, and these constituted as high as 70% of the SAF 
>story total and 69% of the EUS total. Ninety-six stories 
were carried on both AP African and AP European wires, and 
these constituted 70% of the AP African stories and 78%. 
of the AP, European stories. 
The number of stories shared in common between the AP wires 
was higher on each day than the number-of stories which 
the Reuters wires shared; in common. That is, Reuters 
SAF was less similar to'Reuters EUS, thin AP's AF was 
to'AP's. EUR. 
Fewer stories were held in common, by Reuters. andAP than 
were held in common between the different wires of each 
agency. Comparing the two African wires we find that AP 
consistently provided more variety than Reuters. Between 
a third and a half of the Reuters wire carried material 
also 'carried by the AP wire. This material accounted 
for between a fifth and a quarter of the AP wire. : We 
have already seen that much of this difference in variety 
is due to AP's extensive U. S. coverage. On four out of 
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r, 
five. days the AP European wire offered a greater variety 
of stories than the : Reuters. European wire. Between 35/ 
and 44% of Reuters: wire space in-story terms. was also 
carried by AP; this material accounted for 31%-40/ of 
AP's EUR-wire. It is surprising nevertheless to find 
that over a half of the Reuters wire consisted of material Li 
different to that tobe found, on the AP wire-, and vice versa. 
, National/International 
Both UPI and AFP gave significantly more emphasis to 
stories which dealt with two or more countries directly 
than with stories which were primarily about just one 
country. 60°/a of all UPI dispatches for three days were 
'international' and. 35% were 'national'; (the remainder 
were mixed). As many as 59%'of all AFP"dispatches were 
'international', 32°%were 'national. 
48% of UPI stories were international, -40% were national. 
(In the separate five-day analysis of UPI's UKwire'in, 
terms of stories, 43% were national and 41% international. ) 
62% of AFPstories were international, and' 300//o were national. 
The national/international breakdown on the Reuter and AP 
wires was done for dispatches only but this indicates alone 
a heavy emphasis on 'international' type stories. During 
the week Reuters SAF duspatches were 59% international, 38% 
national, 3% mixed. ' Reuters EUS wire dispatches were 69% 
international 27% national and 3% mixed. 
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AP's AF dispatches were-62% international, --35% national 
and 2% mixed. AP European dispatche's were 66% inter- 
national, 32% national and 2% mixed. 
As a general rule, about two thirds of these agency 
dispatches are international and a third national, It 
is probable that this percentage in'favour of international 
would fall on a story analysis, but that international 
would still be the largest proportion. - The initial pre- 
diction was confirmed. 
In summary of this section it can be said that the major 
findings indicated a continuity in the major features of 
agency content balance, and in particular continuity in 
their emphasis on political coverage, in comparison with 
previous studies. of. agency wires. 
The major differences between agencies; and between different 
wires of the same agencies, lay in the relative lengths 
of the wires, in terms of stories and dispatches; and in 
the relative space allocated to different world regions. 
All agencies shared a predominant interest in the western 
world, but this was least marked in, the case of , 
AFP; 
. and. 
in the case of AP, there was much greater emphasis on., 
North American news for European markets than in the case 
of UPI which fed more West European news to European markets. 
lost important of the. non-western regions was the Middle 
East, clearly reflecting the dominant western. concern with 
the third world at that time. These three regionsaccounted 
81-9 
for very substantial proportions of all news on all wires. 
There is very clear evidence of capital city dominance 
of coverage in all wires. Major content categories were 
politics, economics and sport. With the partial exception 
of AFP, the agencies are very similar in the percentage of 
their news (around a"quarter of all news) which falls into 
what have been described as the 'sensational' news content 
categories. News related to social welfare, technology, 
science, labour relations, etc. gets very little play 
even when all these categories are put together. AFP 
appears to be the most distinct of all wires in that'it 
gives less place to news of the western world, has a wider 
spread of datelines within and across world regions, and 
carries less 'sensational' news. It also does very well 
in the sum total of stories it carries, but these are 
probably much shorter than those of other wires. 
Despite similarities in content-balance between. most of 
the agency , wires.,. there is still quite 
' a, surprising 
measure of-dissimilarity of: substantial content, which 
_ranged 
from 
. around -a quarter. 
to- a. -half of; the . 
content of 
most of the"wires. 
Analysis of breakdown into international and national 
categories by dispatch showed a. clear preponderance of 
international. stories, but this. percentage fell_on a. 
story basis. Precisely because international.. stories 
-are about more than one country they. are likely-to 
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generate more dispatches (from different datelines). than 
national stories. But this in turn implies that inter- 
national stories take up more wire space in wordage terms, 
assuming that average dispatch length remains constant 
(there was not time to pursue this). Overall . 
the, evidence 
points to heavier representation of international stories: 
confirming evidence comes from one of the constructed 
'stories' presented to respondents (see Chapter 10). designe d 
to test this, although the same respondents were evenly,, 
divided as to whether they felt international news. accounted 
for more or less than 50% of their output. On the other 
hand it is very likely, as Hester reports in the case for 
South American news12, that editorial desks tend to cut. 
down on the purely 'national' stories in distribution and 
increase those with international angles. 
Alternative News Arrangements 
Despite the differences recorded in this analysis, the 
degree of similarity between the agencies has been 
sufficient for many to lament the absence of real alter- 
natives amongst; the'_sources of international news. Some 
recent alternatives ` that have been canvassed include the 
development and expansion of those news services-closely 
associated with particular newspapers, of-which the New 
York Times News Service is one of the best-known. 
On the face of it, the New York-Times News-Service is an 
-admirable alternative to the agency sources: ', since it 
-consists of detailed; backgroznd copy originally written 
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for inclusion in the paper itself and distributed on tele- 
printer basis around the world. It would seem to be very 
complementary to. the service öf a worldwide news agency, 
the one providing the 'hard' news, the other providing 
deeply informed background. material. 
A short analysis was conducted of New York Times News 
Service overseas wire to examine the extent of similarity 
or dissimilarity with global news agency character. Two 
periods were chosen: a five-day analysis from 25th March, 
1974 through to 29th March, inclusive (all weekdays), and 
a-three-day analysis from Saturday 19th October through 
to. Monday 21st October,. 1974. 
The wire was very heavily dominated by 'American news in 
both periods. The total number of dispatches for 
. 
the 
five-day period was 386, of which 64% were U. S. stories, 
13% were mainly non-U. S. stories, and 23%, were'mixed'., 
However, the. non-U. S. stories got. better lineage. U. S., 
stories accounted. for 60% of total lineage,. and non-U. S. 
stories. for 17%, Of the non-U. S. stories therefore 
those which were related to U. S. interests ('Mixed') 
received, higher priority than pure foreign' stories. 
This indicates relatively low marketing"o'rientat'ion 
towards the requirements of non-U. S. 'countries. 
In the three day analysis, 65% of dispatches (total number 
167) were U, S., and few, other countries got more, '-than one 
story a day. 
. 
'Almost 15% of the'total were from Europe 
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and the U. S. S. R. 
The single most important content category for the five 
day period was economics (22%), followed by politics (19%) 
and business and political crime (16%). These three 
categories accounted for almost 60% of all stories. The 
-'sensational' categories (international and intranational 
violent political conflict, all kinds of crime, tragedy 
and disaster) scored 25% of the total; the social 
categories (science, technology, social welfare, race, 
religion and culture) 12%, labour relations 1.5%. 
Not only wasthis wire extremely American in approach, but 
its content breakdown was very similar to that of the major 
global wire services. Non-violent politics was also the 
most important category in the three day analysis, (32%). 
Economics ranked less important here, perhaps because it 
was a weekend period. Instead, sport ranked second in 
importance (10%). 
Economic News Services 
The main comparative analysis. did not extend of course 
to all the most important of ; the. global"agencyservices, 
in particular to the economic., news services. Meaningful 
comparative analysis of economic services,. especially 
between. those of-. AP and Reuters,, presented very difficult 
; problems 
in that there is a bewildering variety of such 
-services, and there is great flexibility in their arrange- 
ment. They are also directed to a very wide variety of 
823. 
client groups. 
To gain some idea of some of the characteristics of leading 
economic services, certain Reuters economic services were 
examined for very short periods. Three wires were con- 
sidered: ' Reuters' Money Report over'three days, from 
Wednesday 10th September to Friday 12th September, - 1974; 
the Reuters' City Ticker for'one day; and Reuters' Commodity 
Service' for one day. 
Reuters' Money Report over the three days examined 
totalled ' some- 95,000 words. (according to a Reut-ers spokesman), 
and 1013 dispatches.. The wire concentrated on monetary 
'dealings: 35% of the wire's content in terms of dispatches 
was devoted to news concerning monetary exchange rates. 
If this is considered in conjunction with'news about bullion 
exchange rates acid currency dealings, the total proportion 
of the wire devoted to financial' speculation comes to 62%. 
The origins of all this information reflected the structure 
of the world's. financialmarkets, London accounting for 31%, 
New York for, 20%-. Germany ranked third, followed by 
Switzerland and France. These five countries accounted 
for nearly three quarters (73%) of all the information; 
the United States and WesternEurope combined accounted 
forý88% of this western category. Japan was origin of 
only 29 or 3% of all dispatches. 
In addition to the categories of menetary exchange, etc., 
the wire carried news of such matters-as import-export 
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figures, bank loans and interest levels,, raw material 
prices, reserve ratios, etc. In all the researcher 
distinguished some 23 categories for analysis of the wire, 
but the percentage of space allocated to most of them was 
small by comparison with monetary dealing categories. 
Comeuro,. the commodity wire, was analyzed for one day. 
The main part of the wire carried an estimated 59,000 
words and 644 separate datelines. But there was included 
a daily Tokyo report (compensating perhaps for the. relative 
absence of Japanese information on the Money Report), 
which was not commodity based., On the day studied the 
Tokyo report accounted for'44 datelines. The largest 
categories of news in the Tokyo report were violent 
political unrest, disasters, monetary exchange rates and 
currency news. Two. thirds of the report (66%) were 
general news items, and most items actually originated 
from Japan. 
The rest of the Comeuro wire carried a fair amount of 
general news., but 89% was commodity news or related 
items. One quarter of the total was taken up with sugar, 
cocoa, spices, coffee and tea prices. Next most important 
types of item concerned money dealings (13%), non-ferrous. 
metals (12%) and soyabean meal, oilseed and copra (13%). 
Identifying the origin of stories was not always clear but 
the largest single source was evidently the United Kingdom, 
with about 36% of all datelines, followed by the United 
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States (27%). ' North America and Western Europe together 
originated over three quarters (77%) of all items, reflecting 
the location of the. most"important world markets. 
The City Ticker Service, ` estimated at 43,000 words and 
carrying 520 dispatches, ' proved to be very exchange oriented: 
the main categories were money dealings (34%), stock 
exchange prices (30%) and industrial-news (14%). Main 
sources were the U. K. (30%), the United States (21%), 
while Western Europe and North America together accounted 
for over three quarters of'the'-. total`(79%).. 'These wires 
reflect the very heavily specialized character-of Reuters' 
economic news services. General news on the whole had' 
little space-here. - The content reflects-the centralization 
of world economicactivity-in North ' American' and West 
European markets; `Japan was not well represented, ' perhaps 
reflecting relätively'poorfinancial interchange between 
Japanese and Western stock exchanges and commodity markets, 
and also differences in time zones. 
National News Service 
In an earlier chapter (Chapter 8) some consideration was 
given to the consumption of global agency material on 
national news agency wires. In addition-it was. felt 
that some picture of the overall character ofa general 
news-service at a national level, in addition to the 
foreign news it carried, would be useful. 
The Press Association (PA) and part-owner of Reuters 
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: produces a variety, of wires, most important of which are 
the 'A' (trunk) wire, 'B' wire (secondary news), 'C' wire 
for sports, 'D' wire (foreign, sport and city news), '. E' 
wire (racing and sport). Most provincial daily papers 
in the United Kingdom. take all these wires. For the 
purposes of this study the 'A' was examined for five days 
from Sunday, 27th October to Thursday 31st October, 1974, 
and the other wires were examined for one of these days 
only (October 31st). 
During the five: day period,. the 'A' wire carried 1,197 
news dispatches, representing. 315 stories, running to a 
lineage of 13', 167 (estimated wordage-921168). By far 
the single most. important of 15 content. categories for 
the'analysis was labour relations,, accoünting for 24%. of 
all stories. . This important finding indicates 
therefore 
that at least in the case of this national agency, the 
extreme dearth. of labour stories on', the global agency 
services is sufficiently well compensated for at the 
national level, and that labour news although highly 
visible at a national level is not considered. by the 
'gatekeepers' as significant international news, unless 
it occurs at the national political level and is there 
subsumed under the general 'political' heading, but, of 
course this applies only to a certain proportion and a 
certain level of labour news development. 
If the two major political categories are collapsed-into 
one'(political parliamentary and political non-parliament- 
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ary), they account for 20% of the total stories. Economics 
and industrial news also figure prominently on this wire 
by comparison . with.: 
the global agency wires, together 
accounting for 18% of the total, and with the labour 
relations category already discussed, for 42% of the total. 
Other significant categories were crime (9%) and terrorism 
(related to Northern Ireland: '11%). Including the 
'tragedy etc. ' category, then, the 'sensational' news 
categories here took up 23% - very similar to the' average 
percentage, for most of the global agency wires. Human 
interest received relatively little_play, (6%). The 'social' 
categories do not appear. to get much more attention on the 
national wire than on the global wires (59/o altogether). 
. 
Other studies had noted how global agency wires do not 
specify their sources in 'a substantial proportion of all 
stories. In this study at a national level, an attempt 
to assess the authoritativeness of the primary. news 
sources was made in terms of four categories13: 
(i) eyewitness named and unnamed, personalstatements; 
(ii) delegations, conferences, spot reports on Parliament, 
workers' leaders statements, company statements, 
spot reports. on . courts; 
.... 
(iii) unnamed official sources; 
(iv) named official sources. 
Onfour. of the five days,. category (iii), unnamed official 
sources, accounted for 'the highest percentages, of all cases, 
. 
rangingfrom 33%. to.. 57% of the total number of dispatches, 
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and on the fifth day, category (iv), named official sources, 
dominated. This last category was second largest on the 
other four days, ranging from 24%-30% of the daily total. 
The national wire showed heavy concentration on London 
and the home counties in an analysis of the origins of 
stories, thus reflecting the emphasis on news of nationwide 
significance, much of which occurs in the capital, London. 
If this is'true of national agencies as a general rule, 
and if, as seems very likely, national agencies are very 
important sources of 'news for the global agencies, then 
this finding also helps explain the concentration of 
global agency news services on capital city news. In 
this case, London and the home counties that surround and 
partly, make up the Greater London area, accounted for 63% 
of all stories, followed by Glasgow (11%) and Northern 
Ireland (10%)". 
Study of the 'A' wire for five days was followed by a 
study of all wires for just one of those days, 31st October 
(Thursday). The 'B''wire actually carried more stories 
than the 'A'-wire-that day (86 compared with 74), ' and 
showed a difference of emphasis, 19% of stories-falling 
into the 'crime' category, and a similar percentage for 
human interest stories. 'Heavy' spot news developments 
in politics, industry, economics and industrial relations 
still accounted'for a significant percentage of the total: 
44%. The 'social' categories were not especially 
prominent (13%) . 
-Almost half the stories, (49%) were 
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TABLE TWENTY-NINE. 
AUTHORITATIVENESS OF PRIMARY NEWS SOURCES: 
Press Association 'A' wire_- 27-31 October 1974 
No. ' of % of 
'Stories' Total 
(i) Eyewitness, named & unnamed 29 
8 
(ii) Delegations, Conferences etc. 81 22 
(iii) Unnamed official sources 117 37 
(iv)' Named 'official sources 138 32 
(v) Other 4 1 
369+ 100 
+, Figures include multiple . rankings. 
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sourced to named official sources, and a third (31%). to, 
unnamed official sources. London and the home counties 
originated 64% of all stories. 
The 'C' and 'E' wires were primarily, sporting wires. The 
'C' wire carried 52 stories that day; most important 
categories were advance racing news and results (29%),, - 
commentary and tips (23%) arid. soccer commentary, ' results 
etc. (17%). The first two categories (devoted to horses) 
account for a very high percentage. of total lineage . 
(69%), 
The 'E' wire carried mostly racing results, (three quarters 
of all lineage) and some unit trust prices. 
The 'D' wire was the foreign news wire, although it. also 
carried a heavy chunk of city news and sports results.. 
These two categories accounted for 60% of the very heavy 
lineage (5,306)-on this wire. Apart from these there were 
102 stories, a quarter of which fell into the general. 
politics category, 18% were sports stories and 13% were 
industrial. A quarter of the stories (23%) actually 
originated in the United Kingdom, and a"further 22% came 
from the United States. 
How would this compare with an original Reuters wire? 
A one-day analysis of the Reuters UK wire for 28th September 
1974-showed 139 stories for that day, of which 23%. were. 
from the United States but only one was-from the: U. K. 
But whereas the PA'carried 109 stories, amounting to 
2,120 lines, Reuters'. 139 stories amounted to 4,693 lines. 
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In addition to the 'foreign',., stories originating from the 
U. K. in the PA wire, 'a further 29 or 27% were foreign stories 
;. directly related tothe U. K. On the basis of this short 
analysis therefore it would appear that the PA's selection 
of foreign news is actually relatively slight and extremely 
U. K. -oriented or culture bound. However, the PA did use 
more than Reuters as a source, Almost, . 
60% of all 'foreign' 
stories were attributed to Reuters, 22% to"the PA, and 
only 9% to AP. 
In the last sections of this! chapter therefore, the. possib- 
ility of an alternative, to-global, agency news. has been 
explored (New York Times News Service), "but found inadequate 
for'that: 
_purpose 
although,, a useful complementary source- 
of; (mostly) American news.. Some attention has been, 
given to Reuters- economic. wires for non-media'clients, 
:: which are shown to be highly specialized. and very much 
reflective ofthe-structüre. of market activity in the 
western and capitalist world., Finally,. the, -news package 
as it'is received by. a client of a national news agency 
in-. a- developed country (the PA, in the-United Kingdom) was 
taken as a whole.:.; This, -showed that'cer, tain news categories,. 
such as labour-relations, which are, not prominent: on global' 
agency wires, are much more prominent:,; at;.. this level. Other 
categories are less well presented.,. -The selection of 
foreign news, : although this. question, needs much more' 
extended research, does. in this instance: appear extremely 
culture-bound and possibly sketchy. 
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CHAPTER . THIRTEEN:. . The. ory-' ' and Practice: from Cuba to Vietnam 
1. frofessional Ideology 
As important news sources for'media. all over the world, 
news agency executives are frequently invited to explain 
the principles that underlie their operations. Two 
outstanding characteristics of the public-statements 
that result are: -their relative lack of sophistication 
and their relative uniformity. " This chapter examines 
the underlying rationale: of professional ideology in 
news agency work as: it is thus presented, as others have 
described it in South. 'America, and'as the author himself 
discovered it in South Vietnam 'during the early 'seventies. 
American agency coverage of SouthAmerica"at the time of 
the 'Bay of. Pigs'.. fiasco was considered suspect by some 
observers, - it was heldýto be, too trivial', ortoo much 
geared to the interests (or-fundamental lack, of interest) 
of North. American media. in-thesübject. Whatever the 
actual-circumstances, there seems to be an important 
difference between ' the attitude of the critics towards 
agency coverage of, South America and`Cubaýat about this 
time, -and the praise`. extended to the initial agency 
coverage of the : Vietnam war from the point of major U. S. 
involvement. Between Cuba and Vietnam, -perhaps, the 
agencies had learnt an important lesson. " But first let 
us consider some. formalýstatements on the nature of agency 
. work. 
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The task of conceptualizing the. nature of news-agency 
work seems to present no great difficulty to those who 
do it. In the picture presented by various news-agency 
executives, it is the task of the agencies to report the 
news of; major_political, economic, -judicial, and social 
issues. of the day, both to inform and to entertain. 
In doing so, the agencies report 'objectively'. That 
is, their reporting is". not determined'by narrow sectional 
interests, only by.. the interest that-derives from the 
professional-ethic of journalism: namely, the. -obligation 
to present accurate information to readers about the 
kind of matters which. readers most want to know about. 
An indication that . the 
agencies are performing well in 
this respect, 'the executives" will often say, -is the 
frequency with which they are attacked from different 
quarters,, some. saying they are too much, to the-right, 
others that they are too much to'the left. This is held 
to show how the. agencies steer a. `straight course. through,, 
the islands. ofýprejudice on both sides. This is not to 
say. that .. they 'are free - of . human 
error, and 'they will freely 
! admit. to mistakes `. that have been made-- . suchmistakes 
sometimes have . celebrated status in , the occupational 
folklore.. Büt fundamentally, the argument rune, agency 
coverage. is determined, byan interest that=is higher than 
most other, interests,,. and: can command the trust of most. ' 
The fundamental.. basis of. news-agency work: =-as. it has been 
expressed by a vice-president of UPI, Roger Tatarian, is 
'tobea faithful proxy, or stand-in, or substitute eye- 
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witness, for the editor who cannot go to observe a distant 
event for himself '. Editor: s .oC course can be a very 
'heterogenous body of people; the implicationn: is that 
these are editors who subscribe to some concept of- 
objectivity which'is common'to them alle and: to'the 
agency; yet agencies in practice serve bodies of editors' 
who subscribe to very different notions of objectivity. 
But for Tatarian, '., there can be no doubt that in its 
role as `a stand-iii' or 'eyewitness, 'an - agency's first and 
overriding obligation is to-give the-distant editor the 
unvarnished facts of `the situation' . Perhaps he is 
'talking-only of American editors, UPI': s most important 
sources of revenue. 
In meeting. its overriding obligation, the= agency has 
the same responsibility that is discharged with 'such 
'apparent ' faithfizlnes-s - by the American media-, generally: 
the;: separation of facts from commentary.! - As Tatarian 
says: 
The agency must also give interpretations and 
assessments, , 
but, only after its first responsibility 
is discharged, and the two must not be , 
confused.. 
Without the facts the distant editor-would not be 
able l to reach his own 'opiniono. or make. his own assess- 
ment. -. he. would be in danger of being the prisoner 
of someone else's opinion and assessment. 
Professional interest. governs, the process of commentary 
just as it does facts: 
Agency, journalists-must'also make certain that. their 
reportage is influencedasolely. by. professional 
considerations at the point of publication, and 
never by.,, -interests or pressures. 
at the point of 
origin, particularly at. the point-o£ domicile. 
In this view of the agency' journalist. 's task, therefore, 
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five principles are evident: (i1 the , 
'journalist must 
report the news as accurately as -a newspaper editor-client 
would report it if he : were there himself; (ii) assuming 
of course that the editorin question has principles of 
news-gathering that correspond with the, agency's own, 
these values having-'-some relationship with, the strategic 
concept 'objectivity' and which are assumed to be generally 
characteristic. at least of American newspaper editors; 
(iii). and this correspondance of. value extends to the 
distinction to be drawn between 'facts' and 'coimnentary', 
and to the general rule that-(iv) reporting reflects 
general -professional.; and not, sectional interests, it 
being further assumed that (v) professional interests 
are themselves undiluted by-either sectional or national 
interests.. 
Dem anding. though. this body of principles may seem, it is 
not difficult ;. to be, impartial, according to. Wes Gallagher, 
general manager. of Associated Press: 
But it isn't all that difficult to be impartial. 
First, the journalist's job is to gather all 
the facts -I repeatall'the facts, not just 
those on one side. Then he must present'them 
fairly to both sides. He Lets the reader decide 
'which"s do' he.,... e"els"is`-correc'C' : -x .. 
'Thin may.. be 
a very unpopular thing to do,, but it is not 
technicallyrnr intellectually difficult. Certainly, 
no more difficult than the' task, 'of-judge' in weighing 
evidence. 
With this assurance, "Gallagher can advise, young journalists 
to. - be ' the best' professional- you can and don't let your 
ego overtake your conscience'. " The public however, do 
not accept that the task of. weighing evidence, either. that 
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performed by a judge or-by a'journalist, ` is as unproblem- 
atic as the head.. of America's-leading-agency would have 
us believe. The agency executives are alive to this 
and have their own ideas as to. the origin of the credi- 
bility problem.. Grant. Dillman,, as UPI's Washington 
News Editor, identified three : basic reasons for the 
credibility problem: (i), explosion in. the.. volume of 
news and its complexity . 
since. World War.. Two;: (ii) annoyance 
with the 'bad' news; (iii) imperfect understanding of 
the media's 
c ,. röle. in society. 
Accusations against the media, -especially the agencies, 
, 
Dillman seems to suggest, indicate. that something is 
amiss-with: thereading public.... Roger: Tatarian would agree. 
Making an interesting statement of equi. valence. between 
journalism and constitutional demo. cracy,, he goes on ? to 
say: 
One of the frustrating aspects of our profession 
is' simply that it is taken for, granted, so much 
so that few people; ever stop. to ask how a society 
such as. ourscould function without:. it. 
The enemies of agency objectivity,. in news. reporting and 
presentation are identified by Tatarian as the government, 
the legal profession and the 'pleaders of special causes', 
those who are 'unable to distinguish between the world 
as they would like it and the world as it really is'. 
Under'attack from both the Establishment and from minority 
groups, 
. ..,.. 
according to such a perspective, the journalist 
becomes a lone crusader in search of truth: 
Today it is the newsman, the reporter, the 
editor. who stands alone,., separated-, from 
society but a vital part of it - divorced 
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from the action but a recorder of it. 
Thus Wes Gallagher, in a vision of the journalist as 
modern hero with a mission: continuing - 
The concept of objectivity in the news and the 
reporter being a noncombatant and an observer 
rather than a partisan is relatively new in 
journalism. It is this striving for objectivity 
that places the journalist apart from society 
today. It is this struggle for objectivity 
that keeps him awake at night as he wrestles 
with. the facts. It is. this concept of non- 
partisanship that makes him fair game for 
the partisans. 
As hero, and in grace therefore, he must not heed 
criticism; criticism comes of the devil and must 
be shrugged aside. 
This lonely end position makes the journalist 
fair game for critics, but we should not worry 
about this. The louder the critic, the less 
founded his criticism is likely to be. 
He should' distrust attempts to make the principles of 
journalism more explicit to-the public, through, for 
example, the institution of press codes. 
The public has serious doubts on many facets" 
of the'news'now without having 
. 
its confidence 
further underminedby-the adoption of vague 
generalities-which infer there is something 
in the news too distasteful for them'to know, 
or even more insulting too difficult for'them 
to understand. 
To be fair, once one eschews obvious partisanship - 
commitment that is to an identifiable body of material 
interests - the ways are limited in which to go about 
the task of describing an event as a reporter in clear 
and -directlanguage, 
with an awareness that different 
people have different perceptions and that perceptions 
are coloured by, interests. There is nothing particularly 
difficult about reporting, assuming the psychological and 
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sometimes the physical': nerve: the basic objective is to 
relate who-the immediate actors in the , event were, what 
it was they did or . attended to, when=and of course where 
it happened. Thus. far 'well' and good. It is not a 
perfect' process because'. human nature being what it is 
it cannot be perfect: absolute 'truth' is beyond any 
.; _: particular: 
individual's_ability. tö grasp entirely. 
There is always a margin of error, but 'the . 
margin: of 
-error is. far from . 
being:. too great to make the idea or 
the claim, to 'objective: reporting'inherently"ridiculous. 
,. Those who have argued otherwise have actually done harm 
to their own. position by , flying in the. face of `the -, ". 
, everyday experience-of-consumers of . the 
mass media: the 
: willingnessof. very large. 
sectors'ofthe total population 
". in . America aid . Britain `for example, " to 
place, their trust 
in the' capacityof the mass media to do a tolerable job 
on news-reporting. 
But it. is because"" agency-. executives generally focus on 
'the : act of' reporting a given : event . as the core "of their 
professional task, and: they-have plenty of good. reasons 
for? so doing, ' they tend,: to -end up describing 'and defending 
.: 
that professional activity in the'rather naive and simplistic 
; manner that we'have seen. There is a tendency to ignore 
or evade. the, real task of explainingof providing. the' 
answer to the question, 'Why? ': 'which is, generally more,. 
than a matter of simply saying what preceded the, given. 
event. This is at', the heart of the crisis of journalism 
today. . 
In refusing as it were, to. go to a higher, level. 
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of argument, these agency executives (and journalists who 
justify normal. coverage in similar terms) give the 
argument over to the other side. 
-The. arguments that attack the kind of position taken 
in, say,. the quotations provided above. that have to do 
with the value - neutrality of journalism, these arguments 
have been well rehearsed in many academic studies of mass 
media, and probably do not need.. to be-summarized here. 
Suffice it to'say that journalism has to be considered 
from. 'points of view other than the simple components of 
the immediate reporting task: namely,. the media orgain- 
ization which employs the journalist and that organization's 
direct and indirect business and related interests; the 
, socio-economic character. . and national 
identity 
of the 
journalists-themselves. andý'of. theirstrongest audiences; 
the status of the concept 'professionalism' which implies 
that organizational members share a total commitment to 
a body of rules and norms. which may however be. so vague 
as to be in., conflict or incapable of öperationalization. 
Looked at from these points of. view, -journalism is no 
longer quite such a simply or easily explained task. 
Thus, one needs to ask why. it is that certain issues are 
covered and not others; or to ask how it is that an 'event' 
becomes an 'event' at: all. - what needs to be overlooked 
so that any fragment ofthe chaos that is, reality can be 
considered so distinct or discreet, a phenomenon as to 
constitute an event? 
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Criticism of the agencies in terms of a philosophical 
objection to a norm of 'objectivity'` or'impartiality' 
is not especially new, and such suspicion 'is well- 
established in Marxist; thought.;. There`is however a 
body of more practical criticism which bases its 
observations on, empirical evidence, and aims to expose 
failures to achieve 'objectivity' rather'than query the 
attempt. itself. ', Whät'research that has been done in 
this respect is, rather, limited and'much of it-is summar- 
ized in Rucker's short account of American news and feature 
services. claimed_to. ''find numerous examples of 
2 Rucker 
disagreement, between` the- news. services on the facts of 
certain specificstories; - or'cases where certain facts 
werementioned. by; oneagency and ignored by, anöther. In 
. 'many . ways 
the agencies stand . accused:: 
öf'inaccuracies and 
the. reporting of what, are:. deemed`by. intellectuals to be 
'trivialities: at the. expense: of. 'what might be considered 
rather more important. Phenomena. '_'1-Where there is some 
suspicion. of political prejudice,, -that-prejudice is 
generally seen . 
tofavour the Right in internal-matters 
and to be pro-American, and. pro-'cold'war' externally. 
On the other hand-`these-examplesmay''reflect the pre- 
occupations of the. intellec, tuals inthis. field of inquiry. 
"0f late, certai: nly,,, the American. ägenc es haveshown-per- 
haps unusual sensitivity on the i: ssue, of 'establishment 
bias', and this was demonstrated in one, or two striking 
decisions taken in the matter. of disciplining reporters. 
In April 1974, Wes Gallagher,, general manager of"Associated 
-'Press, suspended a photographer,. one James Mone', from the 
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Minneapolis bureau, following Mone's testimony at an 
evidential hearing that he had given information to FBI 
agents, at a roadblock outside Wounded Knee during the 
South; Dakota villages 71-day Indian occuption in 1973. 
Gallagher's comment was that '... it is against AP policy 
for any AP man, to be involved'in any way in any news 
story'. The information which Mone passed on to the 
. FBI agents*and. which earned him his'(temporary) dismissal, 
was ,a certain estimate-of the number of people'he believed 
to be inside the village at the time. ' He also gave 
details of-statements at 'a press conference by Indian - 
leaders.. John W. Hushen, the Justice Department's 
Director of Public Information, ' called the suspension 
. 
'deplorable'. In further explanation of his decision 
on this affair., Gallagher was reported as saying: 
Obviously there are cases and circumstances 
where a journalist, 'like any other citizen, 
would have an obligation to report to the 
authorities or testify about criminal events. 
But in this, case the FBI sought to use a 
journalist to gather information which they 
should have been gathering themselves. 3 
.: 
He. added that this sort of action was likely to jeopardize 
the safety of AP staff who might need to cover events 
involving 'radicals or other fringe elements of society'. 
In his letter to Mone he wrote: 
News that an'AP man, has been collaborating *' 
under cover with the FBI will be quickly spread 
through all the radical groups, jeopardizing 
the safety of AP men assigned to stories involving 
those groups. ' 
A year later, ' however, " an arbitrator ruled that Mone be 
reinstated with seniority and contract rights, including 
. full 
back pay from the time of his discharge. The 
{ 
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situation. -leading to Mone's dismissal was described by 
the arbitrator: as, a 'fluke' = his employer was 'accused 
of discarding him instead of, defending him. 
Ironically, a. UPI photographer also 'gave information to 
the FBI in their enquiries at the time of Wounded. Knee. 
But the report in which 'the information was given was 
not introduced as evidence in the trial., FBI agents 
interviewed Bruno Torres when he returned to his office, 
on March. 26th, 1973. In his evidence Torres said he saw, 
some Indians carrying automatic weapons at. Wounded Knee 
but was unable. toidentify most of, the Indians. He did 
identify. three men who were, AIM. leaders. Torres was-not 
dismissed from UPI. In a statement on the'. case,, UPI 
vice-president F. W. Lyon had this to say: 
I, have talked to Bruno Torres and am convinced 
that' he' has followed UPI's policy'in. connection 
with. such matters tothe. letter. He: volunteered 
no, information"to the FBI., He did reply, to their 
questions concerning actual published , photographs . 
which he, made at Wounded Knee. ' 'It is our policy 
that.. any photographs; or news stories, which have 
been distributed. to UPI subscribers and are there= 
fore. in"thepublic domain are. proper subjects for 
official inquiry. '. However, our photographers and 
reporters are not authorized to act as_informants or 
volunteer other information and we are satisfied 
that nothing of that type occurred, in this case. 
The late ! sixties were a time of unprecedented public 
questioning'of"the media's ability to report the news 
without supporting any particular, faction. This period 
of doubt was fed by public concern over the manner in 
which war was being conducted in South Vietnam, and by 
the-increasing recourse of political groups at , home: to 
forms of -extreme protest. Some of, the caution and< 
844. 
defensiveness that these processes occasioned in the 
minds of those most responsible for the gathering and 
distribution of national news is evident in the Mone, 
decision, and indeed in the kinds of public statement 
earlier referred to. in this chapter. 
. 
2. Practice: South America 
In the material that has been published about the role 
of the (mainly American) agencies in South America up to 
and including the Cuban crisis of the early 1960's, the 
caution and defensiveness apparent in the above section 
were not so evident. The most striking aspect of the 
agency role in South America is the degree to which South 
American. countries were (and to a slightly lesser extent 
still are) dependent directly on the agencies for their 
news more. so perhaps than. in"most African and Asian 
countries where national news agencies intervene in the 
" flow of news and to a, very small degree. supplementit with 
news from some-ofthe smaller western. and, communist agencies. 
These circumstances did not go unlamented at early 
sessions of the Pan American Press-Congress; for example 
the U. S. agencies were frequently attacked for what was 
, 
described as. inadequate and biased Latin American coverage, 
though it was also argued that the news 'selection policies 
of both Latin and American media were to blame. Congress 
in 1943 passed a resolution requesting the foreign: news 
agencies to hire native journalists 
only to head their 
4 
bureaux and to increase Latin American news output. 
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.: Although maybe 
not in response to the Congress resolution, 
there seems to have been some increase inthenumber of 
South American bureaux chiefs since that time. ' The 
overall pattern of dependency''of-Latin American media 
on the agencies did not noticeably decline, however. 
In an often-quoted study, Markham (1961) found that seven 
leading metropolitan South American newspapers relied 
almost entirely for their-foreign news on. the"US agencies... 
and on AFP. UPI in-particular provided more than double 
the'number of stories provided by any other' agencies. 
Yet these -papers carried about twice the volume of 
foreignnews, carried by a-set of. comparable. North American 
papers (which with; the exception ofthe-New York Times, 
relied on the two main US-agencies for almost'-82% of 
their foreign news )', =even though the South American 
papers had only about half the space available to the 
US dailies.. _ Noýwonder therefore'that South American 
newsmen shou dýexpress anxiety about patterns of North 
American news agency coverage. '" The broad findings of 
this study were-confirmed in a study conducted the year 
Markham's research was done, and this covered 20. Hispanic 
papers in 19'South American countries, showing that the 
primary source of US news In-these papers were AP, UPI, 
6 
and APP. ` Some discrepancy was 'noted between the balance, 
of news provided by these agencies and, the balance of news 
used, but 'a further study. of three Argentine dailies in' 
1963-4 concluded that the international news preferences 
of'South American papers coincided with the kinds of news 
? 
provided by the agencies. Yet perhapsthissimply 
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indicated that the papers usedwhat; they were. given: 
the study noted . that;: 
two-thirds of the 
, news. 
in the 
Argentine dailies originated from the western hemisphere, 
reflecting very much the balance of news typically 
provided by the agencies. 
In face of the degree of dependency. that existed, the 
." criticisms of some researchers are 
especially significant. 
Kelly. for example in 1962 noted a preoccupation of the 
. wire services 
in their coverage: of South America with the 
Cuban situation, thus confirming the. dominance: of US 
interests at the possible expense, 6f client interests in 
the region. He-recorded what he considered to be certain 
inadequacies of reporting, anditemized. four major kinds 
of failure:. failure to report eventsof: importance; 
(ii) failure toconvey important information relevant to 
certain events; (iii) failures. of commission. - too much 
stress for example; on the time-factor leading to neglect 
of-other considerations; (iv)_poor; news. selection - an 
inordinate amount of space devoted,,, for instance, to 
. 
Billy Graham, '. s tour of South America-. 
8 
In response to 
Kelly's criticisms, UPI claimed the research-had not taken 
into account all. the pössible material. concerning South 
America, including a 'special Latin, American report compiled 
for: 25 clients with a special regional interest. 
Nevertheless, the: spirit, of Kelly'', s criticisms have been 
repeated elsewhere notably by Barnes in 1964, who was 
inclined to"put part of the blame for what". he agreed was 
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a faulty service of Latin American news on the fact 
that a high. percentage of agency staffers on the 
continent were Latin American nationals. (precisely the 
state of affairs that , would. 
havewon the support of 
many representatives. at the 1943 Pan American Press 
Congress). Barnes estimated that about . 
70% of news 
agency staff correspondents working; for UPI in. South 
America at the time of writing were South American 
nationals, higher than the, figure for AP. 
If any generalization can be made about these 
staffers,. it would be that the majority of 
them are underpaid, under-motivated, and under- 
trained, and that many of them have vested, 
reasons - political, family, . or. 
other - for 
not giving an objective treatment of the news. 
The average, salary for a. fairly well remunerated 
local stringer is around 85 dollars a month - 
and their gripe is that Americans get more. 
On the other hand these staffers may have been getting 
higher. salaries working for. the agencies than they would 
have done working on Latin American newspapers: dis- 
content with salaries was . not what. influenced many of 
these journalists to; accepteven, lower rates of pay 
working for the new continental agency, Latin, after 1970. 
In addition to the possible element of bias that might 
enter the. news process as. a, result of employment of 
too many locals, Barnes was. also concerned about the 
level and quality of, demand for South American news on 
the all-important North, American market., He, noted that 
only 26% of the South American news that was, sent to New 
York appeared on, the, US domestic agency wires.. A heavy 
proportion of the news filed outfrom, Bogota also indicated 
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overemphasis on sensationalism:, banditryl, disasters, 
political violence accounting for 38% of, AP's output, 
and '"31% of UPI's. Non-violent 
political, social and economiccategories' accounted for 
28% of the file in both cases. Much of the 'substantive' 
news of political, söcial'and economic phenomena Barnes 
noted, in this content analysis over a six-week period 
in-1963, was weeded out in New York. Such stories were 
often in any case hooked on to violent incidents, and it. 
was the violent `incidents very often that °remaiined when 
the rest` of the `stories' were cut. ''. Some `of these conclus- 
ions ', were confirmed even a dacade later in Hester' s study 
ofAP's`South American coverage discussed'in Chapter' 
Twelve. 
Barnes recorded a, certain amount of 'colouring' which 
was introduced by descriptive nouns. and verbs, and might 
have suggested an implicit bias: ' Castro for instance 
was inclined'to 'bellow' at" mobs;. ' Guevara woul4. 'harangue' 
at conferences. ' Health campaigns. in Cuba" were described 
as 'propaganda campaigns', and in Chile people were 'lured' 
into voting for left-wing parties. ' A sub=species of 
this kind of colouring'Barnes. =te`rmed'the 'nutshell epithet': 
for example, "... Leonel'Brizda, fiery leftist brother-in- 
law of President'Goulart... ", "... Peron, former dictator 
of Argentina. `.. "; and ""... 'Alfonso Lopez Michelson, whose. 
party is rife with supporters of Fidel Castro... ". 
Barnes described Lopex as a moderate Colomban*prögressive. 
He concluded that the agencies tended to see South America 
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from a North American and call-war point of view. Never- 
theless, he indicated that Latin American publisher 
clients of the agencies were even more conservative than 
the American, and sensitive too, because their-lives 
were often at stake. In their interpretive coverage 
on the other hand the wire services, in Barnes' view 
were beginning to make inroads into the otherwise over- 
simplified image of Latin America they . 
had-helped 
perpetuate in their. hard news coverage. AP more than 
'UPI seemed to have been successful in: promoting inter- 
pretive material. 
9 
Such criticism ofagency practices"and news presentation 
as we have seen in Barnes' account has its origin in 
aspects-of western journalistic, professional values 
concerning the nature of 'news', and implies that ex- 
cessive attention is given. to immediate client interests 
at the expense of long-term understanding. But they 
do'not'usually go beyond that to impute some deliberate 
political motive. One important account however does do 
so, and this is in relation to the notorious 'Bay of Pigs' 
Cuban invasion, and the way the agencies handled the 
build-up to that event. 
10 
Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon record how in November 
1960 it-was brought to the attention of the Nation that 
Ronald Hilton, director of Stanford University's 'Institute 
of Hispanic American and Lus-Brazilian studies,, had just 
written in the Hispanic. American Report that it was 
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common knowledge in Guatemala that the CIA was training 
Cuban exiles at a secret base there, preparing for an 
invasion of Cuba. The Nation ran an editorial on this 
in its issue of November 19th, and copies of that editorial 
were circulated to all major news media when the issue 
. went 
to press (November 11th), while some news bureaux 
were contacted` by 'phone. 
: The Associated Press was called three times; 
each time a different desk man answered, 
professed interest in the story, but said he 
hadn't seen either the release or ä proof of 
the editorial. Could duplicates be sent 
immediately.? Three duplicates were sent in 
as many hours, apparently to end up on the 
desk of. someone. in the AP heirarchy who didn't 
want them to go any further. In the end 
neither the AP nor the UPI used the story, 
nor did they request any check on it that 
weekend from their correspondents in Guatemala. 
The apparent reason for the agencies' reluctance was 
revealed in a telling quote from a UPI editor, Francis 
L. McCarthy, head of the Latin American desk: "yes", 
he admitted, "there's a big base in operation in Guatemala 
and. US planesýare flying in and out. But the Pentagon 
denies any knowledge and the State Department. says. 'No 
comment'. One story we hear is that the base is being 
built by the US as a replacement for Guantanamo., ". -The 
quote is significant because it indicates the resistance 
of-these professional journalists to going against the 
version of truth provided by official US., sources. One 
may either assume that the agencies. had an understanding 
with these official sources, or that in the days before 
the Veitnam build-up and the souring of relations between 
agencies and official sources, they worked on the principle 
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that there was no better source than the 
Pentagon: 
This was not ; the end of the; affair. One of 
the -few papers 
which häd used the-Nation's release, --the-York, (Pa. ) Gazette 
and Daily., askedthe AP to check the Nation's report: 
The AP-said the Nation. article-seemed'thin' 
- an adjective which, weihink, fairly described. 
any. story -as it begins to develop. from hearsay 
or second-hand sources....... But when we 
explained that. we were not requesting' a<rewrite 
of the Nation article but rather a check in 
Guatemala, the AP. wentto. work. Within a few 
days, the AP sent a: story. which was printed on 
page 2 of the Gazette and Daily on November 17th, 
headlined: 'Guatemala President Denies Reports 
of Anti-Castro Force'". The headline reasonably 
sums up the story: the AP had interviewed 
President Ydigoaras of Guatemala and -he.. 
had 
'branded asfalse' the things the Nation had 
" published. ...: 
The`President of the-Guatemala Republic therefore was 
-considered a more. authoritative source, regardless of 
the 
possibility of his having strong reasons, for not disclosing 
this kind of information, thanreputable American citizens. 
So ; authoritative, -in fact, that . seems` , no further checking 
wasthoughtnecessary. Neither: the AP nor the New York 
Times' correspondent who had also interviewed the Guatemalan 
President,. had bothered-to"interview anyone ofthe staff 
of a . Guatemalan newspaper, 
La Hora, which had carried 
reports favouring-the existence of an invasion plan. 
One' reason for AP's reluctance in this case, but not for 
the New York Times', was that`theAP-correspondent in 
Guatemala was a Guatemalan citizen and an AP stringer only, 
and was therefore rather more vulnerable than. an American 
correspondent would have been to pressure. 
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Even when the St. Louis Post-Dispatch sent in one of their 
own men, Richard Dudman, who unearthed considerable grass- 
roots evidence supporting the invasion-story, ' neither of the 
two American agencies did further investigation. AP 
went only as far as a three paragraph summary-of a report 
by Don Dwiggins of the Los Angeles Mirror which indicated 
, 
that. US funds, were involved. in the airstrip and base 
construction in Guatemala. Media reluctance to give 
appropriate coverage to the story continued right up to 
the invasion itself on April 17th, 1961. A short while 
after the event, Alan J. Gould, on the occasion. of his 
retirement as general manager of AP was, quoted as saying: 
I think the people in Government should have 
learned a lesson for all time on the handling 
of the Cuban affair. Occasionally-we have 
witheld stories for a time in the national 
interest. When the President of the United 
States calls you in and says this is a matter 
of vital security, you accept the injunction. 
AP' general. manager therefore preferred to blame the 
Government,. not the press. Bernstein. and Gordon. 
concluded their account. rather more critically: 
............ If the editors. of the Miami Herald. knew the 
significance of Retalheu it issife to say 
. that the AP editors knew too. : Yet the AP 
never budged any part of its massive report- 
orial staff to get at the truth: on behalf of 
its thousands of clients. Neither the AP 
:., nor: , the'; UPI, nor the San Francisco : papers 
ever seemed to have tried to follow through 
the startling remark. of that CIA official 
to a San Francisco Commonwealth Club gathering: 
It will. be a black day if. we. are ever : found out. " 
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3. Practice: South Vietnam 
America's second-major post-war, disaster was approached 
in a very different way by its leading agencies, enough 
to suggest that by now the Cuban lesson had indeed been 
learnt, if not by the government then by an important 
sector of the press. The definitive account of the 
Vietnam War has yet to be written, but it is clear that 
mistakes were made by the press in their reporting of it, 
and grave omissions occurred (see for instance Philip 
Knightley's account in The First Casualty')11; not- 
withstanding: these, the development of as much press- 
government antagonism at a time of national and inter- 
national crisis is a relatively rare event, and an 
important one that had considerable consequences for the 
way in which the war was fought. 
Agency represent. i. on in Saigon in the early 'sixties 
was slight. AP's bureau consisted of Malcolm Browne; 
UPI's representative was Neil Sheehan. These were to 
be identified with that section of the Saigon press 
corps, then numbering less than twenty persons altogether, 
whose descriptiors of life under the Diem regime pleased 
neither the US government nor the regime and attracted 
the criticism not only of the American Establishment, 
but of part of. the press as well. In Saigon agency 
dispatches were regarded as potentially if not actually 
subversive: 
When the reporters filed their stories at night, 
copies were immediately taken. to the Palace. 
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The next morning, when the incoming AP 
and UPI wire stories arrived in the country, 
all dispatches dealing with Vietnam were 
stamped 'Top Secret' and brought to the 
palace. 12 
Malcolm Browne's photo of Quang Duc's self-immolation 
by fire in June'1963 received world-wide attention. 
Writing about his experience in 1964 he recalled how his 
Number 2, Peter Arnett, who joined him in 1963, was beaten 
up by Saigon police, his camera broken, as he tried to 
photograph a Buddhist demonsiation. Charges-were pressed 
against the two newsmen, but President Kennedy successfully 
intervened on their behalf. Sources tended to dry up on 
newsmen quickly at that time; if they did not, ; they ran 
the risk of fines or prison. Police tailed the agency 
staffers constantly. 
13 
During the Cuban crisis of 1961 the American press, taken 
in perhaps by its own persistent anti-Castroism,. instinct- 
ively sided with its own government. But in Vietnam the 
repressive character of the Diem regime was perceived for 
what it was by the American reporters based there, and 
they placed this perception side-by-side with the equally 
evident US support or the Diem regime. This parallel 
description of events created adistrust of US official 
sources which lasted with fluctuating significance, through- 
out the war. The, perception of the contradiction between 
the US stated objective to preserve the 'freedom' of the 
Vietnamese and the actual repression of. the people under 
Diem was nourished by a real fear for personal safety, and 
the consequent appreciation of. the need for unusually 
courageous reporting: 
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Arnett, in his'own-_account of; events in-these early, 
years, quoted from a.. guide which Browne had written as 
. an introduction to reporting in Saigon at the time. 
In this he said that news-gathering in Vietnam required,. 
at times, methods, uncomfortably close`-to. those used by 
professional: intelligence'units. -- The-Vietnam government, 
Browne claimed, hated correspondents' Moreover, Browne was 
intensely" aware' of the involuntary political« significance 
of foreign correspondents and in his opinion '! It is, quite 
possible that the NgoDinh Diem regime would; 'havesurvived 
a lot longer than it did'against the Buddhist insurrection, 
'but for the- role of -the ` foreign' press. Involuntarily, 
"foreign correspondents`become'potentpoliticäl-tools - 
!a role the dictates of our professionstrictly,. 'proscribe. 1114. 
The intensity of press-source-antagonism between, the, 
American"press and the Ameri'can', government, meanwhile, 
was serious enough to affect the way . 
in which Washington 
`thought about the war. Young. press correspondents now 
met'with, perhaps for` the first' time, flagrant non- 
co-operation'and dishonesty from'US officials. ' Browne 
gives as an example an occasion in May 1962 when the 
Vietcong released two army prisoners. An army statement, 
however, claimed that'd Vietcongcamp'had camp, had: been overcome 
and the prisoners liberated 
15 
In January 1963, Neil Sheehan 'of "UPI and David, -Halberstam 
of the New York Times' reported the battle 'of Ap° Bac as 
" a-debacle for_ the US, while the US Command 'described it 
as a victory. From ?; this=point, 'wrote Stanley Karnow, 
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"... the underminings of the journalistic reputations of 
the. Sai. gon press corps had begun". 
16 
Sheehan and Halberstam 
had sourced their. reports to local American military 
advisers., Shortly afterwards a US Embassy official 
characterized US newsmen as inexperienced, unsophisticated,. 
and malicious individuals whose "irresponsible, sensational- 
ized and astigmatic reporting" had damaged the US interests 
in Vietnam. _- Memos from Washington urged. restrictive 
policies towards the press. One from Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Public . 
Affairs,, Carl Rowan, -advised 
that "newsmen should not be exposed to military. activities 
that are likely to result in undesirable stories". The 
USIA chief in Vietnam, John. Mecklin, had to report to' 
President Kennedy that relationships with the press had 
become more important a. matter, for atiention than security. 
Kennedy told his. press; secretary, Pierre. Salinger.,. to tell 
Saigon officials "to take reporters into your confidence".. 
No real change occurred however until Ambassador Nolting 
.. was. replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge,, who was. much more 
favourable towards the press.. His arrival. did not however 
prevent a tightening up of US military restrictions. 
Not only was, there a dearth of correspondents initially, 
but also a shortage of correspondents who were prepared 
to do the dirty work of reporting the war from the field; 
yet this was a"war where, real knowledge. of progress could 
come, only from. the field, and not from the-statistics 
and salesmanship of. Washington and Saigon official sources. 
The agencies, charged with covering, the day-to-day 
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developments,, -of , necessity 
did-this dirty work. James 
McCartney, writing. in 1968, praised-those reporters who 
.! cut 
through the. morass, to.: report,. in ° some kind of perspect- 
ive' and mentioned Peter .; 
Arnett. of- AP as one who 'managed 
to convey, the futility of using sophisticated equipment 
against. jungles and mud', _while,:, 'UPIreporters wrote 
brilliantly on: the occasion of non-battles, -of the sense- 
less" destruction of _ towns- in`. -order to save them'. 
17 
But in Washington too some. of :: the major: -investigative 
;, 
reporting was. i. nitiated, 'by theagencies. " Don Stillman 
gave 'credit _ . 
to AP, for its investigation- of the Tonkin 
affair: 
The;: first real breakthrough came in =July 1967 
when Associated Press sent a special assignment 
team headed- by' Harry Rosenthal and Tom Stewart 
to interview some three dozen. crew members. 
Their superb. 5,000`word-account was the first; 
real enterprise reporting on the Tonkin affair... 
AP 'revealed for the first '-', time'!. that the Maddox 
was carrying intelligence equipment, and also 
cited for. : the first time that the Maddox had 
not fired any warning shots, as claimed by 
. 
Secretary McNamara, but had. shot'. to kill'instead. 
The crew interviews indicated that there was a 
great confusion on : board the <two ships during 
the incident. 18 
On the ground it was mainly the agencies and television 
which followed the troops into combat: the agencies 
because it was their job to provide comprehensive 
coverage of the daily shifts of war; the television 
crews because they needed good visual material. 
Of the newspapermen and magazine correspondents 
in. fact, except for a coupleof people like:; 
Peter Arnett and Henri Huet of. the AP,. and 
David: Greenway of Time and Dana Stone of UPI', 
virtually none are doing the combat work that 
television is now doing on aroutinebasis 
(aseemingly routine basis anyway). 19 
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Although required to follow field. action perhaps more 
closely than newspaper journalists, the agency corresporl- 
ents were more restricted in the time they could spend 
in the field at any one go and in the amount of inter- 
pretation they could indulge in. This was especially 
true of the. European agencies, since they did not'have 
the same number of men as the US agencies. On the other 
hand, because they were not so commuted to meeting the 
needs of the US media market they'were. less under pressure 
to: look at the military situation from the 'soldier's home 
town' point. of view. US agency men were limited by the 
need for rapid communication of news to the Saigon desk.. 
They were normally expected to return to the office'at 
the end of . 
the day; out in the field they had to stay 
closelto telephone facilities. Generally they would 
use the local PTT. if possible, since the military (ARVN) 
phone was bad and the call had to pass through a number" 
of 'exchanges. on the. wayto Saigon. This need to remain 
in close contact with the. office and to return to it at 
the end of each day'was occasioned in the first place by 
the nature-of the'news agency business, and the perceived 
need to keep dispatches flowing, and secondly, the un- 
predictability of the situation, the possibility of new 
developments, made it important that the maximum' number 
of men were available. for fresh. assignments. These 
requirements were to,; some, extent-the unfortunate consequence 
of the -agencies' attempt! -to appease the editors of client 
media who 'got round to thinking that they should have a 
Vietnamese story every day regardless of actual developments' 
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This tied reporters to a. daily file, near to a telephone 
if not a desk, and also created undue pressure on the 
correpsondents to think up new angles and stories at 
the risk of inaccuracies or distortions. 
Photographers were under rather less pressure of this. 
kind. But even if they were not returning to the office 
on the same day as going out on a field-trip, they were. 
generally obliged to ensure that film reached the office 
as soon as possible, or otherwiseýi. t would no longer 
be newsworthy. It was possible to use military planes 
for shipping purpo. ses. In this event it. was necessary. 
to contact the office to let, itknow that film was being 
shipped, and to give the specifications of the plane it 
was . 
beingseht byso.. that someone could meet the plane 
when it landed. Photographers were; unable to use port- 
able radio-transmitters for photo-transmission because 
the necessary reception equipment, in the absence'of 
clients within Vietnam forthe photo service, was not 
available. 
The agencies-did bring in trovingt. correspondents who' 
were less tied to the Saigon. desks. But'these were 
few. in number, and often spent. their time helping out on 
the. major stories of the day. Recognizing the limit- 
ations imposed on field reporting by desk considerations, 
most agency respondents . 
placed. high value on'field 
experience. A correspondent who had covered Cambodia 
in the early 'seventies considered field reporting the 
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only way of correcting statements put out by Phnom Penh. 
A Saigon correspondent considered it impossible to cover 
any major army offensive from a desk in Saigon or Phnom 
Penh, and those who had tried to do so, in his opinion, 
had done a bad job. There was some decentralization 
away from Saigon which helped make up for lack of flex- 
ibility occasioned by the need to keep the news flowing. 
AP in early 1973 reported it sent men northwards period- 
ically and that it had stringers around the country. 
There were hotel rooms booked on a permanent basis in 
major cities for the use of visiting AP journalists. 
UPI kept a staffer in the northern region, while AFP 
had a special correspondent in the north covering 
Quang Tri and Hue. AP and UPI had stringers in. Laos 
and Cambodia, and AFP had permanent bureaux in these 
capitals. 
The original My Lai story was filed from Hong Kong by 
AP. The' bureau chief there picked it up from Hanoi 
radio, and surmised by the. quantity and quality of 
facts provided that it was more than a propaganda story. 
However it was not until the army charged Lt. William 
Calley Jr. with murder in the deaths of 'an unspecified 
number of civilians in Vietnam' that the story began to 
move. This was September 6th, 1969. The local AP man 
at Fort Benning, Ga., promptly put in a query, but when 
no further information of interest was forthcoming from 
the Pentagon, AP left the story as it was. Until, that 
is, Seymour M. Hersh, a former AP Pentagon reporter, 
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decided to follow it up, "'and with-the help of funds from 
the Philip Stern. Fund for Investigative Journalism in 
Washington helped`to-make it the most ' important news 
break of = the 'whole 'war. 
21 
Philip' Knightley recounts how 
the My Lai story, once'it had'been pushed hard enough by 
Hersh, led to a- whole new way of" reporting 'about and 
commentating-On the warz'--. atrocity'storiesthat had, so' 
far just passed reporters by thinking either'they were 
so normal in war as not"'to merit'attention'br for fear 
of recrimination, not to mention the possibility that many 
reporters `in Saigon were 'inevitably' caüghtý upý'in the 
general corruption -'now such stories became commonplace. 
22 
Hersh'-had never-been to Vietnam. 
Ofinvestigative reporting-as such, there was very little 
in Vietnam itself. The kindof-reporting which won'the' 
praise ,_-ga and drew the criticism of "those .a aa. nst and 
for 
the war was mostly, 'in the caseof the agencies, the same 
kind of'objective''reporting which generally'distinguishes 
the agency journalist-from the newspaper columnist: What 
the agency journalists did was to report a 'number of 
stories the very existence of which upsetthe`US or South 
Vietnamese sources. Almost against their will, the 
agencies, along with the prestige press, became"contro- 
versial 
The manner of reporting the'war raised an important question 
which is central to`any consideration of how'the global' 
flow'of news can be confidently left, as far as'the non- 
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communist world is concerned, in the hands largely of 
four organizationsbased in three countries.: This is 
to do with. . 
the problem of reporting-on the activities 
of'two combatants when one's news organization of 
necessity is identified with the. interests of. one of 
the combatants. Given that coverage of one, side is 
therefore limited, what, consequences does this have for 
the wayin, which the other side, ., 
the more. accessible side 
(supposedly) is-; covered? 
Identification of the world-wide agencies with. the 
interests of their base countries, has its. most restrictive 
consequences in time of war, and especially in wars where 
one of the base countries is clearly allied with one'of 
the contending forces. , -This has happened wherever the 
agencies have covered wars that also relate; to. the division 
between the capitalist and the communist countries. 
Divisions of this, kind make it almost impossible for agency 
journalism to fulfil one, of the accepted. norms of western 
journalism that in coverage of a conflict situation the 
agency should cover all. sides to the-dispute. Where 
meaningful access is denied. to any one of. the contending 
forces then the norm is not fulfilled -, the will to impart- 
iality may=be present, but its realization is impossible. 
There are of course nearly always some sources of news 
concerning each side. So for instance a'newspaper can 
decide to. take.. not. only AP world news service for its 
information about Vietnam, but'also, the report of the New 
China, News Agency or even the North Vietnamese news agency. 
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However, no one of these. agencies has, or did have access 
to sources on all sides of the dispute., Therefore there 
If 
was no. source who could claim to have self-generated 
information that wouldenable. it to make a meaningful 
selection of all reports according to the rules imposed 
by impartiality. There may be exceptions. to.. this state 
of affairs, at moments during the course of. a dispute, but 
the general condition is one of imbalanced'access. 
During the Vietnamese war, the four main western agencies 
were represented in Saigon, Washington and Moscow. Only 
two were. represented inPeking: these were the European 
agencies, 
_and 
for a while, in the. late 'sixties, Reuters 
lost its accreditation. Only one agency was represented 
in Hanoi. There was therefore some western representation 
in '. each of the major capitals implicated:, the US agency 
representation was the most limited,. and, even, where the 
western agencies had access. to Peking or, Hanoi its useful- 
ness was severely limited in practice. 
Only one agency had representation in all. the relevant 
capitals-this was AFP. The limited usefulness of 
this. representation was described, in, interview by a 
respondent who had spent two., years in Hanoi before the 
end of direct US involvement in the war, working. for AFP. 
Everything he wrote. had to be vetted by . 
the Foreign 
Ministry. before release.. ., 
Limited communication-facilities 
made it. impossible for him to receive the service of his 
own agency, though hedid have several contacts a. day 
864. 
with Hong Kong and Paris and could listen to foreign 
radio stations. His sources were very restricted. He 
would typically spend his morning reading the Hanoi press, 
using its. stories for his own use, or for checking his 
own stories. He could not contact, officials except 
through the Ministry of Information: success in 
obtaining interviews varied a, great deal. In theafter- 
noon he would often contact embassy sources or, during = 
the periods of bombing,. he would write stories that 
focused on the extent and the kind öf physical. damage, 
maybe indicating its emotional impact from conversations 
with people at the market. ' Travel outside Hanoi was 
allowed only if specific permission and a pass was 
granted; then, accompanied by an interpreter and a 
driver provided by the Ministry of Information he would 
have to aim for 
.a 
specific destination, and onhis arrival 
there would be placed in the charge of a local press 
attache. His wife, who was Vietnamese, had much more 
freedom of `travel than he did, and " this helped compensate 
to some extent. 
The information he gathered did not greatly add to the 
outside world's specific picture of the nature, structure 
and'strategies of-North Vietnamese society ' in' this time' 
of war. `Nevertheless', he was there, so that if sudden 
changes in accessibility did occur, or any very. major 
development not ' otherwise' visible, ' he was in'a position 
to profit` by it. '"He was 'also well placed to write 
'atmosphere' stories, stories which 
might not have added'. 
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much in the way of hard news,, but which could not have 
been written :: from , anywhere. . 
else,, and . 
filled one gap in 
the kinds of information available about the North 
Vietnamese side:: information concerning human feelings 
about and reactions-to the war. 
The correspondent on the spot' is able to write about 
the contents of shop-windows, the: way; people dress, how 
they look, whatseem: to be their mostpressing, worries. 
Such details may-be-revealing, and do reflect apolitical 
reality. In the`wörds of, another AFP respondent, "the 
fewer sources. you have,, the more important it, is to-'be 
on the spot". ' 
= In Peking, asp in Hanoi, , one of. -the. mos, t. important sources 
of information was the diplomatic community. Contacting 
the diplomatic corps, given the; Chinese propensity: to 
play one side off against,. another, could lead to certain 
insights not otherwise possible.,; : 
There were Communist 
sources here which were not.. only. more accessible but 
also. more talkative, such, as. the: -Cuban Embassy and the 
representatives of the Cuban news, agency. Prensa Latina, 
the North"Vietnamese. Embassy and Prince Sihanouk, the 
exiled prince of . 
Cambodia. There were also, western 
diplomats. with access to communist sources, including-the 
North Vietnamese, and. the. se were sometimes able to pass 
on information. Approaches to the. Chinese government, 
however, had to ; be - established. through. the Foreign 
Ministry, and these were generally difficult to achieve. 
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There were no press conferences as such,. and Chinese 
officials were not forthcoming with explanations for 
events. Banquets were important news-gathering events, 
but resident correspondents often found themselves at a 
disadvantage by comparison with visiting journalists in 
the matter of seating arrangements. Thus the visiting 
journalist, who was less able to exploit the situation, 
was more likely to find himself seated next to an 
important dignitary. 
But in this period, the early 'seventies, conditions were 
considerably brighter for the'journalist community than 
they had been in the mid to late 'sixties during the 
'Cultural Revolution'; in this earlier period Hong 
Kong was the major source of news of developments in 
China. 
Possibly the information gained through representation 
in Peking and Hanoi was not substantially greater than 
that obtained by the agencies which had no; such represent- 
ation. Naturally, those agencies which did have access 
to these countries' tended to argue that such represent- 
ation was very important, if only because thisýwas a 
good line' to'push'in sales-talk with clients. Behind 
such representation lay, the usual contingency strategy 
an acknowledgement that even: if the immediate gains 
were not considerable,. an unexpected crisis"or develop- 
ment might suddenly repay the cost .. ofrepresentation 
with interest, simply through the advantage,; that accrues 
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to a journalist who is at the right. place`at the right 
time. 
In Saigon of course contact with Communist- sources was 
especially difficult. A Reuters correspondent in 
Saigon between 1966-8 recalled that his only contact 
with the` North Vietnamese or Vietcong was through the- 
press releases which they placed in a postbox on the 
agency's back door', put there especially for such 
deliveries. This arrangement lasted only for-so long 
as Saigon was 'safe' for the Vietcong to operate. 'An 
AFP respondent claimed that 'before the cease-fire in 1973 
-there was-no communication with the Vietcong except in 
Paris. To have attempted such contact in his'. opinion 
would not only have been suicidal, it-would also have 
been illegal and ä"threat to'the continued survival of. 
his bureau. A colleague claimed that. he in fact had 
had contact with the Vietcong during the 1968 offensive, 
but felt unable to use his source without putting the 
bureau and himself at too great a risk. US agency 
reporters had much the same-experience. "Before'the ' 
ceasefire", said'one picture-editor, "we didn't try: to. 
make contäct'with the communist's.. Freelancers' were 
always coming-in 'and making suggestions as to how we 
could do it. But none of these schemes was successful". 
An ex-AP bureau chief-'in Saigon felt the effort of. 
`establishing communication 'channels'with the Vietcong 
had-never been worth the certain reprisals that would 
have followed. ` - He did however add it was sometimes 
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possible to contact Vietcong sympathizers in Saigon, and 
also that it was possible to locate Vietcong spokesmen 
in Cambodia. Access in Cambodia was also mentioned by 
an AFP respondent who had had contact with the. Phnom 
Penh office of the Liberation Front in 1968; this office 
closed in 1970 after the coup d'etat which overthrew 
Sihanouk. Reluctance of agency staffers to make contacts 
in Saigon was based not only on caution but also on 
economic good sense: the lives of staffers, are well 
insured, but insurance premiums are high. They get 
higher the more journalists get killed. It is-cheaper 
to let stringers or volunteers, who tended to collect in 
Saigon, take the risks. This was especially true of 
photo-journalism. The stringers did not have to be in- 
sured. Not that staffers were short on heroism - but 
certain risks bordered on the suicidal. 
The problem of contacting: communist sources continued 
. even into the post-ceasefire 
period in 1973. Communist 
delegates to the Joint. Military Commission were carefully 
guarded by South Vietnamese police. These delegates 
organized a reception for the press, but access was denied 
not only to members of the press corps-but also to the 
diplomatic community. Some journalists however obtained 
a phone number of the delegates' building; this was on 
a military line,. and only occasionally did a call succeed 
in getting through. The South Vietnamese government 
greatly feared that the press 
would over-glamourize the 
communists; one agency journalist 
tried to persuade 
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ý: officials that once. the press had got over the novelty 
of having communist sources it would be as'critical of 
the Vietcong as it. had been, öf the South Vietnamese. 
But the: argument was. unsuccessful. The military did 
.. 
not like it, when., agency, repor. ters: tried. to make contact 
.. -with communists in the field in the ceasefire period, 
and would not provide any help-at all for this purpose. 
Through. unofficial contacts it was possible to get 
, through to An 
Loc,: held: -by the communists, though the 
road was in a very poor:. state. The South Vietnamese 
did provide helicopters to fly pressmen to the sites of 
POW releases, . butin. at least one instance the US heli- 
copter pilots refused"totake the pressmen on board, 
arguing that arrangements for witness of POW releases 
... 
had been; made only""£or Clark Air Base {in the Philippines, 
where US, POW. 's were flown en route back to North America). 
ýA number of - contacts, with communists were made, despite 
official discouragement, -chiefly 
by, photographers. 
. 
These workedfor. the agencies. mainly on, a. freelance basis, 
paid per photo:. Fees were generous at first, but soon 
returned to, -the. standard'fifteen. dollars a picture. The 
subject-matter of the, new photos could have had 'Only a 
; short life: the picturesof. Vietcong.: villages did not 
look much. different. from: the pictures: öf. government 
villages, except for the, different flags.. : Villagers 
from both sides. had an_annoying habit of. posing specially 
for the press... " Of the. journalists, who made communist ' 
., contacts. a'number became very vulnerable:: 'to, government 
anti-press sentiment. and were. to have their.: visas with- 
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drawn or in any other ways harassed. Such contacts 
were in any case physically hazardous. Under the cease- 
fire agreement it was permitted to raise the Vietcong 
flag but when the government saw a Vietcong flag it 
chose to interpret this to mean that the Vietcong had 
infiltrated the village after the ceasefire', and thus in 
violation 'of the agreement. 
There was heavy dependence therefore on US and South 
Vietnamese sources in coverage of the war. Such. one- 
sided dependence can lead to over-identification with 
the accessible source or to an excessively negative 
reaction against the source. Both these reactions 
appear to have occurred. Some reports indicated that 
some correspondents''had over-reacted to the 'need to be 
tough'. A Reuters respondent remembered a time-when 
American-agency reporters tended to go out looking for 
anti-American stories, and in his opinion it- was fear of. 
imbalanced coverage, that led AP to move in older 
correspondents to help restore the-balance. A general 
feeling existed amongst-the European agency-journalists 
that they were less emotionally involved in. the war and 
its consequences than the US. press teams, and less prone 
to take sides for or against US sources. They felt 
that by contrast tothe US agencies they tended to view 
the -story less' as a US. affair, more as an' Asian . one . 
This view of-emotional'independence was. taken by; Philip 
Knightleywhen he, wrote that 'British correspondents were 
better placed to write about Vietnam than were their 

872. 
be stretched to the point of not reporting an air disaster 
as a loss so long as the tail-wing number was still visible. 
Official figures could be sometimes corrected with the 
help of unofficial estimates offered by'contacts within 
the ranks: so for instance in the Winter of'1971 one 
agency calculated a total'of 240 air losses against an 
official figure. of 98. US sources were generally thought 
more reliable than'ARVN sources; the US after'all had 
more men engaged in this kind of work, a whole regiment 
for the determination of'body identification. 
The sheer complexity of military operations on the ground 
exacerbated the problems' of dependence on sources, and 
made it easier for these sources to maintain 'secrecy. 
A 'Reuters respondent described this situation in reference 
to the"time of the Tet 'offensive in'1968 when the war 
was at'its peak as a ground war: tiAt'any given time the 
bureau aimed to have the maximum number of people in the 
field.. The US sources were extremely accessible, every 
transport facility was offered, and there was no censor- 
ship. Nevertheless, there was a'good deal of conceal- 
ment prior to military actions, and since at times there 
were as many as five or six major actions a day', this 
made adequate field reportage difficult. ' There were no 
barriers to access to'soldiers, although the authorities 
at times'could refuse transportation to certain areas. '. 
The change of the war from being a ground to mainly 
being an air. war meant that there were fewer sources 
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available, and these sources were less visible, less 
dispersed and more tightly controlled from above. As 
troop' withdrawal's progressed, the opportunity for co- 
operation between press and army was reduced. This. 
affected agency correspondents-more than it affected 
newspapermen since theagencies had to provide a day-by- 
day: 'account of changes in the military situation.. 
Newspapermen on-the other hand could depend on the agency 
accounts-, and concentrate on the-overall military and 
political situation. The television crewman and the- 
photographer however were affected the same . way the., 
agencies were, since they needed action 
pictures to. 
help sell the Vietnamese story at a 'time its. importance 
for the western media was declining. Of the forty-five 
journalists killed-in the Indochina war up to'January 1973, 
eleven were western agency men. 
The Spring'Offensiveof 1972 when the. Nor, th. Vietnamese, '.. 
adopted classic invasion tactics in contrast to:: the 
guerilla campaign of the 1968 Tet Offensive revealed the 
extent of the changes that had'occurred in the. reporting, 
situation. More than everthe press was.. obliged;. to 
provide its own transportation, ünder. conditions of 
intense and prolonged artillery'fire. A UPI. respondent 
explained why it was the US' forces could . 
'not have been 
more co-operative than they were: the facilities were 
simply not available; the proportion of air-power in 
actual military use was higher--than in previous confront- 
ations of-'similar magnitude.. The reduction of US air- 
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bases and helicopter units naturally caused much of this 
pressure on air transport availability; the introduction 
of new weapons by the communists increased. this pressure 
- the SA7 Stella missile changed the. nature of air-war 
by making it necessary for helicopters, to fly at much 
higher altitudes than before, thus reducing-their efficiency; 
the new anti-tank missile, AT3, had the same kind of 
effect on the ground, making close proximity to communist 
forces very difficult. The availability of ground 
vehicles was very uneven and where they were 'available 
they were least needed - in Da Nang for example when the 
fighting was north of Hue. Apart from the limitations 
imposed by reduced facilities, there were few US policy 
curbs on press activity.. The reporter was technically 
fairly free to go wherever he wished, but the risks were 
great. There was no longer. any advance information about 
the movement of military bases, so that frequently report- 
ers found themselves driving, into unfriendly territory 
which on the basis of out-of-date, information they had 
assumed to be friendly. 
From 1970 and-the invasion of Cambodia the role and 
importance of the ARVN, grew considerably. There was 
overwhelming agreement among the agency journalists 
that the ARVN presented more problems of coverage than 
the. US. military. Up until the 1972 offensive there 
was an overall dependence on official communiques for 
news of ARVN activity... The good provision of facilities 
and opportunities (if not'accurate information) to which 
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the press corps had been accustomed under the US lead were 
no longer-to be had.. Travel out, into the field with the 
ARVN, was not so easy to arrange, and was largely. a matter 
of the personal, whim of local field, commanders. When 
journalists did get. out,, it was considerably more danger- 
ous than it had been: the correspondents had. to make 
their own way, without help-of transportation, which. was 
not available for non-military use. Yet it was still 
possible for. agency journaliststo maintain contacts with 
top-ranking ARVN officers who,. though loyal, were willing 
to talk quite frankly and-intelligently:. about. the military. 
situation even if from a pro-government angle... Officially 
. 
no ARVN soldier was allowed to talk with. foreign news 
. agency personnel, 
but of course many of them: did. 
.. 
The, conditions which obtained for journalists-in South 
Vietnam. after 1970. as far as-sourcing was concerned,. were 
similar to those-which existed ýn Laos and Cambodia, but 
with rather more protection. There , were many 
fewer, 
press men in Phnom Penh or. Vientiane- than in Saigon. 
The agencies tended to cover. Cambodia with.: one-man. bureaux 
or with stringers and'Vientiane was generally a matter 
for the stringer, with occasional visits from Bangkok-based 
reporters. The Indochina war. tended to: be seen by agencies 
and: western- press generally as aVietnamese, story essent- 
ially, although the. war. in. Laos and Cambodia was a good 
deal more complicated. - There: were many-more identifiable 
and, some.. lessidentifiable factions; the role ofthe US 
was at,. the time far less clear, less visible than in South 
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Vietnam, and US air action well guarded from press inquiries. 
Considered lesslegitimatehre than in Saigon by his 
sources, the journalist was especially vulnerable. There 
were exceptionally heavy casualities in Cambodia in 1970: 
eleven journalists captured and later released, eighteen 
still missing at the end of. 1972 and nine known to have 
been killed. 
The real cause of press resentment and anger about the 
problem of sources. in South Vietnam, however, was-always 
the attitude of the US. Problems with South Vietnamese, 
and of course any of the Indochinese communist groups, 
were to be expected. ' Where the US was concerned, it was 
more a question of betrayal. The feelings aroused were 
complicated, because the US was also the beneficient 
provider of many of the things which made the'war a. 
tolerable one'to`report and the presence ofthe"US in 
Saigon in many respects helped make that city a particu- 
larly exciting place to be, if not'a more beautiful and 
calmer place, '. from the point of view (only) of-the visit- 
ing foreigner and the locals who directly profited from 
this presence. 
The attitude of US official sources of course affected 
most of the press-'indisc. riminately, and there'is no place 
here-tochroniclethe development and-the shifts in the 
relationship between US and press sources., The agencies, 
being asubstantial part of the total press corps, were 
of course' fundamentally affected by the 




relationship.. This grew' more' problematic as time went 
1 
on. Malcolm M. Browne was' quoted as saying at one point: 
'The main difference between then'and'now. is'that then 
they. tried. to persuade'"us. - Now they'don't'bother.. They 
just freeze us out". 
24 The`major period'of deterioration 
in the second half of the war began soonafter the, Tet 
offensive.; A UPI report that. year referred to attempts 
by the Military Command's information-office (MACOI) to 
suppress release of news by-use of lies; its refusal 
to comment on news-with explanatory material; ". its 
-refusal to answer legitimate. qüestiöns. Söme information 
was released only in-answer to-specific query (which 
required prior knowledge).. ': Press Information Officers 
at. divisionlevel had to clear with MACOI'before talking 
to the 'press and this could take several- days. ' Newsmen 
no 'longer had access, to intelligence'officers qualified, 
to brief on the nationwide military situation., These 
difficulties were to- last into: the"'seventies and to the 
end of-the war. In 1971 the Foreign Correspondents 
Association criticized MACOI: for. refusing to- release 
information already available in`Washington, for barring 
correspondents from access to key news sources, refusing 
to`provide background information'on current-military 
. 
developments, monitoring newsmen's interviews with 
soldiers and for refusing torieview its stringent policy 
on providing ' information of. a general character. 
:. A dispatch dated January 20th, 1972, re'lated'that, "US 
Command admitted Wednesday it won't talk about America's 
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growing Indochina involvement outside Vietnam for Polit- 
ical rather than military reasons, and this brought into 
focus an increasingly bitter dispute between. newsmen 
and military here". Once again the observation was 
made that access to information, even about events 
happening in South Vietnam, was better for Washington 
than for Saigon correspondents. "Newsmen are not about 
to let the. Administration get away with selling an 
escalation of the war as a de-escalation and a worsening 
military position as an improving one without somehow 
trying to say what the truth is behind the jargon. " 
During the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong at the end of- 
that year an AP. dispatch reported that "Pentagon officials 
say details of the new American bombing should be reported 
from Saigon, but in Saigon the US Command has limited its 
information to periodic summaries giving only vague details 
of the air strikes". Later US sources 
. 
were seen to have 
closed up altogether, and remained in total silence until 
. 
December 31st... But relations never resumed their previous 
level despite frequent protests. Nor did the February 
ceasefire improve matters. Ultimately. of course it did 
not make any difference: twoyears later 
. 
theNorth 
Vietnamese and the Vietcong won a sweeping victory down 
the east coast and over Saigon. Perhaps greater access 
and understanding with the communists in 1973 would have 
paid off. for the west; and had the US been readier to 
listen to the doubts of its own press representatives, 




incompatible. A certain westernization of thought led. 
journalists to oversimplify matters: in covering Cambodia, 
as one UPI journalist said, there was a tendency to inter- 
pret the situation as a matter of sides and two-power 
politics, whereas in fact it was much more akin to a 
feudal warlord situation. In short the western corr- 
espondents, according to an AFP reporter, had only one 
half of the equation - the other half was always a sur- 
prise. 
The agencies were criticized also for failing to grasp 
the significance of events, and did not always adjust 
their priorities to match changes in the situation.. An 
AFP respondent. argued that the US agencies had missed 
the significance of the Tet Offensive in 1968 for the 
South Vietnamese, for whom it had in fact been something 
of a military and psychological victory and a subsequent 
though not enduring source of support for the Thieu 
regime. Had the agencies interpreted Tet 1968 in this 
light, they might have taken Vietnamizationmore seriously, 
and. given rather more attention to internal South Vietnamese 
politics. The US media, according to the account, were 
slow to see in the South Vietnamese the-real capacity for 
aggression in war, and now (in 1973) they were still 
surprised at the evidence -"the survival of Theiu up to 
and beyond the ceasefire and the readiness; ofthe South 
Vietnamese to violate ., 
the. ceasefire, possibly as much 
as the Vietcong, perhaps more. Part of the media's 
reluctance to accept this view. followed from its assumption 
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of the earlier prejudice of the US Army towards the ARVN, 
prejudice generally expressed towards all Vietnamese at 
My Lai. Because the media', '' agencies included, ' were not 
oriented to thinking'aböut'SouthVietnamese'politics as 
a phenomenon in its own right, they continued to miss 
the significance of internal developments. The 1971 
elections, for instance, were examined from'the point 
of view of whether-'or-not they were democratic. This 
was a somewhat' ridiculous view to take, since the real 
opposition, the Vietcong; were not in'the game' in any 
case. The-essential=point which the US media-did not 
treat with the significance It 'deserved was' that the 
peasants even'in contested areas and within the. limits 
of their understanding of politics and political con-' 
straints, were voting for Thieu. 
While the 'analysis. of this respondent may now seem 
datfd in 'the light of actual events, " it did reflect 
some considerable agreement'amongst other agency 
journalists 'ab'out' the media's' 'failure' to find a way 
of bringing-' South Vietnamese politics (and' for that 
: 'matter, culture and history) into' the war story, and 
explaining the contest in'terms other than astraight- 
forward 'US - Commie' fight. Another popular Simpli- 
fication of reporting was to reduce each battle to 
terms 'of 'will. they take 'the city or not? '. 'A UPI 
respondent felt this kind of coverage of Phnom Pehn in 
2 1972 was inappropriate,, since agreat deal of evidence 
suggested_that'the communists were`not then interested 
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intaking the city. But in concentrating their attention 
on a strategy that was not known definitely to exist, the 
media omitted a number. of other issues of political 
significance in the country.. At a lower level of 
significance, it was argued by another UPI reEpondent 
that the real meaning of events in combat was sometimes, 
if not often, missed by the agencies, who were dependent 
for much of their information on official combat 
communiques from the South Vietnamese or US forces. 
These communiques never attempted to evaluate the'ration- 
ale of army actions. For instance, in the summer of 
1972. the US army was trying to hit a water tower used as 
an observation post, by the North Vietnamese near Quang 
Tri.. city. Without Success. The water tower had been 
built by the US in. 1966 and. now it stood in the way of 
the recapture of Quang Tri from the North Vietnamese. 
It was eventually knocked down ten days. before the city 
was taken - and it was the destruction of the tower that 
allowed the city to be taken., The-first communique 
. 
issued about the tower said nothing of its significance 
however; the respondent was fortunate enough to have 
followed the. story closely and was able to use his 
information for a scoop story.. 
The agencies made some mention of each other. It was 
said that AP had an, important advantage over UPI in that 
its coverage. -of the war-from Washington-was, stronger and 
more aggressive,. thi. s arising from thefact. that AP was 






AP was also said. to have had an advantage 
in greater continuity of staff.. AFP was given credit 
for, its political,; coverage of the war, particularly of, 
South Vietnamese politics. From AFP in turn there was 
praise for the speed and. exhaustiveness of, reporting 
of the US agencies. 
Some newspaper correspondents in Saigon compared their 
own. coverage of the warwith that of the agencies. The 
New York Times claimed it had a strength on the ground 
that could compete with the US agencies: his bureau 
,... ,... 
was five. staffers; strong: at the beginning of' 1973, by 
comparison with. -,., AP, 's six reporters and photographers, 
UPI's. six reporters and, six photographers, Reuters' five 
reporters and AFP's. fivereporters. Each ofthe 
agencies, however had several Vietnamese 'support' staff 
. for whom agencywork might, 
be a second job (some of these 
turned out in 1975 to be Vietcong agents). In certain 
respects the New'YorkTimes' inevitably differed from 
the agencies in . its coverage,; not just in. _the. 
treatment 
of news, which was obvious, but in strategy: for example, 
during the 1972 Spring Offensive there were basically 
three stories,, each associated with. three key., highways. 
Whereas, the; agencies-kept men full-time in each of the 
three areas, for; -three months, ' the New York . "Times 
moved 
its men, around more since they could fall back on the 
agencies.,. Although the` Times. did try"to, duplicate the 
agencies . and 
go, beyond them it appreciated this objective 
'was; in some, respects unrealistic. A Los Angeles Times 
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'reporter,. speaking as one of a two-man bureau, ' agreed that 
the agencies concentrated less on evaluation as one would 
expect; but he felt they tended to be too comprehensive 
-they reached saturation point before , 
they had time or 
resources left to look at the meaning of things. Nor 
were they helped by the shortage of men avail"able. for 
this kind of editorial work. The agencies had too few 
perspectives. Daily round-ups on'the warfocused. on the 
'most'dramatic event, or the event most amenable to being 
made dramatic. New York gave too little direction, 
which is what newsmen in the field often need most of all 
- ". someone to ; fill' in the blanks, who can see the wood". 
'This ` respondent had been in charge of an agency bureau 
in Saigon earlier` in the war and'his criticisms were 
therefore extremely pertinent. A Washington Post 
reporter, finally, also of a'two-man bureau, ` said simply 
that his 'paper did not' try to duplicate the agencies, 
except onthemost'important stories. He did not 
concern himself-with the details of-'combat, his task 
was to define the overall picture. 
In this concludingsection of the chapter therefore', we 
: have seen how the four'world-wide western-based agencies 
are limited intheir coverageof conflictsituations 
which involve the countries in which these'agencies 
themselves are based. Even where there is access -to 
the 'capital cities ' of the countries involved,. the 
restrictions on movement and general professional. 
activity are often so great as to eliminate any advantage 
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CONCLUSION 
The appearance of the 'news agency' as a social instit- 
ution occurred only as one of several major advances in 
communication during a peak phase in the history of 
ýindzstrializatiön. The railway companies had earlier 
permitted greater flexibility in the relationship. between 
raw materials, factories, manufactured goods and consumers: 
they made distance. less of an obstacle. "to the coherence 
of this new system. The news agencies performed a 
similar infrastructural function. Like the railways their 
business was conveyance. The raw material in this case 
was the system's informational lubricant - reports of 
political and economic events, the intelligence which 
interest groups needed to have in order, to exploit the 
fortunes and misfortunes of other interest groups or to 
avoid being exploited by them. The systematic collection 
and distribution of such intelligence was an integrative 
" contribution to the industrial order, one that gave high 
visibility to the issues and crises of the day, and in 
doing so consolidated, as it were, the rules of the game 
that was capitalism. 
As a function, of.. industrialization, the news agencies 
appeared in the world's most advanced economic powers, 
and some were able to retain leading status as agencies 
even after their own country's economic importance had 
declined. In those countries where they first appeared 
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and, in others afterwards they served-or were thought by 
some to serve important functions of national and imperial 
unity: national unity in Germany and America, imperial 
unity in France and Britain. 
Regardless of their actual contribution to the wider 
society, the,. news agencies of this study were deeply 
concerned with money and with how to make it. For after 
all they were the product of the capitalist order, and it 
is in terms of this' commercial concern that the present 
study is. conceived. = 
The . concern, for commercial-viability; is a--useful starting 
point for. an: understanding of-, the various 'strategic 
choices'1 by which, these institutions guided their course 
. 
over: a century, or. more,,. and of their particular market 
orientation at any given moment of time.. . Precisely 
because maximization of profit was greatly restricted 
both, by; poor opportunity.. and by the ethic of.. service, 
commercial. viability was more-rather than less-of a' 
problem. 
This study, has. implicitly_identified, six-strategic 
; choices. ofdominating importance, in the history 
of the 
agencies. Each of these, may.. be represented; in continuum 
form: thus :: '- .- 
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1. Criteria of Criteria of 
Objectivity Patronage 
2. Competitive. Coalition 
Relationship 
3. Revenue Revenue 
Maximization Satisficing 




6. High Level Low Level 
Technology Technology 
The outcome of choice with respect to any of'these 
dimensions was in part determined by existing commitments 
to strategies on other dimensions, and in part to more 
general' environmental factors; for-instance the state 
of political alliances, characterýof the economic climate, 
the' nature of media demand, and the rate of technological 
innovation. 
The choice continuum between criteria of objectivity and 
criteria of patronageis related to strategies`of revenue 
and market. To choose a justification of 'objectivity' 
as criterion of news presentation and selection is to 
some extent a statement about the scope'of market for 
which an agency's service its suited. A. service that is 
'objective"is theoretically.. palatable to everyone, and 
while this need not necessarily be a commercial choice, 
it does imply some commitment to revenue maximization. 
The choice in favour of patronage criteria is similarly 
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related. Inthis strategy, norms of news selection and 
presentation are made subservient.. to the interests of 
certain specific groups . 
in. society at the expense of 
others.. The advantage to. the agency in choosing. such 
a strategy. is the promise. of higher revenue maximization, 
. and-also perhaps, greater security of. revenue - 
if a. 
patron is considered a surer bet than-theopen. market. 
., 
But the strategy may also be related. . 
to; that of a broad 
market orientation, a choice in-other words-in favour of 
providing. servicesto new kinds of clientele where the 
kinds of service they require calls into question the 
objectivity. of the. fundamental selection and. presentation 
machinery. 
Choice.. in_favour of., patronage;. -is. not necessarily voluntary. ' 
... 
One of-the important social consequences, . of news agency 
work is its integrative role in national political 
consolidation.:, This function has many times. been 
prom. otedby.. political parties who either sought such 
consolidation or. wanted to retain their own particular 
brand of it after-it had been attained. . 
In some instances 
the agencies have recognized the . attribute as a natural 
advantage and exploited it intentionally, whereas in 
others they had no choice and: their . offices, were subsumed 
under the authority of government. 
Objectivity. criteria dominated the. strategy of. the 
European agencies in theirearliest years, although of 
course. the. social interests reflected in the news 
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selection and presentation' were in reality limited by the 
extent. of media penetration of the period. But the idea 
of equal treatment to existing clients and client groups 
prevailed. Time eroded the principle in Britain, France 
and Germany. In Germany political patronage asserted- 
itself quickly and left little option to`that country's 
leading agency. In France the'agency to some''consider- 
able extent chose for itself a high level of both polit- 
ical and commercial patronage; and in Britain the principle. 
of limited political patronage won ground as an express 
solution to the agency's financial problems from the 
period preceding the'First World War. Political and 
commercial patronage became increasingly insupportable 
in the period following World War Two in all, three countries. 
This reflected the'more widespread establishment in 
practice of principles of social democracy and a changing 
temper in media culture, hence of media cnt`demand. 
`Concern for financial viability has nevertheless pre- 
vented the elimination of patronage, which still exists 
in all cases to some extent, most notably in France. where 
considerable state funds still support the national 
agency's'continued existence. In other respects the 
limitations on finance that follow upon'the first 
strategic choice in favour of an operation based on 
principles of objectivity are compensated for by choice 
in other strategic directions. But it has to be remem- 
bered that the choice in favour of objectivity criteria 
isa choice in favour of continued'existenöe as a news 
agency, indeed insupport'of the social institution 
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itself. For without. this kind of . 
commitment a new 
animal emerges whose links with-the media industry may, 
though not necessarily, become increasingly tenuous. 
In the communist countries of course, there isa clear 
commitment to political patronage'even_though. the media 
. 
link remains very strong.. But. these have. not been the 
main focus of the. study. 
r. . 
The choice alternatives between objectivity,: and patronage 
criteria were closely linked, in. the American case, with 
the alternatives between competitive ' . and coalition 
strategies.,. Although objectivity criteria were more 
in. evidence in America than in Europe,; partly, reflecting 
the greater class. penetration of American media by the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the influence of 
patronage criteria was higher in the early days of the 
American agencies. than. later. on. This in part was due 
to the 
. outcome: of. a period; of great 
fluctuation along the 
competition-coalition dimension in the relationships 
maintained between the. American agencies, during which 
the; coalition dimension was,, found to be largely inadequate, 
as a source . of. protection or. 
success, failing. as `it did 
to satisfy: many of the'conflicting client requirements. 
Sothat, ultimately, an overall competitive strategy. was 
to prevail. This did. not prevent,. a period of vertical 
coalition as. it were between the, agencies-and selective 
clientele groups,., expressed, for.. 'example in exclusivity, 
agreements. But since these too failed. to meet dominant 
service criteria of clients the extent of. such: vertical 
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coalition was later subject to severe restriction. 
In the European sphere on the other hand an initial 
competitive strategy was followed extremely quickly by 
coalition strategies. The European agencies were more 
heavily engaged in foreign news-gathering at first than 
the American and had less wealthy domestic markets 
behind them. - Thus coalition was a product of commercial 
concern, and its shape reflected the balance of general 
political power, which facilitated close links between, 
agencies of great powers with shared interest or invest- 
ments and between these agencies and the agencies of 
colonial countries. ' Because the political system was 
one of exploitation and inequality and generated its 
own destruction, so too did the agency coalition system 
give rise to dissatisfactions which led to the breakdown 
of the system, but with remnants of cultural and political 
affiliation surviving into the present period. 
History reveals two dominant coalition strategies: 
coalition between rival agencies; coalition between 
agencies and one or'more of their client groups. The 
latter form of coalition however actually creates the 
conditions in which the first becomes necessary. When 
an agency enters into a coälitiön arrangement with 
clients it is in order to set-up 'a monopoly situation 
whereby. the access of rival agencies into the market is 
restricted. The rival agency is thus shut off from the 
market and may'nolonger have sufficient financial 
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incentive 'to cover-that market` thoroughly. Yet it will 
-need news of, 
it . to feed to its own clients. ,. At home it 
will in all: likelihood.: have established similar monopoly 
conditions. 'so -that , the -simplest way out of . the impasse is 
a mutual exchange-agreement with implicit` support' for. 
each, agency Is, monopoly. -.; Coalition agreements of this 
,, secondtype, namely, between agencies and'their clients, 
are sometimes . 
'expressions- of one choice-in the strategy 
continuum first discussed above, -the adoption'of patron- 
age criteria. This occurs when a coalition' arrangement 
between,,. say, an'agency and:.. the political : authorities 
of its-own-country, effectively-excludes-other agencies 
t, from the-news-gathering machinery, and thus creates 
; market-advantages. -'equivalent to a monopoly situation 
and necessitating exchange; 'agreements. ` = 
_The 
-choice- of revenue maximization or revenue satisficing 
shows fairly high- consistency with other-'choices. It is 
a difficult strategy-`to-establish, -since, it exists in 
part in theminds of men, expressed In sometimes' contra- 
dictory. ways. : Although adoption'of criteria of patron- 
-. age-issometimes motivated by: thoughts of-revenue possi-. 
: bil ties, it is often the case-that. such affiliations 
produce a. sense of security and hierarchy in the agency 
such that-its main -responsibilityis nOt to itself but 
to some;: other authority. ''. This--. is of. course 'especially 
possible in the case'of_an agency which recognizes the 
right of a political authority to restrict its area of 
reportage.,. -: In these circumstances-an agency may become 
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very conservative in outlook,. unmindful of new revenue 
possibilities produced by market changes. Another 
related factor has sometimes'been the monopoly situation 
that arises out of patronage strategies, and which has a 
similarly dulling effect. The competition between the 
AmerLcan agencies has certainly served to keep both on 
the alert to market possibilities, although there have been 
periods when one or other has held back: in the period 
for example when the agencies were still'to some extent 
subservient to_the interests of certain client groups, 
loyalty to the newspaper market hindered the growth of 
services to the radio market. The effect of competition 
between the American agencies undoubtedly stimulated their 
development of foreign markets, and this in turn upset 
or contributed to the demise of coalition strategies in 
" 
the European sphere and of the prevalence of patronage 
criteria, : stirring: up in, general its own: competitive 
response from the European agencies. In the period 
following the Second World War a spirit'of revenue 
maximization,. within the-'limits established by'strategic 
choice in favour of criteria of objectivity and accompany-. 
ing choice. in the direction of a competitive strategy, 
has prevailed. But less so in-France where the-effect 
of State-subsidy-has cushioned the managers of the French 
agency from the full brunt of economic. necessity and in 
some ways perhaps limited the? development of certain 
of the servier. 
An orientation towards foreign or home markets may not 
897. 
seem to; have; been a matter Of choice; but what matters 
here is-not necessarily the dominance ofone-or other 
as a source of revenue, but the importance'attributed 
to one or other in terms of the balance'of resources. 
This was `the''focus of ' discussion in Chapter One which 
examined=the generally imbalanced distribution of 
resources in favour of. domestic markets, revealed in 
the' facts of 'agencyomership control, location of 
personnel, quality and quantity of services provided,, 
and the relative' sophistication of communication tech- 
nology employed. ' The most public consequence of this 
orientation towards'the'home market has been a 
'very 
heavy. ', weighting of agency news services in favour of 
culturally proximate"marketinterests, even in services 
destined. for. `the Thi. rd'World. 
The 
, 'European 
`agencies and in"- latter times, Reuters 
especially, " have' always shown a greater'interest. in 
foreign markets than the American agencies, and this has 
been reflected in their balance 'of resources and the topic- 
contours of their news services. The orientation of the 
American agencies was always much more inspired by the 
competition between them, and by particular demands of 
media clients in their home market, 'than seems to have 
been the case with the European agencies who have more 
claim to the virtue of havingsought, out the' interests of. 
foreign clients in the services they provided them. 
The'choice between broad and exclusive market strategies 
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might seem entirely a product of a prior choice concerning 
revenue maximization.. This is not altogether soy since 
agencies which did have high revenue outlooks have been 
known to adopt a conservative attitude towards market 
possibilities, and to have defined their proper sphere 
of activity in such a way as to preclude growth in certain 
i 
directions which appeared legitimate to others. The new 
markets in question have been new sections of the media 
market (agencies, evening or morning papers, radio, tele- 
vision,. CATV etc. ) and non-media markets. (advertisers, 
finance and commerce). The 'costs' of new market develop- 
ment which have sometimes acted as deterrent to entry even 
to highly revenue-conscious agencies have been: possibility 
of financial failure, compromise of criteria of object- 
ivity, and loss of established customers. 
Inevitably, the agencies have reflected the growing 
sophistication of the electronics. industry. in their own 
adoption of technologies over time. But the choice between 
low-level and high level technology has been a fairly 
consistent strategic. decision throughout their history. 
It can be considered-as ranking as an essential strategic 
decision given the scale of costs usually involved and 
because of the consequences of technological adoption for 
competitive strength, relative distribution of resources, 
and internal. organization. Important technological 
landmarks have included the adoption of radio over. the 
early electric telegraph in the First World War period 
and thereafter, which facilitated an expansion of 
volume, 
number of markets served, and increased 
the propagandistic 
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Potential'of the agencies for governments with access 
to their machinery; the invention, of efficient and 
high-quality wire-photo distribution, which, never 
exploited to any great extent by the leading European 
agencies, "gave the American agencies a; very Jmportant 
market advantage in certain parts'of the Third World and 
-may indeed have helped their very rapid expansion in 
-Europe after World War Two; and latterly the exploitation 
of computer technology with its very important consequences 
for the expansion of-data-based services to' non-media 
markets. 
These then appear to be the most important strategic 
choices identified in the course of this study, -and which 
are common'to the four leading agencies of the non-communist 
world. ''They are not exclusive of each other, but do move; 
independently of one another for at, least` some of the time. 
The 'purpose' of 'identifying `them in this -way is heuristic 
only, giving a sense as `. ' it does of the 'outer"-contours of 
`'institutiönal self-awareness'and the ways in"which. _such 
awareness, involving some'-sort-, of commitment to an image 
ofidentity and purpose 'has been translated into action. 
These strategic' choices do-show signs of. an"orientation 
to' rank consistency. That is to ' say` there' has been a 
11 tendency towards `the 'left-hand 'margin on each "dimension 
of, the continuum, so"that a certain consonance is apparent 
across the whole range. Adoption of`objectivity criteria 
in recent years appears to have gone " along with. high'_- 
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competitiveness, revenue maximization, broad market 
orientation, domestic market, high level technology. Not 
entirely, of course; patronage criteria may still be 
apparent in some areas, although where . 
it can be said to 
occur is nowadays not so much a product. of ideology so 
much as of market and of broader political and social 
structures; there still exists. evidence. of coalition 
strategies between agencies and home market clients, 
between large and small agencies and so on, but there 
is no longer any overt and publically tolerated': coalition 
strategy of the kind that existed, say, in Europe before 
the First World War. In three of the agencies certainly, 
the service ethic is no longer quite as much a feature 
of the: organizational self-image as talk of business 
opportunity and strategy - of revenue maximization in 
other words, and this is related to a choice in favour of 
high competition and in favour of. a radical view of market 
possibilites. Nevertheless, the radical view has rarely 
been sufficient to encourage, a dominant reliance on 
. 
foreign markets, which have generally been subsidiary 
in terms of revenue and resources. 
This system of choices in the interests of commercial 
viability and stability is of course not immune to 
change. What are the major possible sources'of change? 
Most important of all is the factor which has always 
threatened the arrangements thrown up by the leading 
agencies, and this is the changing shape. of the political 
world in which the agencies operate. In theevent-of 
j.. 
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hostilities between the countries of these agencies or 
between. their countries and any significant part of their 
total market, then the free flow of news and systems of 
news exchange are certainly threatened. The continued is 
development and existence of the present set of strategic 
choices simply reflects the relative cohesion of the major 
western powers. Another source of change is the devel- 
-opment of major political rifts in the domestic markets 
of the leading agencies. If such rifts should lead to 
the point of extreme polarization, which is not incon- 
ceivable given'the pressure' of, racial and class tensions 
in a period of prolonged recession', "then the credibility 
of the agencies as sources of news might well be reduced 
below the point of continued viability. In such circum- 
stances the criteria of objectivity cease to have much 
meaning or conviction since there is no longer a large 
enough framework of reference, a common ground of value, 
by which the population can continue to share a , single 
system of news presentation and selection. In the case 
of extreme external or internal conflict over 'a prolonged 
period, there would almost. certainly be a return-b the 
adoption of patronage criteria, strategies of coalition, 
and restricted market outlook. 
The introduction helped explore the role of the agencies 
in developing and sustaining the very notion and accept- 
ability of 'objective' news reporting. The history and 
contemporary organization of the agencies, examined in the' 





The research on which this report is based occupied the 
period between June 1971 and the summer of 1975. It 
involved a comprehensive search of the literature, an. 
interviewing . programme, ' a. 
questionnaire survey, content 
analysis, and the . normal: process of. 
interpretation and 
writing up. 
The interview programme had two main stages: the first 
stage concentrated on the head offices of each of-the 
four agencies in the study; -,. the second stage involved 
agency bureaux in. selected. countries across North and 
South America, Western. Europe, Africa, South-East-Asia,, 
and the Far East. Initial clearance was received from 
London-based executives in three of the: four agencies, 
and was followed by approaches to high-ranking executives 
in the head, offices. 
The choice of interviews, however, of countries, and of 
topic-areas was the author's alone. It became clear 
from an early stage that although sources at Head Office 
were useful in helping. the author establish a firm., 
picture of news-processing, and the overall structure 
of the agencies, it was nevertheless very necessary to 
visit, different countries to obtain any kind of detailed 
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picture of news-gathering operations away from Head Office. 
This perhaps was simply because only at this level were 
respondents close enough to the ground to be sufficiently 
aware of and interested in the kind of detail that was 
needed. Such sources were also more up-to-date on certain 
areas, of information, including for example new communi- 
cations arrangements, the state of agency-client relation- 
ships, or the number of stringers. 
Apart from initial interviews, the general format was of 
the semi-structured kind of interview, one which covered 
the same ground in most cases, but allowed for new lines 
of inquiry to emerge. The ground covered was comprehen- 
sive but particular attention was paid to structural 
details: for instance, the-size and composition of 
individual bureaux, the kind and regularity of contact 
with other bureaux, the composition of local clientele. 
This stress'was introduced to avoid an overly journalistic 
account of the news agencies (that is, one which accepted 
at face value the occupational self-image of high unpre- 
dictability, and its largely intuitive sense of what 
constitutes 'news'). 
Underlying the research strategy therefore was a funda- 
mental hypothesis: namely, that the organizational 
structure of the news-gathering and distribution process, 
including such factors as ownership and the distribution 
of clients, would have important consequences for. the 
kinds of news the agencies in fact dealt with. The 
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was an especially newsworthy area by prevailing standards, 
thus attracting heavy coverage facilities and possibly 
highlighting aspects ' of' agency operation that elsewhere 
might not'be so apparent. The Arab-Israeli conflict 
offered a situation of limited source access for any 
given agency bureau, which was also interesting. The 
region also fell under the general surveillance of'the 
European-African region controlled from London or Paris 
in the'. case of three of the agencies. This region was 
the best known to the author at that time, and access to 
head offices in these cities was relatively easy. 
South East. Asia and the Far East were chosen for their 
newsworthiness (especially Vietnam), the great variety 
of reporting conditions and. media markets (Japan as 
well as the Philippines for instance) within the same 
region,, and for the fact that as far as an understanding 
of the structure and operations of the agencies were 
concerned, the region was relatively unknown in: the 
existing literature. 
Choice of the'countries visited in Latin America was 
largely fortuitous in the sense that the author wished 
to profit from a colleague's visit to that region in 
connection with another project. While the same was 
true of the one sub-Saharan African country visited, 
Kenya, this was a particularly appropriate country to 
have included in the survey, given that country's role 
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as a communications centre for international news 
organizations operating , 
in. East. Africa. . In Europe, West 
Germany-was chosen because:. of the size and importance of 
ýt. also became the . 
West German market; " Belgium because a. 
UPI's European centre in the, course , of 
the study; Austria 
,. 
because Vienna acted as. the point from which the agencies 
covered. much of Eastern Europe. . 
The author was also 
able to. use. data. collected from Rome, and Bonn during his 
part of an earlier study. 
The interviews from all these. countries, gave rise to 
certain, more specific hypotheses which. the author 
. 
followed up in, two ways: ,.. 
through content. analysis and 
questionnaire survey.,.,:, The findings of content analysis 
are presented in. Chapter Twelve of the report;. ` the findings 
of the questionnaire survey can mostly be found in Chapter 
Ten. 
Although the head offices of the agencies had extended 
their co-operation for much of the. interviewing (for 
visits-to, individual counts, they were often not 
consulted)', in ' at least three of the four cases they 
were very unwillingto give their support to the 
questionnaire survey, and in at least two cases actively 
canvassed'against it. While it might have been possible 
to go ahead with the survey after further-consultation, 
it becameevident'that the extent of changes which these 
agencies were'looking for would have destroyed the 
original purpose and design of the questionnaire'. Although 
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relatively few questionnaires were returned, those". that 
= were provided a, great deal of information and points of 
view that retained-their validity regardless of the total 
number of questionnaires returned, and also greatly 
extended the total number of countries about which 
information was now available. The content' analysis 
was able to duplicate some of the lines of inquiry attempt- 
ed through the questionnaire survey. A"ýspecial method- 
ologicalappendix in connection with the content analysis 
is provided below in Appendix 2. A copy of the 
questionnaire'(which was translated into'French for. 
French-speaking respondents) is provided in Appendix 3. 
Given the overall length of this manuscript, '"only a 
selection of relevant tables have been provided in the 
text. Access to'the complete set"ofcontent analysis 
'data, Editor and Publisher computations. and questionnaires 
may be arranged on application to the author through 
the Open University. 
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Appendix . 2:, Methodology ;. for.. Content. Analysis (by H. Grayson) 
The main reason for analysing the content of agency wires 
was to assess the comparability of.. the. wires in. terms 
of factors such as the. type. of news. stories; carried, the 
regional origin of stories, the coverage of national or 
international news and the volume of news output... 
In the initial stages of the study volume of. output was 
assessed by estimating the number of words and lines 
carried: on 8" agency wires: 3 Reuters wires, 3 Associated 
Press-wires, 1 Agence France Presse. wire and. 1; United 
Press International-wire. *, For each. wire every tenth 
dispatch from the end of. the day was counted. The 
dispatch; was defined, in: general terms, as`. a., discreet 
piece of"information bearing some form of heading code 
and conveying. some message. This meant tha. t.. some. coded 
, imessages-were iricluded. in the: count when they looked as 
if they conveyed only private information to the client. 
In subsequent analyses our definition of dispatch. was 
refined to exclude this type of message-since; it seemed 
unlikely that they contributed anything to the news- 
- content . of the. wire .- 
Included. in. the count were '. correction' dispatches, 
'substitution' dispatches and-dispatches-showing the 
schedule, for the day. 
. 
For: Vthe-word-count itself-heading. 
codes and titles were; excluded,. but all other words, even 
one-letter words, -, 
were counted (for every . tenth dispatch). .V 
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Abbreviations were counted as one word and sports-score 
relations (e. g. 2-1) were counted as one word, but 
scores divided by a stroke were counted as 2 or more 
words (e. g. 18.0/206.6). This applied also for Stock 
Exchange reports. However, where a figure was obviously 
meant to convey a fraction it was counted as only one word. 
Hyphenated words were counted as one. 
The aim in devising these general rules for counting was 
to achieve a degree of consistency in order that results 
could be compared. There were cases where it was not 
easy-to decide exactly what should be counted as one word. 
This happened mainly in coded messages. 
The line-count included all those lines containing the 
previously counted words. 
The average number of words and-lines per dispatch were 
estimated from the figures obtainedand then multiplied 
by the total number of_dispatches to give the approximate 
number of words and lines for the complete wire. 
However, the researchers have certain' reservations about 
placing too much emphasis on the results of this analysis, 
particularly where the line-count is concerned. This is 
because in sports-score dispatches and Stock Exchange 
dispatches a large number of lines convey a small number 
of words so that. the estimation of 
the average number of 
lines per dispatch is not very meaningful 
in terms of 
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actual volume of information. carried. The word-count is 
more useful in this respect but the difficulties of 
defining a word and the inclusion of coded messages have 
already been mentioned. For these reasons, and because 
the researchers were more interested in content and 
origin of : output than volume of output, this type of 
analysis was not used in subsequent classifications. 
The main part, of the content-analysis began with a pilot 
study of 3'Reuters wires issued onone day. This study, 
enabled 'us to test the, categories which we had drawn up 
1.2 
and to refine them for the final analysis, which was 
carried out on AFP and UPI-UK wires issued over 3 
consecutive days. and Reuters EUS and SAF and, `AP European 
and'African: issued over. 5 consecutive days. 
.,,. During the pilot-study data-sheets were used for coding 
information in order. -. to facilitate later calculations. 
The 
. 
final data-sheets differed quite considerably from 
.,, ''the 
pilot-study sheets. . 
This was because. it took us 
some time, to arrive at. what we considered to be an 
adequate' classification of story-categories. The cate- 
gories used in the final analysis (political,., economic 
etc'. ) can be seen below, ` , 
'where an attempt , 
is also made 
to indicate the types of stories that were placed under 
the broad headin s Political., 'economic-- etc.. The ea,.. 
. 
researchers recognise that there will be some ; argument 
as , to whether one is justified in placing 
stories under 
such broad labels and that there will also be some 
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criticism over the subjectivity of classifying stories. 
But, to compensate in some measure for these factors, the 
researchers have aimed at being as consistent as possible 
in making decisions about the placing of different stories. 
For the pilot-study each dispatch was classified in 
terms of its dateline and content, and some additional 
information was also noted on the* data-sheets: the 
dispatch was indexed as to whether it referred to an on- 
going story, whether it. was national or international,. 
whether it corrected or duplicated a previous dispatch 
and whether a similar dispatch appeared on all 3 of the 
wires or on only 1 or 2. The latter was possible for 
the pilot-study because all'3 wires were Reuters wires 
and if a dispatch was carried on more than one wire it 
was easily recognisable as it had identical. wording. 
However, this classification was not possible in the 
'later analysis when two different agencies were being 
compared. Here, wording was no longer identical and so 
it was decided to look for similarity in story and to 
record this only once for each story rather than once for 
each dispatch. In this way, the category became 'stories 
appearing on more'thanone wire' rather than 'dispatches 
appearing on more than one wire'. 
The terms 'dispatches', 'stories', 'national and inter- 
national' are fundamental to an understanding of the 
methodology of the content-analysis and so it seems 
appropriate to define'them 
here as they were used in the 
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The definition of a 'story' was arrived at early in the 
analysis and as it was found to work with reasonable 
success in the-pilot-study there was little need for 
refinement. This is not to say that it was entirely 
without problems. For. our purposes, a 'story' might 
consist of one or more dispatches. but its distinctive 
feature is that it has one easily identifiable theme. 
So, for example, a number of dispatches carrying dis- 
cussion of the French presidentialelection would 
constitute one story. Stories were looked at in single 
day units; that is, the classification was not carried 
over from. one day to the next. Each story was given a 
number which was recorded in the first column of the 
data-sheet and any dispatch referring to that story 
received the same number. The numbers given to the 
stories were consecutive commencing 1 so-: that one 
-could easily see,. on completion of the data-sheet, that 
the largest number also represented the total number of 
different stories carried on the wire for that day. 
On the whole, the 'story' definition has been easy to 
apply, especially where a. specific incident: was reported 
over only 
.a 
small number of dispatches. Brit where a 
subject had many subdivisions and was discussed at_length 
over many dispatches it became problematic as to whether 
it would not be better regarded as several. stories. This 
can be illustrated by an example from the 5-day analysis 
of the Reuters and AP wires when the Cyprus conflict was 
an on-going, topic. It will be appreciated that not every 
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dispatch about Cyprus concerned itself with fighting:, 
some. discussed, political aspects, some the problem of 
refugees and so on. It wouldhave, made nonsense of, 
the story-type classification to, place_all.. the. dispatches 
in the political violence category and it was therefore 
decided toidividethe topic into its component parts 
thus classifying it as. a number of different: stories 
-, with specific.. themes such as 'violence'., 'American 
. policy 
towards Cyprus', 'refugees' and;. 'the supply of aid'. 
Another point. -that, -should be mentionedaboutour defin- 
ition of stories is; that where, -, a particular. sport is 
reported on it has been treated as one story., throughout 
the wire, : though dispatches might. refer to, different, = 
games and matches. .-_ This.., is in-keeping with-; our defin- 
ition 'one, theme '.. 
_ 
The same principle , applies, 
to reports 
--. -about.: 
the Stock. Exchange. 
We have already, mentioned the change of emphasis after 
the pilot-study-, from the_.. classification, of, 'dispatches 
appearing on. more than one. wireto. that, - of stories 
appearing, on more than one wire'.; It, must'. be, recognised 
of. this category that what we .: were _ really:: counting was, 
. whether , stories 
on different wires-concerned themselves 
with the same subject. -.. -'We 
were not. intending-to 
indicate the' . 
different: angles taken on that., subject by 
each agency-norwhether. one agency, provided more inform- 
ation than another... 
Where difficultiesarose&with this category the usual 
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policy was; to extract the general story-line (e. g. conflict 
in Vietnam or Nixon's part in the Watergate cover-up) and 
then, on that basis, to decide whether the different agencies 
had put out stories referring to that topic. We. do not 
feel that too great an emphasis need be placed on the. 
difficulty encountered in this part of the classification 
because probably the majority of corresponding stories on 
different wires are easily identifiable: stories about,. 
for example, the Paris elections, or a plane-crash in 
Indonesia or Kennedy visiting Moscow. However, ' there is 
r 
a factor affecting the reliability of this part of the 
classification which is that the recognition of similar 
stories depends, to-a large extent on memory, I i. e. one 
recognises that. =a story is the same by the fact that one 
remembers seeing it on another wire before. In the 5-day 
analysis this factor was eliminated as far as possible by 
keeping a record of the story-themes and referring back 
to them when classifying another wire. 
Finally, ` some' explanation is needed of the 'national, 
international' category. Individual dispatches rather 
than stories were classified in this category. A 
'national' dispatch was defined as one that referred only 
to its country of origin: where one or more different 
countries were also directly referred to in a dispatch 
this was classified as 'international'. In practice the 
distinction was not always easy to apply; ' for example, 
it was not clear... how much Stock Exchange news might be 
considered 'international' rather than 'national, or 
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Content Analysis . 
Content Categories 
a) Story Type 
1. Politics 
2. International violent political conflict 
3. Intranation violent political conflict 
4. Economics 
5. Industry 
6. Labour relations 
7. Science and Technology 
8. Social/welfare/education 
9. Race 













c) Appears in Other Wire 
Rl = Reuters S. African 
R2 = Reuters S. European 
R3 = Reuters UK 
AP1= Associated Press African Wire 
AP2= Associated Press European Wire 
AP3= Associated Press Paris Wire 
UPI= United Press International UK Wire 





Structure of Industry 


















Business & Political crime 
Unethical behavious which specifically 
involves the judiciary 
Crime/Legal 
Judicial proceedings 











The Questionnaire distributed to,. bureau chiefs, as 
described in. Chapter 10: - 
Location of Bureau ............................ Date .... 
Q1 Number of Countries Covered 
For how many countries and territories is your bureau 
the principal news-gathering centre in your agency's 
network? Please say which countries and territories 
these are: - 
Q2 Bureau. Size 
(a) How many people are employed full-time by 
your bureau, including all categories of 
personnel, within the area for which the 
bureau is the principal centre? 
No. of full-time staff: ........ persons 
(b) Of the full-time staff (including yourself), 
how many are journalists (i. e. staff who spend 
all, or nearly all, of their time directly, 
engaged in news-gathering or news-processing)? 
No. of journalists; ............ persons 
(c) Of the full-time journalist staff, how man' 
are specialists (i. e. journalists who spend 
at least half of their working time covering. 
only certain kinds of news)? 
No. of specialists: (i) photpgraphers ... 
(ii) economic news 
specialist's .. 
(iii)-sports journalists.. 
(iv) political news 
specialists ... 
(v) Other (please specify) 
(......... ..... ) 
{ 
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(d) How many stringers are employed by your bureau? 
Are these stringers paid a retainer? 
No. of-stringers: ...... (i) paid a retainer 
....... (ii) not paid a retainer 
(e)-Of all the full-time staff employed by your 
bureau within the area for which it is the centre, 
how many are actually based outside the country of 
the bureau, but within the area it covers? (? f the 
bureau is a centre for only one country, please 
tick (4)-the-space below and-pass on to the next 
question). 
Bureau is centre for only one country ...... 
No. of full-time staff based-outside bureau. country.. 
No. of journalists based outside bureau country ... 
No. of specialists. based outside bureau country ... 
No. of stringers based outside bureau country ... 
Q3 Nationalities 
What'are the nationalities of the staff employed by 
your bureau? Please indicate (N) in the appropriate 
space below how many journalist- and non-journalist 












which the bureau 
is a centre 





Q4 At the Desk 
What percentage of your time. during, the average 
working day is spent actually in the bureau, and 
what, percentage is spent outside it - interviewing, 
meeting clients-etc? Please assess the percentage 
on the basis of your-last full working week, giving 
the date of the first day of that week. 
of time spent in office per average day ... o 
of time spent outside ... % 
Date of first day of the week on which average is based 
......... day....... month ....... year 
(b) Work Activities 
Which kinds of activity are the most time- 
consuming during the average-working. week? 
Please indicate below the. approximate percentage 
of your time taken up with-the. following kinds 





News-gathering/processing .... ö 
Sales/Talking to clients .,.. ö 
Dealing with technical 
communications problems .... ö 
Other (please specify) .... % 
( ....:............... ) 
Date of first day 
of-week on which 




Which news-gathering/processing activities are 
the most time-consuming during the average working 
week? Please indicate approximately how many hours 
you might expect to consume on each of the activities 
.. listed on the left-hand column, basing your answer 
on your last full working week.. Please tick (V) the 
appropriate spaces-below. 
'Two hours 3-6 hours t 7-10 hl or less 1 hours 
Two hours l 3-6 hours 
t 


















Ta74ing. to other 
, journalists 
Sociable occasions; 





In the, course of your work, do you traveloutside 
of the city in which your bureau is based, either 
to provincial districts or to other countries in 
your area of coverage?. How many: days did you spend 
away from your bureau in the period July to. Decemher 
1973 inclusive? (If you-joined the bureau during or 
since-that period, please tick the_. space below and 
then base. your answer on the period from the. date of 
joining the bureau', to the date of completing this 
questionnaire) 
(Joined the bureau after July-1973 ....... ) 
Travel outside city, within same country: .... days 
Travel out ofýthe country but within. the 
bureau's area of coverage: :.. days 
Travel outside of-the countries 'covered 
by the bureau: .... days 
Q5 Reporting the News 
(a) News Selection 
To what extent does personal- assessment influence 
the decision to gather and file: certain stories 
and not others in your bureau? -And'. to what extent 
is. this decision determined by factors over which 
there is no scope for 'personal control, such as 
the character of the news story. itself, available 
wire space'and so on? Please. indicate' with a (I) 
the. statement below with which'you most agree: 
News selection is nenrly always outside my 
control .... 
News selection is often determined by f actors 
outside my control .... 
News selection is infrequently determined by 
factors outside my control 
News selection: is only very rarely determined 
by factors outside , 
mv. control 
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(b) Freedom to report 
Would. vou say that you had more or less freedom lü 
to report whatever you consider to be newsworthy 
than either local journalists of the country 
or countries you cover, or non-agency foreign 
correspondents based in this country or countries? 
Please circle as-appropriate: 
I have more/same/less freedom to report what 
I consider newsworthy than. local journalists 
based in the capital city or cities of the 
country or countries .1 'cover. 
I have. more/same/less freedom to kepprt whatever 
I consider newsworthy than other (non-agency) 
foreign correspondents. 
(c) News Sources 
What would you say were the most important initial 
sources of the. news items prepared by your bureau 
for the out-going wire? Please indicate with 
a- tick (v') the, approximate 'percentage of stories 
which originate from each of the following"kinds 
of source, basing your assessment on your last 
full working week. 
Sources 0-10 7 11-20 J31-36 r 31-40 41-50 51-60 bl- /U 
Radio/TV media 
media of country/ 
countries covered 










ion from individuals 
"/organizations 
Other (please specify) 
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(d) most important Sources 
What kinds of sources do you consider to he 
most important in your area of coverage? 
Please list the five most important sources. in 
the space below (e. g. particular ministries, 
organizations, spokesmen etc. ) 
Comments 
(e) Sanctions 
Have you ever experienced any sanctions, 
threates or-, intimidation from important 
sources or source organizations in your 
experience, at this bureau? Please tick (1) 
as appropriate. 
Sanctions Never A Few Times Often Frequent: 
Expulsion 
Threatened Expulsion 





Forbidden to file 
Allowed to file only af« er- 
vetting by censor, even 
when there are no gener l 
restrictions on foreign 
newsmen 
Informally 'warned' 
Physical intimidation . 
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(f) Advance Coverage 
In what percentage of cases-is the coverage 
of a news event planned or prepared in advance 
of; its occurrence? Please assess the average 
percentage of complete stories covered a week 
which are prepared for in advance, basing your 
_; answer: on 
the last, full working week: 
News-coverage prepared within a day 
of the news event's occurrence .... % 
News-coverage prepared more than. a 
day in advance of the news event's 
occurrence 
.... % 
No advance preparation 
Q6 Choice of. News Items 
(a) What is News? 
Here are a number of constructed 'events'. Please 
give each event a score from 0-10 points to 
indicate the likelihood of the event being 
covered and filed on the out-going wire. A high 
score indicates that the event will very probably 
be reported and filed; a low score indicates'that 
the event will. probably not be reported and filed. 
Please give two scores for each. event: one for 
a peak period of activity in the bureau; the other 
for a non-peak period. Unless otherwise stated, 
please imagine that these stories refer to the 
country or countries, covered by your bureau. 
Story Peak Period Non-Peak 
Score Score 
No. 2.: City authorities of. capital 
city announce extensive re- 
development scheme, first of 
its kind in the country (out. of 10) (out of 10) 
No. 2: Annual financial statement of 
large corporation in nation's 
major industry, shows serious .. 
losses. (out of 10) (out of 10) 
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Story Peak Score Non-Peak _, core 
No. 3: Leading opposition spokesman 
makes major speech attacking 
president/prime minister for 
current government economic 
policy (out of' 10) (out of 10) 
No. 4: Provincial authorities of 
remote province announce major 
. ... .... new 'industrial drive (out of"10) (out of.. 10) 
140-. 51. Known local `criniinäl". rq' hg `rob' 
nationally-owned bank of a 
..... ..... 
million dollars (out of 10) (out of 10) 
No. 6: National team wins place in 
final round of international 
football cup (out of 10) (out of 10) 
No. 7: Prestige daily reports 
corruption charges against . ,..... ..... 
Minister of Agriculture (out of 10) (out of 10), 
No. 8: Senior executive of large 
foreign-owned company kid- ....: ..... 
napped by guerillas (out of 10) (out of 10) 
No. 9: Leading opposition spokesman 
makes major speech attacking 
president/prime minister for 
current government foreign policy ..... ..... 
concerning neighbouring country, (of 11)) (out of 10) 
No. 10: Student magazine at nation's 
most prestigious university 
reports allegations of 
serious misconduct by top ..... ....., 
. police 
official (out of 10) (out of 10) 
No. 11: Team of medical scientists at 
leading university claim major 
new findings in field of radiology 
with important implications for ..... ..... 
cancer. cure (out of 10) (out of 10) 
No. 12: Total strike at major-plant of 
large foreign owned company 
(out of 10) (out of 10) 
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(b). Which of the following stories would you not 
file? Please circle 'report' or'not report' 
as appropriate. 
(i) Monarch/prime minister arrives drunk at 
annual celebration function and incapable 
of delivering his speech. Report/Not Report 
(ii) Wide-scale torture of political dissidents 
by army and police -talked about in opposition 
-circles, and confirmed 
from meetings with. 
victims. ' Report/Not Report 
(iii) Detailed , 
leak- of closely-guarded secret deal 
to buy new missiles from major power.. 
Report/Not Report 
(iv) Outbreak of : fa. ctionalismin ruling party 
threatens position. of chief executive. 
Report/Not Report. 
Comments 
"Is there any-other kind. of story which you might not 
file from your area. because it was too 'sensitive'? 
(c) Editorial Control 
Which of the following would you say exercised the 
most influential editorial control over news 
items prepared for the out-going wire? Please tick 
() against the person.. or desk you feel. has. the most 
influence. 
The bureau chief .. 
The desk of the regional bureau ,.,.. 
The. desk at head office .. 
The desks of thoszbureaux to whom news 
is sent from the regional bureau 
or-head office ..... 
Other (please specify) .,;.. 
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Q7 News Output 
(a) On the average weekday, what is'the total 
number of words transmitted from your bureau? 
(Please assess the average on the basis of the 
last working week) 
Total No. of words ......... per weekday 
(b) Of this total, about what proportion is taken. 
up by spot-news stories, and about what 
proportion by feature and/or interpretive 
.. ..... ... ..... , ..,.. - _. material? , _. _ 
Proportion of total accounted for by spot 
news: 
..... .. ö 
Proportion of total accounted for by 
feature/interpretive material:........ % 
(c) Of the total number of words in the last 
working week, about what proportion was news 
of international events,. in your estimation, 
(i. e. directly pertaining to two-or more 
countries), and. what proportion was news of 
national affairs (i. e. news pertaining directly 
to just one country or territory) 
Proportion of total accounted for by 
international news: ....... $ 
Proportion of total accounted for Hy 
national news: ..... % 
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(d) In your estimation what kinds of news from the 
area you cover are the'most important in terms 
of the amount of'wire-space''out ofyýour bureau 
that they consume? Please rank the following 
categories in order of their importance, placing, the 
number 1 after the most 'important; - the number 2 
after the next most important etc. Please base your 
answer on the last full week. 
1. International: political (non violent) 
2. (Directly. political (violent) ... 
3. pertaining economic- 
4. to more than natural calamity ... 
5. one country) crime: _ ... 
6. sport ... 
7. human interest ... 
8.. National political (non violent) ... 
9. (Directly. political (violent) .. 
10. pertaining economic 
11. to only natural calamity ... 
12. one country crime 
13. or sport 
14. territory). human interest 
(e) Nteas Interest 
Is the news which your bureau gathers of interest 
primarily to clients throughout the world, to. 
local clients, or to clients in some other specific 
area? Please rank these types of interest, in order 
of their importance in terms of the amount of 'wire- 
space' out o: f your bureau which'they consume, placing 
the number 1-after the most important etc. Please base 
your answer on the last full. week. 
Of world-wide interest, primarily: ... 
Of interest to local clients within 
area covered by bureau ... 
Of interest to some other specific area 
(please specify......... .... ... ) 
(Date of first day of week on which answers to 
Q7 a, b, c, d and e were based: .. dav.... month.. .. 
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Q8. Competition 
In your estimation which other news agencies or 
news services are you most in competition with (i) 
for clients in your area; (ii) for clients. throughout 
the world who want news of the area you cover. Please 
name upto three competitors foreach kind, of.. 
competition.. 
Most important competition for clients. in your area: 
...................... 
(ii) ...... ".... ... 
(iii) ..... ............... 
Most important competition for clients, throughout the 
world wanting news of your area: 
(i) ...... 
Q9 Clients 
(a) How many clients take'your agency's services 
in this country? 
(b) HQW many clients are there `outside of this 
country but within the area-for which your 
bureau- is a centre? 
(c). Of the: _total. number of clients 
in your area,. how 
.., many are 
there of each. of. the following categories? 
Newspapers: `No............. 
Radio/TV'organizations: No...... ... 
News agencies, both government-owned and others: No. 
Ministries/departments of' government(s) 
of your- area :' No ..... 
Embassies` of-foreign . ,. ' governments: No.. .. 
Foreign-owned commercial/financial organizations: No 
Other (please-specify) "No: .......... 
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(d) What is the relative importance of these 
categories of clients in terms of the amount 
of revenue your agency receives from them? Please 
rank them in accordance with their revenue importance 
in the last full financial year, placing the number 
1 after the most important, the number 2 after the 
next most important etc.... 
Rank 
1. Newspapers .... 
'ý2 ." Radio/TV organizations .... 
-3. News agencies, both government 
owned-and others ... 
4. Ministries/departments of 
government(s), of your area .... 
5. Embassies of foreign 
governments .... 
6. Foreign-owned commercial/ 
financial organizations .... 
7. Locally-owned commercial/. 
financial organizations ... 
8. Other (please specify) :... 
(e) Which different services does your agency offer 
to these clients? Please rank these services (i) 
in'the order of their revenue importance in your 
area-and (ii) in order of-their popularity, that is, 
the number of clients. who take them 
Services in order of Services in order of 
-revenue-importance no. of clients 
............. ., 
1. ... .... ..... 
2 ................ .... 
2..... ... ....... 
3 .............. 3................... 
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Q10 About Yourself 
(a) How-long have you worked for this news agency? 
...... ... . . years. 
(b)-. For whom did you work before. you joined this 
agency? (Please state name of company/media 
organization and give brief. description of the 
type or kind of organization' it was/is) 
. .... ...... 
(c) Have you worked for any other. news agency in the 
course of your career? . Please circle: Yes/No 
If 'Yes' to above,. which other agency or agencies 
have you worked for? -,.. 
(d) What was your first regular job, in journalism? 
Who did you work for then? 
(e) How old were , 
you when you- first., entered regular 
journalism? 
......... ...... years 
(f) What was the year of your birth? 
(g) What is your nationality? 
_. ................ 
In which country and in. which city were you born? 
................ country . 
city 
(i) What . was. - 
the occupation-of . your 
father 
when you were twenty. years old? 
Father's occupation.. 
.. - ... .. 
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(j) Which school, college or university did 
you last attend in the course of your 
full-time education? 
(k) Do you have a degree(s). Please circle: Yes/No. 
If-'Yes' to above, what is/are the subject(s) 
of your degree(s)? 
(1). What is. your marital status? 
(m) How-long have-you been based in your pr esent bureau? 
...... years......... ... .. months 
(r ij : For_ 




.......... .. months 
(: ý) What. are. your approximate total earning s from 
your. agency a year?, Please place a tic k (Y ) 
against the earnings range which most c losely 
. approximates 
to your salary: 
Pounds Francs Dollars 
2,000-3,999 40; 000-59,999 6,000-8, '999 
4,000-5,999 60', 000-79,999 9,000-11,999 
6,000-7,999 80,000-99,999 12,000-14,999 
8,000-9,999 100,000-119,999 15,000-17,999 
10,000-11,999 120,000-139,999 18,000-20,999 





Is there anything about agency work and operations in 
" your area which has not been covered here, and which 
you feel is important, that you would like to mention? 
Please append further pages if, you wish. If you have had 
a particularly " revealing" experience in handling a recent 
story, I. would very, much welcome a copy of the story, 
together with any comments. you may care to make. 
. ..... ... ... . ............ ............. 
... .... ...... ..... ..... 
... . .. . _. ..... ..... 
. ........ ..... ................ .. 
........ ...... .......... ...... 
....................... ... .... 
. ... ......... . .... 
......... . ............ .... ...... ... 
...... ..... ............... ......... .... 
....... .... . ......... ..... . ....... . 
. ...... ... ..... .... ... ........ 
........... ........ ..... . 
................... ..... .... ..... 
...... .... . ... ....... .... .............. 
................. .............................. 
. ........ ...... ......... ........... 
................ ... ... ......... ............. 
.......... .... . ........ .............. ... 
.. "......... ................ ... .......... .... 
.............. ........... ......... ............ 
.......... ... . ... ...... . .... 
................... .... .... ................ 
.... .......... .... ...... ..... .................. 
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APPENDIX 4: Bibliography 
The bibliography on the following pages is intended 
as a broad topic guide to the literature about, or closely 
relevant to, the global, international"and national news 
agencies. It includes only references that have been used 
as sources for this study. While it was not always 
clear that a particular source belonged in one rather than 
another of the topic categories, elaborate cross-referencing 
... has been avoided.: The final choice of=category lpcation 
in ambiguous; cases reflects the author's assessment of the 
.. particular usefulness of each case with respect to the 
different categories. An alternative. division of interest 
within the field is, of course, provided by the. structure 
of this-thesis, and by the bibliographies tobe found at the 
end of each chapter. 
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